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 Abstract 
 
 
This thesis analyses the concept of sense in Deleuze’s early philosophy. I 
claim sense is an empirical process of understanding before a settled 
meaning has been attained. My analysis of Deleuze’s early works Nietzsche 
and Philosophy and Proust and Signs draws upon the empirical and rationalist 
tension between sense and meaning. For empiricists, in order to attain 
meaning, we must first make sense of the world and thereby associate 
experiential qualities to our ideas. They argue that without this process our 
ideas remain blank. In contrast, for rationalists, meaning is attained through 
rational reflection. This enables us to attain clarity in our understanding and 
achieve consensus. Without this process of rational reflection, our ideas 
remain chaotic, based upon a multiplicity of different perspectives. We are 
then presented with an either/or choice. Either we must accept the necessity 
of making sense and face the problems of conflict of interest. Or, by adhering 
to deductive reasoning, individuals can arrive at clarity but face the problem of 
blank ideas.  
 
Deleuze confronts the empirical and rationalist tension through the 
concept of sense and its relation to an apprenticeship. This joins Deleuze’s 
work on Nietzsche and Proust to Logic of Sense. It is through his analysis of 
Lewis Carroll’s Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland and Through the Looking 
Glass that an alternative answer is given. For Deleuze, we must make sense 
	 ii	
of the world but, at the same time, enable our understanding to be guided 
through a structure and methodology. That is to say, different methodologies 
and structures enable us to attain knowledge and educate others. What 
Deleuze makes us attentive to is a process of an experimental apprenticeship 
where methodological structures are continually challenged and made sense 
of. By practically applying structures, we attain meaning. Yet this meaning is 
novel because its sense follows from novel apprenticeship and 
experimentation. Following this. I claim that Deleuze does not seek either a 
purely rationalist or empirical approach, but rather, one that affirms both 
positions. This enables us to affirm the necessity of the process of making 
sense and of the novel attainment of meaning. This also enables an 
epistemological depth to be uncovered in early Deleuze through an analysis 
of his early works as studies of sense. My analysis of sense and language 
then develops the importance of epistemology and language in the philosophy 
of Deleuze, which at present remains still new and embryonic.  
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Introduction 			
What is sense?  	
When curiosity strikes and we seek to know, there are immediate answers waiting 
for us. In contemporary society, curiosity can be resolved within a few seconds after 
we look up a specific dictionary definition or a website entry in an encyclopedia. With 
this fast rate of accessible information, knowledge has become comparable to fast 
food. It appears that it is no longer required for an individual to read full-length 
studies or spend years on a given subject area. If we want to know the philosophical 
concepts corresponding to Descartes’ cogito, Nietzsche’s eternal return, or Plato’s 
theory of Ideal Forms we only need to look up a definition. It is, of course, not just 
philosopher’s concepts that can be easily digested. Everything in society has a 
ready-made meaning. Following this, we could say everything has been predefined 
and all that is required of us is to learn definitions. After that we can relax, put the 
kettle on and be content with what we have learned.  
 
The problem with this view is that we never arrive at an understanding of 
things for ourselves. In other words, meaning is defined according to another’s view. 
The meaning of a word for us remains blank. We have not gone through any process 
of learning, just simply typed in a definition. Without undergoing a process of 
education there is no clear understanding of things. By undergoing a process of 
learning, we can call into the question that we were content to believe was simply 
correct. It is thereby through learning that our critical thinking develops. We are not 
led into blind obedience of a view but enabled to think for ourselves. This is not to 
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claim that by criticising a view we can reaffirm our subjective views. To develop 
critical thinking is to call into question the validity of a set of beliefs and the social 
and cultural context in which these beliefs were adopted. 
 
This can be related to Deleuze’s critical remarks on advertising: “… 
information, technology, communications and advertising are taking over the words 
‘concept’ and ‘creative’, and these ‘conceptualists’ constitute an arrogant breed that 
reveals the activity of selling to be capitalism’s supreme thought, the cogito of the 
marketplace.”1 In advertising concepts are used in order for people to associate the 
universal qualities of a society and culture with the product that is on sale. For 
instance, this can be seen in Coca Cola’s use of advertising in Poland as Jeffrey K. 
Johnson states: “since its earliest days, Coca-Cola has utilized copious amounts of 
advertising … Billboards, neon signs, supermarket displays, restaurant signs and 
market nameplates are only a few forms of Coca-Cola advertising signage that have 
become so common internationally that they are rarely considered.”2 Unlike other 
companies that associate a specific image with their product such as “… 
McDonald’s, Levi’s and Frito-Lay, which want their products to be considered as 
special purchases by the consumer, Coca-Cola does not wish to hold a vaunted 
position in the buyer’s mind. Coca-Cola does not desire to be associated with a night 
on the town or become the symbol of youthful rebellion; rather, the soft-drink maker 
wants its products to be a common yet essential part of everyday life.”3 
 
																																																								
1 Gilles Deleuze, Negotiations, trans. by Martin Joughin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995) p.136 
2 Jeffrey K. Johnson, American Advertising in Poland: A Study of Cultural Interactions Since 1990 (North 
Carolina: McFarland and Company Inc., 2009) p.149 
3 Ibid, pp.149-150 
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For Deleuze, an individual must arrive at his or her own meaning for the 
things they encounter. In order for us to attain meaning we must undertake an 
apprenticeship. In its traditional sense, an apprenticeship is to undertake education 
according to a specific methodology. In this way, meaning is already given and is to 
be repeated. For instance, a trainee cook will repeat the preparation and cooking of 
a meal to the satisfaction of their teacher. Deleuze’s apprenticeship also affirms 
these various educational methodologies. However, Deleuze’s apprenticeship 
focuses on the importance of the student’s education. In other words, an apprentice 
does not simply repeat a meaning but rather has to discover what it means. This is in 
order for meaning to be slowly constructed as we begin to understand things. For 
Deleuze this beginning of understanding requires learning a new sense for 
something. This use of sense is itself different to our usual understanding of the 
term. To make sense is a process that is to be considered separately from 
understanding. It is that moment in the process of learning before we truly know what 
a thing means. In philosophical terms, sense is the process of understanding before 
the attainment of meaning. Deleuze’s apprenticeship therefore affirms the process of 
apprenticeship not as simply a repetition of meaning but where meaning is slowly 
attained through the process of education. 
 
Deleuze’s early work on epistemology and language 	
It is the aim of this thesis to develop Deleuze’s concept of sense and its relation to 
language for the period 1953-1969. The period of 1953-1969 has been chosen in 
order to understand the role and function of the concept of sense and apprenticeship 
in Deleuze’s early works Nietzsche and Philosophy and Proust and Signs. This 
enables a foundation for understanding the emergence of Deleuze’s later work Logic 
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of Sense (1969) and the importance of the role of sense and apprenticeship in his 
philosophy. Before his Logic of Sense, the discussion of sense and language is 
limited. In Empiricism and Subjectivity (1953) there is a short remark made on the 
role of language and its relation to belief: “Illegitimate beliefs or repetitions which are 
not based upon experience, as well as nonphilosophical probabilities, have two 
sources: language and the fancy. These are fictitious causalities. Language, by itself, 
produces belief, as it substitutes observed repetition with spoken repetition, and the 
impression of a present object with the hearing of a specific word which allows to 
conceive ideas vividly.”4 In relation to experiential objects and names, we can 
perceive a certain object when a name is stated.  
 
For instance, the statement ‘that is a dog’ refers to an actual four-legged canine that 
can be perceived. However, philosophy produces concepts that do not refer to 
experiential objects, but metaphysical ones: “The philosopher, having spoken 
continuously of faculties and occult qualities, ends up believing that these words 
‘have a secret meaning, which we might discover by reflection.”5 Deleuze’s 
discussion of Hume’s critique of rationalist approaches to language reveals that it is 
due to repetition that we come to associate a belief with the idea that a particular 
thing exists. This enables belief in metaphysical objects as actually existing through 
language: “… words produce a ‘phantom of belief,’ or a ‘counterfeit’, which renders 
the most severe critique of language philosophically necessary.”6 From this short 
passage on language and belief we then later see the importance of challenging 
																																																								
4 Gilles Deleuze, Empiricism and Subjectivity, trans. by Constantin V. Boundas (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1991) p.70 
5 Ibid 
6 Ibid 
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repetition of the same in Deleuze’s philosophy in Difference and Repetition (1968). In 
repetition of the same, repetition is a generalising force that prevents the emergence 
of difference and creativity. For instance, repetition can be thought of as the overly 
strict teacher whose views the students must follow exactly and never deviate from.  
 
This critical approach to the rationalist use of concepts is continued in 
Nietzsche and Philosophy (1962). This occurs in another set of Deleuze’s brief 
remarks on language on Nietzsche’s essay Truths and Lies in An Extra-Moral Sense 
(1873): “Language is usually judged from the standpoint of the hearer.”7 The hearer 
standpoint influences how we understand language as an acceptance of the 
speaker’s view. In contrast: “Nietzsche dreams of another philology, an active 
philology … [which] has only one principle: a word only means something insofar as 
the speaker wills something by saying it; and one rule: treating speech as a real 
activity, placing oneself at the point of view of the speaker.”8 For Deleuze, what 
Nietzsche’s philosophy of language makes us attentive to is not the meaning of 
words, but rather, the intension. How exactly is the word used? What effect does the 
speaker want to achieve by using these words? By focusing on the speaker’s 
intention we become critical of it.  
 
It is this focus on the critical analysis of speech that relates this brief remark 
on language to Deleuze’s first discussion of sense: “We will never find the sense of 
something (of a human, a biological or even a physical phenomenon) if we do not 																																																								
7 Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, trans. by Hugh Tomlinson (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2006) p. 74. 
8 Ibid 
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know the force which appropriates the thing, which exploits it, which takes 
possession of it or expressed in it.”9 That is, we always need to make sense of 
another’s individual communication. In doing so, an individual can be attentive to 
specific use of tonal emphasis and the force of the communication. For instance, in 
communicating a love for a specific author, we will place tonal emphasis upon what 
we admire about them in order for the intention of our friend or family member to 
read one of their books.  
 
Despite at first sight appearing to be limited Deleuze’s early work on 
epistemology and language concerns itself with how we attain meaning and an 
analysis of rhetorical processes of speech. This engagement with meaning and 
speech takes place in Deleuze’s Proust and Signs (1st edition, 1964) in the concept 
of apprenticeship. A traditional understanding of apprentice is to learn a specific 
methodology or style in which we attain knowledge. Deleuze’s concept of 
apprenticeship is to learn how to decipher and correctly understand signs. This is to 
move through a process of discussion of signs. In this way, we do not simply accept 
the signification but rather reveal how it functions in a social and cultural context. It is 
through this analysis of the function of signs and meaning in society that we are able 
to discover the image of thought. That is, the privileging of certain values and ideas 
by a society. Individuals are then expected to adhere to these social values and 
ideas. Deleuze’s apprenticeship is also concerned with the discovery of other 
valuations and possible truths. This is to discover ‘possible worlds’, other valuations 
and perspectives that challenge our own preconceptions and view of the world. In 
																																																								
9 Ibid, p.3 
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this way, an apprenticeship is dynamic allowing for our view to be continually altered 
through our engagement with the world and others.  
 
Jean-Jacques Lecercle also notes this apparent absence of a discussion of 
language in Deleuze’s early work: “Deleuze in many ways resists the linguistic turn 
that French and European philosophy in the 1960s and 1970s has taken, in a 
different but parallel form to the more famous linguistic turn taken by analytic 
philosophy several decades before.”10 This is why Lecercle suggests that: “if we take 
into account the specific contribution of Guattari to their common work, he is part of 
that turn.”11 By taking into account Deleuze’s later work there is a clear interest in 
language with works on literature, signs, linguistics, style, speech, and the role of 
language in psychoanalysis. For instance, this can be seen in Deleuze’s literary 
analysis of Lewis Carroll’s work, especially Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland and 
Through the Looking Glass, analyzed in Logic of Sense, the new material added on 
style in the 2nd edition of Proust and Signs in 1972, Chapter 4 November 20, 1923: 
Postulates of Linguistics, Chapter 5 587 B.C.- A.D. 70: On Several Regimes of Signs 
in A Thousand Plateaus (1980), and the creation of concepts in What is Philosophy? 
(1991).  
 
Deleuze’s early interest in various functions of language and meaning is 
returned to later in A Thousand Plateaus with Felix Guattari. This is evident through 
the discussions of the role of pragmatics, style, grammar and expression in the 																																																								
10 Jean-Jacques Lecercle, Deleuze and Language (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002) p.2 
11 Ibid 
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‘Postulates of Linguistics’. This can also be seen in their analysis of the various 
functions of a sign in ‘On Several Regimes of Signs’. In relation to the attainment of 
meaning Deleuze and Guattari analyse the concept, order-word. This is where there 
is a complete denial of sense in preference to meaning: “we call order-words, not a 
particular category of explicit statements (for example, in the imperative), but the 
relation of every word or every statement to implicit presuppositions, in other words, 
to speech acts that are, and can only be, accomplished in the statement.”12 The 
order word is where meaning has already been predefined. An individual must then 
conform to the presupposed answer. Deleuze and Guattari use the examples of 
“Questions, promises, are order-words”13 A question is an order-word since it 
presupposes a given answer. Promises are also order-words as we expect an 
individual to keep their word and conform to the expected action (I kept my promise 
and gave you the money back).   
 
For instance, in relation to questions, the question what is the capital of 
France?, has a presupposed answer of Paris. If an incorrect answer is given, such 
as London or Tokyo then a student can be corrected until they arrive at the right 
answer. However, simply replying Paris does not mean that an individual has 
understood anything. They have simply conformed to expectation but failed to make 
sense of it for themselves. By making sense of Paris as a capital of France allows for 
an individual to understand its social and cultural qualities. This can also be applied 
to the recital of historical dates, when did the French revolution begin? 1789. The 
answer of the number 1789 lacks all understanding for the student. In making sense 																																																								
12 Gilles Deleuze, Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, trans. Brian Massumi (London: Continuum, 2004) p.87 
13 Ibid 
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of the beginning of the French Revolution allows for an individual to gain deeper 
insight into the economic and political problems in that period.     
 
It is through the emphasis of a presupposed meaning that Deleuze is critical 
of Wittgenstein in the Alphabet interview with Claire Parnet: “For me, it’s a 
philosophical catastrophe. It’s the very example of a ‘school’, it’s a regression of all 
philosophy, a massive regression. The Wittgenstein matter is quite sad. They 
imposed a system of terror in which, under the pretext of doing something new, it’s 
poverty instituted in all grandeur… There isn’t a word to describe this danger, but this 
danger is one that recurs…”14 For Deleuze, Wittgenstein’s philosophy is dangerous 
because he argues we should adhere to a complete empirical view of the world. For 
instance, this can be seen in his early work Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921) 
that attempted to resolve all philosophical problems through a strict logical 
structure15. Deleuze describes this strict adherence as an assassination of 
philosophy since it denies the positive function of a problem. This is where in 
engagement with a problem we create concepts.  
 
For Deleuze, philosophical concepts serve as a response to a contemporary 
problem. Deleuze breaks from traditional philosophy through his emphasis upon the 																																																								
14 Gilles Deleuze, ‘W as in Wittgenstein’, Deleuze from A to Z, trans. by Charles Stivale, dir. Pierre-Andre 
Boutang (Semiotext(e), 2011) 
15 This can be seen in Wittgenstein’s statement “the correct method in philosophy … to say nothing except what 
can be said i.e. propositions of natural science … whenever someone wanted to say something metaphysical, to 
demonstrate to him that he failed to give a meaning to certain signs in his propositions.” Ludwig Wittgenstein, 
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. by D.F. Pears and B.F. Guinness (London: Routledge, 2005) p.89. Any 
statement that is made must be based on empirical facts. If there included a metaphysical entity to the statement 
then this can be corrected, as it will not be empirically true. For instance, if an individual made the following 
statement “I can see a pink elephant” they have failed to give a correct meaning. There is not a pink elephant 
that is empirically known nor can any other individual can see it so the statement is incorrect. For Wittgenstein 
any metaphysical concepts or nonsensical words should not be uttered at all and we should remain in silence 
when discussing these areas: “what we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence.” Ibid. By not stating 
any nonsensical or metaphysical words the correctness of statements and our understanding of the world should 
be confined to what is empirically known.  
	 10	
positive function of problems since it allows for creation. This is because, 
traditionally, a problem is negative since it prevents the emergence of knowledge. 
Yet if an answer were to be completely accepted knowledge would become 
dogmatic since it would no longer be questioned. Deleuze’s position is then two-fold 
to allow for a multiplicity of methods and disciplines to engage with problems and to 
allow for these methods and disciplines to be questioned and criticized. This enables 
us to challenge the validity of claims made and allows for alternative claims or views 
to be made. 
 
The order-word therefore demonstrates for Deleuze the problem if we 
separate the fields of epistemology and language. In both cases, on a philosophical 
level, meaning has become transcendent. Language becomes a blank word. It 
represents a blank space that is void of all experiential qualities. Language is then 
condemned to express an ideality by never being able to express actual things in the 
world. Comparably, knowledge is dogmatic if confined to a purely empirical view. 
Thereby denying the philosophical process of challenging presupposed answers. In 
this way, scientific truth becomes transcendent by assuming a particular view will 
always be correct.  
 
The reconstruction of Deleuze’s philosophy by academics 	
In contrast to the transcendent metaphysics implied by order-words, Deleuze’s 
philosophy argues for immanence. That is, the attainment of truth is inseparable from 
the worldly forces and processes that created it. Deleuze’s most notable declaration 
of a philosophy of immanence is made in a brief article entitled Immanence: A Life 
(1995) near the end of his life. However, this emphasis on immanence has left his 
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philosophy to be defined in various ways by contemporary academics. This is 
because immanence affirms the dual role of empiricism and rationalism. Empiricism 
is affirmed through the necessity of the role of our experiential world. At the same 
time, a rationalist emphasis upon understanding the transcendent structure of the 
world is also affirmed. For instance, this dichotomy can be identified in Spinoza’s 
famous philosophy of immanence that argued God and nature are one and the same 
substance in The Ethics (1677). As we shall see, most academics achieve a clear 
definition of Deleuze’s philosophy through the interpretation of his statement in What 
is Philosophy? that the aim of philosophy is the creation of concepts. It is through the 
emphasis upon creation that has enabled various academics to determine the role of 
structure and value in Deleuze’s philosophy. A brief analysis of Peter Hallward, 
Manuel DeLanda, Alain Badiou and Anne Sauvagnargues’ views will now be made 
in order to demonstrate the diversity of the contemporary interpretation of Deleuze.  
 
A philosophy of pure becoming 	
Peter Hallward in Out of this World: Deleuze and the Philosophy of Creation (2006) 
argues that Deleuze’s philosophy affirms becoming or a continual state of 
transformation. This is due to Deleuze’s emphasis on creativity: “Deleuze presumes 
that being is creativity. Creativity is what there is and it creates all that there can be 
… Every biological or social configuration is a creation, and so is every sensation, 
statement or concept.”16 That is, everything in the world has been created. For 
instance, we could seek an inventor for any of our everyday objects, Otto Frederick 
Rohwedder invented a bread-slicing machine in 1928, or John Logie Baird invented 
the technique in 1925 to show moving images on a television. However, for 																																																								
16 Peter Hallward, Out of this World: Deleuze and the Philosophy of Creation (London: Verso, 2006) p.1 
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Hallward, Deleuze’s philosophy is not concerned with the end result but the process 
of creating: “in each case, the activity in question is precisely … a dynamic activity or 
process, rather than the created: a writing rather than the written, an expression 
rather than the expressed, a conceiving rather than the conceived.”17 This is 
because in order to be truly creative or created completely new things there must be 
an abstraction from already existing objects: “Deleuze’s philosophy is best described 
as an exercise in creative indiscernment, an effort to subtract the dynamics of 
creation from the mediation of the created.”18 Due to this, Hallward argues that 
Deleuze is a purely metaphysical thinker: … preoccupied with the mechanics of dis-
embodiment and de-materialisation.”19 Deleuze’s philosophy therefore does not 
allow us to gain a deeper understanding of the world since it takes place on a 
complete metaphysical plane: “Deleuze’s philosophy is oriented by lines of flight that 
lead out of the world; though not other-worldly, it is extra-worldly.”20  
 
A realist philosophy compatible with science  	
Manuel DeLanda’s Deleuze in Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy (2002) 
affirms a realist ontology. A realist philosophy is: “… philosophers who grant reality 
full autonomy from the human mind, disregarding the difference between the 
observable and the unobservable, and the anthropocentrism this distinction 
implies.”21 In this way, a realist philosophy is fully compatible with a scientific 
approach. This is because everything in the world can be explained by their scientific 
properties (chemical, biological or its physics). However, for DeLanda, Deleuze 
																																																								
17 Ibid 
18 Ibid, p.3 
19 Ibid 
20 Ibid 
21 Manuel DeLanda, Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy (London: Continuum, 2002) p.2 
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rejects the realist view that everything in the world can be reduced to: “… an 
essence, a core set of properties that defines what these objects are.”22 By defining 
properties according to an essence affirms transcendent properties. That is, 
unchanging qualities that will always remain the same over time. From DeLanda’s 
reading of Deleuze it is not transcendent qualities but rather dynamic processes 
which define objects and preserve their identity: “something else is needed to explain 
what gives objects their identity and what preserves their identity through time.”23 By 
defining objects according to dynamic processes means that even the metaphysical 
processes: “… remain immanent to the world of matter and energy.”24  An immanent 
metaphysics then remain inseparable from our understanding of the world and is not 
completely detached from it, which is a consequence of a transcendent view. 
Deleuze’s philosophy therefore: “breaks with the essentialism that characterizes 
naïve realism and … removes one of the main objections which non-realists make … 
[through its explanation of] how the entities that populate reality are produced without 
the need for anything transcendent.”25  
 
A pseudo-rationalist philosophy of Oneness 	
In contrast to Hallward’s image of a philosophy of pure becoming, Alain Badiou in 
Deleuze: The Clamour of Being (1997) argues that: “Deleuze’s fundamental problem 
is most certainly not to liberate the multiple but to submit thinking to a renewed 
concept of the One.”26 Deleuze’s philosophy of Oneness is identified through: “… 
																																																								
22 Ibid, p.3 
23 Ibid 
24 Ibid 
25 Ibid 
26 Alain Badiou, Deleuze: The Clamor of Being trans. by Louise Burchill (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 2000) p.10 
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indicating particular cases of a concept.”27 This process of identifying concepts is 
where Deleuze: “… in starting from innumerable and seemingly disparate cases … 
arrives at conceptual productions that I would unhesitatingly qualify as monotonous, 
composing a very particular regime of emphasis or almost infinite repetition of a 
limited repertoire of concepts, as well as a virtuosic variation of names, under which 
what is thought remains essentially identical.”28 To illustrate this point, Badiou gives 
an example of the emergence of Deleuze’s concepts in his two books on cinema, 
Cinema 1: The Movement Image (1983) and Cinema 2: The Time-Image (1985): 
“Consider the example of cinema. On the one hand, Deleuze singularly analyzes 
work after work, with the disconcerting erudition of a nonspecialist. Yet, on the other 
hand, what finally comes out of this is siphoned into the reservoir of concepts that, 
from the very beginning of his work, Deleuze has established and linked together: 
namely, movement and time ...”29 Deleuze begins an apprenticeship to cinema 
having no prior knowledge. In entering this apprenticeship he engaging in 
discussions of several different films, actors, directors and so forth. For Badiou, the 
aim of all of these discussions is to discover the general Idea that is expressed 
throughout various works. In other words, this is to express an image of thought or 
transcendent signification that is revealed throughout the works. In relation to 
Deleuze’s works on cinema this is expressed in the concepts of movement and time 
throughout various uses of an image in film. Therefore Oneness is always expressed 
through the same concepts despite Deleuze’s different analyses and use of terms. 
 
 
																																																								
27 Ibid, p.13 
28 Ibid, p.15 
29 Ibid 
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A transcendental empiricist, post-Kantian philosophy 	
Anne Sauvagnargues’ Deleuze: L'empirisme transcendantal (2009) states:  
 
Deleuze continues the Kantian undertaking of a critique of thought and gives it 
the task of inspecting its own chronic weaknesses, the transcendental illusion 
he calls the image of thought. Transcendental empiricism is a clinic of thought 
that seeks to guarantee an empiricism purged of transcendental illusions by 
showing the operating modes of thought that explain its inventiveness but also 
its conformism.30  
 
Deleuze renews the Kantian project of critique through a critical analysis of 
philosophical concepts. The analysis of philosophical concepts provides us with an 
image of their thought, enabling us to understand their perspective. It is through the 
analysis of philosophical concepts that we can take into account their inventiveness 
and their social and cultural impact. At the same time, the purity of transcendental 
categories or conditions for knowledge is challenged. This purity is challenged by 
demonstrating that they are conditioned by their social and cultural context. 
Sauvagnargues illustrates that, in contrast to DeLanda’s view, Deleuze cannot be 
limited to a realist view that analyses dynamic processes. This is because Deleuze’s 
philosophy retains the transcendental aspect of Kantian philosophy. In other words, it 
enables an analysis of the conditions in which creation takes place: “Transcendental, 
yet, empirical, it rejects the Kantian dichotomy between the empirical and the a priori. 																																																								
30 Anne Sauvagnargues, Deleuze: L'empirisme transcendantal (Paris: Presses Universitaire de France, 2009) 
p.9. The original French passage is as follows: Deleuze reprend l'initiative kantienne d'une critique de la pensee, 
et lui assigne a sou tour le role d'inspecter ses zones de faiblesses chroniques, cette illusion transcendantale qu'il 
nomme l'image de la pensee. L'empirisme transcendantal consiste en une clinique de la pensee, qui cherche a 
garantir un empirisme purge des illusions de la transcendance, en exposant les modes operatoires de la pensee, 
qui rendent compte de son inventivite mais aussi de son conformisme. 
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Still, it remains transcendental since it retains intensity as the insensible limit of 
difference itself … [transcendental empiricism] is precisely this intensive world of 
differences, where qualities find their rationale and the sensible finds its being.”31  
 
Deleuze does not seek to reconcile the problems of rationalism and 
empiricism, but rather, overcomes them. These problems of knowledge are 
overcome through an analysis of their transcendental conditions. That is, Deleuze is 
concerned with the underlying conditions that enable the creation of concepts. It is 
through these intensive conditions that reveal the limit to difference. For 
Sauvagnargues, difference is not a continual state of becoming since intensive 
conditions in which the concept is created provide a limit. An analysis of these 
worldly processes reveals difference as transcendental and pushes thought towards 
transcendental difference. This demonstrates Deleuze’s philosophy is 
transcendental since it reveals the conditions of thought. At the same time it is 
empirical since transcendental conditions are dependent upon the worldly context. 
As this worldly context changes over time different transcendental conditions will 
take place according to these conditions. Therefore in contrast to Kant’s 
transcendental categories, Deleuze’s transcendental conditions are dynamic and 
defined according to worldly forces.  
 
A philosophy of discovering paradoxes as the creation of 
structures 	
In contrast to these views, my thesis argues that Deleuze does not take either a 
rationalist or empirical position. Nor does he seek to overcome the problems of both 																																																								
31 Anne Sauvagnargues ‘Hegel and Deleuze: Difference or Contradiction’ Trans. By Marc Champagne, Niels 
Feuerhahn and Jim Vernon in Karen Houlie and Jim Vernon (eds.) Hegel and Deleuze: Together Again for the 
First Time, (Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 2013) p.52 
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positions. My position is that Deleuze’s philosophy affirms the paradox of their 
dichotomy. This paradox is to adopt an empirical position of importance of the world 
and its processes in forming our ideas. At the same time, this is also to adopt a 
rationalist position by affirming structures that serve to educate us and form a basis 
for our knowledge. A reason for this paradoxical dichotomy within Deleuze’s 
philosophy is because he is concerned with revealing problems or paradoxes within 
philosophies, rather than seeking to resolve or reconcile them. This view raises a 
criticism, namely, it is the matter of philosophy to resolve paradoxes. Philosophical 
reflection enables us to reveal paradoxes and then recommend a solution to them. 
An answer to this criticism is that Deleuze’s philosophy is not against answers but 
precisely analyzes philosophical concepts in order to allow deeper questions to be 
asked, for example: Why was it necessary to create this specific concept? What 
problem does the concept respond to? What worldly influences (social, cultural, 
historical, political) can be identified? 
 
From this we can see that the philosophic task of the creation of concepts is 
on the surface a radical critique of structures. However, on a deeper philosophic 
level it demonstrates how paradoxes and problems create structure: “… in 
philosophy there are two things at once: the creation of a concept, and the creation 
of a concept always occurs as a function of a problem. If one has not found the 
problem, one cannot understand philosophy, philosophy remains abstract.”32 Without 
being able to identify which problem the concept responds to a philosophy may 
appear to be metaphysical and abstract. For instance, Leibniz’s monads are 																																																								
32 Gilles Deleuze, ‘H as in the History of Philosophy’, Deleuze from A to Z DVD, trans. by Charles Stivale 
(Semiotext(e), 2011) 
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indivisible and have no parts. Due to this, Leibniz’s philosophy appears to be strange 
and hard to understand since we cannot seem to relate it to anything in the world.  
As Brandon Look remarks “Leibniz’s metaphysics is strange – or so it appears at first 
… And it is still the case that when students first encounter Leibniz’s philosophy they 
adopt an incredulous stare.”33 Anthony Savile also comments “A common reaction to 
[Leibniz’s] metaphysic[s] is to dismiss it as an extravagant fairy tale, one that is not 
seriously concerned with the reality around us at all.”34   
 
For Deleuze, we can arrive at a concrete understanding of Leibniz’s concepts 
by taking into account the social and cultural context in which the concepts were 
created. As Tom Conley in his preface to Deleuze’s The Fold: Leibniz and the 
Baroque states “… Leibniz’s theories are not specifically ‘objects’ but, in Deleuze’s 
lexicon, Baroque territories.”35 Niamh McDonnell and Sjoerd van Tuinen also 
comment on Deleuze’s emphasis on the Baroque context: “… the subtitle [of 
Deleuze’s The Fold] asks that we read Leibniz’s philosophy in between seventeenth 
century art and science and in doing so the ‘operative function’ [of creating folds] is 
put into play.”36 The creation of monads, is therefore a reaction by Leibniz to the 
problem of the inability to clearly distinguish things in the world. This inability to 
clearly distinguish is described by Deleuze: “[Leibniz] didn’t create the ‘monad’ for 
the pleasure of it … he saw the world as an aggregate of things folded within each 
other … [following this,] you can never reach something that is completely 																																																								
33 Brandon Look (ed.), The Continuum Companion to Leibniz (London: Continuum, 2011) p.89 
34 Anthony Savile, Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Leibniz and the Monadology (London: Routledge, 2000) 
p.26 
35 Tom Conley, ‘Translator’s foreword: A plea for Leibniz’ in Gilles Deleuze, The Fold: Leibniz and the 
Baroque, trans. by Tom Conley (London: Continuum, 2006) p. xviii 
36 Niamh McDonnell and Sjoerd van Tuinen (eds.), Deleuze and the Fold: A Critical Reader (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2010) p.4 
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unfolded.”37 Deleuze illustrates this through the problem of defining the soul where: 
“Its precisely because perceptions, feelings, ideas are folded into a soul that [Leibniz] 
constructed this concept of a soul [as a monad].”38 
 
Therefore problematizing concepts, in contrast to seeking direct answers to 
questions, allow for an individual to make sense of a concept. In making sense of a 
concept we give a worldly empirical context to a concept. It is through this process of 
understanding the contemporary context that enables philosophical concepts to 
become concrete and worldly. This enables the relation between epistemology and 
language to be affirmed through the relation of worldly forces, the process of making 
sense and the attainment of meaning. For Deleuze, it is in philosophical thought, or 
the act of critically engaging with society, that we can challenge its values. In doing 
so, we no longer accept given meanings as true but have to make sense of things. 
We thereby enter into a child-like state by having to revaluate our given values. The 
worldly context then shapes how we reconstruct meaning. 
 
Jeffrey A. Bell also illustrates the role of paradoxical dichotomy: “[The] 
contrasting interpretations of Deleuze’s work do not pose a problem for Deleuze 
scholarship; to the contrary, they highlight Deleuze’s very claim that empiricism is 
only correctly defined by dualism. One need not choose between the realist or 
nominalist Deleuze. It is more accurate to state, instead, that there is a double 
movement of Deleuze’s thought, a nominalist and realist movement.”39 The realist 
aspect of Deleuze: “… provides us with the conceptual tools to name that which 																																																								
37 Gilles Deleuze, ‘H as in the History of Philosophy’, Deleuze from A to Z DVD 
38 Ibid 
39 Jeffrey A. Bell, Deleuze’s Hume: Philosophy, Culture and the Scottish Enlightenment (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2009) p.4 
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already is/was identifiable.”40 This realist analysis of the empirical world enables the 
identification of the worldly processes and forces, the problems and paradoxes that a 
specific philosophical concept responds to. On the other hand: “the nominalist 
Deleuze gives us the means to name the manner in which something is not yet 
identifiable but becomes so when it becomes nameable – that is, when actualized.”41 
We are completely unaware of all the forces and problems that affect our thought; 
they remain unidentifiable. Yet an analysis of philosophical concepts is able to 
identify and name these forces at work that was necessary in order for a new 
concept to be created. 
 
However, for Deleuze, we cannot determine thought solely by any influence 
be it social, cultural, political, historical, economic or environmental: “I could always 
say historical, social forces … but I believe in a kind of becoming of thought, [an] 
evolution of thought that results not only in no longer posing the same problems, but 
also they are no longer posed in the same way … a call for the necessity always to 
create and re-create new concepts. The history of philosophy cannot be reduced to 
sociological influence, or to another influence …”42 This is because identifying 
influencing factors that determine thought places a limit upon our understanding. 
This would be to limit our understanding and creativity to specific epochs (Da Vinci is 
a classic example of Renaissance Art, Warhol of a 20th Century reaction to 
consumerism.) Deleuze view is that we continually make sense. In this way, Deleuze 
is not solely concerned with the attainment of meaning but also with how we return to 
it. In returning to meaning, we enter into a process of making sense again. This 																																																								
40 Ibid, p.3 
41 Ibid, p.4 
42 Gilles Deleuze, ‘H as in the History of Philosophy’, Deleuze from A to Z DVD 
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could be day after day, a few weeks, months or even years. In each case, the 
attainment of meaning is a work in progress. It is a process through which there is a 
continual revaluation of our own understanding. This is why a philosopher’s 
understanding cannot be generalised nor limited to social or cultural context. This 
generalisation does not take into account the novelty and fragility of meaning. The 
novelty and fragility of meaning can be identified in the process of reading Deleuze. 
This is because for a reader of Deleuze his philosophy is an apprenticeship. In other 
words, it emphasises an individual undertaking his or her own apprenticeship. From 
this, Deleuze’s philosophy is different from a traditional approach philosophy. It does 
not seek to provide answers. The answers that are provided are to be challenged. 
Nor does it seek to create an absolute or pure structure. It asks for the reader to 
revaluate them. In this way, an individual will make sense and arrive at their his or 
her own understanding of philosophies, whether his or her own or that of others, and 
the world. Deleuze’s approach then differs from a relativist position since we have no 
immediate awareness of the worldly processes and influences that shape our 
understanding. An apprenticeship remains then part of a dynamic process of working 
with a methodology or structure and the implicit influence of contemporary influences 
and problems that force aspects of it to be altered. By learning we can affirm the 
importance of structure by enabling understanding to take place, and at the same 
time, we can also affirm the transformation of this structure by a student coming to 
their own understanding of it through its practical application.  
 
My thesis adopts a genealogical approach in order to reveal the empirical and 
rationalist tension and conflicts within Deleuze’s philosophy. The tensions that are 
discussed throughout the chapters are not to be understood in a dialectical manner 
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where one force will synthesise with another. On the contrary, it is through an 
analysis of these conflicts that enables a disjunctive synthesis to be affirmed. This is 
where the opposition between values is beneficiary for the production of knowledge. 
In other words, it is not through a continual resolution of problems but the creation 
and engagement with problems that enables the process of understanding to take 
place. From this it can be seen that the concept of genealogy is opposed to a 
Hegelian dialectical approach that documents the historical transformation of 
oppositional forces and their resolution over periods of time. A genealogical 
approach, on the other hand, documents the underlying immanent forces that 
influence the construction of an idea. A genealogical approach therefore affirms 
underlying immanent forces, which influence the creation of general structures of 
thought or causal principles, rather than, seeking to establish them. This 
demonstrates a transition in the concept of sense from an empiricism based upon a 
structural analysis of phenomena (which seeks to establish conditions for 
knowledge) to Deleuze’s radical transformation of empiricism based upon an 
immanent metaphysics (that reveals those conditions as affected by worldly forces). 
 
The initial chapter on Nietzsche and Philosophy analyses the first conflict 
between sense and transcendent values. This conflict occurs through a discussion of 
Friedrich Nietzsche’s early essays ‘On the Origin of Language’ and ‘On Rhetoric’. 
Nietzsche’s later concepts of genealogy and transvaluation are discussed as an 
advancement of his earlier essays. The second conflict that takes place is between 
sense and its dialectical negation. This is illuminated through an analysis of Hegel’s 
The Phenomenology of Spirit and The Science of Logic. Deleuze’s problematizes 
Hegel through the dialectical method and negation in Max Stirner’s The Ego and its 
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Own. After this, a contrast emerges between the Hegelian concept of negation 
(experiential forces are nonsensical and do not constitute knowledge) and 
Nietzsche’s project of transvaluation of values (experiential forces underlie the 
construction of knowledge). Deleuze’s reading then enables a positive role of sense 
to be affirmed and in doing so, reverses the role of negation within the dialectic.   
 
The remaining chapters develop the relation of the concept of apprenticeship 
to sense. The fourth and fifth chapters develop the conflict between rationalist and 
empirical apprenticeships that occurs in Proust and Signs. The fourth develops 
Deleuze’s critical remarks of rationalist apprenticeship. A concept of rationalist 
apprenticeship is defined through a reading of Descartes’ Rules for the Direction of 
the Mind and Meditations on First Philosophy. Descartes’ rationalist view is 
problematized through an objection made by Hobbes. These contrasting approaches 
to apprenticeship are reflected in a modern linguistic discussion of Noam Chomsky’s 
Cartesian Linguistics and William Labov’s Sociolinguistics. Deleuze’s critical remarks 
on Chomsky and Labov with Felix Guattari in A Thousand Plateaus demonstrate a 
paradoxical relationship between meaning and communication. Or in other words, 
the effect worldly forces have upon language and its conveyance.  
 
 
This allows for a contrast with the fifth chapter, which establishes Deleuze’s 
concept of apprenticeship. It will be argued that the Deleuze’s concept of 
apprenticeship emerges through a conflict between singularity and universality. This 
occurs in Deleuze’s brief remarks on Leibniz in Proust. Following this, an individual’s 
understanding is monadic, singular and completely unique. At the same time, it is 
argued that this singularity of our understanding is paradoxically maintained through 
	 24	
the use of general terms. Through the discussion of monads and possible worlds in 
Leibniz’s Discourse on Metaphysics and The Monadology enables further insight into 
the functioning of an immanent apprenticeship through the affirmation of the paradox 
between singularity and universality.  
 
Finally, Deleuze’s Logic of Sense is separated into two discussions. The first 
deals with the paradox of becoming and universal language in Plato’s Cratylus. This 
takes place through the two contrasting positions of Hermogenes and Cratylus. 
Hermogenes’ view argues for the use of private language in order to maintain the 
uniqueness of each individual’s perspective. Whilst Cratylus’ view is that we can 
discover the true meaning of words by their etymological origin. Plato’s position then 
seeks to reconcile both views overcoming the problems of communication and 
meaning in order for individuals to reflect upon the Idea. It is by reflecting upon the 
Idea that we can understand how all languages share the same meaning. The 
second discussion of Logic of Sense deals with Deleuze’s reversal of Platonism. 
This reversal is made in Deleuze’s reading of Lewis Carroll’s Alice’s Adventures in 
Wonderland and Through the Looking Glass. It is shown that Deleuze’s engagement 
with this paradox is reflective of the conflicts between sense and meaning 
established in the previous chapters. Therefore through Deleuze’s engagement with 
this paradox allows for a formation of a framework for a philosophy of language as 
based on immanence and sense. The thesis concludes with a summary of the prior 
conflicts within the thesis and an analysis of Deleuze’s self criticism of his own use of 
concepts in order provide the reader with insight into the development of his 
philosophy of language and a reason for the necessity of his radicalisation of style 
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that occurs in his work with Guattari.   
 
Locke, Sense and Language 	
The remainder of the introduction will now allow for us to trace the foundations of 
Deleuze’s concept of sense to a discussion of Locke’s conception in his philosophy 
of language in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. At first this is a strange 
connection to be made in relation to Deleuze’s philosophy due to the lack of 
discussion of Locke’s work. Although writing on Hume, Deleuze’s only discussion of 
Locke occurs in a brief moment to be found in Deleuze’s Leibniz lecture on 24th April 
198043. The brief discussion of Locke relates his concept of anxiety to his 
uneasiness of entering into an exchange with Leibniz. Nevertheless, a relation to 
Locke can be made based upon his concept of sense. This is because Locke deals 
with the empirical conflict between sense (the process of understanding) and 
meaning (the attainment of comprehension). As we have seen it is this dynamic 
between sense and meaning that also takes precedence in Deleuze’s epistemology 
and philosophy of language. This dynamic will then be explored in Locke’s concept 
of sense and its relation to general and private uses of language. From this 
discussion of Locke, a strong connection between his concept of sense and 
Deleuze’s later work Logic of Sense can be made (A full discussion of Deleuze’s 
view of sense in Logic of Sense is made in chapter 6.) This is why I have chosen to 
discuss Locke, rather than Hume, in order to provide a basis to the concept of sense. 
I have also chosen to discuss Locke because Deleuze does not discuss the concept 																																																								
43 Gilles Deleuze, Leibniz course at Vincennes 29th April 1980, transcribed by Richard Pinhas, 
http://www.webdeleuze.com/php/texte.php?cle=54&groupe=Leibniz&langue=1 [accessed 12th January 2015]. 
English translation can be found here: 
http://www.webdeleuze.com/php/texte.php?cle=55&groupe=Leibniz&langue=2 
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of sense at all in his work on Hume. My analysis of Locke’s concept of sense allows 
for an empirical foundation to be formed for Deleuze’s own concept of sense. 
However, this is not to say that Deleuze is completely Lockean, rather, Locke’s 
definition of sense will be challenged by its denial of unique senses and 
understandings by generality. Despite this, Deleuze still upholds Locke’s initial claim 
of privileging the empirical process of making-sense as necessary for understanding. 
Following my discussion of Locke, Leibniz’s reading of Locke’s philosophy in the 
New Essays on Human Understanding will be used to problematize the concept of 
sense. This will be in order to draw out Leibniz’s problems of the singularity of our 
understanding where our thought is always unique and therefore cannot be 
generalized.  
 
At the beginning of Book 3 on language in his Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding Locke states: “Words in their primary or immediate signification, 
stand for nothing, but the Ideas in the Mind of him that uses them.”44 Locke is here 
alluding to a child-like interaction with the world. Everything in the world in this child-
like state is devoid of meaning. Objects are without any particular word attributed to 
them. They are only known through their sensual properties. Later we are told of the 
names that are associated to these particular objects. However, this process of 
naming objects is problematical. This is because it is only once we have made sense 
of things in the world that words are able to mean and signify particular ideas. Locke 
illustrates this point in the problem of communicating an idea to another individual: 
“When a man speaks to another, it is, that he may be understood; and the end of 
speech is, that those sounds, as marks, [the speaker] may make known his Ideas to 																																																								
44 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. by Peter H. Nidditch (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1975) p.405 
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the Hearer.”45 The purpose of communicating is for our words to be understood. 
However, these words will remain blank and have no meaning until the other 
individual is able to attain their own understanding of it: “Till he has some Ideas of his 
own, he cannot suppose them to correspond with the conceptions of another man; 
nor can he use signs for them: for thus they would be the signs of he knows not what 
…”46 This can be related to the everyday example of a friend having a film they really 
enjoy but we have not heard of nor seen. In communicating their love of the film to 
us, we have no knowledge of what the film’s title, plot, or its actors. In this way, 
despite our friends’ enjoyment for the film, we cannot gain a complete understanding 
of it until we have watched it for ourselves.  
 
After we have attained our own understanding, this will be different from 
another individuals: “when he represents to himself other men’s Ideas, by some of 
his own, if he gives consent to give them the same names, that other men do, ‘tis still 
to his own Ideas; to Ideas that he has, and not to Ideas that he has not.”47 That is, 
the way in which each individual understands is different. When communicating a 
particular name to another individual, they will associate their own understanding to 
it. From this, it is evident that each way in which a thing is made sense of affects how 
a word is interpreted. Locke uses the example of a child’s association of gold: “A 
child having taken notice of nothing the metal he hears called gold, but the bright 
shining yellow colour, he applies to his own Idea of that colour, and nothing else.”48 
This colour is then associated to other objects such as in “… a peacocks tail.” Ibid 
The qualities of gold can then be added to so it “… signifies a body, bright, yellow, 																																																								
45 Ibid 
46 Ibid, p.406 
47 Ibid 
48 Ibid 
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fusible, and very heavy.”49 Yet when adding these qualities it does not apply to the 
child’s own simple understanding of gold as a colour: “… he [cannot] make it stand, 
as a sign of such a complex Idea, as he has not [come to his own understanding of 
its various different properties].”50 Walter R. Ott notes that the utterance of a word is 
not completely meaningless since it enables us to relate a specific sound to it: “If my 
uttering ‘gold’ cannot be a reliable indicator of the sound ‘gold’. The word used in this 
way is not strictly speaking meaningless, since it signifies an idea; the idea in 
question is simply that of the sound of ‘gold’”51  
 
As we can associate different ideas to the same word, Locke’s philosophy of 
language maintains the use of general names. This is because general names are 
necessary in order to signify general Ideas: “words become general, by being made 
by the signs of general Ideas.”52 A general idea is not applicable to our variety of 
experiential qualities: “Ideas becomes general, by separating from the circumstances 
of Time, and Place, and any other Ideas that may determine them to this or that 
particular Existence.”53 This is because a general idea is a universal expression of a 
various experiential qualities: “By this way of abstraction they are made capable of 
representing more Individuals than one; each of which, having in it a conformity to 
that abstract Idea …”54 Following this, a careful note must be made. Even though 
words refer to specific Ideas Locke is not denying our experiential relation to things 
in the world as Paul Guyer remarks “it is quite clear that Locke does not mean to say 
that our words refer only to our ideas rather than to things … rather, Locke is arguing 
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that we refer to things by means of the ideas of them that we associate with our 
names for them.”55 Locke demonstrates this through the example of children’s use of 
general terms. A child will associate a general name to a particular thing such as 
using the term of Mamma for their mother: “The Names they first give … the Names 
of Nurse and Mamma, the Child uses, determine themselves to those Persons.”56  
 
However, when a child then learns that there are many different individuals 
that resemble their mother and father they do not attribute the same names to these 
other individuals: “Afterwards, when time and a larger Acquaintance has made them 
observe … [that there are many different individuals] resemble their Father and 
Mother … they frame an Idea, which they find many particulars do partake in; and to 
that they give, with others [who are not their parents], the name Man, for Example.”57  
The same name of mother and father is not given to a stranger as a child has formed 
an idea of qualitative differences of their parents through their associations (Mother 
has blonde hair whilst ladies X, Y, Z do not share the same shade of blondeness.) All 
other individuals then are able to be attributed a name of man, woman, or stranger 
since they do not share the same qualities of their parents. It is through their 
association of qualitative differences that a child attains a general name and general 
idea of their parents. A general idea contain qualitative differences and so cannot be 
confused with another individuals: “wherein they make nothing new, but only leave 
out of the complex Idea they had of Peter and James, Mary and Jane, that which is 
peculiar to each, and retain only what is common to all.”58 Therefore when 
representing their parents or carers we can be sure that children use general ideas 																																																								
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to take into account the qualitative differences that enable them to denote their 
parents: “The Ideas of the Nurse, and the Mother, are well framed in [children’s] 
Minds; and, like Pictures of them, represent only those Individuals.”59   
 
Another reason general names are necessary is because: “it is impossible, 
that every particular Thing should have a distinct peculiar Name.”60 Locke here 
alludes to the limits of language, namely, that is impossible to have a singular name 
for everything in the world (One name for each leaf.) If individuals used singular 
names it would be in vain since they would not be able to communicate their ideas 
clearly to others: “… if it were possible, it would yet be useless … Men would in vain 
heap up Names of particular Things, that would not serve them to communicate their 
ideas.”61 An individual would speak a singular language that is only known to 
themselves. As meaning is singular it would impossible for communication of ideas 
to occur since another individual would designate an object with a different name [I 
designate Y as X but they designate Y as Z]. This demonstrates the benefit of 
general names since they allow for communication of individual’s ideas which would 
be impossible if based upon singular names: “Men learn Names, and use them in 
Talk with others, only that they may be understood: which is then only done, when by 
Use or Consent, the Sound I make by the Organs of Speech, excites in another 
Man’s Mind, who hears it, the Idea I apply it to in mine, when I speak it. This cannot 
be done by Names, applied to particular Things …”62 General names allow for 
communication because names apply to the same Ideas. In this way, through 
communicating a particular idea another individual will be able to understand what is 																																																								
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being stated. Due to this inability to communicate they do not lead to an 
improvement of an individual’s knowledge: “… a distinct Name for every particular 
Thing would not be of any great use for the improvement of knowledge.”63 Our 
understanding is not based upon solely what our minds can make sense of but 
dependent upon communication and interaction with other individuals. This enables 
Locke to be affirmative of other views where our understanding is enriched through 
communication. From this, we can see that Locke’s view is in contrast to Descartes 
where our understanding is built upon what we can rationally deduce for ourselves.  
 
However, Locke does not completely disregard the use of singular names. 
This is because singular names are used in a personal manner when not 
communication in a public sense. In other words, individuals use a private language 
that differs from a public language. This private language uses proper names which 
is not the general name attributed but its personal name: “… [individuals] have often 
occasion to mention particular Persons; they make use of proper Names, and there 
distinct individuals have distinct Denominations … Besides Persons, Countries also, 
Cities, Rivers, Mountains, and other the like Distinctions of Place, have usually found 
peculiar Names, and for the same Reason; they being such as Men have often an 
Occasion to mark particularly.”64 A common use of proper names is to attribute a 
nickname to a number of different particular things such as individuals, places, pets, 
or cities. In relation to cities, a proper name of New York City is the Big Apple. One 
of the theories as to why New York City attainted the nickname of the Big Apple is 
due to horse-racing columnist John J. FitzGerald, as Valeri R. Helterbran explains 
“… according to Barry Popik, a New York City slang historian, it was in 1924, thanks 																																																								
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to horse-racing columnist John J. FitzGerald … [when he] overheard stablehands in 
New Orleans using ‘big apple’ to refer to the goal of racing in New York. He liked the 
nickname and used the phrase to name his column ‘Around the Big Apple’ in the 
New York Morning Telegraph.”65  
 
It is due to its popularisation that the proper name of the Big Apple that shares 
its general name of New York. Locke also takes the popularisation of proper names 
into consideration and imagines a possible situation where a particular name for 
horses would be as popular as a general name for an individual: “… if we had 
Reason to mention particular Horses, as often as we have to mention particular Men, 
we should have proper Names for the one, as familiar as for the other; and 
[Alexander the Great’s horse] Bucephalus would be a Word as much in use, as 
Alexander.”66 Through the popularisation of a proper name allows it to become part 
of a general understanding. When communicating a popular proper name it would be 
possible for both individuals to understand what is being stated since they adhere to 
the same idea.  
 
Leibniz, Singularity and Language 	
Leibniz first read Locke’s Essay in 1695 and despite a few critical remarks he found 
Locke’s views praiseworthy, as Nicholas Jolley explains “… as was [Leibniz’s] habit, 
he recorded his reactions in writing; he wrote a mildly critical but mainly 
complimentary paper which he sent to a Scottish acquaintance, Thomas Burnett, in 																																																								
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the hope that he would communicate it to Locke himself.”67 Locke did not receive 
Leibniz’s letter until 1697. It was in the same year that he wrote a letter to his friend 
William Molyneux68, a member of the Irish Parliament about his view of Leibniz, as 
Peter Alexander remarks “… In a letter to William Molyneux in that year [1697] Locke 
says that he has read [Leibniz’s letter] and a paper by Leibniz referred to in it … 
Locke was clearly unfamiliar was Leibniz’s central doctrines he was doubtless in no 
position to appreciate Leibniz’s objection. [This is due to] Locke [having] read little, if 
anything else by Leibniz.”69 Despite his lack of knowledge of Leibniz’s philosophy: 
“Locke’s response was churlish. He refused to be drawn into correspondence with 
Leibniz and wrote slightingly to Molyneux about [Leibniz’s] two papers.”70 This can 
be identified in Locke’s discourteous remark: “You and I agree pretty well concerning 
the man; and this sort of fiddling makes me hardly avoid thinking that he is not that 
very great man that has been talked of him.”71  
 
Despite his initial attempt being unsuccessful in being able to enter into a 
correspondence with Locke, Leibniz made several more attempts, as Jolley states 
“… he made a number of attempts to enter into a correspondence with Locke … 
However, his efforts were unavailing. Locke had indeed received Leibniz’s first 
																																																								
67 Nicholas Jolley, Leibniz (London: Routledge, 2005) pp.23-4 
68 William Molyneux is remembered as posing an epistemic problem of blindness to Locke, as Timothy Stanton 
states: “Molyneux is best remembered today for proposing a problem arising out the Essay’s account of the way 
in which diverse senses worked together to convey Ideas to the mind. Molyneux’s problem was whether a blind 
man, his sight restored, given a globe and a cube, could by sight alone tell which was which. Locke would note 
the problem in the second edition of the Essay, agreeing with Molyneux that the blind man would be unable to 
do so.” Timothy Stanton, ‘Locke and His Influence’ in The Oxford handbook of British Philosophy in the 
Eighteenth Century ed. by James A. Harris (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) p.26 
69 Peter Alexander, ‘Solidity and Elasticity in the Seventeenth Century’ in Locke’s Philosophy: Content and 
Context, ed. By G. A. J. Rogers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994) p.151 
70 Ibid 
71 John Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. A. C. Fraser Oxford, 1894, vol. 1 p.xlv in Benson 
Mates, The Philosophy of Leibniz: Metaphysics and Language (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986) 
footnote 87, p.34 
	 34	
comments on the Essay and he responded with merely polite and conventional 
expressions of gratitude. (In private Locke was scathing about the quality of Leibniz’s 
criticisms.)”72 With Locke seemingly unwilling to enter into debate: “… Leibniz might 
have simply given up at this stage, but then in 1700 the French translation of Locke’s 
Essay was published.”73 The publication of this translation: “… was doubly 
significant: it made it easier for Locke to study Locke’s philosophy carefully, and it 
alerted Leibniz to the fact that the Essay would be assured of a wide continental 
readership.”74  
 
With a possibility of wide readership of Locke’s philosophy: “… Leibniz wrote 
a point-by-point commentary on the Essay which he later turned into a dialogue.”75 
By writing an in depth analysis of Locke’s Essay: “[Leibniz] clearly intended to 
publish the work with the aim of forcing Locke to reply finally to his criticisms.”76 
Leibniz’s work, New Essays on Human Understanding (1704) was almost ready for 
publication but was prevented from release with the death of Locke in 1704. The 
reason for stopping its release was: “… partly on the ground that it would be unfair to 
publish a critique when its target could no longer defend himself, and partly on the 
ground that he could not now achieve his aim of engaging Locke in public debate. As 
a result the New Essays on Human Understanding lay buried among Leibniz’s 
manuscripts in Hanover until fifty years after his death.”77  
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Despite holding different philosophical ideas Leibniz’s New Essays, as with 
his initial review of Locke’s Essay in 1695, was not written in opposition to Locke’s 
empiricism. As Alexander notes “Leibniz was by no means wholly critical of Locke, 
and he in considerable admiration for and agreement with him.”78 This view is also 
shared by Jolley who states, “Predictably the New Essays has been seen as a 
classic confrontation between rationalist and empiricist theories of knowledge. In 
fact, however, it is clear from Leibniz’s statements about the work that his main aim 
is not to refute Locke’s theory of knowledge at all … it is rather to defend an 
immaterialist theory of mind against what he regarded as Locke’s insidious attacks 
on the doctrine”79  
 
Leibniz agrees with Locke in using general names or appellatives in the New 
Essays: “General terms do not merely improve languages but are required for their 
essential structure … if we only had words which applied to them – only proper 
names and no appellatives – we would not be able to say anything.”80 Comparable to 
Locke’s view, by using general terms we are able to communicate the same idea to 
each other. This is otherwise impossible if using a private language where the idea is 
distorted through a nonsensical language. In order to illustrate this, Leibniz uses the 
example of children or those learning a foreign language who make mistakes in their 
attribution of names: “… you will see children and people who are trying to speak an 
unfamiliar language, or speak about unfamiliar matters, employ general terms like 
																																																								
78 Peter Alexander, ‘Solidity and Elasticity in the Seventeenth Century’ in Locke’s Philosophy: Content and 
Context p.151 
79 Nicholas Jolley, Leibniz, p.25 
80 Gottfried Leibniz, New Essays on Human Understanding, trans. and ed. by Peter Remnant and Jonathan 
Bennett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) Book 3, Section 275-6.   
	 36	
‘thing’, ‘plant’, ‘animal’, in place of the more specific terms which they do not have.”81 
It is through our dependence on general terms that Leibniz suggests that proper 
names were once accepted general terms: “… It is certain that all proper or 
individual names were originally appellative or general.”82 A proper name, for 
Leibniz, is not a nonsensical idea (glarb) or an inventive grammatical structure that is 
created (Klingon). This is because a proper name is a forgotten term and due to this 
it has a genealogy that can be traced in order to find its meaning: “I would venture to 
say that almost all words were originally general terms, since it will very rarely 
happen that a name will be invented just for one given individual without any reason 
for it. So we can say that individual names used to be names of species which were 
given to some individual either as a prime example of the species or for some other 
reason.”83  
 
Leibniz gives an example of Roman names. The reason for this is because 
they a particular reason why they were given a proper name: “… proper names such 
as Brutus, Caesar, Augustus … the first Brutus was given this name because of his 
apparent stupidity, that Caesar was the name of a child delivered through an incision 
in his mother's abdomen … Augustus was a name expressing reverence.”84. Leibniz 
also explains an etymological reason for attributing proper names to mountains:  
“Alps are snowcovered mountains (compare album, white), and Brenner and 
Pyrenees signify great height, for bren in Celtic meant high or chief (compare 
Brennus), just as brink still means height in Low Saxon - there is a Brenner between 
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Germany and Italy, and a Pyrenees between Gaul and Spain.”85 As Richard T.W. 
Arthur explains Leibniz’s interest in the evolution of language: “…Leibniz was deeply 
interested in the evolution of natural languages, which he sought to uncover with 
detailed historical (including archival) research into the oldest writings available.”86 
One particular line of research “… led him to believe that the Germanic and Nordic 
languages as well as Britannic and Gaelic ‘can be regarded as variants of a single 
language which could be called ‘Celtic’.”87 However, as Arthur notes the problem 
with Leibniz’s etymological analysis is that it lacks any references or evidence to 
confirm his theories: “In the New Essays Leibniz provides several pages of such 
etymological studies, but cautions that one must always be careful to try to find 
confirming evidence of supposed derivations … otherwise one will … produce 
fanciful and ridiculous etymologies …”88  
 
However, Leibniz does not think it is universally true in every instance that a 
proper name has an etymological root and relation to a more commonly used 
general term. This is because there are instances in which a general name is the 
only name used and so it is impossible to trace any other origin. A reason for this is 
due to a general term being preferred to a variety of proper names. This is explained 
by Leibniz in reference to the designation of the same term of wormwood in order to 
explain the variety of species: “… we shall be satisfied with a vaguer or more general 
term to designate a more specific kind, if the differentiae are of no interest to us; for 
instance we are satisfied with the general term wormwood, even though there are so 
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many species of it …”89 A general term is then preferential to a proper name when it 
is of little interest for us to name every specific difference. An example of this is 
evident in the use of the general term of woodworm to designate the various different 
larvae of wood-boring beetles. As Norman E. Hickman states “About three hundred 
different species of wood-boring beetles are known as occurring in our domestic 
woodwork indoors, but of these only seven are of frequent occurrence, and it is to 
the larval or grub stage that we apply the description ‘woodworm’.”90  
 
For Leibniz, the problem of singularity emerges through the use of a general 
term. This is because general terms do not represent the variations and differences 
between qualities in each individual. In other words, it is through the use of 
resemblance that an individual associates particular ideas. In using resemblance, an 
individual negates singular qualities of objects into the same shared general 
properties: “… [a] child proceeds by abstraction from observing the idea of man to 
observing that of [an] animal, he arrived at the idea of human nature from the more 
specific idea which he observed his mother and father and other people.”91 A child 
arrives at a general idea of human nature by recognising a resemblance of similar 
qualities from individuals that they come into contact with: their parents, teachers 
and so forth. It is therefore by having our own understanding of a name that enables 
each usage to be distinguished and different from another individual’s use of the 
same word. As Fabrizio Mandadori states “According to [Leibniz’s] view, proper 
names name only by describing the objects they name, they name just in case there 
is a unique object ‘satisfying’ their sense (that object being accordingly the referent 
of the name) and their sense can be characterized as what serves to distinguish the 																																																								
89 Leibniz, New Essays, Section 289 
90 Norman E. Hickin, ‘Woodworm and its control’, The New Scientist, Vol. 4., No. 83, 19th June 1958, p.202 
91 Leibniz, New Essays Concerning Human Understanding, Book 3, Section 290 
	 39	
individual (if any) named by them from all other individuals.”92 This same idea of 
human nature is then associated with animals. It is from this association of human 
nature to animals that Leibniz is implicitly referring to the capacity of each individual 
to reason. Not all individuals share the same capacity to reason and so it is easier to 
understand our relation to animals. That is, the less intellectual we think about the 
world the more prone we are to acting violently and stupidly. This would be not the 
case if we reflected on our actions.  
 
The problem with this idea of human nature is that we form negates the 
singular qualities of each individual: “That he had no precise idea of the individual is 
shown by the fact that he could easily be deceived by a moderate resemblance into 
mistaking some other woman for his mother.”93 It is in the problem of generalisation 
that Leibniz refers to Martin Guerre, a famous of a case of mistaken identity: “You 
know the story of the false Martin Guerre who fooled even the wife and close 
relatives of the real one by his resemblance to him, combined with his cunning, and 
for a long time puzzled the judges even after the real one had turned up.”94 In this 
case, Guerre had disappeared after an argument. After a period of eight years an 
individual turned up claiming to be Guerre. However, as Paul Aron states, suspicions 
were raised when: “… in 1558, Martin asked his uncle Pierre Guerre, for his share of 
the profits from the family farm during his absence.”95 Pierre’s suspicion was further 
added to when: “… two soldiers passing through the village said they’d served with 
Martin Guerre and that he’d lost a leg during the war. Yet the [man who claimed to 
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be Martin] clearly had both legs.”96 The case was taken to court and in a shocking 
turn of events the actual Martin Guerre turned up just as the sentence was about to 
be passed. This lead to the imposter Guerre being revealed as Arnauld du Tilh who 
was from a neighbouring village.  
 
The case of the mistaken identity of Martin Guerre is significant for Leibniz 
because, based upon an empirical understanding, we were led into error due to 
resemblance. When using an empirical understanding, like Martin’s family members, 
we accept general qualities as a true representation. Yet these general qualities do 
not represent a true identity. A true identity is the singular qualities that enable an 
individual to be unique and differentiated from others. Leibniz challenges Locke’s 
use of general terms as able to maintain singularity and differentiation. For instance, 
using Leibniz’s example, we can see how children fall into error in the judgment of 
recognizing their parents through general qualities. Their mother or father has a 
general hair of X, clothes colours of A, B, C. When in a busy area and having lost 
sight of their parents, a child may run up to another individual who also has hair 
colour X and clothes colours of A, B, C. A child then realizes that they were mistaken 
when the other individual turns around to face them. It is in the process of facing the 
child that they recognize the singular qualities of their parents against the general 
qualities that allows them to be differentiated from other individuals.  
 
Therefore, as Donald W. Mertz notes Leibniz’s position is not resemblance 
nominalism. This is because: “what Leibniz is suggesting cannot be simply 
resemblance nominalism, where the latter is understood as exact resemblance … 																																																								
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since this violates his position that relations are entia rationis. What are real, as 
opposed to merely ideal, are ‘separated things’ and their properties.”97  Leibniz’s 
position can then be defined as closer to Ostrich nominalism, as Gonzalo Rodiguez-
Pereyra states “[for Leibniz] the similarity of substances derives not from the 
similarity of their accidents but from how substances intrinsically are: that is, 
substances A and B resemble each other because they are F, not the other way 
around. But this does not mean Leibniz is reifying accidents or properties. Thus … 
Leibniz is closer to what has been called Ostrich Nominalism than to Resemblance 
Nominalism.”98 This is because Ostrich nominalism affirms metaphysical nature of 
difference in Leibniz’s philosophy. In this way, difference is not dependent upon 
speech and a subject but rather each object is naturally different from one another. 
As Rodiguez-Pereyra remarks “… Ostrich Nominalism. This view, held by Quine, 
among others, maintains that there is nothing in virtue of which our thing is scarlet: it 
just is scarlet.”99  
 
Conclusion 	
From Locke, it has been suggested that we must make sense of an idea in order to 
correctly understand it. In making sense we associate particular worldly qualities to 
ideas. Following this, our experience and social and cultural backgrounds influence 
the way in which we understand an idea. Based upon these backgrounds individuals 
will have different understandings of the same idea. Following this, a problem of 																																																								
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communication arises, as it is difficult to understand another individual’s 
understanding of an idea. This is because we can only relate to our personal 
experience and background. In order to overcome this problem Locke suggests that 
social and cultural conventions should be adhered to. For instance, if visiting a 
different part of a country or a foreign country it might be difficult to understand each 
other. If we begin to understand the social and cultural context then this allows us 
access to another individual’s different sense of an idea.  
 
However, Leibniz’s close commentary of Locke in the New Essays reveals a 
paradox between general names and the world. Leibniz agrees with Locke that 
general names are beneficial. We should adhere to the socially accepted usage of a 
name in order to reflect upon the same communicated idea. General names are also 
beneficial since it avoids the problem of a nonsensical language in the attribution of a 
unique name to everything in the world. But for Leibniz, everything in the world is 
completely unique (his concept of monads is discussed in Chapter 4). In other 
words, no two things share the same qualities. To compare qualities would negate 
their singular qualities. This demonstrates the limits of language since we cannot 
adequately describe singularity. Each explanation of a unique quality would describe 
its general properties. For instance, a child can recognize their parents through 
identifying the singular qualities of their face or voice. Yet using the terms ‘Mum’ or 
‘Dad’ negates the unique qualities of the child’s parents through their generalization 
in the general term. Therefore, this demonstrates the paradoxical relationship 
between sense and meaning. We must use general terms in order to be understood. 
Yet our unique sense cannot be expressed through those terms.  
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The next chapter will analyse the relationship of sense and meaning in 
Nietzsche’s philosophy of language. An initial discussion of Deleuze’s critical view of 
education and the teaching of philosophy will be made. This is in order to develop a 
connection between Deleuze, Locke, Leibniz, and Nietzsche. A connection can be 
made by their emphasis upon the process of sense rather than solely upon the 
attainment of meaning. In other words, individuals should not simply repeat values or 
answers but arrive at understanding for themselves. For Nietzsche, in contrast to 
Locke, an individual’s understanding is burdened by their complete acceptance of 
social and cultural conventions. These problems will be developed through a 
discussion of herd mentality, the role of transcendental concepts and of origins in 
society and philosophy. This allows for Nietzsche’s emphasis upon sense to be 
identified in his early advocacy of the analysis of rhetorical processes in language 
and also in a brief discussion of its development in his later philosophy. It is therefore 
the aim of the next chapter to further problematize Locke’s adherence to general 
terms and whether it is a worthwhile endeavor for an individual to turn their back 
upon the use of socially and culturally determined usage of terms.
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1 
Nietzsche, Sense and Transcendent signs 
 
 
Introduction 	
The introductory analysis of Locke’s concept of sense has enabled us to define it as 
an empirical process. This is because in order to understand things in the world we 
attribute specific worldly qualities to a sign. A worldly quality is then a socially agreed 
upon context. If we are unable to do so then we are left with, as Locke argues, a 
blank idea. This blank idea or sign challenges the rationalist assumption that 
individuals only need to rationally reflect upon the sign in order to correctly know. For 
rationalists, the process of rational reflection upon a sign leads to clear 
understanding. In this way, a material object is not strictly defined according to its 
experiential qualities but according to a distinct metaphysical sign. The benefit of the 
rationalist approach is that it enables universal reflection upon the same sign. 
Regardless of individuals’ social or cultural backgrounds, their environments or 
epochs, the same correct understanding can be attained. Locke’s challenge to the 
rationalist approach, on the surface level, is to demonstrate the importance of our 
social, cultural, environmental backgrounds and time periods as having a lasting 
effect on how we construct different ideas.  
 
However, on a deeper philosophical level, Locke challenges the rationalist 
assumption that meaning is inherent and presupposed. That is, in challenging 
innatism, Locke objects to the notion that meaning is based upon a transcendent or 
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metaphysical foundation. Individuals give meaning to the world by making sense of 
signs. Starting from a blank sign, an individual has not sought to attain an absolute 
understanding of everything in the world, but has constructed a worldly meaning. For 
instance, if we only learn the native language of a country, we leave utterances in 
non-native languages blank, because we remain incapable of arriving at a clear 
innate understanding of them. 
 
Deleuze’s philosophy can be related to Locke’s through the problem of 
maintaining the dynamic relationship between sense and meaning. This problem can 
be related to Deleuze’s time as a student and his education in studying the history of 
philosophy: “At the Liberation [of Paris] we were strangely stuck in the history of 
philosophy. We simply plunged into Hegel, Husserl and Heidegger; we threw 
ourselves like puppies into a scholasticism worse than that of the Middle Ages.”100  
Deleuze, like most philosophy students, was introduced to philosophy by studying its 
key figures. This was to be familiarised with the popular school of thought in France 
at the time, phenomenology. Yet for Deleuze this educational model had a negative 
impact upon the development of his own understanding of key philosophical figures 
and their concepts: “The history of philosophy has always been the agent of power in 
philosophy, and even in thought. It played the repressor’s role: how can you think 
without having read Plato, Descartes, Kant … An image of thought called philosophy 
has been formed historically and it effectively stops people from thinking.”101  
 
The history of philosophy prevents our own understanding from developing 
due to the same association of particular meaning with a philosopher’s concept (the 																																																								
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cogito always means X, the monad always means Y, the Platonic Idea always 
means Z …) The same association of particular meaning with a philosopher’s 
concept enables students to engage with a philosopher, understand their philosophy 
and their importance in the history of philosophy. It is through the process of 
communicating the expected given meaning that a student’s understanding is 
demonstrated to be correct. If a student does not communicate the expected 
meaning then they can be corrected until it adheres to the given expectation.  
 
Despite this educational benefit, Deleuze demonstrates that by always 
associating the same given meaning transforms the concept into a blank idea. This 
is because the student must always give an expected meaning in order to be correct. 
In repeating this information the student has not gained a greater understanding of it 
for himself or herself. This highlights an educational problem, namely, how can a 
student attain understanding without negating his or her own process of 
apprenticeship? This is because in its standard educational model, the process of 
making sense is denied. A student does not need to make sense of anything since 
everything has a predetermined meaning that the student must communicate. By not 
needing to make sense of anything, individuals do not think for themselves as every 
thought that is made can be connected and related to a prior thought that was 
already made. Statements made would always be related to its historicity (the idea of 
X is related to school of thought Y). Each attempt that an individual express a 
different understanding would be compared and judged according to a thought 
already made (Your idea of X is related to Y). This comparison negates its 
uniqueness as the school of thought or philosopher is privileged over any other 
thought that is made (The notion of X expressed by school of thought Y is much 
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better than your Idea of X). In relation to language, an individual’s different 
understanding cannot be expressed since each expression must conform to a 
general signification (X expresses sign of Y).  
 
For instance, this can be related to schools of thought in philosophy where 
various philosophers are argued to share similar views. For Deleuze, the 
generalisation of concepts and philosophies prevent unique differences between 
philosophers. This can be related to his remarks on Hume’s concept of empiricism:  
 
… every history of philosophy has its chapter on empiricism: Locke and 
Berkeley have their place there, but in Hume there is something very strange 
which displaces empiricism, giving it a new power, a theory and practice of 
relations … but which belongs underground or marginal in relation to the great 
classifications, even when they inspire a new conception of logic and 
epistemology.102     
 
Traditionally the school of empiricism is generalised to include Locke, Hume and 
Berkeley. However, for Deleuze, this generalisation of the concept of empiricism 
takes us away from the unique views held within each philosophy that prevents them 
from being so easily categorised. In this way, there is a displacement of the general 
concept when taking into account each unique perspective of it. Hume’s concept of 
empiricism retains a unique and contrasting sense whilst being classified under the 
general term with other empiricist thinkers. It is this unique perspective that we 
encounter when reading a philosopher. It is a mistake to assume that every 
																																																								
102 Deleuze, Parnet, Dialogues, p.15 
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philosopher holds the similar view to another when using the same concept. When 
reading a philosopher we encounter their unique understanding of a concept (Hume 
empiricism is X, Locke’s Y, Berkeley’s Z). These differences in concepts transform 
the general image of empiricism that is placed upon each philosopher. A 
generalisation then cannot properly explain the differences between each view of 
empiricism as a general view is taken (All views signify X).  
 
For Deleuze, it was Nietzsche who provided a different approach to the 
reading of philosophers from the traditional academic approach: “It was Nietzsche, 
who I read only later, who extricated me from all this. Because you just can't deal 
with him in the same sort of way. He gets up to all sorts of things behind your back. 
He gives you a perverse taste--certainly something neither Marx nor Freud ever 
gave anyone-for saying simple things in your own way, in affects, intensities, 
experiences, experiments.”103 Nietzsche does not provide a criterion for 
interpretation (Freud) or a criterion for revolutionary change (Marx) but enables a 
way in which structure is constructed through the development of our understanding. 
This is because the process of making sense remains separate to the meaning of a 
word. When we no longer take into account the process of making sense and its 
relation to meaning, it becomes part of a universal criterion. Each interpretation that 
is made must conform to the general meaning. Any alternative understanding of a 
word would always be denied in preference to the criterion (My sense of X as Z is 
wrong because it does not fit the general criterion which states X is always Y.) This 
enables knowledge itself to be static where no different understanding could emerge.   
																																																								
103 Gilles Deleuze, Negotiations, trans. Martin Joughin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995) p.6 
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Deleuze’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s philosophy as exposing processes of 
understanding within transcendent or metaphysical foundations continues into his 
view of reconstruction of the concept of philosophy in Nietzsche and Philosophy. 
In Nietzsche and Philosophy, Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche is designed to enable a 
positive sense of Nietzsche’s concepts and philosophy to emerge. To include the 
word philosophy to Nietzsche can be seen as shocking following Russell’s criticism 
in his History of Western Philosophy (1945)104: How can Nietzsche’s philosophy be 
philosophical when it has no clear philosophical assumptions? This is what Deleuze 
intends to do, not to reinstate a general understanding of Nietzsche through a school 
of thought but to revalue the concept of philosophy. For Deleuze, a different concept 
of philosophy is needed because of Nietzsche’s questioning of truth and its relation 
to language: 
 
Nietzsche questions the concept of truth, he denies that the true can be an 
element of language. What he is contesting is the very notions of true and 
false. Not because he wants to ‘relativize’ them like an ordinary skeptic. In 
their place he substitutes sense and value as rigorous notions: the sense of 
what one says, and the evaluation of the one saying it. You always get the 
truth you deserve according to the sense of what you say, and according to 
																																																								
104 This can be seen in Russell’s statement “Nietzsche, though a professor, was a literary rather than an 
academic philosopher. He invented no new technical theories in ontology or epistemology; his importance is 
primarily in ethics, and secondarily as an acute historical critic.” Bertrand Russell, The History of Western 
Philosophy (Woking: Unwin Brothers Limited, 1947) p.788. For Russell, there are no philosophical aspects to 
Nietzsche’s thought because there is no stable philosophical foundation or system of philosophy. This is due to 
the lack of any concepts that could affirm a universal truth: “It does not occur to Nietzsche as possible that a 
man should genuinely feel universal love.” Ibid, p.795. In contrast, this universal love Russell argues is 
something that all share in: “Nietzsche despises universal love; I feel it the motive power to all that I desire as 
regards the world.” Ibid, p.800 An example of this need for universal values can be seen in his criticism of 
Nietzsche’s Beyond Good And Evil , “[the book] really aims at changing the reader’s opinion as to what is good 
and what is evil, but professes, except at moments, to be praising what is ‘evil’ and decrying what is ‘good’” 
Ibid, p.790 
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the values to which you give voice. This presupposes a radically new 
conception of thought and language, because sense and value, signification 
and evaluation, bring into play mechanisms of the unconscious.105   
 
Emphasising the importance of the evaluation of meaning presupposes a completely 
different conception for thought and language. This is because the process of 
evaluation and interpretation is subject to worldly and unconscious processes at 
work which make an individual hold certain values as true and false (The underlying 
conditions for stating X is Y are A, B, C). Nietzsche thereby challenges a 
transcendent foundation since truth always remains conditioned and affected by 
worldly forces. Yet this is not to say that there do not exist any forms of truth 
whatsoever in Nietzsche’s philosophy. Truths are conditioned by the values that 
attempt to hold a given perspective as the correct meaning (At the given time period 
the values of A, B, C were of importance this influenced the thought at the time that 
X always meant Y). This would mean an individual cannot absolutely affirm that a 
certain truth is always correct. Truth is continually transforming effected by different 
perspectives, social, political, cultural forces or our environment, as Brook Thomas 
argues “… Nietzsche emphasises the distortions and violations required in order to 
bring about such a consistent stability.”106 
 
The chapter analyses Nietzsche’s philosophy of language in order to 
understand why it is necessary to analyse processes and worldly forces underlying 
meaning. Comparable to Locke, this is to argue that meaning is not pure or absolute 																																																								
105 Deleuze, Desert Islands and Other Texts, ed. by David Lapoujade, trans. by Michael Taormina (London: 
Semiotext(e), 2004) pp.135-6 
106 Brook Thomas, The New Historicism: And Other Old-Fashioned Topics, (New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 1991) p.104 
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but dependent upon how we understand, or make sense of things in the world. 
These initial relations to sense and meaning are then strengthened through a denial 
of a causal origin for language, the role of rhetoric in its relation to sense and the 
tension of an individual’s acceptance of social norms. The denial of a causal origin 
for language is analysed in Nietzsche’s brief essay On the Origin of Language. The 
remarks made by Nietzsche on philosophers are very brief. Due to this, it is 
necessary to fully expand upon these remarks by discussing the criticism in context 
with the given thinkers’ view. The views that will be expanded upon are Rousseau’s 
emotional gesture, de Brosses’ natural association, Mondobbo’s divine ideogram, 
and Herder’s reflection upon expression. Following this, an analysis of rhetoric 
develops Nietzsche’s argument by emphasising the importance of the role of sense. 
It will be argued that, in contrast to Locke, meaning is in a continual state of 
becoming. In other words, our understanding is in a continual process of making 
sense of the world. In this way, meaning is not absolute or in a continual process of 
redefinition at different periods in time. The attainment of meaning is novel since we 
continually make sense of things differently. This radical concept of meaning allows 
us to understand developments in Nietzsche’s philosophy where individuals must 
become opposed to social norms by demonstrating its absurdity. It in Nietzsche’s 
later philosophical concepts of revaluation and the eternal return where its necessary 
for an individual to continually revaluate their understanding and thereby affirm a 
continual challenge to societies’ values and their own preconceptions.  
 
Problems with a transcendent foundation for knowledge 	
In his brief essay, On the Origin of Language written in 1869-70, the same year that 
he became Chair of Classical Philology at the University of Basel, Nietzsche outlines 
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how the problem of language has been treated in the history of philosophy. 
Nietzsche’s remarks are critical of the role of the creation and necessity of a 
foundation within philosophy. He is critical of both the transcendent philosophy 
(Plato) and Kant’s transcendental philosophy. Against these positions he argues that 
we need to affirm worldly processes, sense making and multiple perspectives. 
Despite being an everyday occurrence, philosophy has traditionally argued that 
language is: “…neither the conscious work of individuals nor of a plurality.”107 This is 
because philosophers have sought a transcendent foundation for language.  
 
Traditionally, a transcendent foundation is beneficial for our understanding since it 
provides a stable structure. What is discovered is an absolute causal basis that 
serves to always explain the reason for why phenomena behave in a certain manner. 
For Nietzsche, this absolute basis for knowledge is negative since it denies other 
possible causes for an origin. In relation to understanding, it also prevents the 
development of novel or different uses of structures by privileging the one method as 
providing the best means for education. In relation to language, this privileges role of 
the Idea rather than an expression. In doing so, there is a denial of the development 
of language itself, the novel and different uses of language that occur over time. 
 
The privileged role of a transcendent cause or signifier then takes such precedence 
that any individual nor a number of worldly affects (social, cultural, environmental 
forces) cannot either create language or affect language. Nietzsche then highlights 
the problem of developing a new thought in philosophy: “all conscious thought is 
possible only with the help of language. It is absolutely impossible to have such a 																																																								
107 Friedrich Nietzsche, Friedrich Nietzsche on Rhetoric and Language, ed. and trans. by Sander L. Gilman, 
Carole Blair and David J. Parent (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989) p.209 
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clever thought … [since] the deepest philosophical insights are already implicitly 
contained in language.”108 Thought itself is dependent upon language. It is 
impossible to think without a means of expression. Without language this would 
mean Ideas would remain forever trapped without any means of actualising them. 
Yet the removal of the individual’s creation and affectual relation to language means 
that it is impossible to develop differences between our ideas. This is because each 
thought would not be new or show a completely different knowledge of something 
since each expression is always the same (it doesn’t matter if its in Ancient Greek, 
Medieval English or contemporary French). That is, a transcendent cause acts as an 
ultimate value where various different valuations always reflect the same value. In 
this way, language itself negates different thoughts from emerging and developing as 
it denies a different means of expressing the uniqueness of these ideas. Each 
expression of a thought reflects the same meaning. As Wayne Klein notes “the 
philosopher’s error is dependent on errors in language is ... implied in the temporal 
structure of Nietzsche’s narrative.”109 The error that philosophers make is because 
“we are forced into error as soon as we begin to refer to a world of stable objects 
existing in space and time.”110 This expression is based upon an ideality since it is 
unable to account for actuality, a world of continual change and becoming: “the 
senses do not lie insofar as they show becoming, change and alteration.”111 
Philosophers traditionally create a metaphysical foundation in order to resolve 
problems and provide an absolutely stable basis. However, we see that this 
metaphysical foundation further detaches us from reality: “the philosopher who posits 
																																																								
108 Ibid 
109 Wayne Klein, Nietzsche and the Promise of Philosophy (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997) 
p.92 
110  Ibid 
111 Ibid 
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a ‘true’ world is unable to escape from error, but merely adds one error to another 
…”112  
 
Nietzsche illuminates this problem in philosophy through a discussion of Kant 
and quotes from the Critique of Pure Reason: “A great part, perhaps the greatest 
part of the work of reason consists in analyzing the concepts which man finds pre-
existing in himself.”113These pre-existing concepts in Kant’s philosophy are the a 
priori categories114. An individual must move from an analysis of experiential 
phenomena to one based upon rational reflection. By rationally reflecting we can 
achieve understanding of metaphysical (or which Kant describes as noumenal) 
ideas. For Kant, we can never achieve a complete understanding based upon pure 
rational reflection. This is because, comparable to Locke, our idea would remain 
blank. Yet Kant maintains that we are still able to arrive at an understanding of a 
thing even if we cannot fully represent them by making sense of them: “… even if we 
cannot cognize these same objects as things in themselves, we must at least be 
able to think them as things in themselves. For otherwise there would follow the 
absurd proposition that there is an appearance without anything that appears.”115  
 
																																																								
112 Ibid, p.93	
113 Friedrich Nietzsche, Friedrich Nietzsche on Rhetoric and Language, p.209 
114 A problem for Kant’s philosophical project was how to maintain metaphysics without it denying experience 
(the rationalist position of a priori not a posteriori) and how to maintain experience without it denying 
metaphysics (the empiricist position of a posteriori not a priori). As Roger Scruton argues “it was already 
apparent to Kant that empiricism denies the possibility of metaphysics. And yet metaphysics is necessary if 
foundations are to be provided for objective knowledge: without it, there is no conceivable barrier against 
Hume’s scepticism.” Roger Scruton, Kant: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) 
pp.28-30 This formed a foundation for Kant’s project in Critique of Pure Reason to show that: "In opposition to 
Hume, to show that synthetic a priori knowledge is possible ... [and] in opposition to Leibniz, to demonstrate 
that 'pure reason' alone, operating outside the constraints placed on it by experience, leads only to illusion, so 
that there is no a priori knowledge of things-in-themselves." Ibid p.31 
115 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. and ed. by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998) p.115 
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In making sense of a metaphysical object we can associate empirical qualities 
to it and are able to comprehend it. For instance, we are able to understand the idea 
of infinity by relating it to empirical objects such as the sea. As thought must conform 
to empirical conditions Kant conceives of twelve categories of understanding that 
provide a priori conditions for an experience to occur and are demonstrable within 
experience. This can be seen in Herbert James Paton’s commentary “Kant’s whole 
argument turns on the possibility of experience, experience being always a 
compound of intuition and thought. Unless given intuitions or appearances can be 
thought, they cannot give us knowledge or experience. But if they are to be thought 
or judged, they must conform to the conditions or forms of judgment, and therefore to 
the categories.”116  
 
For Nietzsche, as Kant’s philosophy limits our knowledge solely to the 
phenomenal realm, it prevents us from being able to learn. This is because the a 
priori categories are absolute and prevent any alternative category to be presented 
in the future and also prevent an alternative opinion from Kant about how the 
category functions. As Catherine H. Zuckert states “philosophy has been traditionally 
been understood to be the search for wisdom ... with Kant that search culminated 
only in the knowledge that we cannot know.”117 In other words, Kant’s categories act 
as an absolute foundation where we cannot reach different or alternative categories. 
This foundation denies an interaction or explanation of the immediate immanent 
qualities of the experiential qualities that Kant’s own system wants to affirm. The 
problem then lies with our use of reason. In order to know we must always use 
rational reflection. Yet in doing so, we do not reflect upon the immediate object but 																																																								
116 Herbert James Paton, Kant’s Metaphysic of Experience, Vol.1 (London: Routledge, 2002) p.472 
117 Catherine H. Zuckert, Postmodern Platos (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996) p.10 
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the ideal one. An earlier contemporary, Friedrich Jacobi, of Kant’s also highlights this 
problem, as Olav Bryant Smith remarks “… as early as 1787 [Jacobi] criticized the 
inconsistency in Kant’s system … Jacobi argued that in reasoning, human beings 
establish a distance from which to reflect upon the representation. Such reflective 
thinking … cannot help but be far removed from experienced reality.”118 The rational 
model’s abstraction from reality then led to an idealistic view of the world that was 
detached from actuality.  
 
Nietzsche continues to highlight a problem of education through the process 
of an individual making sense of an idea is considered to be harmful: “the 
development of conscious thinking is harmful to language.”119 The development of 
one’s own sense is to come to the knowledge of what a thing is differently from the 
given meaning (My understanding of X means Y whilst it traditionally means Z). This 
is because different connections and relations would be assembled in understanding 
a meaning (His understanding of X means Y is effected by various social, cultural 
and political forces of B, C and D). Following this, each understanding of a given 
meaning would not be universal but subjective. In this way, meaning is not absolute 
but composed of different contrasting opinions. The move from absolute basis to 
multiplicity is harmful for an individual’s understanding. It is harmful because an 
individual can no longer be certain of a given meaning. This leads to a distortion in 
their understanding where any possible opinion could be correct knowledge. 
Therefore in order for attain clarity for one’s own understanding and have correct 
knowledge we must move away from a multiplicity of contrasting opinions to one 
absolute view. In order to avoid harm an individual’s understanding must conform to 																																																								
118 Olav Bryant Smith, Myths of the Self: Narrative Identity and Postmodern Metaphysics (Maryland: Lexington 
Books, 2004) p.28 
119 Nietzsche, Friedrich Nietzsche on Rhetoric and Language, p.209 
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its universal expectation. Each subjective opinion would then not differ but be 
reflective of the same generality. For instance, this view of language can be seen in 
Plato’s Cratylus (this is analysed further in Chapter 5). Put simply, Hermogenes, a 
friend of Socrates, advocates a subjective argument where meaning would differ 
between each individual. Plato criticises this view since no clear understanding of a 
meaning could ever be reached. In order for individuals to attain a correct 
understanding their knowledge must be reflective of the same general Idea. 
Knowledge of an Idea would therefore be gradually arrived at through rational 
reflection, which would combine similarities of various qualities together. 
 
In contrast to this transcendent model for our thought, Nietzsche states 
“Decadence is caused by advanced culture. The formal element which has 
philosophical value is damaged. Think of the French language … all final syllables 
are eroded away; the stem syllables are distorted beyond recognition. A more highly 
developed culture is even incapable of preserving from decay what was handed 
down to it complete.”120 That is, the privileging of a given meaning, a transcendent 
concept, is to have a decadent system of language. This decadence is based on an 
‘advanced culture’; this term is a sign of Nietzsche’s humour. It is humorous because 
it challenges and parodies an image of thought from Enlightenment thinking. In short, 
in the Age of Enlightenment it was held that man with the aid of Reason was in 
continual progression towards a utopian society. As Roy Porter states “Reason alone 
(Enlighteners tended to believe) would afford a total knowledge of man, society, 
Nature and the cosmos; [this] would enable them to mount a critique of the political 
and the religious status quo; and, above all, would provide the foundations for a 
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utopian future.”121 Nietzsche is therefore questioning the premise that reason is an 
act of the intellect, pure reflection, and free from all worldly influences. This is 
because it is the sign of a decadent and aristocratic culture that influenced that 
creation of such transcendent concepts. In other words, it is a decadent lifestyle itself 
that is reflected in philosophy of seeking a seeking a utopian or ideal future state that 
is greater than their current one. In this way, philosophy itself becomes damaged 
since it no longer retains its critical or sceptical aspect due to the obedience to 
rationalist philosophy that seeks to establish an absolute foundation for knowledge.  
 
It is therefore Kant’s attempted complete resolution of the empirical and 
rationalist problems that is considered to be harmful. This is because the complete 
resolution of a problem attempts to forestall any further attempt at making sense of it. 
Knowledge then becomes dogmatic and remains closed to any further responses to 
these problems. The benefit of the continued returning to make sense of problems is 
then to allow for alternative answers to be given. It is also to allow for a continued 
engagement with a given problem over time; to allow for the problem to function and 
transform in relation to different social and cultural environments and in different time 
periods. In contrast to attempting to fully resolve a problem it can be returned to and 
transformed in a positive and constructive manner. This can be seen in Deleuze’s 
early work that offers an alternative reading to Kant’s definitions of rationalist and 
empiricist philosopher. For instance, Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza in Expressionism 
in Philosophy: Spinoza (1968) and Spinoza: Practical Philosophy (1970) challenges 
Kant’s view based by demonstrating the immanent and empirical qualities of 
Spinoza’s philosophy.  
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A genealogy of language and its various origins  	
After his critical analysis of transcendent and transcendental philosophical 
foundations, Nietzsche continues to show how worldly influences affect our thought 
and language. This is demonstrated through analyzing the phonetic changes in 
language over time. The necessity of these phonetic differences then affirms the 
social, cultural environmental, and historical influence upon language (William 
Labov’s phonetic analysis that also takes this into consideration occurs in Chapter 
3.) This is in contrast to a traditional philosophical approach that denies phonetics 
altogether in preference to a causal foundation or transcendent origin. Nietzsche 
illustrates the fragility of language through the example of the eradication of 
elements from the French language. In relation to the French language the 
eradication of aspects of its development was apparent through different invasions. 
As Jean-Benoit Nadeau and Julie Barlow argue “when the Roman victors showed up 
… it didn’t take long for the Gaulish elite to start speaking Latin.”122 Due to this 
popularity of speaking Latin “the Gaulish language ended up contributing very little to 
the vocabulary of modern French. Only about a hundred words survived the 
centuries, mostly rural and agricultural terms such as bouleau (birch) … mouton 
(sheep) … and boue (mud).”123 Despite its minor influence “…Gaulish is still 
relatively known, partly because it left many place and family names in northern 
France. For example, the name Paris comes from the Parisii, a Gaulish tribe …”124  
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This eradication of different styles of language is also related to the origins of 
language itself: “… there was supposedly a condition without language, with only 
gestures and shrieks. Then conventional gestures and shrieks were established. 
These means could have been perfected into a pantomimed language of shrieks and 
song. But that would have been precarious. Not everyone is skilled at correct 
intonation and precise hearing.”125 That is, there was thought to be a pure phonetic 
language before pronunciation took place. This was where each object could be 
identified and distinguished by a different tone. As Raimo Anttila explains 
“…phoneticians, around the turn of the century, developed transcription systems 
intended to be truly phonetic … but it was soon realized that one could never reach 
the ultimate logical goal of one symbol for each sound in the sum total of all known 
languages. The obstacle results from the fact that nobody pronounces the ‘same 
sound’ twice…”126 For instance, this phonetic language can be ascribed to a 
caveman. A caveman is portrayed with only grunts and groans without any capacity 
for speech. Yet this caveman language was not perfected. The grunts and groans 
were not made into a language because not everyone would be capable of creating 
the right tones [No it’s a# for yes not c flat]. This shrieking language is replaced by 
using a new mode of expression “[by] using the tongue and lips, it was possible to 
produce a certain amount of articulation. The new language was felt to be 
advantageous and so was retained.”127 A transformation of shrieking occurred; it was 
no longer acceptable to use a commonplace shrieking but something different. In 
accepting the new language the previous uses of tones was not eradicated but 
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transformed in such a way in which they could be affirmed. Following this, it did not 
matter whether the tone was correct or not but only the pronunciation.  
 
In order to understand these various transformations of language throughout 
time, a pure origin is sought. This pure origin enables us to understand how we were 
able to gain the capacity to communicate. Yet, on a deeper level, it enables a 
universal foundation for meaning. That is, regardless of differences in language over 
time or grammatical variations within languages, we all would be able to understand 
the same timeless ideas. Nietzsche analyses these claims for a pure origin for 
language and remarks that it has been debated as to whether this foundation was 
“… merely from human mental power or whether it was a direct gift from God.”128 For 
Nietzsche, God as an original foundation remained as an explanation due to the lack 
of the historical and physiological understanding of language: “That question was 
justified because of the scanty historical and physiological understanding of the 
time.”129 We must be careful here; Nietzsche is not criticizing ancient civilizations that 
accepted the unfolding of events as divine occurrences, but rather, the modern 
explanation for language as originating from transcendence. An example of this is 
from Rousseau (1712-1778): “Jean-Jacques Rousseau believed that language could 
not possibly have originated by purely human means.”130 His other examples that are 
analysed in the chapter are the claims for an origin for language by Charles de 
Brosses, Lord Monboddo, and Johann Herder. Nietzsche problematizes each case 
by highlighting the immanent and worldly forces that affect a claim for a transcendent 
foundation.  
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Rousseau, speech and signs as an empathetic gesture 	
In his Essay on the Origin of Languages Rousseau explains “As soon as man was 
recognised by another as a sentient, thinking being similar to himself, the desire or 
need to communicate his feelings and thoughts made him seek the means to do 
so.”131 Two ways in which individuals attempted to communicate was through 
signification by gestures or by speech. Gesturing limits our means of communication 
to expression through body language. This enables us to reflect upon the emotional 
gesture that is expressed: “Far more things affect our eyes than our ears”132 A 
gesture is to express the performance of a sign. When gesturing there is an effectual 
relation between our body and the thing that we are attempting to portray. To 
illustrate this point Rousseau retells the story of Levite of Ephraim. Levite’s wife was 
murdered and instead of writing to the tribes of Israel, he divided her body into 
twelve sections and sent them to the tribes. This infuriated the tribes who stated 
“Never has such a thing happened in Israel, from the time of our father’s going out of 
Egypt to present day.”133 The sign of Levite’s dismembered wife signified his revenge 
more than words could. This is because the dismembered body of his wife signified 
death. Reflecting upon this sign enabled the tribes of Israel to reflect upon their own 
possible deaths.  
 
Speech enables us to have greater emotional attachment to a sign: “the 
passions have their gestures, but they also have their accents; and these accents 
which thrill us, these tones of the voice that cannot fail to be heard, penetrate to the 
very depth of the heart, carrying there the emotion they wring from us, forcing us in 																																																								
131 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, On the Origin of Language, trans. by John H. Moran in Two Essays On the Origin of 
Language; Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Johann Gottfried Herder, ed. and. trans. by John H. Moran and 
Alexander Gode (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1966) p.5 
132 Ibid, p.6 
133 Ibid, p.7 
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spite of ourselves to feel what we hear.”134 The use of specific tones enables us to 
react emotionally to what is being stated. This enables us to recognise certain signs 
as having more value than others depending on the tone that is used. In order to 
show the importance of speech’s relation to the sign Rousseau uses the example of 
someone weeping: “Imagine someone in a painful situation that is fully known; as 
you watch the afflicted person, you are likely not to weep. But give him time to tell 
you what he feels and soon you will burst into tears.”135 We are unable to 
immediately relate ourselves to another individual’s tragic situation. However, when 
the other individual explains their situation to us we are then able to empathise with 
them. In this way, speech gives the sign of weeping an emotional power that forces 
an individual to reflect upon their tragic situation. 
 
This leads Rousseau to state “…if the only needs we ever experienced were 
physical, we should most likely never have been able to speak; we would fully 
express our meanings by the language of gesture alone.”136 That is, if all that the 
individual sought was to satisfy bodily desires then we would never likely have 
developed speech. There would be no need to communicate our thoughts to one 
another through speech, as simple sign language would suffice. This demonstrates 
that, for Rousseau, individuals desire an emotional attachment to signs. We want to 
communicate ideas and thoughts to one another and, in doing so; we become better 
individuals through our emotional conveyance to each other through speech.  
 
																																																								
134 Ibid, p.9 
135 Ibid, p.8 
136 Ibid, p.9 
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This allows us to return to Nietzsche’s single sentence criticism of 
Rousseau137. Human language could not have originated by purely human means 
since we would be left with only the capacity to gesture to one another through body 
language. Speech is then necessary because it enables us to empathise with one 
another. By empathising we can reflect upon common ideals that are shared with 
another individual. This enables us to move away from a purely selfish means by 
satisfying our own bodily desires to a selfless reflection upon universal ideals shared 
by society. In other words, through empathising, we reflect upon a metaphysical 
foundation based upon universal ideals. This enables us to see how society itself, for 
Rousseau, is established through the act of empathy in speech: “We would not have 
been able to institute laws, to choose leaders, to invent arts, to establish commerce, 
and to do, in a word, almost as many things as we do with the help of speech.”138  
 
Following on from this, a critical question can be asked: Is Nietzsche 
suggesting that body language or a sign language based upon gestures should take 
on a greater importance than speech? Nietzsche is not privileging either position 
because he wants to demonstrate a problem of the transcendent signifier in claims 
for an origin or causal foundation. A transcendent signifier is a metaphysical sign that 
all individuals are able to rationally reflect upon. For instance, as we have 
demonstrated with Rousseau, through the use of speech we are able to empathise 																																																								
137 It must be noted that Nietzsche did not take into account the complexity of Rousseau’s thought as Keith 
Ansell-Pearson states “It is evident that Nietzsche did not develop a grasp either of the subtleties, or of the 
complexities, of Rousseau’s thought. Of Rousseau’s writings, he was most familiar with Emile and the 
autobiographical pieces such as the Confessions.” Keith Ansell-Pearson, Nietzsche Contra Rousseau: A Study of 
Nietzsche’s Moral and Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) p.20 Despite this, the 
effect of Rousseau upon Nietzsche’s philosophy cannot be understated: “Rousseau’s ideas, in fact, play a key 
role in Nietzsche’s genealogy of modern decadence, which, in his writings of the mid to late 1880s, takes the 
form of a history of European nihilism where he locates in Rousseau’s writings the origins of a distinctly 
modern sensibility.” Ibid  
138 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Two Essays On the Origin of Language; Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Johann 
Gottfried Herder, p.9 
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with another, and in doing so, we are able to rationally reflect upon universal ideals. 
The problem is that use of rational deduction moves us away from worldly processes 
and forces. The desiring body, the individual that acts, everyday objects, in order to 
propose a metaphysical methodology that determines how we think about objects or 
how we act in the world. Nietzsche then wants to return to us to these worldly 
processes in order to demonstrate that a transcendent signifier is always based upon 
these processes.  What are these worldly processes or who creates these worldly 
processes? It is these questions that the shape the problem for man as a creator of 
language.  
 
De Brosses and our natural association of names 	
Nietzsche briefly summarises the contrasting view of the human origin of language 
through the views of Charles de Brosses, Lord Monboddo and Johann Gottfried 
Herder. For Nietzsche, de Brosses’ (1709-1777)139 view “… postulates the purely 
human origin of language but with inadequate means. According to him, the choice 
of sounds depends on the nature of thing, e.g., [in French] rude [crude] and doux 
[sweet], and he asks ‘Is not one thing crude and the other sweet?”140 De Brosses 
view explains the natural association of sounds to things. This would mean a word 
has a natural and correct pronunciation if it matches the same signification: “because 																																																								
139 Charles de Brosses was a French jurist, scholar, anthropologist and a geographer. He was a councillor in the 
parlement (royal law court) of Dijon in 1730. In 1775 he became first president of the parlement. His other 
pursuits are succinctly described by Peter Hanns Reill and Ellen Judy Wilson “He was a close friend of David 
Hume and actually translated portions of Hume’s Natural History of Religion into his own language … as a 
scholar, de Brosses contributed to the growth of knowledge about the antiquities of Greece and Rome.” Peter 
Hanns Reill and Ellen Judy Wilson, Encyclopedia of the Enlightment, Revised Edition (New York: Book 
Builders Inc., 2004) p.71 De Brosses also had a heated rivalry with Voltaire “...over payment for 40 cords of 
wood. The two men lived on adjoining estates in Burgundy … The dispute so angered Voltaire that he reputedly 
acted to ensure that the French Academy would not admit de Brosses into its membership.” Ibid. De Brosses 
philosophy of language was also popular with it influencing Anne-Robert-Jacques Turgot who was “the 
philosophe and reforming general controller of finances under Louis XV, [who] adapted material from de 
Brosses’s treatise for his articles on language in the Encyclopedie.”Ibid 
140 Nietzsche, Friedrich Nietzsche on Rhetoric and Language, p.210 
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the mechanical structure of certain organs naturally makes them appropriate for 
naming certain classes of things of the same kind; … this leads ultimately to the fact 
that the objects included in this class have some quality or some movement which 
resembles that appropriate to the organ. It is therefore nature which is in charge 
here.”141 
 
Nietzsche questions de Brosses’ assumption that there is a natural 
association of sounds to things and states “…such words are extremely remote from 
the origin of language; we have grown accustomed to the sounds and imagine that 
they contain some elements of things.”142 Through habit we have become 
accustomed to associate things together. Yet it is through habit that individuals 
associate different things together. This enables individuals from various cultures 
and societies to have different ideas. A discussion of habit is then remote from a 
discussion on the origin of language since de Brosses does not attempt to explain 
how these various associations have the same causal foundation. From this it cannot 
be argued that there is a natural association of sounds to names since this 
association transforms over time. Nietzsche gives an example of comparative 
linguistics to illustrate this point: “[which] immediately showed with clarity that the 
origin of language from the nature of things could not be proven.”143 Comparative 
linguistics compares meanings of words from different languages in order to 
construct its historical development. In this way, there are various causes and effects 
for how a sound forms the basis for the correct pronunciation of a word. This can be 																																																								
141 Charles de Brosses, Traité de la formation méchanique des langues et des principes physiques de 
l'étymologie [Treatise on the Mechanical Formulation of Languages, and the Physical Principles of Etymology] 
in Pieter Adrianus Verburg, Language and its functions: a historico-critical study of views concerning the 
functions of language from the pre-humanistic philology of Orleans to the rationalistic philology of Bopp 
(Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Co., 1998) p.391 
142 Nietzsche, Friedrich Nietzsche on Rhetoric and Language, p.210 
143 Ibid 
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seen in Spike Gildea’s modern linguistic study of Cariban language, an indigenous 
language from South America:  
 
In reconstructing the history of Cariban grammar … I began studying the 
Panare language [A Cariban language in southern Venezuela] … it was clear 
that a great deal of grammatical change had taken place somewhere to make 
Panare look so different from … [the] Carib of Surinam and Hixkaryana … 
when I gathered the available comparative data, I found exactly the predicted 
source constructions to be widespread throughout the family, and the 
anticipated further changes in a few languages. The existence of these 
comparative patterns constituted a reality check on the internal reconstruction 
… the comparative patterns disconfirmed some of my earlier hypothesis about 
Panare grammar, and by revealing source morphology and constructions 
which had been lost in modern Panare …144    
 
Lord Monboddo and the divine ideogram as a foundation for 
language 
  
Nietzsche notes that James Burnett, Lord Monboddo (1714-1799)145 initially 
accepted the view that language is a human creation but ran into difficulties: 
																																																								
144 Spike Gildea (ed.), Reconstructing Grammar: Comparative linguistics and Grammaticalization (Amsterdam: 
John Benjamins Publishing Co., 2000) pp. viii - ix  
145 James Burnett, Lord Monboddo was a jurist, scholar and anthropologist. As a scholar “Lord Monboddo was 
an enthusiastic admirer of ancient literature, and especially of the works of Plato, and other Grecian 
philosophers.” Thomas Thomson, Daniel K. Sandford and Allan Cunningham, The Popular Encyclopedia, Vol. 
1, (Glasgow: Blackie and Son, 1841) p.763 Monboddo was also an eccentric where “he seriously advocates the 
existence of satyrs and mermaids. [Depsite this] both his official and his private character were extremely 
respectable; and he was, notwithstanding his eccentricities, a man of learning and ability.” Ibid His writing on 
language was also a precursor to evolutionary theory. As Tim Ingold explains “At the time the anthropoid apes 
were generally known as orang-utans … and nowadays denotes a particular species … Monboddo was firmly 
convinced that orang-utans were humans.” Tim Ingold, ‘Humanity and Animality’ in Tim Ingold (ed.), 
Companion Encyclopedia of Anthropology: Humanity, Culture and Social Life (London: Routledge, 1994) p.20 
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“[Monboddo] accepts a reflexive activity of the mind: language is an invention of man 
… so man needs no primeval language. Monboddo wrote about his theory for 
twenty-one years: but the difficulties kept increasing. He ascribed the origin of 
language to the very wisest of men. Even then he still must resort to superhuman 
help: the Egyptian demon-kings.”146 Unlike de Brosses, for Monboddo there is no 
natural foundation for language since he argues that “… the faculty of speech is not 
the gift of nature to man, but, like many others, is acquired by him.”147 A natural 
foundation for language is rejected. This is due to Monboddo’s acceptance of the 
Aristotelian premise that individuals are born with capacities, which are developed 
through habit and become a faculty for knowledge. In this way, language is not 
considered part of essential functioning of an individual’s existence. As E.L. Cloyd 
explains "... from this [Monboddo] reasoned that as language was not essential to 
man's existence, as for example, the function of the senses is essential, language 
was not a natural power in man, but a faculty, for which man has some natural 
capacity. Thus he was led to reject one of the basic premises accepted by most of 
his fellow Scots, that language was one of the natural gifts bestowed on man by 
God."148  
 
With no natural foundation, a problem for Monboddo’s philosophy of language 
emerges. If language is not natural but acquired why did language need to develop 
at all? How did man originally arrive at the capacity or habit to acquire language as a 
faculty? An answer to this emerges through divine assistance: 
																																																								
146 Nietzsche, Friedrich Nietzsche on Rhetoric and Language, p.211 
147 Lord James Burnett Monboddo, Of the Origin and progress of language, Vol.1, 2nd Edition (Edinburgh: J. 
Balfour, 1774) p.12 http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=OctB-
IVhyloC&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false [accessed 31st 
January 2012] 
148 E.L. Cloyd, James Burnett Lord Monboddo (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972) p.64 
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… a question will naturally occur …whether the invention of such an art does 
not exceed the faculties of man. And tho’ I have no doubt that men, after the 
art is invented, may cultivate and improve it … [but] in the first discovery [of 
language] … men had a supernatural assistance; and therefore, I am much 
inclined to what the Egyptians tell us of a God … an intelligence superior to 
man, having first taught them the use of language: For the art of language 
was first practised in Egypt and from thence propagated all over the world.149  
 
In contrast to his earlier thought, it was deduced that divine assistance was the only 
solution to the acquirement of language. Monboddo privileges ancient Egyptian 
civilisation, since it is thought to be the most developed system of language in the 
ancient world. This is illuminated by Cloyd’s remarks:  
 
…demon kings, demi-gods gave the Egyptians the idea of language, which 
they then developed themselves … the Egyptian culture had progressed far 
enough to set aside certain men, priests, whose sole duty was the invention 
and development of the arts and sciences. These priests then made the 
language systematic, so that it could express all kinds of ideas with great 
flexibility and precision.150  
 
For Nietzsche, Monboddo is unsuccessful in attempting to resolve a matter of the 
acquisition of language by arguing for a divine foundation based upon Ancient 																																																								
149 Lord James Burnett Monboddo, Of the Origin and progress of language, Vol.4 (Edinburgh: J. Balfour, 1787) 
pp. 184-5 
http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=1pPMBJ6AopUC&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=
0#v=onepage&q&f=false [accessed 31st January 2012] 
150 E.L. Cloyd, James Burnett Lord Monboddo, p.168 
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Egyptian ideograms. This ultimately negates various forms of language and their 
different uses of expression. This can be seen in Qian Zhongshu’s analysis of 
Monboddo’s remarks on Chinese language. “[Monboddo] came to the conclusion 
that Chinese is ‘the most extraordinary language in the world’ being intermediate 
between a language of art and a barbarous language … [in resembling] the 
barbarous languages … it has neither composition, derivation nor flection.”151 This 
leads Monboddo to claim that even the Chinese language structure originated from 
the Ancient Egyptian language structure: “He praised the Egyptians at the expense 
of the Chinese, and, on the authority of ‘a learned academician’ … [who] affirmed 
that the Chinese have taken their written characters from Egypt.”152 We therefore 
see that in Nietzsche’s view, by privileging Ancient Egyptian civilisation, Monboddo 
denies the possibility of different systems of language. Monboddo’s false historical 
analysis allows for the presumption that all languages must follow the same 
structure. It also does not occur to Monboddo that the divine assistance could lead to 
a deception. This is because there is an assumption by Monboddo that the Ancient 
Egyptian Gods would always provide good assistance like the Christian God. 
 
Herder and reflection upon expression as the foundation for 
language 		
Nietzsche initial remarks on Johann Gottfried Herder’s (1744-1803)153 essay is about 
his accomplishments but notes that Herder shares a dependence upon a 
																																																								
151 Qian Zhongshu, ‘China in the English literature of the Eighteenth Century’ in Adrian Hsia (ed.), The Vision 
of China in the English Literature of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries (Hong Kong: The Chinese 
University Press, 1998) p.145 
152 Ibid, p.146 
153 Herder’s writings were immensely influential on Romantic period writers. This influence is explained by 
Michael N. Forster “… Hegel’s philosophy … [extends] Herderian ideas … so too does Schleiermacher’s 
[ideas] … Nietzsche is strongly influenced by Herder (concerning the mind, history, and morals) … J.S. Mill 
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transcendent foundation for language:  “In Germany one hundred years ago the 
Berlin Academy had proposed a prize question … In 1770, Herder’s book was 
selected. Man was born for language … But Herder shares with his predecessors 
the view that language is internalized from expressed sounds. He sees exclamation 
as the mother of language; whereas in actual fact the mother of language is 
negation.”154 In the Essay on the Origin of Language (1772), Herder makes the claim 
in its opening statement that “Already as an animal, the human being has 
language.”155 That is, we have a relation to animals through our tonal reaction to 
worldly sensations: “All animals, down to the mute fish, sound their sensations.”156 
For instance, yawning when tired or screaming when in pain.  
 
However, our ability to choose what to communicate enables human language to be 
distinguished from animals: “… no animal, not even the most perfect, has so much 
as the faintest beginning of a truly human language … refine and organize those 
outcries as much as you wish; if no reason is added … I do not see how … there can 
ever be a human language - a language of volitional speech.”157 In this way, animals 
remain limited to their use of language as being determined by reactions to things in 
their environment. This is because an animal’s tonal expression is related to an 
instinctual drive: “the bee hums as it sucks; the bird sings as it nests.”158 In contrast, 
individuals can communicate delight or displeasure at the same sign (oh no, not dark 																																																																																																																																																																												
has important debts to Herder (in political philosophy); Goethe received his philosophical outlook from 
Herder…” Johann Gottfried Herder, Philosophical Writings ed. and trans. by Michael N. Forster (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002) p. vii 
154 Nietzsche, Friedrich Nietzsche on Rhetoric and Language, p.211 
155 Johann Gottfried Herder, Philosophical Writings, ed. and trans. by Michael N. Forster (Cambridge 
University Press, 2002) p.65 
156 Johann Gottfried Herder, Essay on the Origin of Language, trans. Alexander Gode in Two Essays On the 
Origin of Language; Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Johann Gottfried Herder, ed. and. trans. by John H. Moran 
and Alexander Gode (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1966) p.99 
157 Ibid 
158 Ibid 
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chocolate, oh yummy dark chocolate). Human communication then enables different 
reactions at signs whilst animals always communicate the same reaction.  
 
Herder relates this distinction between human and animal language to the 
speech of new-born children: “how does man speak by nature? Not at all, just as he 
does little or nothing entirely by instinct, entirely as an animal … [the new-born child] 
expresses neither conceptions nor instinctive drives through sounds as any animal 
does in accordance with its species …”159 A child can be said to mimic animal like 
tendencies at an early stage of development by only seeking to fulfil their basic 
needs. For instance, crying because they are hungry. However, a child’s language 
must be distinguished from an animal’s expression of tones since humans have the 
power of rational reflection. This reflection upon what to express enables freedom 
and independence from being solely determined by instinctual drives. “If man was 
not to be an instinctual animal, he had to be-by virtue of the more freely working 
positive power of his soul-a creature of reflection.”160 In this way, by reflecting upon 
what they want to express, children do not always react in the same way. A parent 
cannot always be certain that a baby or infant crying means that they want milk or 
food. Therefore reflecting upon which thoughts to express enables a freer relation of 
speech than in always communicating in order to express a reaction to a sensation. 
As Jürgen Trabant states “[the term reflection was used by Herder] to mean the 
cognitive disposition of human beings, the need of human beings to gain knowledge 
of the world … and this cognitive need – which is totally different from the animal 
need to communicate – creates thought that is simultaneously language.”161  																																																								
159 Ibid, p.107 
160 Ibid, p.112 
161 Jürgen Trabant, ‘Herder and Language’ in A Companion to the works of Johann Gottfried Herder, ed. by 
Hans Adler and Wulf Koepke (New York: Camden House, 2009) p.124 
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For Herder, it is through our ability to reflect upon an expression itself that 
creates language. This enables Herder to be distinguished from the Aristotelian 
tradition where language is defined according to external factors, our voice or 
material signs. As Trabant explains “…language is no longer voice or the material 
sign for the designation and communication of thought as in the traditional, 
Aristotelian view of language. Language is primarily thought.”162  By stating language 
is primarily thought, is for its expression to be an internal action created by reflection. 
In other words, language is dependent upon our internal capacity to reflect upon 
what to express and thereby is not detached or externalised from an individual. This 
enables Herder’s philosophy of language to be distinguished from all others 
discussed so far as they depend upon an external source in order to validate it as 
language. The external source in Rousseau is the source of empathy required 
through the other individual, in de Brosses it is the body as a product of natural 
association of words, and in Monboddo, it is the Egyptian hieroglyphic. 
 
This corresponds to Herder’s initial thoughts on the origin of language made 
in Fragments on Recent German Literature (1766-67) where he makes the claim that 
human knowledge is dependent on language: “If it is true that we cannot think 
without thoughts, and learn to think through words, then language sets limits and 
outline for the whole of human cognition.”163 Language enables our thoughts to be 
expressed. By communicating our thoughts, individuals can learn and educate 
others. However, knowledge remains limited to what can be communicated and 
expressed. In other words, knowledge is defined according to given meanings that 																																																								
162 Ibid 
163 Johann Gottfried Herder, Philosophical Writings, p.49 
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we can understand. Andrew Bowie demonstrates this significance in relation to 
Kant’s later attempt to identify the limit of knowledge in the Critique of Pure Reason: 
“Kant thinks the limits of human knowledge are dictated by the necessary mental 
forms in which it takes place. Before Kant even formulates his main ideas, Herder 
already suggests how these limits may be interpreted in terms of language as the 
condition of possibility of communicable knowledge.”164  
 
Nietzsche’s criticism of Herder is related to the problem of the transcendent 
role of meaning. That is, Herder shares with his predecessors a search for the origin 
for language. This is in order to identify how communication is able to occur. This is 
why Nietzsche states that for Herder communication is the ‘mother of language’. Yet 
Herder’s answer is based upon the process of rational reflection. The process of 
reasoned deduction of what to communicate enables us to be distinguished from 
animals. Reason also then dictates the limits of knowledge based upon what can be 
communicated. From this, Herder’s view of language is restrictive since all 
individuals have to reflect upon the same meaning. It is this same meaning that 
should be communicated in order for an individual’s understanding to be correct. The 
role of meaning in Herder then is that it is based upon a transcendent sign that is 
devoid of any worldly qualities. This is in order for an individual to reflect upon the 
pure and absolute meaning that is attained through rational deduction. 
 
In contrast, for Nietzsche, setting limits to our knowledge prevents differing 
opinions or perspectives from being formed. In other words, what is communicated is 
always open to the process of making sense. By having to make sense of the 																																																								
164 Andrew Bowie, Introduction to German Philosophy: From Kant to Habermas (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003) 
P.51 
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communication, an individual’s understanding is empirical. We relate names that are 
being communicated to given worldly objects. In doing so, names can never be 
abstracted or detached from the world. This enables individuals to form different 
opinions from their different cultural and social backgrounds. From this a critical 
remark can be made that a limit to our understanding is still applicable. A limit can 
still be applied according to the various different expressions of an idea. For 
instance, the expression of hello can be defined to the various expressions in 
different languages, konnichiwa in Japanese, bonjour in French, hallo in German and 
so forth. An answer to this criticism is that it does not take into account the process 
of making sense of an idea. It removes the worldly context and tonality in order for it 
to always express the same meaning. This enables a distinction to be made between 
Herder’s and Nietzsche’s views as Andrea Christian Bertino states “Herder and 
Nietzsche reflect on the interweavement of language, anthropology and history … 
the philosophy of history remains, for Herder, at the center [of understanding how 
ideas are formed], as is shown by the Ideas for the Philosophy of History of 
Humanity (1774-1791).”165 In contrast, Nietzsche’s philosophy rejects the privileged 
use of one discipline or technique over another. This is because of: “… his insistence 
on a critical use of historical knowledge fertile for a genealogical questioning of 
morality, religion, philosophy, and the myths of Modernity.”166  
 
By taking into account a worldly context and tonality we allow for meaning to 
be changed depending upon how an individual makes sense of the communication 
(X said hello whilst rushing in to work, Y said hello in a seductive manner, Z said 																																																								
165 Andrea Christian Bertino, ‘As with Bees?’ Notes on Instinct and Language in Nietzsche and Herder’ in 
Nietzsche on Instinct and Language, ed. by João Constâncio and Maria João Mayer Branco (Berlin: Walter de 
Gruyter, 2011) p.7 
166 Ibid 
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hello loudly in order to get someone’s attention). A meaning is therefore is in 
continual state of becoming since it is always dependent upon how an individual 
makes sense of the communication. Due to this, meaning, for Nietzsche, is never 
absolute (A is always B), conditional (A was true at time B but not now at C), or 
general (from differences of A, B, C, the general truth is D). Meaning is novel by 
being subject to a continual process of transforming in conjunction with an 
individual’s process of making sense. Or to put it another way, there is any number 
of possible meanings that a word can be understood. Meaning remains dynamic by 
continually denying a foundation to be given. In this way, meaning is temporarily 
arrived at through our attainment of understanding but at the same time is able to be 
later changed when we return to it. This takes into account the novelty and fragility of 
meaning where we continually transform our prior understanding. The later 
perspective that we gain may be due to a reaction to contemporary events, 
responding to another’s opinion, or reflecting upon what was said. The continual 
change of our understanding is a positive process that enables our thought to 
respond to contemporary problems.  
 
Therefore for Nietzsche there cannot be a defined limit to our knowledge 
based upon communication since we must take into account the process of making 
sense in order to attain understanding. In this way, any limit remains in a continual 
state of becoming, as our knowledge is dynamic and in a state of transformation. 
Worldly forces (social, cultural, historical, political, environmental) continually affect 
an individual’s understanding. These forces make our understanding dynamic as 
they remain in a state of continual flux. We thereby respond to these dynamic 
changes, which influence our opinion. For instance, in teaching a course over a 
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number of years the same material will be presented to students. Yet things 
happening in the world during their time reading the material will affect their 
understanding of it. In this way, a philosopher’s concept is not simply repeated with 
the same meaning each year, rather, the concept’s meaning is transformed by the 
different context in which it is repeatedly understood.   
 
Following this, Nietzsche’s philosophy of language is in contrast to the 
philosophers who have searched for an origin to language. He aims to reverse the 
notion that language is dependent upon transcendental signifiers such as God, man, 
reason or nature. This is to identify language itself as a dependent upon an 
individual’s process of making sense.  This shows an important early development 
for the later concept of transvaluation in Nietzsche’s philosophy of language that 
seeks to reverse the transcendental signifier and replace it with values that affirm the 
world and the novelty of values. Nietzsche concludes the essay with a quote from 
Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling’s Historical-Critical Introduction to the Philosophy 
of Mythology (1842) who shares this different way of thinking about language, that is, 
individuals are not pure creators of meaning but our understanding is dependent 
upon and effected by worldly forces:  
 
… no philosophical consciousness, but … also no human consciousness at all 
is thinkable without language … yet, the deeper we inquire into language, the 
more definitely it becomes known that its depths exceed by far that of the 
most conscious product. It is with language as it is with organic beings; we 
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believe we see them blindly emerge into being and cannot deny the 
inscrutable intentionality of their formation, right up to the smallest detail.167  
 
Rhetoric, Metaphor, and the denial of a pure origin 	
This conception of language is developed further in Nietzsche’s Description of 
Ancient Rhetoric (1872-3) a series of notes that were delivered as lectures at Basel, 
to only two students. For Nietzsche, rhetoric is a critical tool that can be used to 
analyse the speech and writing of others, thus enabling us to become aware of their 
rhetorical techniques for hiding and furthering bias. This approach can also be 
applied to the analysis of claims for an absolute cause or origin. It is demonstrated 
that rhetoric is inseparable from such claims and that therefore a philosophy can 
never truly escape immanent processes. Nietzsche challenges the traditional 
philosophical role of rhetoric by drawing attention to its relation to bias. Once this link 
is established, the study of rhetoric assists in the denial of pure origins or 
transcendent foundations for meaning, because meaning is always a distortion. 
 
Language is distorted since there is a multiplicity of possible interpretation of an 
expression: “we call an author, a book or a style ‘rhetorical’ when we observe a 
conscious application of artistic means of speaking … we consider it to be not 
natural, and as producing the impression of being done purposefully. Obviously, very 
much depends on the taste of the one who passes judgment …”168 This is because 
rhetoric is dependent upon the speaker whose own personal preferences and bias 
affects their tonal emphasis. In Ancient Greek and Roman society, rhetoric was 																																																								
167 Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, Historical-Critical Introduction to the Philosophy of Mythology trans. 
by Mason Richey and Markus Zisselsberger (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2007) p.40 
168 Nietzsche, Friedrich Nietzsche on Rhetoric and Language, p.21 
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inseparable from language itself. Due to the specific tonal expression on the 
speakers’ bias, it was impossible for the writer recording the speech not to add their 
own sense of what was being said.  
 
For Nietzsche, in contrast to antiquity, modern language assumes its own 
purity free from rhetorical distortion: “whereas our [modern] prose is always to be 
explained more from writing, and our style presents itself as something to be 
perceived through reading.”169 The writer can communicate clearly to the reader 
without the need for an interlocutor. Modern language thereby assumes that the 
writer’s meaning can be clearly interpreted in its original sense by the reader. 
However, Nietzsche insists that modern language cannot be freed from rhetorical 
processes. This because rhetoric is a process working within language: “language 
itself is the result of purely rhetorical arts. The power to discover and to make 
operative that which works and impresses, with respect to each thing, a power which 
Aristotle calls rhetoric, is at the same time, the essence of language.”170 Briefly, for 
Aristotle, rhetoric was a valid art of communication because it allowed an individual 
to observe how an argument attempts to persuade its listeners into believing a truth: 
“[with] rhetoric we look upon as the power of observing the means of persuasion on 
almost any subject presented to us; and that is why … [rhetoric] is not concerned 
with any special or definite class of subjects.”171 Rhetoric enables us to precisely 
reflect upon those moments that the speaker places tonal emphasis upon. It is 
through this that the listener is able to identify the speaker’s bias. The listener is 
therefore not simply an awaiting fanatical follower but rather a critical thinker who 
analyses the speech and is sceptical of its ideas.   																																																								
169 Ibid 
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Nietzsche accepts the Aristotelian view of rhetoric by remarking: “Language 
does not desire to instruct, but to convey to others a subjective impulse and its 
acceptance.”172  For Nietzsche, rhetoric is also not an art of persuasion. It enables us 
to identify and analyse the process that persuades us into believing what is true. 
Nietzsche’s view of rhetoric can therefore be identified and distinguished from the 
general modern and classical approaches. This is because rhetorical processes 
affect both speaker and writer. In this way, there is no original meaning or intention 
to return to discover: “Man, who forms language, does not perceive things or events, 
but impulses: he does not communicate sensations, but merely copies of 
sensations.”173  
 
The speaker or writer communicates only copies of truths. These copies of a 
truth are simulacra. Each copy is not a different form of the truth itself but a distortion 
of the truth. This is not to say truth itself cannot emerge, rather that, truth itself is 
distorted. There are no essential truths because a natural or original foundation is 
always prevented since rhetorical processes always underlie it. What is 
communicated is never knowledge but only an opinion: “Instead of the thing, the 
sensation takes in only a sign. That is the first aspect: language is rhetoric, because 
it desires to convey only a doxa [opinion], and not an episteme [knowledge]”174   
 
Following these remarks, a critical point can be raised that Nietzsche arguing 
that we can never arrive at knowledge, or to put it another way, that we can never 
attain complete clarity for ourselves. This is because our knowledge is dependant 																																																								
172 Nietzsche, Friedrich Nietzsche on Rhetoric and Language, p.21 
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upon the personal bias of someone else and so we can never truly think for 
ourselves. Should we not then adopt a rationalist methodology or empirical 
methodology that allows for think for ourselves and be free from being influenced by 
other views? We can be critical of any methodology that claims to be free from bias 
and enabling an individual to think for themselves. This is because, for Nietzsche, 
any philosophical method or concepts are inseparable from rhetoric. In other words, 
philosophers and philosophical methods are not free from seducing the reader into 
believing in their perspective and method as the best one. It is because of 
philosophy’s relation to rhetoric that individuals are able to identify these processes. 
The identification of the specific emphasis placed on specific words enables us to 
critical of the text. In being critical of what is stated individuals think for themselves 
by not immediately agreeing with the argument175.  
 
The way in which rhetoricians persuade is through the use of images: “the 
sensation is presented externally through an image … It is not the things that pass 
over into consciousness, but the manner in which we stand towards them.”176 The 
speaker’s personal bias affects the way in which an image is portrayed to the 
listener. This is to effect the listener’s unconscious disposition towards the image 
used. The listener will then associate a particular idea towards specific worldly signs. 
It is through the association of ideas to signs that demonstrate the artistic aspect of 
rhetoric: “the tropes, the nonliteral significations, are considered to be the most 
																																																								
175 From this we can see Nietzsche’s influence on modern philosophical movement of deconstructionism and 
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artistic means of rhetoric ...”177 Artists, like rhetoricians, do not simply seek to 
express worldly objects but their ideas. In other words, artists seek to express a 
general signification. For instance, Scottish poet Robert Burns’ poem in My Love is 
Like a Red, Red, Rose (1794) proclaims, “my love is like a red, red, rose”178. What 
Burns seeks to express are not the various qualities (signifiers), its colours or 
botanical properties, but its general signification of temporality. Love is then temporal 
since, we our bodies can be compared to the life of flowers that will eventually decay 
and die.  
 
The association of ideas to signs demonstrates for Nietzsche that all words 
are tropes: “… all words are tropes in themselves.”179 That is to say, there is no pure 
or absolute meaning for words. This is because associations change over time. 
Particular images will be transformed or fade over time as we make return to make 
sense of things. Due to this, an image that is associated to a particular sign becomes 
less expressive and fades over time: “[tropes] present a sound image, which fades 
away with time: language never expresses something completely but displays only a 
characteristic which appears to be prominent to it.”180 A particular association of an 
idea to a sign is not absolute since there is a multiplicity of ways to understand the 
sign. A particular association of an image then is temporal since it represents only 
one possible way to understand a sign. This enables us to understand various 
associations as influenced by their social and cultural forces in a specific time period. 
Ideas then lose their initial vivacity and their cultural and social impact over time. For 
instance, George A. Romero’s Night of the Living Dead (1968) was shocking for its 																																																								
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time, as Kim Paffenroth remarks “… it immediately attracted controversy for its 
scenes of graphic and unremitting horror, including zombies ravenously eating 
intestines … in close-up shots. Even more shocking was the scene of a zombie child 
eating her father and murdering her mother ... ”181 Today these scenes are not 
considered shocking with the popularity of zombie culture such as the television 
series of The Walking Dead regularly depicting violent scenes.   
 
It is the second form of the tropus, the metaphor, that allows for new 
associations to be produced: “…it does not produce new words, but gives new 
meaning to them.”182 The distinction between first form tropes and second form 
tropus can be explained as follows. The first form, the tropes, is where certain 
characteristics of an idea fade over time. The second form, the tropus, allows for 
new characteristics of a sign to emerge. This demonstrates a dynamic connection 
between the two forms. Particular characteristics of a sign fade (tropes) whilst other 
characteristics are brought to light to replace them (tropus). Metaphors enable us to 
reflect on other possible characteristics of a sign. For instance, when a partner states 
‘he is the apple of my eye’ it identifies a particular characteristic of being beloved. 
Whilst later they may state ‘he is the light of my life’ that identifies another 
characteristics of joy and happiness. This demonstrates that there is a multiplicity 
(simulacra) of characteristics that define an idea. Any definition of an idea therefore 
remains dynamic where any given associations are in flux.  
 
The third form is the metonymy, the substitution of cause and effect. This is 
where the characteristics (the effects) and not the cause or absolute definition 																																																								
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constitutes a name: “when the rhetorician says ‘perspiration’ for ‘work,’ ‘tongue’ for 
‘language’”183. This is to criticise a rationalist view of language where different 
understandings and perspectives of a name are negated in preference to a general 
signification (I am a cogito). In contrast, for Nietzsche, the various senses that 
constitute a name cannot be related to the same meaning. Or to put it another way, a 
multiplicity of senses transform the relationship to its meaning in each expression.  
 
This is because each understanding of a sign is singular and unique. An 
understanding therefore does not repeat the general signification but creates its own 
unique form. For instance, an individual can attempt to categorise different shades of 
colours and say that they all share quality. Yet this categorisation of colour negates 
each unique shade. Instead of categorising them into sharing the same quality of 
colour, each colour itself transforms the way in which we understand the general 
signified. This is to recognise different senses for themselves in order for them to 
maintain the contrasting ways they express knowledge. In doing so, the multiplicities 
themselves deny an original foundation or essence to knowledge. As Céline Denat 
states “Nietzsche’s argumentation … consists in showing that the terms which we 
call ‘proper’ or ‘natural’ are only said to be so in as much as a long habit has made 
them seem to be so … Hence, what appears to be artificial or rhetorical in a given 
linguistic, historical and cultural context could end up seeming quite different in 
another one.”184 We should then question what is natural or our own habits in order 
to return to an experiential foundation for language: “… the belief in a proper 
language and in its real differentiation from an improper language is the effect of 																																																								
183 Ibid, p.25 
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having forgotten the history and developmental nature of language, as well as of our 
‘taste’ for certain modes of expression rather than others.”185 
 
Therefore Nietzsche has defined language’s inseparable relation to rhetoric 
through three connected forms of simulacra: The tropus, tropes and metonymy. Or to 
put it another way: the fading of knowledge, the selection of new characteristics that 
revitalise concepts and the denial of an original cause. Paul de Man further explains 
this significance “[Nietzsche’s work on rhetoric] marks a full reversal of the 
established priorities which traditionally root the authority of the language in its 
adequation to an extralinguistic referent or meaning, rather than in the intralinguistic 
resources of figures.”186  This shows a difference in Nietzsche’s philosophy of 
language to his predecessors’ search for the origin of language. For his 
predecessors there was a necessity of finding a transcendent category: Rousseau’s 
emotional gesture, de Brosses’ natural association, Monboddo’s divine ideogram 
and Herder’s reflective thought. A transcendent category of language was necessary 
for each of their philosophies as it explained how humanity acquired language. 
However, this emphasis on a transcendent category negates differences within 
languages. The transcendent category assumes a universal linguistic where each 
individual would not have a contrasting sense of things, share the same meanings 
and collectively all share the same experiences. In contrast, Nietzsche’s philosophy 
of language shows that each individual has a unique sense of things (tropus). This 
unique sense is developed through an image that is not eternal but fades over time. 
Through expressing their sense, it transforms the given category of things where it 
given a new meaning (tropes). This denies an original foundation to language 																																																								
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(metonymy) since an individual’s sense always transforms due to their continual 
apprenticeship. Nietzsche’s philosophy of language therefore does not seek to find 
an origin but to show how that origin itself is part of an inseparable process of 
rhetoric.  
 
The determination of sense by social convention and its absurdity 	
As we have seen Nietzsche’s use of rhetoric takes into account the immanent 
processes that form given philosophical truths and values. By taking these 
processes into account the traditional philosophical model is challenged. This model 
is challenged by not attempting to discover a pure transcendent foundation for 
language but rather, to demonstrate how any claim for an absolute cause is based 
upon the worldly forces that play a part in creating it. Nietzsche’s use of rhetoric as a 
critical tool is not limited to philosophical concepts, origins or causes but also allows 
us to critical of norms in society and culture. Once we have become aware of and 
identify bias we become skeptical of the accepted values or truths that are given to 
us. This is because it allows us to take into other opinions and viewpoints, rather 
than, solely accepting one.  
 
By challenging the accepted social and cultural norms we then begin the process of 
thinking for ourselves. In other words, we begin the process of making-sense of it 
and rediscovering what it means. However, the use of rhetoric and critical thinking 
then leads to an alienation from its values. As we have seen in the introduction, 
Locke avoids this problem of alienation by an individual’s acceptance and conformity 
to the general use of names. In contrast, Nietzsche affirms this alienation as a 
positive process that allows us to remain skeptical and to think for ourselves. Yet this 
	
	
87	
process is an unending process since his later concepts of the overman, revaluation 
and the eternal return that is discussed are ways of constructing an alternative 
philosophical model based upon immanence, and at the same time, allowing for the 
reader to arrive at their own meaning having undergone an existential style of crisis.  
 	
Far from affirming an individual’s unique perspective, language remains determined 
by the choices of the masses: “language is created by the individual speech artist, 
but it is determined by the fact that taste of the many makes choices … a figure [of 
speech] which finds no buyer becomes an error. An error that is accepted by some 
usus [custom] or other becomes a figure [of speech].”187 An individual’s perspective 
must find followers in order for it to become accepted by society. In other words, a 
perspective must have a use value. By accepting a perspective other individual’s 
give it greater value. In giving a specific view enough value it will become accepted 
as a general view by society. However, those individuals who do not find followers to 
accept their view are considered as in error and their view is forgotten. The relation 
of society’s values and error is discussed further in Nietzsche’s essay On Truth and 
Lying in an Extra-Moral Sense (1873): 
 
[An] individual wants to preserve himself against other individuals … but at the 
same time, because man, out of necessity and boredom, wants to live socially 
in the herd, he needs a peace agreement … [this] leads to the first step 
towards man’s acquisition of his mysterious desire for truth. For what ‘truth’ 
will be from now on is fixed; a uniformly valid and binding terminology for 
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things is invented and the legislation of language also enacts the first laws of 
truth.188  
 
An agreement is made by an individual in order to accept a country’s social and 
cultural values. By accepting these values an individual is no longer an outsider but 
is able to be accepted by society. The consequence of accepting these values is the 
negation of an individual’s unique perspective. This perspective must be negated in 
order to be equal and fit in with others in society: “man also wants truth in a similar, 
restricted sense … he is indifferent to pure, inconsequential knowledge; toward 
truths which are perhaps even damaging and destructive, he is hostile.”189 Any 
perspective that differs from what is generally accepted by society is treated as 
hostile, damaging and destructive to the status quo. Or to put it another way, any 
truths that attempt to challenge social norms are invalidated. This is to say, at a 
deeper philosophical level; to be part of society is to accept a herd mentality, a 
perspective that is agreed upon by society as correct. In this way, individuals no 
longer seek to make sense of the world for themselves but conform to generally 
accepted values. This is because an individual’s perspective has less use value than 
the social norm. In order to be correct and have greater value the perspective must 
conform its truths190.  
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For Nietzsche, complete obedience to generally accepted values is also to 
deceive oneself into believing a falsity as the truth: “… only by hardening and 
rigidification of the mass of images that originally gushed forth ... only by the 
invincible belief that this sun, this window, this table is a truth-in-itself, in short, only 
insofar as man forgets himself as a subject, indeed as an artistically creative subject, 
does he live with some calm, security and consistency.”191  The problem is that by 
denying a unique perspective is also to deny the creative force to transform how we 
understand the world. Nietzsche explains that a denial of rhetorical processes, the 
identification of bias and words as metaphors, has led us to forget about other 
possible valuations: “[an individual] thus forgets that the original intuitive metaphors 
are indeed metaphors and takes them for the things themselves.”192 As Linda L. 
Williams explains “Nietzsche argues that language is a convention, wholly non-
natural, which stresses similarities over differences in its invention of words, nouns 
especially. Because language ignores individual differences and concentrates on 
gross similarities, words other than proper nouns operate as a kind of shorthand, or 
economy for human experience.”193  
 
That is, one specific perspective is then given so much value that we always 
associate it to signs. Yet this general association is false since there are other 
perspectives that challenge it. For instance, Copernicus (1473-1543) who is famous 
for the heliocentric view (the planets revolved around the sun and not the earth) was 
mislabelled as a priest. As Edwards Rosen states “… Copernicus, the founder of 
modern astronomy, never called himself a priest throughout the seventy years of his 																																																								
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life. Neither his friends, nor his enemies … his close associates nor his distant 
acquaintances, ever referred to him as a priest.”194 The reason for this mislabelling 
was due to Galileo: “The falsification ‘Copernicus the priest’ was invented by Galileo 
while he was embroiled in his bitter and tragic struggle with the Roman Catholic 
Church.”195  
 
Following this criticism of general truths, does this mean that Nietzsche is 
affirming the life of a hermit rather than being accepted and living in society? 
Nietzsche is not arguing that individuals should exclude themselves from society; 
rather, individuals should be active members in society in order to show the 
absurdity in general truths by analysing the underlying rhetorical emphasis. In doing 
so, the social norm is debased and shown to be erroneous. This enables individuals 
to reflect upon the idea of truth as a perspective, one among many that is 
overburdened with value.  As Williams states “Nietzsche’s point seems to be not that 
we must abandon these kind of [philosophical] concepts [such as God or Reason] 
but that we must recognize that such designations arise from within us and not from 
the external world …”196 There is not then a pure for foundation or origin for Truth 
since it “… arises from particular humans beings, from perhaps their very physiology 
and not from any conscious decision to create it, then an independent, nonarbitarary 
foundation for Truth is a fiction invented by us.”197 
 
The process of debasing social norms claims for truth can be related to 
Nietzsche’s later philosophical work Thus Spoke Zarathustra (1883-5). In the 																																																								
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Prologue, Zarathustra descends from the mountains after ten years have passed to 
teach his philosophy.  The philosophy that Zarathustra teaches is that of the 
Übermensch or Overman, which is sometimes translated as Superman:  
 
I teach you the Superman. Man is something that should be overcome. All 
creatures hitherto have created something beyond themselves: and do you 
want to be the ebb of this great tide, and return to the animals rather than 
overcome man? What is the ape to men? And just so shall man be to the 
Superman: a laughing stock or a painful embarrassment … The Superman is 
the meaning of the earth. Let your will say: The Superman shall be the 
meaning of the earth!198  
 
After this prophetic speech the people listening at the marketplace mock and laugh 
at the idea of a Superman. The mockery of the philosophical concept by the people 
of the marketplace cannot be understated. This is because Nietzsche is 
demonstrating the problems in philosophical concepts’ practical value for society. In 
order to have worth, philosophical concepts affect social norms. By affecting social 
norms individuals are then left open to question their values and preconceptions for 
how they had understood the world. This enables an individual to be seduced by the 
philosopher’s concepts since their philosophy offers the correct way to understand 
the world. The irony of philosophical concepts is evident, unlike social norms that 
have a relation to a country and civilisation; they are based upon metaphysical 
foundation. In other words, an individual must become an apprentice to a 
metaphysical system that will enable them to more correctly understand the world. 
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Nietzsche’s concept of the Superman is a humorous mockery of this philosophical 
view. In other words, we can view the Superman as the achievement of reason by 
reflecting upon a pure version of our self (such as the Cartesian cogito). In order to 
attain a correct understanding of ourselves we must accept a metaphysical view. 
This is because we are able to clearly define who we are, rather than, attempting to 
define ourselves based upon experiential effects (I am cold, I am hot) or the novel 
changes in our personality over time (I used to like A, B, C but now like D, E, F). At 
the same time, Nietzsche insists that we should be critical of this traditional 
emphasis on a metaphysical self in order to affirm experience and life itself: 
“…remain true to the earth, and do not believe those who speak to you of 
superterrestrial hopes … They are despisers of life, atrophying and self-poisoned 
men, of whom the earth is weary: so let them be gone!”199  
 
 For Deleuze Nietzsche’s Overman or higher man addresses this nihilism by 
making us reflect upon the reactive nature of thought: “to what extent is man 
essentially reactive? … Nietzsche presents the triumph of reactive forces as 
something essential to man and history.”200 That is, to react is a positive reaction 
since it addresses a problem that arises. This takes place within a worldly context 
and its resolution will have a positive effect on various areas of life. For instance, 
whether tuition fees should be paid requires a positive reaction in order to resolve 
the problem. Its resolution will then have an effect upon the impact of social, cultural, 
and political impact upon whether people will be able to afford, or receive funding for 
their education. The problem is that this aspect of reacting has taken by becoming 
focused upon the transcendent: “Nietzsche speaks of the masters as a type of 																																																								
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human being that the slave has merely conquered, of culture as a human species 
activity that reactive forces have simply diverted from its course, of the free and 
sovereign individual as the human product of this activity that the reactive man has 
only deformed.”201 We must then not think of a reaction in terms of a dialectical 
division but as part of a process of forces: “what constitutes man and his world is not 
only a particular type of force, but a mode of becoming of forces in general, not 
reactive forces in particular, but the becoming-reactive of all forces.”202 By taking into 
account various affective forces we can then return to a focus upon the worldly 
context and the positive effect our reaction takes, rather than, focusing upon one 
particular force above others or a move away from these forces completely. 
 
Nietzsche then sought to invent concepts that emphasised a life affirming 
philosophy rather than attempting to deny it through transcendental concepts. In 
relation to the Overman, individuals must rediscover themselves as creative forces 
that have the capability to positively transform the way they think. The way in which 
Nietzsche demonstrated this was through the rhetorical technique of aposiopesis. As 
David B. Allison explains “… there is no ‘essential’ property [of the overman] to 
describe … nor …does the overman appear even once in the whole of Zarathustra. 
Thus, it is left up to the reader to fill in what the ‘characteristics’ of the overman might 
be.”203 This technique is adopted so that:  
 
The reader is forced to draw a conclusion … one that is left unstated by the 
author, but seems implied by contextual circumstances … its strength is that 																																																								
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the reader or interlocutor feels he has come to his own conclusion –quite 
literally- in his own terms and in function of his own judgment, thereby 
personalising his understanding of what the author may, or may not, have 
intended.204 
 
It is therefore arriving at an understanding of values for one self that enables a word 
to be revaluated. It is through the process of continually revaluating words that the 
worldly forces that influence a given conception are affirmed: “Every word becomes 
a concept as soon as it is supposed to serve not merely as a reminder of the unique, 
absolutely individualized original experience … but at the same time to fit countless, 
more or less similar cases, which, strictly speaking, are never identical, and hence 
absolutely dissimilar.”205 That is, once a word becomes a concept it becomes part of 
a generalised and accepted usage for the term. Yet at the same time, each time the 
word is applied it does not fit the general category. For instance, the concept of a 
white cat assumes a perfectly white feline. However, this term is inadequate when 
trying to apply the term white cat to various instances we find in our experience. 
There might be a white cat with a black tail, or with brown spots and so forth. Each 
time we encounter these various instances of white cats this then forces us to 
continually make sense and revaluate the category. By revaluating the category we 
continually affirm the worldly forces that challenge our previous association. 
Nietzsche emphasises this importance in his last work, Ecce Homo (1888): “To be 
able to look out from the optic of sickness towards healthier concepts and values … 
if I became a master of anything, it was this. I have a hand for switching 
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perspectives: the first reason why a ‘revaluation of all values’ was possible, perhaps 
for me - alone.”206 
 
The consequences of not being able to challenge accepted views or revaluate 
understanding is illuminated in another of Nietzsche’s concepts, the eternal return, 
developed in his later philosophy which describes the necessity of the revaluation for 
language. One of Nietzsche’s most famous statements about the eternal return is 
from The Gay Science (1882): 
 
What, if some day or night a demon were to steal after you into your loneliest 
loneliness and say to you: ‘This life as you now live it and have lived it, you 
will have to live it once more and innumerable times more … there will be 
nothing new in it, but every pain and every joy and every thought will have to 
return to you, all in the same succession and sequence.207 
 
The eternal return is a repetition of the same. This is for an individual to continually 
repeat the same events in their life forever. No differences or newness would ever 
emerge since it can only be repeated exactly the same way. For Deleuze the eternal 
causes an individual to reflect on events in their life and how they could have been 
unfolded differently, thereby demonstrating the necessity of new values and 
difference. This is reflected through an affirmation of novelty: “… the eternal return is 
… the result of the dicethrow, the affirmation of necessity which brings together all 
parts of chance. But it is also … the repetition of the dicethrow, the reproduction and 
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reaffirmation of chance itself.”208 The eternal return is an affirmation of chance due to 
the continual return of novelty. For instance, this can be seen in the continual 
different experience of driving to work. One day we get stuck behind traffic, another 
day someone cuts you off, and another your favorite song comes on the radio. As 
Deleuze notes, traditionally these novelties and differences are denied within 
philosophy. This is because of the precedence of transcendent causes: “chaos and 
cycle, becoming and being have often been brought together, but as if they were 
opposites … there is no chaos in the cycle, the cycle expresses the forced 
submission of becoming to an external law.”209  
 
 In this way, each given multiplicity is not seen as unique but rather expresses 
part of a unity or whole.  Deleuze gives the example of Plato’s philosophy where 
“becoming is itself an unlimited becoming, a becoming insane, a becoming hubric 
and guilty which, in order [to gain control over] needs the act of a demiurge who 
forcibly bends it, who imposes the model of the idea on it.”210 In order to attain 
understanding and knowledge a model must be placed upon multiplicity. For 
instance, if we attempted to state what is red? Then we are presented with various 
examples, ruby, crimson, blood red and so forth. However, we are not lead to a clear 
and definitive answer but rather examples of red. If then we asked again what is red? 
More examples could be given which results in a set of endless examples would any 
clarity having been attained. In order to attain understanding, Plato uses the model 
of the Idea. This is where various multiplicities reflect the same Idea. In this way, 
crimson, ruby and blood red are not completely unique since they all reflect the same 
idea of redness.  																																																								
208 Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, p.26 
209 Ibid, pp.26-7 
210 Ibid 
	
	
97	
 
For Deleuze, Nietzsche does not adhere to the traditional model where multiplicity 
reflects a unity or whole: “Nietzsche does not recognize his idea of eternal return in 
his predecessors of antiquity. They did not see in the eternal return the being of 
becoming … that is to say the necessary number, the necessary result of all chance. 
They saw it as the opposite, a subjugation of becoming, an avowal of its injustice 
and the expiation of this injustice.”211 Chance and novelty is then to be viewed not as 
a detriment to knowledge but is productive since it allows us to continually revaluate 
and challenge our own ideas. For instance, in encountering an artwork such as 
Jackson Pollock’s usage of dripping paint enables us to challenge the traditional role 
of the brushes in art. Yet this challenge does not have to be based upon general 
methods since Deleuze and Nietzsche make us continually reflect upon the subtle 
changes that we can continually make. This would be to take into account the artist’s 
continually different usage of techniques and his or her modification of those 
techniques as problems are encountered.  
 
Therefore knowledge is not to be based upon a transcendent foundation due to the 
complete denial of novelty. Nor is knowledge to be based upon a transcendental 
foundation since transcendental categories also deny these novelties through their 
generalization. For Deleuze and Nietzsche, it is only an immanent foundation to 
knowledge that can truly affirm novelty and the dicethrow. This is to affirm the 
continual dissatisfaction that we have in continually remodeling our ideas. For 
instance, this positive destruction can be seen in the continual revaluation of what a 
day is like. One day is boring, another depressing, another filled with a miracle. 
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The relation between eternal return and transvaluation is captured in a note 
from 1884 during the composition of Zarathustra: 
 
1059 (1884) 
 
1. The idea [of the eternal recurrence]: the presuppositions that would have to 
be true if it were true. Its consequences. 
 
2. As the hardest idea: its probable effect if it were not prevented, i.e., if all 
values were not revalued. 
 
3. Means of enduring it: the revaluation of all values. No longer joy in certainty 
but uncertainty; no longer ‘cause and effect’ but the continually creative; no 
longer will to preservation but to power; no longer the humble expression, 
‘everything is merely subjective,’ but "it is also our work! - Let us be proud of 
it!212  
 
Through the eternal return Nietzsche forces readers into contemplating the dread of 
having a continuation of the same values. Each belief would be dogmatically 
affirmed without an opportunity for it to be refuted. This would lead to a reaction 
against a revaluation of all values since the belief in a given value would overpower 
contrasting values. As George David Miller states “Assuming that values are at the 
core of the human enterprise, we may say that our incompleteness as human beings 
refers to the incompleteness of values. Denial of transvaluation amounts to denial of 																																																								
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the human project. To be a seeker of truth, transvaluation is imperative…”213 This 
negative effect on language can be seen in the Enlightenment period when Scottish 
phrases were corrected into ‘proper’ English equivalent. Scottish writers became 
aware that it was necessary that their ideas were communicated clearly so it could 
make sense to another reader so there could be established a wider readership. As 
Joan Beal states “Although the most pressing concern was with ‘correct’ 
pronunciation, respected authors such as David Hume and James Beattie were 
sufficiently concerned about their written English to compile their own lists of such 
Scotticisms as should be avoided.”214 The purpose of these lists of Scotticisms was 
“…[to] eradicate such features from the written language of educated Scots.”215 This 
demonstrates the destructive feature of value where in denying rhetorical difference 
destroys language itself. This is because language must compare itself to an ideality 
that cannot compare to it. In contrast, Nietzsche argues words cannot eternally retain 
the same value. Values must change in order for there to be progress in ideas and to 
show the flaw in a dominant value.  This can be seen in the continuation of the 
Scottish language which did not fully conform to an English standard: “…Scots 
continued in use in informal, and particularly spoken, registers even among the 
educated upper and middle classes, and the eighteenth century saw a revival of 
poetry in Scots.”216 The continuation of the Scottish language showed that it had its 
own separate and different values from the English language. This enabled a 
revaluation the concept of Scotticism from being a negative use of the English 
language into a positive use of language itself.  
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A way in which a positive transformation of language occurs where difference 
was to be affirmed can be seen in a modern example of revaluation through the 
transformation of the image of thought of an African American in the 20th Century. As 
Thomas E. Carney explains “The major issue facing African Americans in the 
twentieth century was segregation, set in place by the Jim Crow laws [established 
after the Civil War] and validated by the Supreme Court in Plessy v. Ferguson in 
1896.”217 It was only through the Civil Rights movement (1955-1968) and by figures 
such as Martin Luther King Jr. and the later speeches of Malcolm X that enabled a 
transvaluation of the image of thought. This revaluation showed the vicious way the 
racism was implemented through society and the absurdity of still treating another 
individual like a slave. As Heather Adamson explains “the [civil rights] movement 
inched along, one lunch counter at a time, one sports team at a time. One school. 
One store. One town.”218 This struggle eventually enabled several bills to be passed 
such as “The Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1968 gave African Americans equal 
chances at jobs and housing.”219 Despite these changes “life is still not equal for all 
Americans. But the United States continues a commitment to change thanks to the 
civil rights movement.”220  
 
Conclusion 	
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Revaluation therefore takes place through a suppression of difference. This is for an 
individual to realise the necessity of difference through an eternal return of the same 
value. The same values attempt to consume and establish a universal image of 
thought through the correct use of language or correct image of thought. Yet for 
Nietzsche this realisation of an eternal return of the same is a rhetorical process. 
This is because an individual becomes aware of rhetorical processes that work 
through a value. A value is not pure or transcendent but is part of several different 
competing forces that attempt to be the overall truth. In this way, values do not retain 
an eternal power but fade over time. Just as the impact of a certain idea was 
shocking there is a loss of its intensity and vivacity over time (as can be seen with 
the initial shock at Darwin’s theory of evolution and its modern acceptance). Values 
are also not dependent on certain people but their apprenticeship to language. This 
is to take away the individual as the centre of all choices, in other words to decentre 
the subject. This is to say, a choice remains subject to rhetorical processes. A choice 
cannot be determined by pure cause or causal origin since it is determined through 
historical and social influences.  
 
An individual or subject’s choice is then based upon the unconscious processes and 
forces that form part of the reason for our conscious actions. However, this is not 
solely to focus upon the unconscious processes of their mind but rather upon those 
based within the world. It is to take into account the novel occurrences within the 
world that have an effect upon us. For instance, we could see this in adopting a 
particular lifestyle choice. By adopting a certain lifestyle individuals will have to 
continually take into account different occurrences on an everyday basis that force 
them to reflect upon their choice. Individuals choosing a healthy lifestyle will heavily 
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scrutinise the meal choices that are made. They will make concessions at times to 
allow for “non-healthy” snacks and continually adapt their health plan in order to be 
one that works for them. From this we can see that for Nietzsche and also for 
Deleuze’s philosophy the role of individual is not secondary to the unconscious or to 
processes and forces. The individual or subject plays an important complementary 
role in the adoption of social and cultural roles. This adoption is to become an 
apprentice in learning roles. Yet our performance of these roles demonstrates the 
novelty of the everyday and the fragility of the social and cultural norm that is 
enforced.  
 
Nietzsche’s concept of apprenticeship then differs greatly from Locke. In 
Locke the aim of an apprenticeship is for an individual’s understanding to conform to 
the social norm. This allows for other individuals to understand what is being 
expressed. It also allows for an educational system where correctness is based upon 
agreeing with the generally accepted truth. For Nietzsche, the aim of an 
apprenticeship is for an individual to demonstrate that a generally accepted truth is 
based upon a burdened perspective. It is through an analysis of its historical and 
social context that reveals that there are other competing claims. Or to put it another 
way, a multiplicity of other senses in which it could be understood. The 
apprenticeship is therefore to reveal these processes that influence the creation of 
concepts and structures of knowledge. By revealing these processes at work an 
individual affirms worldly forces in order for all individuals to revaluate their 
understanding of the world. In doing so, we are presented with a challenge to make 
sense of things for our self is to be alienated from society. However, this is a risk 
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worth taking as it enables us be free from deception, think for ourselves and open up 
to different possible ways to view the world.  
 
The next chapter continues to develop the concept of sense in relation to a 
Hegelian understanding from a reading of the Phenomenology of Spirit and the 
Science of Logic. This will enable an important connection to a child-like 
understanding of the world that will be returned in Chapter 6’s discussion of Alice’s 
apprenticeship in Logic of Sense. This analysis will also enable the important 
concept of difference to be developed in relation to Deleuze’s philosophy. Recent 
academic analysis has focus upon the Deleuze’s interpretation of Hegel based 
around his understanding of difference. Two alternative views of Stephen Houlgate 
and Slavoj Zizek are given in order to demonstrate both sides of this argument. 
Houlgate presents Deleuze’s interpretation of Hegel as a misreading of the concept 
of inherent difference. Whilst Zizek’s affirms Deleuze’s reading since both of their 
philosophies adhere to the same ideas of inherent different. The aim of the next 
chapter then will be to present an alternative view that Deleuze does not seek to 
affirm a philosophy of pure becoming or pure difference. My reading of Deleuze’s 
analysis of Max Stirner’s concept of the unique Ego will be used to demonstrate this 
point. It will be argued that Deleuze’s position is between Hegel’s and Stirner’s one 
that affirms structure and at the same time, also affirms the unique understanding of 
each individual.  
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2 
Deleuze’s Hegel: Negation and the Revaluation of 
Dialectics 		
 
Introduction 
  
In the previous chapter, I demonstrated how Nietzsche challenged various 
transcendent claims for an origin for language. This is because worldly forces and 
process are inseparable from our ideas and the creation of philosophical concepts. 
Nietzsche’s project then is based upon the importance of the empirical process of 
making sense. As Deleuze states: “Nietzsche’s most general project is the 
introduction of the concepts of sense and value into philosophy.”221 Nietzsche 
introduces the concepts of sense and value into philosophy in order to challenge the 
role of ideal metaphysical structures in German Idealism. This is to argue that an 
ideal structure is revealed through rational reflection upon immediate experiential 
objects. From an idealist view knowledge is not gained through our immediate 
engagement with the world, but rather, through reflection upon the mind’s rational 
framework. Nietzsche viewed this philosophical movement as nihilistic. This is 
because the emphasis on an idealist foundation negates the importance of bodies, 
actions, and the world. As Karen Leslie Carr explains “Nihilism [in Nietzsche’s 
philosophy] is used to describe particular negating, life-denying interpretations of the 
world … the absence of any meaningful interpretation of the world, usually due to the 
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collapse of the prevailing interpretation … [and] the multiplicity of possible 
interpretations all deemed equally false.”222  
 
For Nietzsche, the ideal qualities that we reflect upon are not metaphysical or 
detached from the world, but rather, ideals that are valued by a society. Our 
knowledge then conforms to socially accepted ideals and norms. The problem with 
this acceptance of social norms is the denial of other possible perspectives. By 
denying other viewpoints we become passive, in the acceptance of herd-mentality. In 
this subdued form, individuals blindly accept others’ opinions as true without calling 
them into question. Nietzsche then challenges us to become philosophical in order 
for individuals to be critical and call into question the validity of truth claims. In this 
way, we must no longer take truths at face value but must make sense of things for 
ourselves in order to attain knowledge. By challenging the values of society we 
demonstrate the timeliness of truth. In other words, the ideal values that are 
privileged are based upon correct knowledge at a given time. This challenge to 
values then allows us to come to the realisation that our knowledge of truth is not 
based upon an absolute foundation but an uncertain one. It remains uncertain since 
there always remains a possibility that this knowledge will be incorrect or later 
disproven.  
 
Nietzsche’s philosophical project then challenges the image of thought 
presented by traditional philosophy. That is, our knowledge is based upon 
unchanging and eternal truths. In contrast, for Nietzsche, knowledge is dynamic, 
transformative and transient. With this focus on a dynamic basis Nietzsche called for 																																																								
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individuals to revaluate all values. In philosophical terms, we must revaluate 
transcendent claims. The revaluation of these claims then demonstrates their 
timeliness. More importantly, the demonstration of a timely foundation enables us to 
identify the contemporary problem that the metaphysical concept aimed to resolve. 
In this way, worldly forces (cultural, social, historical and so forth) influence the 
creation of a concept. Although a claim made in his later philosophy, Nietzsche’s 
process of revaluation can already be identified in the previous chapter’s discussion 
of the origin of language. Nietzsche revaluates various causal claims, Rousseau’s 
empathetic gesture, de Brosses’ establishment of a natural origin to language, Lord 
Monboddo’s divine origin and Herder’s origin based on thought. Each answer 
attempted to establish itself as an absolute value by providing the definitive origin of 
language.  
 
The problem with Nietzsche’s critical analysis of philosophical structure is that 
it devalues claims to meaning. That is, by having a metaphysical foundation for our 
knowledge we allow individuals to arrive at certainty and clarity. To be sceptical of 
this foundation is to arrive at an affirmation of our experiential relation to the world. 
Yet at the same time, we affirm a multiplicity of possible truths and not an absolute 
truth. By doing so, our knowledge becomes uncertain and distorted. Arthur Danto 
confirms this nihilistic view, as he states: “Nietzsche’s philosophy is a sustained 
attempt to work out the reasons for and the consequences of Nihilism.”223  This is 
because, for Danto, Nietzsche denies the possibility of arriving at both empirical and 
rational truth. As Richard Schacht comments“[Danto’s view of Nietzsche ascribes to 
the view that] nothing true can be said about reality, or (more narrowly) … that there 																																																								
223 Arthur C. Danto, Nietzsche As Philosopher: Expanded Edition (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2013) p.16 
	
	
107	
are no objectively valid axiological principles.”224 In this way, the metaphysical move 
made by philosophy is necessary since it enables us to arrive at meaning. It is then 
Nietzsche’s non-traditional philosophy that is nihilistic by having no structure. 
Deleuze further illuminates this problem in Nietzsche’s project: “Previously life was 
deprecated from the height of higher values, it was denied in the name of these 
values. Here, on the contrary, only life remains, but it is still a deprecated life which 
now continues stripped of meaning and purpose, sliding ever further towards its 
nothingness.”225 Nietzsche’s project of revaluation then becomes an act of futility that 
reaffirms the philosophical move to the transcendental.  
 
We are then presented with two contrasting philosophical approaches. Either, 
we must support an empirical perspective that demonstrates the importance of our 
experiential relation to the world; or a rationalist view that aims to establish a 
metaphysical foundation in order for individuals to be able to arrive at stable 
meaning. The problem in both cases is the problem is nihilism. From an empirical 
view is that the rationalist’s emphasis upon transcendent concepts is nihilistic since it 
detaches us from the importance our experiential relation to the world. The benefit of 
an empirical approach is the enrichment and diversity of our ideas. Other 
perspectives also enable a critical analysis of our view where our own views can be 
challenged, as well as, the capacity to recognise flaws in another individual’s 
argument. From the rationalist view, we cannot arrive at meaning or certainty by 
affirming a multiplicity of different opinions. In doing so, an empirical approach is 
nihilistic by being unable to arrive at meaning. The benefit of a rationalist approach is 
the resolution of conflicts and arguments. This is because we all share the same 																																																								
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capacity to reason. By rationally reflecting upon differences in our opinion, 
similarities and comparable qualities begin to emerge. Through the use of reason we 
can agree upon the same universal principles regardless of our social, cultural 
background or our time periods.  
 
It appears from Deleuze’s analysis of Hegel that he agrees with an empirical 
approach. As he remarks: “Spinoza or Nietzsche are philosophers whose critical and 
destructive powers are without equal, but this power always springs from affirmation, 
from joy, from a cult of affirmation, from the exigency of life against those who would 
mutilate and mortify it. For me, this is philosophy itself.”226 By adopting an empirical 
approach we affirm our experience, and the worldly forces that influence our 
thoughts. Deleuze’s image of Hegelian philosophy presents a stark contrast: “… 
what is philosophy incarnated in Hegel is the enterprise to ‘burden’ life … to 
reconcile life with the State and religion, to inscribe death in life - the monstrous 
enterprise to submit life to negativity, the enterprise of resentment and unhappy 
consciousness.”227 In adopting a rationalist approach we negate various 
perspectives and worldly influences in order to arrive at the same universal principle. 
Yet, in doing so, we deny the importance of our experience and worldly processes.  
 
This chapter will analyse the empirical and rational tension in Nietzsche and 
Philosophy. An analysis of Hegel’s Phenomenology enables me to develop further 
the importance of the process of making sense. It is an outline of Hegel’s concept of 
sense that enables the concept of conceptual difference to be established. Put 
simply, in order to arrive at knowledge we must negate our immediate understanding 																																																								
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in order to reflect upon its absent qualities. By reflecting on the absent qualities we 
are able to identify conceptual differences. These conceptual differences provide a 
structure for our experiential knowledge by clearly defining and differentiating 
objects. It is in different justifications of the importance of being able to attain 
meaning through rational reflection that two contrasting images of Deleuze’s 
interpretation of Hegel emerge. Stephen Houlgate draws upon Deleuze’s empiricism 
in order to problematize the attainment of meaning. This is because without 
conceptual difference we are left with only understanding but no knowledge. In other 
words, we are restricted to a purely sensory engagement with the world without 
language or communication. Slavoj Zizek presents us with an alternative image of a 
Deleuze who precisely agrees with Hegel’s conceptual difference. Deleuze and 
Hegel’s philosophies then share the same rational grounding. I challenge Zizek’s 
purely rationalist view by drawing upon Deleuze’s empiricism through his brief 
analysis of Max Stirner.  
 
For Deleuze, Stirner enables us to reflect upon the negation of novelty that 
occurs in the dialectical process. In affirming novelty, Stirner creates the alternative 
concept of non-conceptual difference. In philosophical terms, Stirner’s concept of 
uniqueness, the unique ego, creates a metaphysics of pure difference. Difference 
cannot be actualised since it is no longer truly unique. It will then be argued in 
contrast to Houlgate’s view that Deleuze aims to affirm both Hegel and Stirner’s 
positions. In choosing an either/or alternative we separate the process of making 
sense and meaning (either a child-like world or an ordered world). Deleuze affirms 
both the process of sense and the attainment of meaning. Structure and 
methodologies are essential in allowing us to understand the world. Yet we our 
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practical application and empirical process of making sense is also necessary. We 
are then presented with a mobile structure, a Frankenstein, whose parts are added 
to and transformed through each individual’s process of making sense (a child’s 
creative play with structures, continually rebuilding their Legos).  
 
Hegel, Sense and Negation 	
Hegel’s concept of sense is developed in The Phenomenology of the Mind (1807). 
Our initial knowledge is gained through our immediate experience of the world. Our 
immediate experience is a child-like interaction with the world. Comparable to 
Locke’s view in the Essay, the world is blank, without language and meaning. Due to 
this relation and importance of experience, Robert Stern notes commentators have 
contrasting opinions as to what school of thought that Hegel initially discussed:  
“For some interpreters, the motivation behind sense-certainty is a commitment to 
epistemic foundationalism, which posits direct intuitive experience as giving us the 
kind of unshakeable hook-up to the world on which knowledge is built.”228 Others 
disagree with this epistemic foundationalism approach seeing it rather as “… a 
commitment to empiricism, according to which intuitive knowledge is prior to 
conceptual knowledge, because empirical concepts are learned and get their 
meaning by being linked to objects as they are given in experience.”229 Following 
this, there are a third set of commentators who argue that “… it is a commitment to 
realism, which holds that if the mind is not to distort or create the world, it needs to 
be in a position to gain access to the world in a passive manner without the 
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meditation of conceptual activity, so the kind of direct experience envisaged by 
sense-certainty must be fundamental.”230  
 
In contrast to the adoption a specific school of thought or style of thought Stern notes 
“[there is] a deeper assumption here that is really Hegel’s more fundamental 
concern. This is the assumption that because it does not use concepts, sense-
certainty is in a position to grasp a thing as an individual, without any abstraction 
from its unique specificity or pure particularity and that in doing so sense certainty 
gives us the most important kind of knowledge, which is of things as concrete 
singular entities.”231 Stern’s point is then that that the certainty and meaning that is 
attained through sense-making takes importance over the particular methodological 
style. This is because the priority is for an individual to arrive at his or her own 
unique singular understanding of an object: “sense-certainty prioritizes the one-to-
one relation of direct experience over the generality and abstractness of thought, and 
so treats apprehension as more fundamental than comprehension.”232 For Stern then 
the focus is then based upon an ontological foundation, with the focus upon how 
objects in the world reflect the individuality of our own understanding: “Hegel 
emphasizes that for sense-certainty it is the individuality of the object that is taken to 
be ontologically fundamental.”233  
 
For Hegel, we begin to make sense and understand objects through our sensory 
engagement: “the knowledge or knowing which is at the start or is immediately our 
object, cannot be anything else but immediate knowledge itself … we must alter 																																																								
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nothing in the object as it presents itself. In apprehending it, we must refrain from 
trying to comprehend it.”234 That is, an object in its immediate impression is in a child 
like state of sense making. In this child like state we can understand its various 
sensual qualities. As Peter Singer remarks “[when our] consciousness has front of it 
what we would describe as a ripe tomato, it cannot describe its experience as a 
tomato, for that would be to classify what it sees. It cannot even describe the 
experience as one of seeing something round and red, for these terms too 
presuppose some form of classification.”235 In the process of making sense, we are 
able to apprehend an object’s qualities (it’s hot, cold, squidgy, hard and so forth.) Yet 
we remain unable to fully comprehend it since we are unable to know exactly what 
the object is (I do not know that bouncy, round, red object is a ball). It is then through 
the process of naming that we attain knowledge (the thing that provides hot and cold 
sensations is a called a water tap.)  
 
Following this, Hegel problematizes the empirical process of naming. This is 
because our experiential world is in a state of continual transformation. Any definition 
that would be given would always be in a prior state of change in the actual object. 
Any empirical definition would then never be able to adequately describe the world. 
In order to illuminate this point, Hegel attempts to define arrive at a definition of Now: 
“To the question: ‘What is Now?, let us answer, e.g. ‘Now is Night’ … we write down 
this truth [in an attempt to preserve it] if now, this [we observe has, in fact, has 
transformed to] noon … [then] we shall have to say that it has become stale.”236 An 
empirical definition of Now fails since it must continually be altered according to the 																																																								
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time of the day. From this, we can identify for Hegel that an empirical definition only 
remains temporarily true. At a specific point, it was night, but this is no longer true, it 
is now noon.   
 
For Hegel, we can arrive at a correct definition by reflecting upon the absence 
of qualities in the actual object. In philosophical terms, we reflect not upon the 
immediate object present to our senses, but rather, the mediated object. This is to 
rationally reflect upon the general qualities that differentiate each object. By 
reflecting upon these differences, we can arrive at a clear definition. This is because 
we reflect upon an object’s universal properties. These properties will always remain 
the same over time: “A simple thing of this kind which is through negation, which is 
neither This nor That … such a thing we call a universal. So it is in fact the universal 
that is the true [content] of sense-certainty.”237 It is from this basis of that we can 
attain to a certain and clear definition of Now: “The Now that is Night is preserved … 
but as something that is not Night … in other words, as a negative in general. This 
self-preserving Now is … not immediate but mediated.”238 This is because we are to 
reflect upon its general qualities and separate Now into either daytime or night time. 
Following this, we can define their universal qualities, night as darkness with an 
absence of sunlight. We can also define daytime, bright with an absence of 
moonlight.  
 
With Hegel’s emphasis upon communicating an ideal and not actual objects, a 
criticism can be raised. This is because we are still faced with the problem of being 
unable to express the actual object. Comparable to Leibniz, we cannot seem to 																																																								
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accurately represent actual object in language. Or in Hegelian terms, the world is 
immediate whilst language is always mediated. Hegel’s response to this problem is 
that language is a direct expression of an actual object:  
 
It is a universal too that we utter what the sensuous [content] is … we do not 
envisage the universal This or Being in general, but we utter the universal; in 
other words, we do not strictly say what in this sense-certainty we mean to 
say. But language … [is] more truthful; in it, we ourselves directly refute what 
we mean to say … language expresses this true [content] alone.239  
 
The process of rational reflection enables us to reflect upon the correct 
understanding of our experiential world. When we then communicate we express, 
the mediated object, the true representation of the object. The dualism between 
ideality and actuality is then removed since the mediated Idea enables us to attain 
knowledge by reflection upon a defined universal property. This arrival at the 
universal property then enables us to conceptually define objects. As Jean Hyppolite 
notes the opening chapters of the Phenomenology is for us to arrive at the concept:: 
“we could … summarize the three chapters on consciousness – sensuous certainty, 
perception, understanding- by saying that for us, but only for us, the object of 
consciousness comes to be what Hegel calls the ‘concept’ (Begriff,) which is nothing 
other than the subject, that which is only by virtue of self-development, opposing 
itself to itself, and rediscovering itself in that opposition.”240 However, it must be 
noted, that Hegel does not deny that we cannot be conscious of specificity or the 
uniqueness of things, as Stephen Houlgate remarks, “The result of Hegel’s analysis 																																																								
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is not … that we can never be conscious of specific things.”241 The problem is then 
that the specific qualities of the object is denied in sense-certainty by the lack of 
being able to clearly define its unique properties: “The specificity of things eludes 
sense-certainty because it refuses to identify them explicitly, but thinks of each 
purely as this, here, now. And it does that because it thinks that, in so doing, it will 
have in view the undiluted immediacy of the thing.”242 Yet far from being able to 
affirm its uniqueness we are left in a completely indeterminate state being unable to 
clearly communicate its differences: “Sense-certainty’s concern for immediacy is 
thus what consigns it to utter indeterminacy.”243 
 
It is through communication that we are able to share our knowledge with 
others, as Jim Vernon states “Because we have no immediate access to the minds 
of others, we require a medium through which we can inter-subjectively share our 
experience with others. This medium, Hegel claims, is language. Language arises as 
an inter-subjective medium employed to demonstrate the objectivity of our 
(determining forms of) experience."244 Language is the means in which we can test 
with others if we have correctly understood an Idea, or in Hegelian terms, if we have 
been able to use our reason correctly to reflect upon the qualities that the immediate 
object is lacking. In contrast to Locke’s Essay, we should remove ourselves from our 
social and cultural usage of language. In doing so, greater objectivity is achieved 
about a given Idea: “We must abstract from lived language, without abstracting from 
language itself, for it is in the latter that our ideas (start to) gain objectivity. By 
examining language outside of [everyday] use, we can come to know what if any 																																																								
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universals can be expressed through it.”245 For instance, we can reflect upon the 
same-shared meaning in different languages such as goodbye in English, au revoir 
in French or auf Widersehen in German. Or in relation to philosophy, we must 
challenge our immediate understanding of a concept. This is necessary in order to 
understand the philosopher’s sense of it. Through reflecting upon its meaning we are 
led to a more profound meaning. It is through understanding this concept that we can 
slowly discover the structure to the philosophy.  
 
For Vernon, we can arrive at a Hegelian philosophy of language through its 
syntactical structure. This is because all language adheres to syntax in order for our 
ideas to be understood: “… isolated words, without associations or senses – what 
Hegel calls names as such … these senseless words form the material through 
which a truly universal form of content-determination can be demonstrated … thus 
the syntactic form that underlies all language is immanent to it, and not the 
contingent imposition of thinking upon it.”246 Following this, even if a radical approach 
were taken in order to speak complete nonsense, an individual’s sentence would not 
be understood but still adhere to syntax. A famous example of this is Noam 
Chomsky’s nonsensical sentence colourless green clouds sleep furiously. A fuller 
discussion of Chomsky’s philosophy of language will be made in the next chapter. At 
present it is sufficient to state that for Chomsky, through syntax we arrive at 
understanding of the underlying deep structure of language. This deep structure is 
revealed by the mind through its capacity to associate abstract concepts such as 
goodness to actual objects.  
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Therefore, for Hegel, we arrive at knowledge of the world through 
understanding the mind. It is the mind that enables us to provide structure to our 
sensory experience. From this we can see the move from a chaotic, unstable and 
transitory empirical basis to an immutable, stable and eternal foundation. A Hegelian 
apprenticeship is then a process of rational reflection upon the structures of the 
world. However, it must be stressed that to have knowledge of these structures is not 
to eventually arrive at an absolute, complete or God like understanding of the world, 
as Deleuze remarks: “How ‘arrogant’ someone will say, to act like God and grant 
yourself absolute knowledge. But we have to understand what being is with respect 
to the given … the world refers to being not as the essence beyond appearances, 
and not as a second world which would be the world of the Intelligible, but as the 
sense of this world.”247  
 
Hegel is opposed to a pure metaphysics (such as the Platonic forms) where 
everything worldly is devalued according to higher values (the soul’s devaluation of 
the body).  Hegel’s Ideal structures are not abstract since they are created through 
making sense of given objects. Or in philosophical terms, the mediate can only be 
created by reflection upon an object that is immediately present to our 
consciousness: “In the empirical and in the absolute, it is the same being and same 
thought; but the empirical, external difference of thought has given way to the 
difference which is identical to Being, to the internal difference of Being...”248 That is, 
the empirical differences enable us to reflect upon their general qualities. This 
general quality is the internal difference or the mediated Idea. What is lost through 
the creation of the Ideal are the novel differences (sky blue, baby blue, royal blue are 																																																								
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all unique shades). These are the singular qualities that are negated altogether. In 
this way, in making sense of a given object there is loss of ability to be dissimilar and 
unique. As Deleuze states “… absolute knowledge is in effect distinct from empirical 
knowledge, but only at the cost of denying the knowledge of non-different 
essence.”249 There is a cost to attain knowledge, namely, the denial of these singular 
and unique differences that is apparent in our experience. Yet, for Hegel, this is price 
worth paying if it means that we can arrive at clarity, certainty and knowledge.  
 
Deleuze’s problem with Hegel’s negation of immediacy 	
We can relate Deleuze to Hegel’s concept of sense in his review of Jean Hyppolite’s 
Logic and Existence (1953). This is because it in this review that Deleuze is 
concerned with the role of sense and the negation of novelty in Hegel’s 
epistemology: “Being can be identical to difference only insofar as difference is taken 
to the absolute, in other words, all the way to contradiction … The thing contradicts 
itself because, distinguishing itself from all that is not, it finds its being in this very 
difference; it reflects itself only by reflecting itself in the other, since the other is its 
other.”250 For Deleuze, each experiential object is singular and unique. The 
generalisation of these qualities then negates their singularity. In this way, Hegel 
only compares general differences (black is not white, white is not black), its ideal 
qualities and not actual objects, which are incomparable (liquorice black is not onyx 
black). This radical concept of difference is later echoed in Difference and Repetition 
(1968): “Repetition is not generality. Repetition and generality must be distinguished 
in several ways. Every formula which implies their confusion is regrettable.”251  																																																								
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If we repeat general qualities we can reproduce an idea. For instance, if I 
drew a yellow circular object then other individuals would understand it as the sun. 
Yet what is lost is the novel way in which these qualities would be drawn. The artist’s 
the ability to express of each singular quality is negated in preference to its general 
representation (The uniqueness of each of Van Gogh’s flowers negated as 
sunflowers in a vase.) Therefore, in order to know Hegelian philosophy negation is 
based upon the external experiential object. An object then differs from another 
based upon comparison. We reflect upon its ideal qualities, stripping it of any novelty 
and uniqueness in order to knowledge of its general properties.  
 
For Deleuze, another form of negation can be identified in Hegel’s Science of 
Logic (1812-16) that is inherent to a given object. This conflict separates the Logic 
from the earlier Phenomenology: “This supposes that in the very least that the 
moments of Phenomenology and the moments of Logic are not moments in the 
same sense, but also that there are two ways, phenomenological and logical, to 
contradict oneself.”252 This is because in logic an individual does reflect upon an 
immediate experiential object but rather, its ideal properties. It is then the task to 
prove if these ideal properties can be practically applied to every instance (2+2=4 
can be applied to every object in the world). For Deleuze, what is lost in the use of 
an ideal method such as mathematics is the loss of the account of variables in our 
experience. For instance, a scientific experiment produces a median that generalises 
the variables from the data that was gathered. Yet this median number has the 
possibility of transforms if a larger set of data was gathered. If this data is later 
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disproven through repeating the experiment, one set of general data replaces 
another. Therefore for Deleuze, in both the Phenomenology and the Logic what we 
must return to is our initial process of making sense. As we shall see that Deleuze 
seeks to reverse this dialectical structure, from negation to knowledge to multiplicity 
and negation. This enables us to affirm the initial and immediate experiential 
engagement with the world that is otherwise negated by Hegel. In doing so, we 
affirm these uniqueness of expression but also the necessity of attaining definition 
and structure to our knowledge.  
 
Deleuze’s critical reading of Hegel’s concept of difference has been itself 
criticized by contemporary Hegelian scholar, Stephen Houlgate. For Houlgate, 
Deleuze misreads Hegel’s concept of difference. This is because of complex nature 
of difference in Hegel’s philosophy. It begins from an external difference based upon 
subjectivity, where difference is based upon subjective preference. This allows for a 
multiplicity of various opinions of the same idea. The subjective model then moves to 
one based upon internal difference. That is to say, an object has inherent differences 
that make it unique from another. These qualities are universal and allow us to arrive 
at a clear and concise understanding of it. Houlgate’s view of Deleuze problematizes 
his view of difference as based upon a distortion of meaning by allowing for a 
multiplicity of meanings. Therefore for Houlgate the model of internal or inherent 
difference then must adhered to in order for meaning and clarity to be established.  
 
In contrast to Houlgate’s view, Slavoj Zizek, another contemporary 
philosopher and Hegel scholar, argues that Deleuze’s view of difference is identical 
to that of Hegel’s view of inherent difference. Zizek’s own project in Organs Without 
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Bodies then attempts to draw out these similarities within Deleuze and Hegel’s 
philosophies. In opposition to both Houlgate and Zizek, my view is that Deleuze’s 
critical reading of Hegel seeks to address the deeper philosophical problem of the 
dialectical structure. This problem is the negation of immediacy and multiplicity in 
preference to idealism and sameness. However, this is not to affirm a subjective 
philosophy or one based upon pure difference. I argue Deleuze’s philosophy and 
view of dialectics seeks to affirm both multiplicity and structure.  
 
Houlgate on Deleuze: negation is inherent and not external  	
For Stephen Houlgate in Hegel, Nietzsche, And The Criticism of Metaphysics (1986), 
it is Deleuze’s sympathies with Nietzsche that lead to a misreading of Hegel’s 
concept of difference. Houlgate highlights that Hegel’s philosophy is influential for 
other readers who sympathise with Nietzsche’s argument such as R. J. Hollingdale: 
“In Hollingdale’s view, Hegel is the last major representative of that tradition of 
Western philosophy which finds its most incisive critic in Nietzsche.”253 However, in 
Houlgate’s view, Deleuze is the example par excellence of those who completely 
disregard Hegel’s influence upon Nietzsche’s philosophy: “The most celebrated 
advocate of Nietzsche’s critique of Hegel is Gilles Deleuze … In Deleuze’s view … 
there can be no question of a compromise between Nietzsche and Hegel. [To such 
an extent that] Nietzsche’s philosophy is ‘an absolute anti-dialectics’.”254 By 
interpreting with a complete Nietzschean bias Deleuze’s reading of Hegel’s 
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philosophy remains completely unrecognisable: “[Deleuze’s] view of Hegel … is a 
distortion.”255  
 
Houlgate highlights Deleuze’s use of the concept of negation within Hegel’s 
philosophy as an example of this bastardisation: “For Deleuze, negation is always 
either a denial of already qualitatively specified forces, or the secondary 
consequence of the self-affirmation of already qualitatively specified forces. It is 
never conceived as that which specifies and differentiates such ‘forces’ in the first 
place.”256 In Houlgate’s reading of Deleuze, negation is either based upon a denial of 
already predefined objects in the world (what I see does not have A, B or C qualities) 
or reaffirms their experiential qualities (a white cat is not a black dog). In this way, we 
never reflect upon the ideal structure, or in Hegelian terms, move from the immediate 
to the mediate. We remain within experience, the immediate, through association. 
Either through the association of qualities that we perceive or in the ideas that are 
reflected upon.  
 
For Houlgate, negation is not an empirical act but based upon the subject’s 
external negation. This is because we arrive at an abstract ideas that are detached 
from the actual object: “… If we are predominantly negative beings, we begin with 
the external negation of existing forces and derive an abstract notion of selfhood by 
a conceptual dialectical process.”257 Houlgate here illustrates that based upon an 
empirical view of negation we affirm different subjective ideas of a given object (A’s 
Idea of X differs from Y’s and Z’s). We then arrive at a different idea of what the 
object is for us, rather than reflect upon the ideal structure of the actual object. For 																																																								
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Houlgate, this is why “… negation for Hegel is not something brought to bear on a 
positive premise from the outside, but is inherent in that premise from the start. 
According to Hegel’s Science of Logic, a thing must be in itself the negation of 
something else if it is to have any determinate characteristics – and indeed be 
differentiated from anything else – at all.”258  
 
A distinction must then be made from external and inherent negation. This is 
because negation is an internal process within a given object where we reflect upon 
a predefined meaning. An object will then always possess the same qualities that 
enable it to be differentiated from another (blue is never red). Individuals are then 
able to reflect upon the same rational structure that underlies our experience: “… if 
on the other hand, we are predominately affirmative beings, then we begin with the 
affirmation of ourselves and of what differentiates us from other forces, and conclude 
with a negative evaluation of certain of those forces.”259 From the use of rational 
reflection, we then move from subjective disagreement and to consensus, or from 
conflict to harmony. In philosophical terms, this demonstrates the dialectical structure 
of Hegel’s philosophy of the move between thesis and anti-thesis to synthesis. 
Following this, Houlgate implicitly agrees with Jean Hyppolite’s view of negation in 
Logic and Existence, it is not two separate forms of negation in the Phenomenology 
and the Logic but a consistent one. In both works, it is the same rational structure of 
the world that is emphasised, and at the same the inseparability of it from the world 
(we always reflect upon the experiential object and practically apply a logical 
method).  
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By arriving at knowledge, and not a series of different opinions, negation is a 
positive process that leads us to meaning.  Deleuze’s Nietzschean bias only views 
negation as external process in order to affirm a multiplicity of different opinions: 
“Deleuze will not acknowledge that negation is inherent in affirmation as Hegel does. 
Instead he insists that negation is either a quality … distinct from affirmation or 
merely a subordinate consequence of affirmative premises.”260 For Houlgate, as we 
cannot arrive at consensus or knowledge, Deleuze’s understanding of Hegel leads to 
a form of anarchism since it is impossible for meaning to be established: “what are 
the consequences of Deleuze’s failure to appreciate Hegel … a great deal, because 
it means that for Deleuze there is no qualitative identity between affirmative and 
negative modes of being … a further consequence … is that selfhood for him is 
conceived in an asocial, virtually anarchic way.”261  
 
Zizek’s Deleuze: inherent negation is difference in both Hegel and 
Deleuze 	
Slavoj Zizek shares Houlgate’s view that Deleuze misinterpreted Hegel’s view of 
negation. As he remarks in Organs Without Bodies: On Deleuze and Consequences: 
“If ever there was a straw-man, it is Deleuze’s Hegel: is not Hegel’s basic insight 
precisely that every external opposition is grounded in the thing’s immanent self-
opposition, i.e. that every external difference implies self-difference? A finite being 
differs from other (finite) things because it is not already identical with itself.”262 
Comparable to Houlgate’s view, Zizek also states that negation is not externally 
applied by an individual but is intrinsic to the object itself. It is based upon this 
misreading of Hegel in Houlgate’s view there is no value whatsoever in Deleuze’s 																																																								
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reading. However, for Zizek, Deleuze also holds Hegel’s view of internal negation. 
Throughout each of Deleuze’s work on philosophers he attempts to discover positive 
elements within even philosophies that he disliked: “Besides Hegel, there are three 
philosophers who are obviously hated by Deleuze: Plato, Descartes and Kant … in 
all three cases, Deleuze tries to enter the enemy’s territory and twist, for his own 
ends, the very philosopher who should be his greatest enemy.”263  
 
In Zizek’s view, Deleuze did not need to produce any work on Hegel. In other 
words, Deleuze did not have to discover a positive element within Hegel’s philosophy 
since their views on negation are comparable: “Hegel is the absolute exception – as 
if this conception is constitutive … this would mean that, in an unacknowledged way, 
Hegel is uncannily close to Deleuze.”264 Zizek then seeks to provide a close reading 
of their philosophies in order to demonstrate how two seemingly opposed views 
emerge in a mutual relationship: “…why should we not risk … the practice of the 
Hegelian buggery of Deleuze? … How would the offspring of this immaculate 
conception look like? … What if … Hegel is the greatest self-buggerer in the history 
of philosophy?”265   
 
Following this, in Houlgate and Zizek’s view of Deleuze there is an emphasis 
on devaluation and revaluation. If we agree with Houlgate then Deleuze’s reading of 
Hegel must be dismissed completely. On the other hand, if we agree with Zizek’s 
view, then a revaluation of Deleuze and Hegel’s relationship can be made. Both 
views emphasise the role of Nietzsche, in Houlgate’s view, Deleuze’s Nietzschean 
bias clouds his interpretation of negation. Or for Zizek’s, Nietzsche’s philosophy was 																																																								
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able to be ‘twisted’ but Hegel’s philosophy remained unique as it was impenetrable 
due to the mutual relationship shared between their philosophies. In both cases 
Hegel’s philosophy takes precedence over any interpretation that can be made by 
Deleuze. His brief reading is therefore a ‘distortion’ or a ‘straw man’ where the 
Hegel’s concept of internal negation replaces Deleuze’s concern for the negation of 
novelty. 
 
This enables us to return to Deleuze’s epistemological concern with the 
dialectical method: the negation of the process of sense by meaning. From the view 
of internal negation, the process of education is then to repeat predefined meanings. 
From this model, the emergence of unique styles and techniques are denied in 
preference to the established model. For instance, if a fanatical Jimi Hendrix fan 
taught guitar, his or her students would be continually reprimanded for not adhering 
to the same style. This would deny the student the possibility of learning other styles 
and techniques. This would also deny, more importantly, their own style of playing 
Hendrix that differed from their teacher’s. Therefore, I do not agree with Houlgate’s 
view that Deleuze is an anti-dialectician, but rather, he seeks to revaluate the role of 
immediacy in the dialectical method. In this way, Deleuze has not misinterpreted 
Hegel since he wants to transform the traditional understanding of negation to an 
affirmation of immediacy. 
 
  For Deleuze, we can affirm of the role of immediacy and the process of 
making sense through revaluation: “… the point of transmutation or transvaluation: 
negation loses its own power, it becomes active, it is now only the mode of the 
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powers of affirming.”266 This is because through the process revaluating we debase 
the claim for an original meaning or absolute value. In philosophical terms, the ideal 
qualities of a structure is challenged by demonstrating its reliance upon worldly 
forces (social, cultural, environmental, and so forth.) For instance, in the evaluation 
of an antique we place an initial, and sometimes an unreasonably high, value upon 
an object. A professional evaluation by an antique dealer challenges our valuation 
through an examination of the quality of the object and its maker’s history. If the 
object is in bad condition but was of a limited production with a renowned maker then 
it could be extremely valuable. If, on the other hand, that the object was of part of a 
large production then the value may be considerably less than what we had in mind.  
 
It is then through a historical evaluation that we can challenge an idealistic 
expectation and values that we place upon objects. In this way, negation becomes a 
positive force by calling into question our ideal expectation or bias. In the same way, 
we can apply the process of revaluation to the Jimi Hendrix fanatic by discussing 
Hendrix’s influences from history. This would demonstrate that the creation of one’s 
own style is dependant upon a variation of techniques. Their idolisation and personal 
bias is then challenged through a demonstrating the multiplicity of influences upon 
the creation of an individual’s own style. A discussion of Deleuze’s later philosophy 
of difference in Difference and Repetition is made in Chapter 5. At present, for 
Deleuze, we can see negation is an affirmation of not only our experience but also 
our own unique understanding of the world. In other words, the negation of an 
opinion or methodology is a positive action since it allows for views and 
predispositions to be challenged. In challenging these views and predispositions we 
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can then affirm the novel process of and unique way in which an individual 
transforms a given methodology in order for it to respond to a given problem. 
 
A connection then can be made with Hegel’s philosophy based upon the 
problem of identity, as Henry Somers-Hall remarks “… both Hegel and Deleuze 
develop their philosophies from a common problematic, which Deleuze calls finite 
representation … In Deleuzian terms, it is a multiplicity made up of elements that 
remain indifferent to their relations, or at the least, pre-exist the relations between 
them.”267 In Hegelian terms, this is to challenge our immediate empirical 
understanding by moving towards understanding of its rational structure. This allows 
all individuals to reflect upon the same universal ideas and arrive at consensus. In 
contrast, Deleuze seeks a metaphysics based upon pure difference (each 
understanding is unique). Comparable to Leibniz’s view, this is where we our 
empirical understanding, through generalisation, fails to adequately express the 
singularity of the world.  
 
Given my current description of revaluation, do I fall prey to at Houlgate’s 
problem of anarchism? In other words, is Deleuze’s view that we should never arrive 
at consensus since all values, methods and perspectives are affirmed? Or is 
Deleuze’s philosophy dualistic in nature, in a manner comparable to Peter Hallward’s 
view of his philosophy, where a virtual sense can never be actualised. It is through 
Deleuze’s reading of Max Stirner’s concept of the Ego that the problem of language 
and dualism will be illuminated. This reading challenges views of dualism, anarchism 
and a popular characterisation of Deleuze’s philosophy as destructive of structures. I 																																																								
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will show that this image is flawed. The problem for Deleuze is, rather, that how can 
we affirm unique understanding whilst at the same time, affirming general structure? 
In philosophical terms, we must challenge Stirner’s view of non-conceptual 
difference and affirm the use of concepts, methods and their revaluation.  
 
Stirner: the Ego, uniqueness and the problem of names 	
In Stirner’s The Ego and Its Own (1845) the history of philosophy is summarised by 
transcendent concepts and structures that determine an individual’s action: “What is 
not supposed to be my concern! First and foremost the good cause, then God’s 
causes, the cause of mankind, of truth, of freedom, of humanity, of justice, further, 
the cause of my people, my prince, my fatherland; even finally the cause of my mind 
and a thousand other causes.”268 Traditionally in philosophy individuals must define 
their knowledge, ethical and moral judgment and political actions according to a 
teleological end. As Pierre Hadot remarks: “… there is no discourse that deserves to 
be called philosophical if it is separated from philosophical life, and there is no 
philosophical life unless it is directly linked to discourse.”269 Philosophy provides us 
with a metaphysical structure. This structure provides us with a guide or method for 
living our life. This enables us to positively change our attitude: “we can define 
philosophical discourse as a spiritual exercise - in other words, as a practical method 
intended to carry out a radical change in our being ... thereby transforming one’s 
vision of the world and one’s own inner attitude.”270 By rationally reflecting upon our 
actions, we can recognise the potential harm that we could cause to others and 
																																																								
268 Max Stirner, The Ego and Its Own, ed. by David Leopold (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) 
p.5 
269 Pierre Hadot, What is Ancient Philosophy?, trans. Michael Chase (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 
2004) p.174 
270 Ibid, pp.176-8 
	
	
130	
ourselves. Rational reflection also allows us arrive at clarity of understanding. In 
order to live a good life our actions then must adhere to the attainment of achieving a 
teleological end.  
 
For Stirner, we may appear to be doing good actions but we always act in our 
own personal interest and gain. Stirner therefore implicitly suggests a Machiavellian 
nature of selfish goal achievement. In philosophical terms, individuals will use any 
number of means to achieve the same end. Those who are successful in achieving 
this end will be masters of deception. For instance, Juliette a prostitute, in Marquis 
de Sade’s The Misfortunes of Virtue pretends to love a nobleman and marries him. 
He arranges for her to inherit his estate and wealth if he should die. With a title and 
wealth Juliette is then able to erase her history of living in a brothel, along with, her 
husband: “… to have a name and be rid of all chains, dared yield to the culpable 
notion of abridging her husband’s life … she conceived her plan and, executed it with 
such stealth that she was able both to elude the arm of the law and to bury all traces 
of her abominable crime along with her hindrance of a husband.”271  
 
A critical response to Stirner is that metaphysical structure is positive since it 
enables us to overcome our own selfish desires and to think of others. In relation to 
Christianity, there is the parable of the Good Samaritan (Luke 10:25-37). This 
teaches us to help others regardless of race, religion or background. By helping 
another individual, we move from our desires and interests towards charity, 
selflessness, and compassion. According to a Stirnerian response to the Christian 
act of helping one’s neighbour the act cannot be seen without the benefit the 																																																								
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Samaritan hoped to achieve. The parable is an answer to the question given to 
Christ “what must I do to inherit eternal life?” (Luke 10:25) The parable teaches an 
individual to commit good actions in order to be rewarded in the afterlife. From this, 
we can see that the act of helping another is negated through the benefits that they 
sought to achieve in the afterlife. We no longer help another individual human being 
because we care for them, but rather, we performed it for our own personal 
wellbeing. Therefore the charity, selflessness and compassion shown by the 
Samaritan is negated by a deeper preference to serve the selfish and callous desire 
to achieve a teleological end.  
 
Another critical reply could be made to Stirner: it can be admitted that we are 
flawed and make incorrect judgments or serve our own self-interests. However, a 
metaphysical entity such as God is pure and flawless. We cannot attribute any 
worldly qualities to God. To do so would be to humanise God and attribute finite 
qualities to an infinite Being. Following this, God must be considered as an 
absolutely good basis for our actions. Stirner anticipates this reply and responds: “… 
God cares only for what is his, busies himself only with himself, and has only himself 
before his eyes, woe to all that is not well-pleasing to him! He serves no higher 
person and satisfies only himself. His cause is – a purely egoistic cause.”272 For 
Stirner, the Christian God is comparable to Ancient Greek Gods. Ancient Greek 
Gods served their own personal interests and used humanity as a means for 
achieving them. As Ken Dowden explains “in most [Greek] myths the point of 
intercourse with a god is the offspring that results … if someone wishes proudly to 
claim that some hero [Hercules] or tribe is descended from Zeus, another adultery 
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will usually be added to his list.”273 The image of Zeus the rapist and adulterer: “… is 
actually a product of the needs of what one might term ‘international’ poetry as it 
came together in the allegedly ‘Dark Age’ (say, 1200-776 BC). This was in fact a 
formative age, which had to combine different local traditions for the growing and 
dynamically self-aware market all over the Greek world.”274  
 
The Christian God is Creator of the world (Genesis 1:1) and all things 
contained within it. In this way, God has set the rules that we must abide by and is 
the perfect judge of our sins. Following this, we can think of God as a strict game 
master. We play the game to serve His ego by strictly abiding to his rules and we 
suffer severe punishment if we do not (You all have the potential to be my friend but 
only if you do exactly what I say). Richard Dawkins, like Stirner, comments on the 
egotistical nature of God: “the God of the Old Testament is arguably the most 
unpleasant character in all fiction: jealous and proud of it; a petty, unjust, unforgiving 
control-freak; a vindictive, bloodthirsty ethnic cleanser, a misogynistic, homophobic, 
racist, infanticidal, genocidal, filicidal, pestilential, megalomaniacal, sado-
masochistic, capriciously malevolent bully.”275 The ego of God is also identified 
through the action of simply allowing us to live. This is because we are always at His 
mercy, at any given moment; we must abide by what He says, or face planetary 
oblivion.  
 
By demonstrating the egotistical nature of metaphysical structures, does 
Stirner then hope to return to man as the creator of all structures? This is the view of 
Ludwig Feuerbach who argues in The Essence of Christianity (1841) that God is a 																																																								
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reflection of human consciousness. As Marx W. Wartofsky explains “… [Human] 
reason makes God wholly other, objectifies Him in the form of nonhuman or 
superhuman perfection, separates Him from man utterly … Feuerbach’s thesis [is 
that] this God of reason, or of the understanding is Himself an objectification of an 
aspect of human consciousness.”276 God is then a source of our conscious needs 
that we have dissociated from ourselves: “The God who is wholly other is nothing but 
the image of utter self-estrangement of consciousness from itself: and the sources of 
this self-estrangement lie in a real dichotomy within man.”277 For Stirner, we still do 
not resolve the problem of egoism by demonstrating that God is a human creation: 
“…man represents only another Supreme Being, nothing in fact has taken place but 
a metamorphosis in the Supreme Being, and the fear of man is merely an altered 
form of the fear of God.”278 This is because our Ego is personified in God. We use 
the concept of God for our own personal gain and interest. For instance, using the 
fear of hell as a tool of manipulation. People would then be manipulated in order to 
donate more money to the church. The irony is that the main gain is not to the 
church but rather to the priest or minister who becomes richer at the expense of 
others’ belief.  
 
Does Stirner then ask for an individual to be completely free, in a Hegelian 
sense, where humanity is in a process of moving towards an ever more rational 
society? Hegel’s view is made in the posthumous The Philosophy of History (1831). 
His conception of history is that we will continually evolve towards greater and ever 
increasing higher forms of freedom. The world was not heading towards war or 
destruction but an enrichment of its shared sense of community and purpose. As 																																																								
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Robert C. Solomon states “Hegel and his friends experienced that chaos [of the 
French Revolution and Napoleon Wars] … not as apocalypse … not as insanity … 
nor with despair … Hegel describes what he sees as … the beginning of the final 
realization of the human Spirit …or in simpler terms, the age-old ideal of the ‘the 
perfectibility of humanity’.”279 For Stirner, our individuality is denied in the goal of 
achieving the ideal of a rational community: “who is it that to become free? You, I, 
we. Free from what? From everything that is not you, not I not we. I therefore … is to 
be delivered from all wrappings and – freed from all cramping shells”280 That is, a 
rational society or utopian ideal is to eradicate all different perspectives in order to all 
agree upon the same values and share the same views. Anything that would differ 
from these views would then not be considered rational or good. From this image, 
we do not arrive at a utopian society but rather, a totalitarian one. For instance, we 
can relate this image to the Nazi’s ideal of an Aryan race. By not fitting within this 
ideal Jews were persecuted, as William Brustein states “In the months following Nazi 
Germany’s annexation of Austria in March 1938, Nazi persecution of Jews in Austria 
climbed dramatically. Jewish property was destroyed, persecution and violence 
against individual Jews became common place, and hundreds of Jews were 
marched off to prisons and concentration camps.”281  
 
By living our lives according to methodologies or aspiring towards goals we 
continually undermine our own ego. In other words, our unique individuality and 
perspective is always sapped. This realisation brings us to affirm our own ego and 
individuality. In doing so, we recognise that our ego that should take precedence 																																																								
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over and above serving others: “I am the owner of my might, and I am so when I 
know myself as unique. In the unique one the owner himself returns to his creative 
nothing, of which he is born. Every higher essence above me, be it God, be it man, 
weakens the feeling of my uniqueness, and pales only before the sun of this 
consciousness.”282 In Stirner’s view every individual is unique and incomparable: “I 
am not an ego along with other egos, but the sole ego: I am unique … my wants are 
too unique, and my deeds; in short, everything about me is unique. And it is only as 
this unique I that I take everything for my own, as I set myself to work … I do not 
develop men, nor as man, but, as I, I develop myself.”283  The word unique affirms an 
extreme individualism where absolutely no external ends must determine an 
individual’s action. Individuals must be capable of developing according to their own 
ends. This is why each individual must determine his or her own ends as this further 
enables uniqueness. In this way, for Stirner, individuals flourish by determining their 
own ends where selfish action is always affirmed instead of negated.  
 
Stirner’s unique ego is therefore completely metaphysical. In philosophical 
terms, it is pure difference. It is devoid of any worldly qualities. To determine its 
qualities is to begin the process of comparison and thereby detract from uniqueness. 
Hence we lack the ability to be describe the unique ego, as Camus remarks 
“Socrates, Jesus, Descartes, Hegel, all the prophets and philosophers, have done 
nothing but invent new methods of deranging what I am, the I that Stirner is so intent 
on distinguishing from the absolute I of Fichte by reducing it to its most specific and 
transitory aspect. ‘It has no name,’ it is the Unique.”284 Stirner’s unique ego then 																																																								
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affirms our initial process of sense making described by Hegel in the 
Phenomenology. It is through our process of making sense that we attain a singular 
understanding of the world. This unique understanding is negated through the 
process of naming. Names negate our understanding through generalization. In this 
way, we are never able to express our own singular view or sense through names. 
Stirner seeks an even more radical form of singularity than Leibniz. In Leibniz’s 
philosophy of language, we are unable to express difference in the world (all leaves 
are different). In contrast, for Stirner, nothing can adequately describe uniqueness 
(no leaf is truly unique). In philosophical terms, Leibniz maintains an immanent 
relation to his philosophy whilst Stirner’s concept of unique ego is transcendent.  
 
Deleuze on Stirner: the problem of non-conceptual difference 	
It is through this affirmation of novelty and differences that is otherwise negated by 
Hegel, that Saul Newman identifies a connection between Deleuze and Stirner: 
“Stirner’s ego as a principle of difference is the logical counterpart to Deleuze’s 
principle of non-conceptual difference. They both signify difference in itself—
difference which defies the logic of representation. Moreover, both are actualisations 
of difference which lead to the construction of new multiplicities and pluralities”.285 In 
contrast to Zizek’s Hegelian Deleuze, Newman presents us with the image of the 
Stirnerian Deleuze. This is because Deleuze also wants to challenge the Hegelian 
emphasis upon an Ideal structure that completely determines our understanding.  
 
As have seen in his review of Hyppolite’s Logic and Existence, for Deleuze, 																																																								
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the problem with the dialectical method is the denial of novelty. Stirner enables us to 
reflect upon the dialectic’s denial of novelty, as Deleuze remarks: “the dialectic loves 
and controls history, but it has a history itself which it suffers from and which it does 
not control.”286 That is, by reflecting upon the absent qualities in a given object we 
deny its uniqueness. This is because its singular qualities are negated in preference 
to a generality. This set of general properties enables us to know how one thing 
differs from another. Stirner allows us to return to affirm those novelties in everyday 
experience, and our initial process of making sense that is otherwise negated. For 
instance, a generalisation of the Mortal Kombat video game series is a fighting game 
where one player has to defeat another in hand to hand combat. Each game differs 
from another based upon a set of new fighters that were introduced and improved 
technological advances. Yet this generalisation does not take into account the novel 
differences that occur in each play through. This is because the game requires us to 
react in a different way each time in order to exploit an opening or in defending our 
own character. This also does not take into account the novelty of learning the 
abilities of a character or in reacting to the ability of a new character. In this way, 
each time we play the game is novel since we must continually react differently in 
each play through in order to win.  
 
However, Deleuze refrains from adopting Stirner’s form of negation. This is 
because uniqueness is taken to its destructive extreme where we are left with 
nothingness: “the unique ego turns everything but itself into nothingness, and this 
nothingness is precisely its own nothingness, the ego’s own nothingness.”287 In other 																																																								
286 Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, p.152 
287 Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, p.153 
	
	
138	
words, we are left with dualism, metaphysics with no relation into the world. Newman 
describes this point of nothingness, the destruction of all values and methods as the 
point of pure creativity: “This emptiness at the base of existence is a creative 
nothingness, a principle of difference through which new pluralities and multiplicities 
can be formed.”288 Stirner’s complete denial of all structures and methods allows us 
to form our understanding of the world without being influenced by another’s opinion. 
In this way, we have no apprenticeship but are the masters of our own 
understanding. Yet in this affirmation of pure creativity and pure difference we have 
precisely denied the relation to the world and arrived at the absolute form of 
idealism. As Deleuze states: “… precisely because Stirner still thinks like a 
dialectician  … he throws himself into the nothingness which he hollows out beneath 
the steps of the dialectic.”289 With the dialectic’s focus on the negation of experiential 
world Stirner takes negation to its extreme. We should then see Stirner’s philosophy 
as an extension of Hegel’s, as John Welsh states "Stirner, who denied essences and 
focused on the pure consciousness of the ego, ay be called the ‘anti-Hegel’, but he is 
also the ‘complete’ Hegel because The Ego and Its Own completes the study of 
consciousness that Hegel began in the Phenomenology …”290 
 
For Deleuze, we must rethink the role of negation in order to be affirmative of 
actuality and avoid the problem of dualism. In Stirner and Hegel, negation takes 
precedence over our immediate experiential relation to the world. In relation to our 
understanding, meaning always takes precedence over sense. We must reverse the 
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role of negation in the dialectic to where sense as individual process of 
understanding takes precedence over meaning. This transforms the process of 
negation into an affirmative act that allows for a different of meanings to continually 
occur: “…the negative is transmuted and converted into an affirmative power.”291 
This is not to agree with Stirner’s position that our unique understanding takes 
completes precedence over all structures, but rather, that structure is important for 
our understanding.  
 
The relation between metaphysics and the world or pure difference and its 
actualisation is made by James Williams in ‘Why Deleuze Doesn’t Blow the Actual 
on Virtual Priority’. Williams responds to Jack Reynolds’ ‘Wounds and Scars: 
Deleuze on Time and Ethics of the Event.’ Reynold’s argues that Deleuze prioritises 
his philosophy towards the creation of metaphysical concepts that take precedence 
over the actual world: “Even though the transcendental (virtual) is not fixed but fluid, 
and in an asymmetrical relation of reciprocal determination with the actual, it 
nonetheless retains a priority … over the body and states of affairs.”292 An example 
of this can be seen in Deleuze’s ethical concepts such as the wound in the Logic of 
Sense: “[these] ethical principles derive from a hierarchical transcendental 
philosophy that gives to the body the lesser role: even when Deleuze talks of 
‘sensations’ they come from the virtual and the surface more than from the realm of 
bodies and depths.”293  
 
																																																								
291 Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, p.164 
292 Jack Reynolds, ‘Wounds and Scars: Deleuze on the Time and Ethics of the Event’, Deleuze Studies, Vol. 1, 
Issue 2, December 2007, p.162 
293 Ibid 
	
	
140	
Williams notes that this describes Deleuze’s philosophy as: “… a dualist 
philosophy that is elitist and abstract from concrete [examples] of wounds and their 
scarification.”294 In contrast to this dualistic image, for Williams, we should view 
Deleuze’s concepts as having practical application to the world: “… a structure of 
interlinked processes that only acquire determination in practical situations.”295 In 
denying structures as purely metaphysical, a connection to Hegel can be made. We 
arrive at an understanding of structure by reflecting upon the actual objects. At the 
same time, this structure is not completely ideal but has a necessary practical 
application in understanding world. Yet in contrast to Hegel, we never arrive at 
complete knowledge through rational reflection. This is because our practical 
application of a method remains experimental: “no given practice can be a secure 
blueprint for another, every practice is actual, the practice is necessarily 
experimental, it never arrives at a goal, it is not directed towards  or towards sense, 
and it is directed towards a clinical and critical affirmation of our actual lives and 
shared communication through events.”296 In this way, Deleuze affirms the 
experimental primacy of a process of apprenticeship. This is to adopt a structure that 
is socially preconditioned in order to understand the world. Yet this structure does 
not always determine how we understand the world. It is continually transformed 
through practical application. In philosophical terms, we continually make sense of 
the structure and, in doing so, we continually revaluate and transform our 
knowledge. This is not to deny meaning altogether but to submit it to novel and 
continually experimental interactions with this structure. We then arrive neither at 
Hegel’s position where meaning stands over sense nor at Stirner’s position of sense 																																																								
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over meaning. Deleuze affirms both positions simultaneously, sense and meaning, 
or the necessity of structure for our education and our continual experimentation with 
the structure.   
 
Conclusion 
For Hegel, we first understand the world through the process of making sense. This 
is to gain a child-like understanding based upon a purely sensual interaction with the 
world. In order to know, a name must be attributed to given things. We must negate 
our experiential knowledge in order to move towards knowledge of its ideal structure. 
This ideal structure allows us to conceptualise and define the world. We then arrive 
at knowledge through conceptual difference. These ideal conceptual differences 
describe actual things as they appear to us. This allows us to correctly define worldly 
qualities and differentiate them (Blue is not Black). It is through the process of 
rational reflection, which enables us to reflect upon an inherent grammatical 
structure, that we can be correctly understood by others.   
 
For Stirner, our unique understanding is continually undermined in not serving our 
own immediate needs but rather the possibility of attaining a future state. This is 
identified in the Christian performance of a good action in order to achieve the 
possibility of heaven in the afterlife. This can also be identified in the Hegelian 
possibility of achieving a rationalist utopia. In order to affirm our uniqueness, we 
must be completely free from all determination. In this way, we can care for another 
individual for itself without having to worry about the afterlife. In the political context, 
we can avoid problems of a totalitarian state where all our unique differences are 
denied in preference to an ideal norm. From Stirner, our knowledge is based upon 
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non-conceptual difference. We cannot conceptualise or define our own unique 
perspective. From this, we arrive at Stirner’s radical definition of uniqueness as pure 
difference that cannot be actualised. Comparable to Hegel, our task is to completely 
negate all experiential qualities and reflect upon its purely rational qualities. Yet in 
contrast to Hegel, this is not to reflect upon the same structure but rather, a unique 
one. In doing so, knowledge becomes based upon an affirmation of multiplicity rather 
than the One.   
 
For Deleuze, the problem with Hegel’s conceptual difference is the denial of 
novelty. This is because of Hegel’s generalisation of difference. In relation to our 
understanding, our initial process of making sense of the world is negated in 
preference to meaning. In order to know, we must associate names to given things. 
It is through this name, that we negate the singularity of the given object. In 
Deleuzian philosophical terms, we negate an experimental process of 
apprenticeship. This is the process of learning that is attained through novel 
engagement with the world. We must repeat predefined features in order for our 
understanding to be correct, but in repeating the same we must deny not our novel 
interactions with the structure. We must therefore always engage in thoroughgoing 
experimentation in order to affirm a process of apprenticeship that changes the 
structures. 
 
Deleuze’s critical remarks on a dialectical approach to history further illustrate 
the negation of sense by meaning. In a Hegelian approach to history, we arrive at 
general qualities that define each epoch or decade. Yet this does not take into 
account the minor or forgotten elements that were not part of popular mainstream 
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culture. For instance, Hume’s empiricism was not popular during his life. Despite 
this, he is regarded as one of history’s most influential and important philosophers, 
as Saul Traiger remarks “David Hume’s A Treatise of Human Nature … Although its 
initial reception led Hume to describe it as having fallen ‘dead-born from the Press,’ 
the influence of the Treatise on the philosophical world is incalculable. Immanuel 
Kant, for example, admitted that Hume’s ideas caused him to awake from his 
dogmatic slumbers and begin work on The Critique of Pure Reason.”297  
 
Deleuze’s problem with Stirner’s non-conceptual difference is that our unique 
understanding can never be actualised. In order to affirm uniqueness Stirner uses a 
more radical form of negation than Hegel. This is because in the Hegelian form of 
negation, in order to arrive at an ideal structure, we must reflect on the experiential 
object that is immediately present to our senses. For Stirner, in order for each object 
to remain completely unique it must be incomparable. We cannot associate any 
given qualities, as this would begin the process of identifying comparable qualities. 
Following this negation of all worldly qualities we are left with nothingness. In 
philosophical terms, pure difference, a metaphysical form of difference that cannot 
be actualised. In this Stirnerian model of apprenticeship, we no longer seek to affirm 
the same understanding but our own unique perspective. This would deny all general 
methods and techniques as guides for our knowledge in order for us to discover and 
educate ourselves. We then arrive at a paradox for education, since we can never 
assist another in his or her education. It is at this point that Stirner’s negation is 
completely destructive. For instance, in an everyday sense, we would not read, 
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watch TV, play games, listen to others opinions and so forth. We must then carve out 
our own opinion yet at the same time we must refrain from sharing it.  
 
Deleuze’s position is therefore between Hegel and Stirner, a conceptual 
difference that paradoxically affirms pure difference.  Deleuze seeks an 
apprenticeship that aims to affirm our process of making sense of the world and, at 
the same time, allows our understanding to affect and transform structures. This is 
not to affirm the initial influence of structures for our understanding and then later 
disregard them, in preference to our own understanding. For Deleuze, we require 
structure as a mobile foundation for our understanding of the world. It is through our 
novel and continual interaction with the structure that we develop our own style but 
at the same time we retain the value and practical use of the method. From this, we 
can be critical of interpretations of Deleuze, as anti-Hegelian or affirming a 
philosophy of pure becoming. We must overcome the either/or opposition in viewing 
Deleuze’s philosophy. Deleuze draws upon the paradoxical tensions within empiricist 
and rationalist philosophies. In philosophical terms, this is to affirm a philosophy of 
the Many and the One, rather than, the One over the Many or the Many over the 
One.  
 
It is the purpose of the next chapter to further develop Deleuze’s concept of 
apprenticeship in Proust and Signs. My analysis of the concept of apprenticeship in 
Proust and Signs will draw upon the rationalist and empiricist tension in Deleuze’s 
epistemology. The next chapter will seek to discover the aims of a rationalist 
apprenticeship through a reading of Descartes. This rationalist apprenticeship will be 
illuminated by the contemporary work linguistic work of Noam Chomsky. Problems 
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will also be highlighted in Hobbes and the sociolinguistic work of William Labov. 
Chapter 4 will develop an alternative Leibnizian apprenticeship that affirms an 
empirical approach. Following this it must be noted that my later Deleuzian reading 
of Leibniz is in contrast to the popular image of him being a purely rationalist 
philosopher.   
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3  
The image of thought and a Cartesian apprenticeship to 
signs 
 
 
Introduction 	
My claim in the thesis has been so far that in order for us to arrive at knowledge of 
the world we must first make sense of it. From my reading of Stirner in the previous 
chapter, this understanding cannot be completely unique. This is because for unique 
understanding we must affirm a metaphysics of pure difference with no possible way 
of actualising our knowledge. To avoid this, our process of making sense of the 
world must be defined according to an image of thought. This is to provide a 
structure that we can apply to the world in order for individuals to learn and for us to 
educate others. A rationalist philosophy privileges the necessity of reason in order 
for us to reflect upon universal ideals. It is these ideals that provide structure for our 
experiential knowledge. As we have seen in the previous chapter’s analysis of 
Hegel’s philosophy, this is where we must reflect upon the absent qualities in objects 
that are immediately presented to our senses. In doing so, we reflect upon the ideal 
qualities which enable one object to be differentiated from another. 
 
In contrast, an empiricist philosophy emphasises the necessity of making 
sense. It is argued that we must be able to associate qualities from our experience to 
ideas. Otherwise these ideas remain blank. It is our experience and social and 
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cultural background that provide a structure for our knowledge. Individuals’ 
experience dictates whether they associate positively or negatively towards 
particular ideas. For instance, an individual who has not tried a particular food item 
will associate different elements and determine the means and ends of their 
enjoyment through their past experience. 
 
In an interview in 1968 for the leftist magazine Les Lettres Françaises, 
Deleuze states that the image of thought connects his early works of Empiricism and 
Subjectivity, Nietzsche and Philosophy, Proust and Signs and Bergsonism:  
 
Hume, Bergson and Proust interest me so much because in their work can be 
found profound elements for a new image of thought … we live with a 
particular image of thought, that is to say, before we begin to think, we have a 
vague idea of what it means to think, its means and ends. And then someone 
comes along and proposes another idea, a whole other image.1  
 
A new image of thought, an alternative structure for knowledge, enables us to think 
of things differently. In other words, a new structure enables us to be open to 
possibilities that otherwise remained oblivious to us in our adherence to a previous 
model. In this way, a new image of thought challenges both the rationalist and 
empirical models’ denial of novelty. In the rationalist model novelty is denied in 
preference to the Ideal (all shades of blue share the same essence of blueness). In 																																																								
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the empiricist model novelty is denied in preference to association (my idea of blue is 
formed by associating various shades together). The problem in both cases is that 
we cannot directly think, express or make sense of things differently. This is because 
a new structure must always conform to either a rationalist or empirical position tied 
to either a transcendental ideal or to prior experience mediated by a transcendent 
principle such as Hume’s causal principle. In philosophical terms, our understanding 
must be always be based upon a transcendent foundation, though this is different for 
rationalism and empiricism. This is because a transcendent foundation enables an 
absolute foundation for meaning.  
 
In Nietzsche and Philosophy, Deleuze outlines the rationalist and empirical 
move towards a transcendent foundation. This move occurs through three stages: to 
define the condition for arriving at truth, the identification of errors, and lastly, the 
method for avoidance of errors. Firstly, the condition for arriving at truth is rational 
reflection upon our thoughts and actions. The ability to reason is a natural process 
that is inherent within humanity and traditionally distinguishes us from animals: “… 
thought possesses or formally contains truth … it is therefore sufficient to think ‘truly’ 
or ‘really’ in order to think with truth.”2 With the use of rational reflection we are not 
led into deception by believing in others’ opinion. It enables us to be critical of 
opinions and begin to think for ourselves. For instance, despite our friend’s attempts 
at making us like their favourite band, by using rational reflection, we can criticise 
certain aspects of the music. In philosophical terms, reason enables us to 
problematise idolatry and common opinion in order to move towards a more ‘realistic’ 
and stable basis.  																																																								
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This leads to the second stage, the identification of errors. An error is an 
action that deviates from a rational choice: “we are … told that we are ‘diverted’ from 
the truth but by forces which are foreign to it … Error: this would be merely the effect 
… of external forces which are opposed to thought.”3 This enables us to move away 
from basing our action or words on pure emotion or passion. By passionately acting 
we could harm others and ourselves. Rational reflection enables us to avoid harm by 
consideration of how our actions and words would affect others. This leads into the 
final stage where an epistemic method is constructed in order to teach us how to 
identify errors and make good decisions: “we are told … that all we need to think 
well, to think truthfully, is a method. Method is an artifice but one through which we 
are brought back to the nature of thought … [in order to] ward off the effect of the 
alien forces which alter and distract us.”4 It is through an epistemic methodology that 
meaning becomes transcendent. This is because all deviations from its general 
principles are determined as alien. We must always adhere to the same universal 
principles in our lives in order to make rational choices.  
 
The irony then is that initially both empiricist and rationalist approaches seek 
to affirm our immediate experiential interaction with the world, overcome deception 
and arrive at meaning. Yet we arrive at a metaphysical methodology that is detached 
from worldly forces and processes: “… it conceives of truth as an abstract universal. 
We are never referred to the real forces that form thought, thought itself is never 
																																																								
3 Ibid 
4 Ibid 
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related to the real forces that it presupposes as thought.”5 For Deleuze, in seeking to 
secure meaning, philosophers have neglected the experiential forces that influence 
the construction of a concept. We must therefore revaluate our consideration of 
meaning in order to take sense making into account. By taking sense into 
consideration we no longer seek to determine truth, as he remarks, “truth, as a 
concept, is entirely undetermined. Everything depends on the value and sense of 
what we think. We always have the truths we deserve as a function of the sense of 
what we conceive, of the value of what we believe.”6  
 
Truth should not be considered part of an unconditional transcendent 
foundation but rather a conditional one. This condition is based upon the sense and 
value that we place upon a certain truth. We must take into account the underlying 
worldly forces that motivated the construction of our privileging of a certain given 
value. Deleuze here draws upon a Humean influence, namely, to demonstrate the 
flaws in our belief in associations. This is because through association we seek a 
causal connection between our experience and an idea (experiential qualities A, B, C 
adhere to my idea X). The problem is that we believe that a given set of qualities will 
always adhere to the same idea. When we take worldly forces into account our 
association of qualities remains only temporary. An association remains only 
temporary due to the different processes out with our immediate control that affects 
our idea. The analysis of these worldly processes enables us to understand why 
specific concepts were created at specific periods in time: “the truth of a thought 
must be interpreted and evaluated according to the forces or power that determine it 
																																																								
5 Ibid, p.97 
6 Ibid 
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to think and to think this rather than that.”7  For instance, our particular like or dislike 
towards certain foods is considered to be always the same (I’ll have X, it’s my 
favourite, aren’t I always predictable?) Yet Deleuze makes us reflect upon the 
continual immanent changes that occur to our taste buds as different flavours are 
encountered. In Deleuze’s terminology the general term for this experiential 
encounter is affects8.  
 
It is the aim of this chapter to develop Deleuze’s criticism of a transcendent 
foundation for meaning. This is in order to demonstrate the inseparable immanent 
relations in formation of our ideas and the creation of concepts. My criticism of a 
transcendent foundation for meaning then further develops the experimental 
immanent apprenticeship from the previous chapter. This is because Deleuze’s 
concept of apprenticeship in Proust and Signs is developed in opposition to a 
traditional educational method where in order to be correct an individual repeats the 
same expected meaning: “… [Proust’s novels] the Search [for Lost Time] is first of all 
a search for truth. Thereby is manifested the ‘philosophical’ bearing of Proust’s work: 
it vies with philosophy ... He attacks what is most essential in a classical philosophy 
of the rationalist type: the presuppositions of this philosophy.”9 I identify this classical 
philosophical structure of apprenticeship with Descartes’ Rules for the Direction of 
																																																								
7 Ibid 
8 A scientific example of different taste affects has been demonstrated in an experiment by psychologists, 
Richard J. Stevenson, John Prescott and Robert A. Boakes as they state “This study investigated the relationship 
between perception of an odour when smelled and the taste of a solution when to which the odour is added as 
flavorant. In Experiment 1 … certain odours were found to enhance tasted sweetness while others suppressed it 
… In Experiment 2 … the most sweet smelling odour, caramel, was found to suppress the sourness of citric acid 
and … to enhance the sweetness of sucrose … The study demonstrated that the effects of odours on taste 
perception are not limited to sweetness enhancement and apply to sour as well as sweet tastes.” Richard J. 
Stevenson, John Prescott and Robert A. Boakes, ‘Confusing Tastes and Smells: How Odours can Influence the 
Perception of Sweet and Sour Tastes’, Chemical Sciences, Vol. 26, Issue 6, June, 1999.  
9 Gilles Deleuze, Proust and Signs, trans. by Richard Howard (London: Continuum, 2008) p.60 
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the Mind. These rules are then practically implemented in the Meditations on First 
Philosophy. It is the aim of the Cartesian apprentice to reflect upon the transcendent 
sign. This is achieved through the process of rational deduction that eliminates a 
multiplicity of senses in order for an individual to reflect upon the absolute meaning. I 
connect Chomsky’s philosophy of language in Cartesian Linguistics and Syntactic 
Structures to a modern Cartesian apprenticeship. This is because of the Cartesian 
nature of Chomsky’s concept of deep grammar. Put simply, grammatical structure is 
innate. In this way, even when we speak nonsense it still makes sense since it 
adheres to a grammatical structure.  
 
In contrast to the Cartesian transcendent foundation for language, I 
demonstrate the underlying immanent relation for our understanding and language. 
This is made through my analysis of Hobbes’ objection to Descartes’ emphasis upon 
signs. Hobbes emphasizes the importance of the imagination in an individual’s ability 
to clearly understand. We cannot then purely reflect without making sense of and 
imagining an idea. Hobbes’ objection is connected here to William Labov’s linguistics 
work in Sociolinguistics. Labov’s linguistic approach demonstrates that speech and 
tonal pronunciation are formed from various environmental influences such as 
working environment, financial income, social and cultural backgrounds. I analyse 
Deleuze and Guattari’s reading of Chomsky and Labov in A Thousand Plateaus in 
order to demonstrate the dangers posed in negating these influences. This is 
illustrated through their analysis of Chomsky and Labov’s readings of African 
American English. A Chomskyian approach results in racism by seeking to always 
correct an African American child’s incorrect use of pronunciation. Labov’s 
alternative approach affirms the child’s novel use of language and different style. 
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This chapter’s discussion of Deleuze and Guattari therefore builds upon Deleuze’s 
critical comments on a rationalist apprenticeship in Proust and Signs. It allows an 
alternative to the rationalist method (focused upon the reflection of transcendent 
signs and creation of a pure metaphysical foundation) to be presented that takes into 
account both the importance of both immanent processes and structure. For Deleuze 
and Guattari we must affirm the paradoxical relation between names and signs. By 
affirming these, we allow for different uses of language and the attainment of novel 
meaning. Due to this, it must be noted that I do not take the position that Deleuze 
privileges a philosophy of pure immanence. The next chapter will demonstrate that 
Deleuze’s philosophy expresses thought as both immanent and transcendent 
process. This is to affirm the paradox of maintaining the pure singularity of our 
understanding whilst, at the same time, the necessity of its actualization through the 
use of general terms.  
 
Descartes’ deductive method for making sense 	
Descartes constructs a rationalist methodology in Rules for the Direction of the Mind 
(1625-8). The reason for the necessity of rational methodology is to allow for an 
individual to arrive at clear understanding. For Descartes, our initial empirical 
education is based learning a particular technique or skill. This skill is defined 
according to the role in which an individual will practically use it. An apprentice 
farmer will learn how to correctly use a hoe. Or a musician will use learn how to 
correctly place their fingers and hands in order to produce a sound on a guitar. The 
problem with this approach is that we only learn a specific technique and not the 
universal one: “[Uneducated individuals] see that not all arts can be learned by the 
same man, but that a man can perform an art best and most easily who perform that 
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one only, since the same hands are not so suitable for both agriculture and playing 
the lute ...”10 This would mean that an empirical apprenticeship limits our 
understanding to learning particular skills. In order to know we would then have to 
learn every possible technique and skill. Descartes therefore wants to arrive a 
universal method with the same fundamental principles that can be applied to all 
variations in a discipline. In learning these principles individuals could apply their 
knowledge to all fields. In this way, our choice of a specific field within a discipline 
does not limit our knowledge because all fields share the same methods and 
techniques.  
 
In order to arrive at knowledge of these universal principles we must move, in 
logical terms, from an inductive method to one based upon rational deduction. A 
rationally deductive method allows for an apprentice to make sense of their thoughts 
and thereby attaining clarity and meaning. As Descartes states “The purpose of our 
studies should be the direction of the mind towards the production of firm and true 
judgments concerning all things which come to its attention.”11 Inductive or empirical 
reasoning is based upon the premise that any conclusion can always be called into 
question. The conclusion drawn from this line of argument is then never absolute but 
based upon the best possible evidence at a given time. As trial lawyers Ronald J. 
Waicukauski, Paul Mark Sandler and JoAnne Epps state: 
 
																																																								
10 Rene Descartes, Philosophical Essays: Discourse on Method, Meditations and Rules for the Direction of the 
Mind, trans. by Laurence J. Lafeur (New York: Macmillian Publishing, 1989) p.147 
11 Ibid, p.165-6 
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… when a conclusion relies upon an inference and contains new information 
not found in the premises, the reasoning is inductive. For example, if premises 
were established that the defendant slurred his words … and smelled of 
alcohol, you might reasonably infer the conclusion that the defendant was 
drunk … [from this it can be seen that] in an inductive argument the 
conclusion is at best probable.12  
 
In this case, the lawyer infers from an association of signifiers, the smell of alcohol 
and slurring of words, that the defendant is drunk. However, we no longer rely on 
actual evidence but from our own belief. In this way, our prior experience affects our 
judgment. This is to allow for our own personal bias, social and cultural backgrounds 
to cloud our minds.  
 
In contrast, for Descartes, a rationally deductive method enables us to make 
certain and indubitable judgments: “…’deduction’ or the pure logical inference from 
one thing to another, can never be performed improperly by an intellect which is in 
the last degree rational, although it may escape our attention if we do not happen to 
notice it.”13 It is through our rational deduction of the experiential evidence that 
enables us to arrive at a clear judgment. In philosophical terms, we arrive at an 
unbiased judgment and truth, rather than, a biased opinion. As Steven M. Nadler 
states “Knowledge about the world can, Descartes insists, come only by moving 
beyond the confused testimony of the senses … with which we are presented to get 																																																								
12 Ronald J. Waicukauski, Paul Mark Sandler and JoAnne Epps, The Winning Argument (Illinois: American Bar 
Association Publishing, 2001) p.48 
13 Rene Descartes, Philosophical Essays, p.151 
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to get to a scientific core that is conceptually pure and composed only of ‘clear and 
distinct’ elements.”14 This clarity is achieved by “… the intellect and the proper and 
critical use of our reasoning faculties.”15 For instance, a jury rationally deduce from 
the evidence and arguments given whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty. By 
basing their judgment upon the evidence, the jury does not allow for their bias to 
affect the outcome for the defendant (Despite his shifty features, from the evidence 
provided, I must conclude that he is not guilty).  
 
It is this rational framework that we must apply to our own understanding in 
order to determine the validity of a truth claim. In order for our understanding to 
remain free from others influence we must adopt a singular apprenticeship16: “… we 
should seek to determine, not what others have thought, nor what we ourselves 
conjecture, but what we can clearly and evidently intuit, or deduce with certainty; for 
in no other way is knowledge obtained.”17 Comparable to Stirner, it is only though our 
own personal apprenticeship that we can be certain of the truth. Yet, in contrast to 
Stirner, this is not to arrive at various unique understandings, but rather, to ascertain 
the validity of the truth claim. By questioning this validity Descartes then tests 																																																								
14 Steven Nadler, The Philosopher, the Priest, and the Painter: A Portrait of Descartes (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2013) p.91 
15 Ibid 
16 From this avocation of a singular apprenticeship, Descartes is affirmative of his own rigorous education at 
Collège La Flèche, a Jesuit institution. An insight into the curriculum is given by Roger Ariew: “The 
philosophical curriculum at La Flèche is fairly well-known, and the daily routine of its students well-
documented. At La Flèche, as in other Jesuit colleges of the time, the curriculum in philosophy would have 
lasted three years (the final three years of a student’s education, from about the age of fifteen on). It would have 
consisted of lectures twice a day in sessions lasting two hours each, from a set curriculum based primarily on 
Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas. During Descartes time, the first year was devoted to logic and ethics, consisting 
of commentaries and questions based on Porphyry’s Isagoge and Aristotle’s Categories, On Interpretation, 
Prior Analytics, Topics, Posterior Analytics, and Nicomachean Ethics. The second year was devoted to physics 
and metaphysics, based primarily on Aristote’s Physics, De Caelo, On Generation and Corruption Book 1, and 
Metaphysics Books, 1, 2 and 11. The third year of philosophy was a year of mathematics, consisting of 
arithmetics, geometry, music and astronomy …” Roger Ariew, ‘Descartes and scholasticism: the intellectual 
background to Descartes’ thought’ in The Cambridge Companion to Descartes ed. by John Cottingham 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992) p.60  
17 Rene Descartes, Descartes Philosophical Essays, p.152 
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whether it is universally applicable and not based upon an individual’s bias or 
egoism. As Daniel Garber’s remarks “Descartes’ rule of method has two steps, a 
reductive step, in which ‘involved and obscure propositions’ are reduced to simpler 
ones, and a constructive step, in which we proceed from simpler propositions back to 
the more complex.”18 The purpose of the rational framework is then constructive 
where we can arrive at a clear and distinct understanding through the process of 
simplification:  
Ultimately, Descartes thinks, when we follow out this series of 
questions, from the one that first interests us, to the ‘simpler’ and more basic 
questions on which it depends, we will eventually reach an intuition … having 
intuited the answer … we can turn the procedure on its head, and begin 
answering the questions that we have successively raised, in the reserve of 
the order in which we have raised them.19  
 
By following this method Descartes then enables us to have us to have a 
practical way to overcome problems that we face: “what the method gives us is a 
workable procedure for discovering an appropriate intuition, one from which the 
answer to the question posed can be deduced, and it shows us the path the 
deduction must follow.”20  
 
																																																								
18 Daniel Garber, Descartes Embodied: Reading Cartesian Philosophy Through Cartesian Science (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001) p.87 
19 Ibid, pp.89-90 
20 Ibid, p.90 
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For instance, if I asked the question, what is a dog? I could be presented with 
various answers based different types, a Chihuahua, a Labrador, a Great Dane. Yet I 
am not presented with a clear answer, simplifying this question to what qualities do 
dogs have in common? Enables a more general answer. They are hairy, four-legged, 
have claws, two eyes and tails. Further simplifying this question, why are these 
qualities necessary? We are presented with an answer based upon satisfaction of its 
bodily desires such as its need for food and its sex drive. Using Descartes’ method 
we can now successfully answer the question what is a dog? A dog is an animal that 
uses its claws and teeth in order to satisfy its bodily desires of hunger. This same 
quality is apparent throughout the various types and breeds of dogs. Therefore the 
rational method enables us to reduce a multiplicity of possible answers to one clear 
answer through a process of simplification and intuition. 
 
Descartes’ project in his later Meditations on First Philosophy (1641) is an 
expression of the apprenticeship that is detailed in the earlier Rules. However, the 
Meditations does not seek to provide a revaluated set of rules for an apprenticeship 
but asks for the reader to take a meditative journey with him: “… I do not advise 
anyone to read [this book] except those who have both the ability and the desire to 
meditate seriously with me, and to withdraw their minds from the senses as well as 
from all prejudices … those who do not take the time to grasp the order and linkage 
of my arguments … will derive little benefit from reading this work.”21 By sharing a 
comparable journey with Descartes the reader must forgo all their prior knowledge 
and only reflect on the truths that are obtained through meditation. In doing so, the 
																																																								
21 Rene Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy trans. by Donald A. Cress, 3rd Edition (Indianapolis: Hackett 
Publishing, 1993) p.6 
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reader will be able to discover for themselves the validity of his findings. Descartes’ 
affirmed this process of testing by forwarding copies of the Meditations to a number 
of fellow intellectuals and replied to their criticisms. These intellectuals included, 
Johannes Caterus22 [Johan de Kater] (1590–1655), Marin Mersenne23 (1588-1648), 
Thomas Hobbes24 (1588-1679), Antoine Arnauld25 (1612-1694) and Pierre 
Gassendi26 (1592-1655).  
																																																								
22 Caterus, a Catholic Priest and theologian replied to Descartes’ Meditations by request of his mutual friends 
and fellow priests Jan Bannius and Augustinus Alstenius, as Roger Ariew and Donald A. Cress explain 
“…Descartes asked his friends Jan Albert Bannius and Augustinus Alstenius Bloemaert to write some 
objections; they, in turn, asked the Dutch priest Caterus (Johan de Kater) to do so. Rene Descartes, Meditations, 
Objections and Replies, ed. by Roger Ariew and trans. by Donald A. Cress (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 
2006) p.vii 
23 Mersenne, a priest, formed a friendship with Descartes whilst they were students, as Carol MacClintock 
remarks “showing intellectual promise, he was sent to school at the Jesuit College of Le Mans and then to the 
college at La Fleche … Here he was a fellow student of … Descartes, with whom he founded a lifelong 
friendship … In Paris, together with Descartes and other intellectual friends, he formed a discussion group, or 
‘academy’, to study the sciences.” Carol MacClintock (ed. and trans.), Readings in the History of Music in 
Performance (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1979) p.152. One accomplishment of Mersenne was his 
work in music theory: “the result of Mersenne’s interest and investigation in music was the publication of his 
Harmonie Universelle (1636), a massive work comprising studies on the nature of sound, mechanics, 
consonance and dissonance, modes, composition, the voice and singing, and especially instruments – their 
construction, range, musical possibilities.” Ibid. Another accomplishment of Mersenne’s was his work in 
mathematics, as John Tabak explains “…Marsenne … is a prominent figure in the history of mathematics. He 
was a talented mathematician, who enjoyed studying the theory of numbers and discovered a class of prime 
numbers that are now called Mersenne primes.” John Tabak, Geometry: The Language of Space and Form 
(New York: Infobase Publishing, 2004) p.73 
 
Mersenne is attributed to have written the second and sixth set of objections to the Meditations despite it being 
attributed to various authors in the text. As John Cottingham states “The Second Set of Objections is simply 
attributed to ‘theologians and philosophers in the index to the first edition, but the French version of 1647 
announces that they were ‘collected by the Reverend Father Mersenne’. In fact they are largely the work of 
Mersenne himself … the Sixth Set of Objections was printed with no indication of the author in the first and 
second editions, and is described in the 1647 French edition as being by ‘various theologians and philosophers’. 
The compiler, as in the case of the Second Objections, is Mersenne.” John Cottingham ‘Objections and Replies 
Translator’s Preface’ in Rene Descartes, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes Vol. II, trans. by John 
Cottingham, Robert Stoothoof and Dugald Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984) p.64 
 
24 Hobbes is a political philosopher, his most famous work is The Leviathan (1642) in which he describes how 
individuals in a state of nature would be a war of all against all. That is, all individuals would ultimately act on 
their own selfish needs, forgoing any empathy or assistance for others. In order to avoid this state of anarchy a 
social contract must be undertaken by all individuals in which a monarchical state can effectively govern the 
populous. Prior to the writing The Leviathan, Hobbes wrote a political treatise The Elements of Law: Natural 
and Politic (1640) which also argues for the benefits of a monarchical state, however, with an impending civil 
war (English Civil War 1642-1651) his view met hostility and was forced into exile. As Richard H. Popkin 
elaborates “In [the Elements of Law], Hobbes defends the authority of monarchy against the rising force of 
Parliamentarians. Hobbes’ argument generated personal hostility and, perhaps also foreseeing the coming civil 
war, he fled to Paris, where he remained for the next eleven years. It was there that he wrote much of his 
greatest work, including De Cive and Leviathan, which marked the end of his Paris period.” Richard H. Popkin 
(ed.), The Columbia History of Western Philosophy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999) p.347 
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Descartes and language: towards pure concepts of the mind 
For Descartes, empirical language is to give names to the various sensual and 
qualitative attributes of objects that have an immediate effect on our perception. This 
can be identified in a deconstruction of the wax example in Meditation Two: “it has 
been quite recently taken from the honeycomb; it has not yet lost all the honey 
flavour. It retains some of the scent of the flowers from which it was collected. Its 
colour, shape, and size are manifest. It is hard and cold; it is easy to touch. If you rap 
on it with your knuckle it will emit a sound.”27 In order to correctly understand the 
collection of properties an individual must undergo an apprenticeship. This is where 																																																																																																																																																																												
The third set of objections to the Meditations is accredited to Hobbes. Prior to his critical remarks on the 
Meditations he had reviewed a copy of Descartes’ Discourse on Method in 1637 “In 1637, Hobbes received a 
copy of Descartes’ Discourse on Method from an associate. After a few years, Hobbes recorded his opinion … 
in a manuscript that was sent to Marin Mersenne. Shortly thereafter, Mersenne provided Hobbes with an 
original print of Descartes’ Meditations on First Philosophy.” Stephen J. Finn, Thomas Hobbes and the Politics 
of Natural Philosophy (London: Continuum, 2006) p.102 
 
25 Arnauld was a theologian and due to the logical rigour of his arguments was a respected thinker by his 
contemporaries. This can be seen in Steven M. Nadler’s commentary: “His opinion on both philosophical and 
theological matters was earnestly sought by Descartes, Leibniz and others who had a profound respect for his 
philosophical acumen and for the logical rigor of his mind … Arnauld’s most important contribution to 
philosophy lies in his analysis of perception and his role in the polemic over ideas and knowledge that took 
place in the seventeenth century. In Des vraies et des fausses idees (1683), Arnauld offers a sophisticated direct 
realist theory of perception and an analysis of the intentionality of mental acts in response to the doctrine of 
ideas and indirect perception presented by Nicolas Malebranche in De la recherché de la verite (1712).” Steven 
M. Nadler, Arnauld and the Cartesian Philosophy of Ideas (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1989) 
pp.1-2.  
 
Arnauld’s introduction to philosophy was to respond to a copy of the Meditations which he had received from 
Mersenne: “… Arnauld’s real introduction to the philosophical world, and the basis for his attraction to 
Cartesian thought, are his exchanges with Descartes in the 1640s concerning the latter’s Meditationes de Prima 
Philosophia … Arnauld addressed his objections to Mersenne early in 1641, and they appeared to Descartes 
himself to be the most acute and serious of the responses he received.” Ibid, p.21. 
26 Gassendi was an important thinker on atom theory and sought to reconcile Christian theory with Epicurean 
atomism. Kenneth C. Clatterbaugh explains how Gassendi was able to reconcile these views: “… [Gassendi] 
abandon[ed] his projected seven-part work on Aristotle in 1628 in favour of a study and rehabilitation of 
Epicurean atomism. Gassendi’s atomism transformed the ancient atomism of Democritus and Epicurus by 
inserting God as the creator and maintainer of atoms in the void … Just when his Physics was almost finished in 
1637, Gassendi lost his enthusiasm for atomism, fearing ... [a] deterministic (atheistic) materialism … But in 
1641 Gassendi revived his project and before his death in 1655 completed the Syntagma Philosophicum, which 
contains his mature physics …”Kenneth C. Clatterbaugh, The Causation Debate in Modern Philosophy: 1637-
1739 (London: Routledge, 1999)p.68 
 
Gassendi asked by Mersenne to write a response to the Meditations and during this time he was acquainted and 
became friends with Hobbes: “In [1640] … Mersenne introduced Hobbes to Pierre Gassendi, he asked both men 
to prepare objections to Descartes’s Meditations … During the time in which they were preparing their 
objections, Hobbes and Gassendi became close friends and correspondents, exchanging views on various 
philosophical topics.” Ibid, p.67.  
27 Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, p.21 
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an individual would not just learn a specific methodology but also how to decipher 
signs. The basis for their interpretation of signs would depend upon which profession 
they sought to learn. For instance, an individual would then have to decide be an 
artist, musician or mathematician in order to fully understand the wax’s use of colour, 
sound or its shape and size.  
 
However, a problem emerges for an apprenticeship since none of these 
immediate experiential properties remain the same: “[but as] I am bringing it close to 
the fire. The remaining traces of the honey flavour are disappearing; the scent is 
vanishing; the colour is changing; the original shape is disappearing. Its size is 
increasing; it is becoming liquid and hot … and now, when you rap on it, it no longer 
emits any sound.”28 With the transformation of experiential qualities, an apprentice 
cannot make a correct interpretation of signs. This is because what we initially 
thought to be correct properties of the wax, such as it being hard and cold, is 
incorrect since it has become liquid and hot. As Kurt Brandhorst states  
Having employed the activity of sensing in the investigation of the wax, 
Descartes identifies the limits of this approach and hence the limits of sensing 
in general: sensing can only report on the sensible properties of an object but 
not what makes that object persist through time, through changes of those 
sensible properties.29  
 
																																																								
28 Ibid 
29 Kurt Brandhorst, Descartes’ Meditations on First Philosophy (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010) 
p.78 
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For Descartes, this represents a lack in empirical language’s capacity to 
adequately express the essence of the sign: “for although I am considering these 
things within myself silently and without words nevertheless I seize upon words 
themselves I am nearly deceived by the ways in which people commonly speak.”30 
That is, the various empirical qualities that are commonly discussed by individuals 
fail to express its unchanging and timeless qualities. This leads to a distortion of the 
sign where a variety of sensual qualities are illegitimately identified as an absolute 
foundation for meaning.  
 
 This empirical distortion is created by the failure of our imagination to 
encompass every possible form that the wax could take: “… Is it what my 
imagination shows it to be; namely, that this piece of wax can change from a round 
to a square shape, or from the latter to a triangle shape? Not at all; for I grasp that 
the wax is capable of innumerable changes of this sort, even though I am incapable 
of running through these innumerable changes by using my imagination.”31 For 
Descartes, our imagination is limited since we are only capable of reflecting on 
various experiential associations. For instance, a fantasy creature from Greek 
mythology, is not completely abstract, but rather, a collection of various experiential 
qualities: “for … when painters themselves wish to represent sirens and satyrs by 
means of especially bizarre forms, they surely cannot assign to them utterly new 
natures. Rather, they simply fuse together the members of various animals.”32  
 
																																																								
30 Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, p.22 – italics added for emphasis. 
31 Ibid 
32 Ibid, p.15 
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Despite this limitation of the imagination we can still arrive at clarity. Clarity 
emerges by seeking to understand an empirical object’s universal properties. This is 
to be able to reflect upon which properties always remain the same despite its 
qualitative transformation: “let us … see what remains after we have removed 
everything that does not belong to the wax; only that it is something extended, 
flexible and mutable.”33 The universal properties of wax that is revealed through 
rational reflection is that it is an extension of our mind, capable of being manipulated 
and bent. These timeless qualities then enable us to arrive at a correct judgment and 
decipherment of a sign through a establishing a transcendent foundation for the 
meaning: “…I would not judge correctly what the wax is if I did not believe that it 
takes on greater variety of dimensions that I could ever grasp with the imagination 
…”34 A transcendent foundation is created since we identify the pure qualities of an 
object. These qualities will always remain the same despite any transformation in our 
experience.  
 
By understanding these universal properties of an object Descartes comes to 
the realisation that his mind mediates sensory experience: “… it remains for me to 
concede that I do not grasp what this wax is through the imagination; rather I 
perceive it through the mind alone.”35 It is an individual’s mind that applies a 
structure of understanding to the wax.36 The structure that is applied to experience is 
composed of universal properties of an object. As Desmond M. Clarke remarks: 
																																																								
33 Ibid, p.21 
34 Ibid, p.22 
35 Ibid 
36 It is through the dependence on how the mind gives a structure and framework to experience that Descartes 
shares a comparable relation to Hegel’s philosophy. However, an important difference must be noted, namely, 
that Descartes affirms the role of experience to a greater extent than in Hegelian philosophy. Descartes wants to 
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 Descartes suggests that we … need a distinction between those 
features of the wax that can change without the wax ceasing to be wax, and 
those that are so essential that, without them, it would no longer be wax at 
all.37  
 
Once we rid our analysis of the empirical qualities that change then we are left 
with its essential qualities: “at that point [of removing inessential qualities of the wax], 
we would realize that nothing remains expect something that is extended, flexible, 
and changeable.”38 In this way, the same properties that are applied to a particular 
object can also be applied to a variety of others. As the same qualities and 
properties of an object remain through the structure, an object can be correctly 
understood despite its transformation in experience. This can be seen in Clarke’s 
relation of the Meditations’ wax example to Descartes’ discussion of a stone in the 
Principles of Philosophy (1644): “A similar analysis of what is essential to a stone, in 
the Principles, concludes that ‘nothing remains in the idea of the stone except that it 
is something extended in length, breadth, and depth.”39 Yet it must be noted that “[it] 
is not the same question that is addressed in the Principles, where Descartes argues 
that there is one principal attribute of every substance.”40 The realisation of the 
mind’s mediation of experience also reflects the earlier discovery in Meditation Two 
of the cogito: “I am … precisely nothing but a thinking thing; that is, a mind, or 
intellect, or understanding, or reason – words whose meanings I was previously 																																																																																																																																																																												
discover the principles that give structure to experience in order for a scientific method to be developed that 
would enable greater understanding of the world. Whilst Hegel’s understanding negates experience completely 
in order to express the world as an expression of the mind.  
37 Desmond M. Clarke, Descartes’ Theory of Mind (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) p.218 
38 Ibid 
39 Ibid 
40 Ibid, p.219	
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ignorant.”41 An individual is precisely not a collection of empirical qualities but a 
thinking thing, a collection of various thought processes, which enable understanding 
to take place. In other words, an individual is not a collection of empirical properties 
that change over time but a collection of rational principles that are universal and 
eternally true. 
 
Therefore it is with the discovery of timeless truths through the use of 
deductive reason that the Meditations is comparable to the Rules. It is through the 
use of deductive reason that universality is created for knowledge through the act of 
meditation itself. The act of meditation replaces the prior set of rules and enables an 
individual to transcend the conflict of qualities in our experience and reflect upon the 
truth. It is through the discovery of pure truths through meditation that a singular 
Cartesian apprenticeship is developed and affirmed. Here, an individual is self-taught 
and not allow others to determine their understanding. We must come to 
understanding for our self. In doing so, we are able to discover the timeless 
principles that underlie various disciplines and fields. These principles then provide a 
foundation upon which knowledge can be applied universally for all individuals. 
Others can then test the validity of these universal principles. A principle (the cogito) 
is true if all others can universally reflect upon it. If not, then it cannot serve as a 
universal principle.  
 
This rationalist apprenticeship based upon the reflection of transcendent sign 
is critically discussed in Thomas Hobbes’ 4th objection to Descartes’ Meditations. 																																																								
41 Rene Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, p.19 
	
	
166	
Hobbes illustrates the problem in our ability to reflect upon a concept of the mind 
such as the cogito. This is because the idea remains blank. Comparable to Locke, 
we must be able to make sense of an idea by attributing worldly qualities to it. 
Hobbes’ view is then challenged by the contemporary Cartesian linguistic philosophy 
of Chomsky. Chomsky argues that language is based upon a deep grammar, 
namely, that there is a natural innate way in which sentences are constructed even if 
they are nonsensical. The way we make sense is not based upon our imagination 
but through our innate use of grammar.  
 
Hobbes’ objection: the imagination as an empirical process of 
making sense 	
Hobbes’ 4th objection to Descartes’ is that reflection upon transcendent signifiers 
such as the cogito remains empirical. This is because we must make sense and 
imagine the qualities of any idea: “There is a tremendous difference between 
imagining (that is, having some idea) and conceiving with the mind (that is, 
concluding by a process of reasoning that something is or exists). But M. Descartes 
has not explained to us the basis for their being different.”42 In contrast to Descartes, 
a mind cannot reflect upon the pure universal properties of an object. This is 
because, without a process of association, the mind’s idea of an object remains 
blank: “… the ancient peripatetic philosophers have taught clearly enough that a 
substance is not perceived by the senses but is inferred by means of arguments … 
[but] were reasoning perhaps merely the joining together and linking of names or 
																																																								
42 Rene Descartes, Meditations, Objections and Replies, ed. and trans. by Roger Ariew and Donald Cress 
(Indianapolis: Hackett, 2006) p.104 
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designations by the means of the word ‘is’? It would follow from this that we draw no 
conclusions whatever by way of argument about the nature of things.43  
 
 We are then faced with a problem in defining an object based on pure reason 
since there would be no way to distinguish or differentiate objects. In being unable to 
be differentiated, ideas remain conflated and impossible to define. In order for us to 
be able to define and distinguish objects the empirical act of association must be 
affirmed. This is because it is through the process of imagination that we can 
associate various experiential qualities to an idea:  “… reasoning will depend upon 
names, names upon imagination, and imagination perhaps, as I see it upon the 
motions of the corporeal organs.”44  
 
 This enables meaning to be established for an object through the attribution of 
a name: “… it is about the designation of things that we draw any conclusions, that 
is, whether or not we in fact join the names of things in accordance with some 
convention that we have arbitrarily established regarding the meanings of these 
terms.”45 Hobbes is here critical of Descartes’ use of rational concepts in the 
Meditations. In Descartes’ attribution of a name to an idea of the mind negates its 
purity. Purity of the concepts such as the cogito remains negated since their name 
remains empirical. In this case, the use of Latin for denoting a concept is made only 
once it has been understood in an empirical context. Descartes’ prior discussion of 
empirical qualities of the wax or the body is therefore crucial to the formation of the 																																																								
43 Ibid 
44 Ibid, pp.104-5 
45 Ibid 
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creation of a rationalist concept. Without this prior discussion of the empirical 
qualities an individual would not be able to reach the same conclusions since they 
would not be able to form a clear idea of it. 
 
 Descartes’ reply to Hobbes reiterates that languages are united by signs and 
not names:  “… in reasoning there is a joining together not of names but of things 
signified by these names … for who doubts that a Frenchman and a German could 
come to precisely the same conclusions about the very same things, even though 
they conceive very different words?”46 By reflecting on a sign, we are able to 
rationally reflect on the universal properties of an object. Despite differences in 
languages everyone can reflect upon the same properties. This demonstrates the 
transcendent foundation of knowledge is accessible through reason and, with this, 
an apprenticeship to knowledge is affirmed. This is because we are always able to 
reflect upon the same ideas, regardless of our social or cultural backgrounds or time 
period. Edwin Curley relates Descartes’ reply to the prior argument in Meditation Six 
of the limitation of our imagination:  
There is … [an] argument in Hobbes[‘ objections] for the inconceivability of a 
nonextended subject … to have an idea or conception of a thing is to have an 
image of it; but every image is necessarily the image of some extended thing; 
so lacking an image of any nonextended thing, we cannot conceive it.47  
Yet Hobbes’ argument is not satisfactory for Curley because:  
 																																																								
46 Ibid, p.105 
47 Edwin Curley, ‘Hobbes versus Descartes’ in Roger Ariew and Marjorie Green (eds.), Descartes and His 
Contempories: Meditations, Objections and Replies (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1995) p.104 
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In the Sixth Meditation Descartes presents an argument for making a 
distinction between an idea and an image: we have an idea of a chiliagon 
which is completely distinct from the idea we have of any other polygon … but 
the image we have of a chiliagon is not distinct from the images we have of 
many other polygons; therefore, we must make a distinction between having 
an idea of something and having an image of it.48  
 
 Despite attempting to resolve Hobbes’ critical remarks, Descartes further 
problematizes them by negating language in preference to the sign. In other words, 
how can language emerge if the essence of the idea, a sign, is privileged over 
words? Using Hobbes argument, an empirical language is based on qualities of an 
object that is necessary in order to form an idea of it. In response to Curley’s critical 
remarks an idea cannot be distinguished from its image. For Hobbes, in contrast to 
Descartes, a name is not devoid of knowledge altogether. A name is affirmative of 
the prior process of forming an idea of the various experiential associations of an 
object. A name for an individual is able to reflect an apprenticeship where knowledge 
is gained through a material engagement with the world. This is not to represent a 
pure essence but a multiplicity of different qualities. In contrast to Descartes, each 
different quality would be affirmed rather than negated under the same sign. For 
instance, in forming an idea of a person, another individual would associate their 
various qualities, nice/bad hair, good/bad teeth and so forth as a collection of 
properties which co-exist in a given name. A Cartesian approach would negate all 
these various empirical qualities in preference to the same transcendent property of 
a cogito. Therefore without affirming these qualities of an object the sign is blank. 																																																								
48 Ibid 
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The sign is blank since it affirms a transcendent basis for meaning devoid of any 
worldly qualities. Language then takes on a secondary role in order to reveal the 
essence of objects. Whilst in Hobbes’ objection to Descartes, language has a 
primary role since it is a reflection of knowledge itself.  
 
Chomsky and Cartesian Linguistics: the mind as a grammatical 
foundation  
A problem with Hobbes’ view emerges, however, if a syntactic structure is applied to 
names. This is because the organisation of each word has an importance to the way 
individuals are able to understand each other. A collection of names arranged in any 
order is nonsensical but arranged according to a grammatical order can be 
universally understood. A Cartesian foundation for language can be affirmed through 
the necessity of gaining understanding through a universal syntactic structure. A 
modern Cartesian theory of language which emphasises a universal syntactic 
foundation for language has been developed by Noam Chomsky in Cartesian 
Linguistics: A Chapter in the History of Rationalist Thought (1966).  
 
 
For Chomsky, an individual’s mind is the site of a grammatical structure which 
enables the creative (and rational) use of language: “Pursuing the fundamental 
distinction between body and mind, Cartesian linguistics characteristically assumes 
that language has two aspects …”49 The first aspect of Cartesian linguistics is study 
a sentence from its empirical qualities: “… A sentence can be studied … from the 
point of view of its physical shape, that is, from the point of view of … [its] phonetic 																																																								
49 Noam Chomsky, Cartesian Linguistics: A Chapter in the History of Rationalist Thought, 3rd Edition 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) p.79 
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interpretation …”50 In grammatical terms, the empirical or surface structure of 
language is the various sounds that an individual makes when denoting a word. In 
order to pronounce words individuals are dependent on a variety of empirical 
qualities such as their tongue, teeth and voice box. It is by using a semantic structure 
for language that individuals assume that coherence is achieved grammatically. 
However, for Chomsky, a grammatical structure or correct syntactic sentence 
structure cannot be solely determined by an analysis of its phonetics. This is 
because a phonetic structure by itself affirms a nonsensical combination of 
language.  
 
Chomsky’s proof of this can be found in his example of colorless green ideas 
sleep furiously from his earlier work Syntactic Structure (1957):  
 
… the notion ‘grammatical’ cannot be identified with ‘meaningful’ or 
‘significant’ in any semantic sense. Sentences (1) and (2) are equally 
nonsensical, but any speaker of the English language will recognise that only 
the former is grammatical. 
 
(1) Colorless green ideas sleep furiously. 
(2) Furiously sleep ideas green colourless. 
 
… Such examples suggest that any search for a semantically based definition 
of ‘grammaticalness’ will be futile.51 
 																																																								
50 Ibid 
51 Noam Chomsky, Syntactic Structures (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2002) p.15 
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It is clear from the sentence structure provided that the second example is a 
complete jumble of words. Or as John Collins describes, “[its] just word salad”52. This 
is because the sentence is without any given structure in which an individual can 
clearly understand it. The only way in which the words make sense is in a list of 
words without any necessary relation to each other: “… the pronunciation of [2] has a 
flat intonation contour, as if one was merely listing a string of words.”53 What then 
prevents the first sentence, colorless green ideas sleep furiously, from not also 
reading as a list of words? In other words, what is it about the first sentence that 
makes it a structure in which an individual can understand what is being said in a 
way that the second example lacks? This lack of understanding can be seen in 
attempting to analyse the sentence empirically: “… [Empirically] only animate things 
can sleep … ideas are abstract and only concrete things can be green. Further, it is 
contradictory to describe a thing as both green and colourless, and it is wholly 
opaque how anything can sleep in a furious manner.”54 A reason the first sentence 
retains understanding is because the sentence affirms a variety of grammatical 
functions whilst second sentence does not. In other words, a grammatical structure 
is adhered to because it is through the comprehension by an individual’s mind of 
empirical contradictions of colourless and green, furious and sleeping which 
demonstrate a deep structure at work. 
 
 Collins elaborates: 
 
[1] smoothly admits to various grammatical operations that [2] precludes: For 
example … 																																																								
52 John Colllins, Chomsky: A Guide for the Perplexed (London: Continuum, 2008) p.41 
53 Ibid 
54 Ibid, p.42 
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a. Colourless green ideas do sleep furiously. [emphasis] 
b. Colourless green ideas don’t sleep furiously. [negation] 
c. Do Colourless green ideas sleep furiously? [interrogative] 
 
… [unlike Chomsky’s second example] we can freely change the tense, aspect 
and modality [of the first sentence] with no change in its relative acceptability. All 
this suggests that we are dealing with a perfectly well-formed structure.55  
 
For Chomsky, a phonetic incapacity to express the underlying mental understanding 
of the ideas that are expressed demonstrates the deep structure of the mind which 
provides a correct grammatical structure for language:  
 
“The surface structure resulting from these transformations does not directly 
express the meaning relations of the words, of course, except in the simplest 
cases. It is the deep structure underlying the actual utterance, a structure that 
is purely mental … [this] constitutes an underlying mental reality – a mental 
accompaniment to the utterance – whether or not the surface form of the 
utterance that is produced corresponds to it in a simple, point-by-point 
manner.”56  
 
That is, there is an underlying grammatical structure for the construction of 
phonetic sentences. This underlying structure, or deep structure, can only be 
explained through the mind and not through experience. An example of the deep 																																																								
55 Ibid 
56 Noam Chomsky, Cartesian Linguistics, pp.80-1 – italics have been added for emphasis. 
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grammatical structure Chomsky provides is the sentence: “The doctrine which 
identifies the sovereign good with the sensual pleasure of the body, which was 
taught by Epicurus, is unworthy of a philosopher.”57 The aspect in which deep 
structure is identified is through the mind’s capacity to associate the idea of 
goodness with the sensual pleasure of the body: “the complex phrase containing the 
restrictive relative clause and its antecedent expresses a single complex idea formed 
from the two ideas of a doctrine and of identifying the sovereign good with the 
sensual pleasure of the body. All this information must be represented in the deep 
structure of the original sentence.”58 The idea of sensual goodness is not implied by 
the body itself. In scientific terms, the body is a composition of organs, tissue and 
blood. In this way, the idea of a good body or a sensually good body is only 
conceived of by the mind. This image that is constructed by their mind is then 
applied to their own bodies.  
 
In the final chapter of Cartesian Linguistics Chomsky applies the deep 
structure of grammar to the process of learning a first language, as Alan Nelson 
explains “Chomsky argues that humans’ knowledge of their first language exceeds 
the experiential base available to them … [due to this Chomsky argues that] part of 
the process of first language learning … must depend on an innate structure.”59 For 
Chomsky, an experiential basis serves to explain the acquisition of language by a 
child in a certain period of time and in certain conditions: “… language acquisition is 
a matter of growth and maturation of relatively fixed capacities, under appropriate 
																																																								
57 Ibid, p.82 
58 Ibid 
59 Alan Nelson, ‘Cartesian Innateness’ in A Companion to Descartes, ed. by Janet Broughton and John Carriero 
(Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011) p.331 
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external conditions.”60 However it does not explain the form of language, namely not 
as an expression of nonsense but capable of expressing ideas: “The form of that is 
acquired is largely determined by internal factors; it is because of the fundamental 
correspondence of all human languages … that a child can learn any language.”61 
That is, as the same idea is reflected despite a transformation of language, a child 
can learn any language. For instance, this can be seen in the process in learning 
another language. As the same idea is reflected through a different word an 
individual is able to understand the word and also be able to use it in a sentence that 
is syntactically correct.  
 
In other words, a child cannot learn by mere reflection but is dependent on a 
correct learning environment. This environment is extremely important as it allows for 
a greater potential of unleashing their innate linguistic abilities, as he states “… the 
basic structure of language and principles that determine the form and interpretation 
of sentences are in large part innate. But it does not follow that emphasis on 
language development is misplaced. If a child is placed in an impoverished 
environment, innate abilities will not develop, mature and flourish.”62  Far from being 
able to comprehend language and ideas in isolation, an experiential relationship in 
order to develop the capacities of an individual’s mind. It is through the correct 
environmental stimulation that these capacities will flourish. This state is described 
as “a stimulating environment … to enable natural curiosity, intelligence, and 
creativity to develop, and to encourage our biological capacities to unfold.”63 Without 
this experiential relationship an individual’s mental capacity will remain in an 																																																								
60 Noam Chomsky, Cartesian Linguistics, p.101 
61 Ibid, pp.101-2 
62 Lillian R. Putnam and Noam Chomsky, ‘An Interview with Noam Chomsky’, The Reading Teacher, Vol. 48, 
No. 4 (Dec., 1994 - Jan., 1995) p.331 
63 Ibid, p.332 
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undeveloped state. In this way, an individual will be unable to fulfil their potential and 
enable their capacities to flourish. An example of this state is where “… a child 
[having been] brought up in an institution may have ample experience and nutrition, 
but still may not develop normally, either physically or mentally, if normal human 
interaction is lacking.”64 
 
Chomsky therefore affirms a Cartesian foundation for language since it is the 
innate grammatical structure of the mind that enables a clear and distinct image from 
what is being communicated. If ideas are arbitrarily arranged in a nonsensical order 
then a mind is unable to reflect upon the ideas that are contained in the sentence. In 
contrast to Hobbes, without the capacity of a mind, a phonetic structure of a 
sentence is a collection of sounds. These collections of sounds do not have any 
structure and so lack the capacity to express an idea. This leads into problems for an 
empirical apprenticeship since there would no grammatical structure underlying a 
sentence. Due to this, an individual would find it impossible to understand and make 
sense of what was being stated. For Chomsky, it is only through a Cartesian 
apprenticeship that enables knowledge to be affirmed. This is because the intellect 
enables the correct arrangement of phonetic qualities in order for a clear idea to 
emerge. In other words, the phonetic properties of sentence reflect a sign. It is the 
sign and not words themselves that are reflected upon in order for understanding to 
take place. A universal basis for knowledge is affirmed despite a change in language 
itself.  
 
																																																								
64 Ibid, p.331 
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Another contemporary linguist William Labov challenges Chomsky’s Cartesian 
idea of deep grammar. This is because Labov’s approach takes into account and 
demonstrates how worldly forces affect language. He notes the tonal variances of an 
utterance based upon the environment, social and cultural influences. Therefore 
through the opposing viewpoints of Hobbes and Labov show how the transcendent 
sign cannot be separated from immanent forces. The importance of these forces is 
that they affirm novel differences such as social and cultural differences. My 
discussion of Deleuze and Guattari then highlights the problems of racism in a 
rationalist viewpoint. The problem of racism occurs through the negation of the 
importance of the unique expressions of individual by having them to conform to a 
universal standard. 
 
William Labov and sociolinguistics: an immanent foundation for 
language 	
William Labov in Sociolinguistic Patterns (1972) studies the different uses of 
languages by various groups of individuals in society. The everyday variants of 
speech are considered to be essential for any understanding of language. This is 
because an individual cannot understand the structure of language independently 
from phonetics, as Labov remarks “… the basis of intersubjective knowledge in 
linguistics must be found in speech – language as it is used in everyday life by 
members of the social order, that vehicle of communication in which they argue with 
their wives, joke with their friends, and deceive their enemies.”65 This analysis of 
everyday language is not focused on a transcendent metaphysics but its immanent 
transformation: “… one cannot understand the development of a language change 																																																								
65 William Labov, Sociolinguistic Patterns (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1991) p. xiii 
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apart from the social life of the community in which it occurs. Or to put it another 
way, social pressures are continually operating upon language, not from some 
remote point in the past, but as an immanent social force in the living present.”66 
Comparable to Hobbes’ criticism of Descartes, it is from a phonetic understanding of 
language that enables an idea to be based on various experiential associations. In 
this case, the variety of social communities and pressures effect language in a 
dynamic way. This can be seen in the variety of different ways an individual 
transforms their speech depending on the social context. As Labov’s method seeks 
to analyse an immanent transformation of language a historical analysis of this 
change acts as a limitation: “it seems that a historical approach is more appropriate 
to an empirical science concerned with change, even over a narrow time span … at 
the same time, such a close view of historical change makes us extremely sceptical 
of the value of limitations on the kinds of data which may be considered.”67  
 
In order to study the variation of language based on a historical analysis only 
specific sets of data can be used. This limits the variations itself to a generality. In 
limiting variation to generality it could be argued that linguistic change only occurs in 
epochs of time. Yet Labov’s aim is to study the immanent transformation of speech a 
dynamic approach must be used in order to affirm the variation itself: “one would 
expect that the application of structural linguistics to diachronic problems would lead 
to the enrichment of the data, rather than the impoverishment of it.”68 A singular 
method is rejected by Labov in preference to adoption of various techniques, as R. 
A. Hudson notes: “[Labov’s] most general answer [to studying the variation of 																																																								
66 Ibid, p.4 
67 Ibid, p.3 
68 Ibid 
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language] is that we should use as many different methods as possible, preferring 
results which are supported by them all.”69 In adopting a variety of techniques, a 
chaotic method is not affirmed as a consistent set of results is able to be obtained.   
Hudson gives further insight into the general techniques of how data is gathered: “.... 
investigators focus on a predetermined list of linguistic variables – elements which 
are known in advance to have different realisations, such as words which have more 
than one pronunciation … For each variable, there is a list of variants – the 
alternative forms known to be used – and the investigator goes through a collection 
of data noting which variants were used for each variant in the list.”70 The collection 
of linguistic data then interpreted by the investigator where it is quantified and made 
into a set of statistics.    
 
An example of Labov’s method can be seen in his study entitled ‘The Social 
Stratification of (r) in New York department stores’. Labov’s hypothesis was to: “… 
test two ideas … first, the variable (r) is a social differentiator in all levels of New 
York City speech; and the second, that casual and anonymous and speech events 
could be used as the basis for a systematic study of language.”71 The experiment 
was conducted in November 1962 where he studied the speech of staff members 
from three different department stores. The stores chosen were representative of 
three areas of society. The first, Saks Fifth Avenue was in a high fashion district, sold 
expensive goods and had high prestige. The second, Macy’s, was in a garment 
district, sold middle range price goods and had average prestige.  The last, Klein’s, 
																																																								
69 R. A. Hudson, Sociolinguistics, 2nd Edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) p.146 
70 Ibid 
71 William Labov, The Social Stratification of English in New York City, 2nd Edition (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006) p.40 
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was in the working class district of the Lower East Side, sold cheaply priced goods 
and had little prestige. Labov asked various store assistants from each store either to 
inform him of the location of goods that he knew were on the fourth floor. The 
responses given by the store assistants was either “on the fourth floor” or “the fourth 
floor”. The question was then repeated by Labov to note the variance by the store 
assistant in their second emphatic reply. The investigation itself was done by noting 
the responses in secret and without the store assistant’s knowledge: “the exchange 
was a normal salesman-customer interaction, almost below the level of conscious 
attention, in which relations of the speakers were so casual and anonymous that 
they hardly have been said to have met.”72  
 
The results from the three department stores confirmed that: “… (r) 
stratification is an integral part of the linguistic structure of New York City speech 
community … [this] should terminate any suspicion that the pronunciation of [the 
variance of r] in New York City is limited to a narrow group of speakers, or that it is a 
phenomenon which occurs only in the presence of linguistics and speech 
teachers.”73 Linguistic variance cannot be limited to a specific set of speakers 
because there are numerous individual characteristics were included in the test. The 
classification of these characteristics allow for a comparison with other data. The 
data that was compared was an individual’s sex, estimated age, occupation within 
the store, race, and if they were foreign or had any regional accent. From this data it 
could be argued that a homogenous system of language is created a universality of 
the variance is evident within all speakers. However, the linguistic variances of each 
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class prevents a homogeneous system from arising. This can be seen in Labov’s 
comparison between linguistic data which notes the variables within each 
classification.  
 
For instance, Labov observed that it was native female New York workers 
who use the highest amount of variance: “the stratification of (r) is a property of the 
most homogeneous sub-group in the three stores: native New York, white, 
saleswomen.”74 However, the variance is effected by the location of the store. In the 
comparison of data between Macy’s and Saks: “… a total of 62 percent of Saks 
employees used all or some of [r-1] (emphatic second pronunciation), 51 percent of 
Macys …[from this we can see that] In the emphatic pronunciation of the final (r), 
Macy’s employees come very close to the mark set by marks. It would seem that r-
pronunciation is the norm at which a majority of employees aim, yet not the one they 
use most often.”75 Whilst the employees at the Lower East Side store, Kleins, which 
had the lowest amount of emphatic difference with only “… 21 percent”76 
 
A reason for the higher variance in Saks than in Macy’s or Kleins is due to the 
different management of each store where: “… In Macy’s, the employees who were 
interviewed could be identified as floorwalkers (by red and white carnations), sales 
people, cashiers, stockboys, and elevator operators. In Saks, the cashiers are not 
accessible to the customer, working behind sales counters, and stockboys are not 
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seen.”77 This displayed the greatest use of variance in Macy’s were by the 
floorwalkers and sales people: “the floorwalkers and sales people are almost the 
same in percentage of those who use all or some of (r-1), but the floorwalkers have a 
much higher percentage of those who consistently use (r-1).”78 With the lack of a 
shared working environment and greater amount of sales assistants available in 
Saks gives evidence for their increase in use of their variance: “The ground floor of 
Saks looks very much like Macy’s … salesgirls leaning over the counters … a great 
deal of merchandise displayed. But the upper floors of Saks are far more spacious; 
there are long vistas of empty carpeting, and on the floors devoted to high fashion, 
there are models who display the individual garments to the customers.”79  
 
Therefore there is a crucial relationship between language and environment 
that emerges from Labov’s analysis. A different working environment has a direct 
effectual relation to an individual’s expression. This is where an individual’s language 
becomes an expression of the environment itself. As Labov remarks “The executives 
of the prestige stores pay a great deal of attention to employee relations, and take 
many unusual measures to ensure that the sales people feel that they share in the 
general prestige of the store.”80 This embodiment of the store’s prestige can be seen 
in the case of an individual from the Lower East Side who worked at Saks: “One of 
the Lower East Side informants who worked at Saks was chiefly impressed with the 
fact that she could buy Saks clothes at a 25 percent discount. A similar concession 
from a lower prestige store would have been of little interest to her.”81  
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Due to this effect by the environment on an individual’s expression, a 
homogeneous system for language cannot take place since it would negate the very 
empirical elements that form the basis for their expression. As Anne Sauvagnargues 
states “[Labov] maintains that not only do the idiolects in New York City not form a 
homogeneous system, but they also show the idea of a homogeneous system of 
linguistics to be inconsistent.”82 A homogeneous system attempts to negate these 
qualities in order to emphasize the same idea that is portrayed throughout each 
phonetic variance. This is to negate the immanent qualities of language that Labov 
classifies such as, accents and variance between sexes. However, Labov’s method 
demonstrates that immanent qualities have a direct effect on an individual’s 
language. Comparable to Hobbes criticism of Descartes, the idea or sign that is 
reflected upon in Chomsky’s method remains blank. This is because without these 
experiential qualities an idea remains in a purely metaphysical state. It is therefore 
through immanent experiential forces that enables meaning to occur within each 
linguistic variance. Meaning is then not destroyed altogether into nonsense through 
these immanent differences. This is because meaning is affirmed as a multiplicity of 
immanent forces.  
 
Deleuze and Guattari on Chomsky and Labov: linguistic variables 
and African American English 
In A Thousand Plateaus (1980) Deleuze and Guattari highlight a crucial difference 
between Chomsky and Labov based on their treatment of linguistic variables: 
“Chomsky asks only that one carve from this aggregate a homogeneous or standard 
system as a basis for abstraction or idealisation, making possible a scientific study of 
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principles …”83 As we have seen in Chomsky’s privileging of a Cartesian 
apprenticeship linguistics variables or various phonetic qualities represent a sign. A 
sign is representative of the mind’s capacity to understand the idea that is expressed 
in a phonetic structure. However, due to Chomsky’s dependence on a homogenous 
system in order to account for all language, a problem emerges, namely, how do 
minor variations of the standard form of English also enable the same knowledge 
and ideas to emerge? This problem emerges in relation to a discussion of Black 
English where for Deleuze and Guattari, Chomsky still adheres to a homogeneous 
system that negates phonetic variables: “limiting oneself to standard English is thus 
not the issue or the English of the ghettos is obliged to extract a standard system 
guaranteeing the constancy and homogeneity of the object under study …”84 In 
Chomsky’s view, the variables and variations of Black English do not affect the 
overall structure of the English language. This is because the minor language of 
Black English still adheres to the same ideas that are expressed in the standard form 
of English, as he argues “…Black English is simply a language on par with my urban 
Philadelphia dialect of English, the English of High Table at Oxford, Japanese, 
Greek, etc. … The idea that Black English … or any other language fails to provide 
to an adequate basis for abstract thinking is utterly implausible, and I think one 
should be extremely sceptical about claims to the contrary.”85 However, in order not 
to suffer the disadvantages of adhering to a minor language the dominant standard 
of a society should be taught in order to assist a child to function in the world: “… the 
speakers of a language …should probably be taught in their own language at the 
very early stages, until basic skills are acquired, and should be taught in the 																																																								
83 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus trans. by Brian Massumi (London: Continuum, 2004) 
p.103 
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dominant language at the later stages, so that they can enter society without 
suffering the disadvantages that are rooted in the prevailing power, privilege, and 
domination.”86  
 
For Deleuze and Guattari, a reason that minor variations of a language will 
not be seen as part of a homogenous system can be seen in Chomsky’s criticism of 
the interpretation of variables where Labov’s emphasis on phonetics through the 
collection of linguistic data is not based on an analysis of language but pragmatics: 
“… Chomsky pretends to believe that by asserting his interest in the variable 
features of language, Labov is situating himself in a de facto pragmatics external to 
linguistics.”87 In other words, an individual’s beliefs in the interpretation of data lies 
outside the analysis of language itself. As Chomsky remarks “language 
documentation requires linguistic theory … when I was a student, the work that we 
did as students was language documentation … But the data you were looking for 
was dependent on what linguistic theory tells you to look for … [and] the kind of data 
you look for depends on what you think exists, what you think is important.”88 That is, 
in a subjective approach, the data that will be selected will be biased according to 
their beliefs. This calls into question the initial process of a selection of candidates 
where an individual’s focus will not solely be on their language structure but on the 
different pragmatic structures in society. Following the collection of data, the 
pragmatic structures of society and beliefs of the individual will enviably cloud the 
overall outcome will be contrived. A subjective bias can then be overcome through 																																																								
86 Ibid, p.333 
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an analysis of the linguistic theory in itself. For Chomsky, language is dependent on 
the linguistic theory that determines an individual’s beliefs. It is through the 
adherence to the same structural system that demonstrates an individual does not 
affect transform language itself. In this way, language is not transformed through 
each differing variable or data that is gathered since it is demonstrative of the same 
homogeneous structure.  
 
In contrast to Chomsky who seeks to homogenise the minor variations of 
language, Deleuze and Guattari note that: “Labov … has other ambitions … When 
he brings to light lines of inherent variation, he does not see them simply as ‘free 
variants’ pertaining to pronunciation, style, or nonpertinent features that lie outside 
the system and leave the homogeneity of the system in tact; neither does he see 
them as a de facto mix between two systems …”89 That is, Labov does not analyse 
each linguistic variation as a reflection of the same homogeneous structure of 
English. Nor is each variance perceived as minor language that mixes with a major 
standard of English. This is because the immanent qualities of the linguistic 
variances would be negated under a generalisation. This is where the unique 
qualities of a variance such as its pronunciation and style are negated in preference 
to the standard structure of English. In negating these immanent qualities the 
structure of English language would therefore act as an absolute foundation for how 
all subsequent uses of language and its variances should be expressed.  
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Deleuze and Guattari argue that in order to affirm these immanent qualities 
Labov seeks to maintain the uniqueness of linguistic variation: “it is the variation itself 
that is systematic …Labov sees variation as a dejure component affecting each 
system from within, sending it cascading or leaping on its own power and forbidding 
one to close it off, to make it homogeneous in principle.”90 That is, a variation is not a 
heterogeneous form of language that continually transforms and so prevents any 
system of language from emerging. On the contrary, a variation has its own set of 
unique set of linguistic systematic properties. By having its own set of systematic 
properties enables it to deviate from the standard form of English and become its 
own form of language. A different problem is therefore formed from Labov’s 
treatment of linguistic variations, namely, how do minor variations demonstrate a 
new linguistic system that affects and transforms the knowledge and ideas of the 
standard form of English?  For Deleuze and Guattari, this problem also emerges in 
relation to a discussion of Black English: “[Labov] takes the example of a young 
black person who, in a very short series of phrases, seems to pass from the Black 
English system to the standard eighteen times.”91 
 
Labov’s analysis of Black English occurs in in Language in the Inner City: 
Studies in the Black English Vernacular (1972) where he seeks to problematize the 
use of applying a standard English grammatical structure to Black English 
Vernacular. The term of Black English Vernacular has been chosen by Labov in 
order to avoid a generalisation of Black language: “’Black English’ might be best 
used for the whole range of language forms used by black people in the United 
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States: a very large range indeed, extending from the Creole grammar of Fullah 
spoken in the Sea Islands of South Carolina to the most and accomplished literary 
style.”92 The term has also been used in order to avoid the division between standard 
English and Black English: “the term ‘black English’ is not suitable for this dialect 
since that phrase implies a dichotomy between Standard English on the one hand 
and black English on the other.”93 Labov defines Black English Vernacular as “the 
relatively uniform dialect spoken by the majority of black youth in most parts of the 
United States today, especially in the inner city areas [such as] New York, Boston, 
Detroit, Philadelphia, Washington … it is also spoken in most rural areas and used in 
the causal, intimate speech of many adults …”94 The age group which is analysed 
that displayed the most consistent form of Black English vernacular is “… found in its 
most consist form in the speech of black youth from 8 to 19 years old who fully 
participate in the street cultures of the inner cities.”95   
 
A problem in application of an English grammatical structure to Black English 
vernacular can be seen in an attempt to correct a student’s misuse of language: 
“when the teacher attempts to [teach ‘standard English’ to an African American 
student] by precept and example in the classroom, she discovers that the student 
shows a strong and inexplicable resistance to learning the few simple rules that he 
needs to know."96 An example of this resistance is the lack of use of past tense in 
sentence structure: “He is told over and over again, from the early grades to the 
twelfth, that –ed is required for the past participle ending, but he continues to write: ‘I 																																																								
92 William Labov, Language in The Inner Cities: Studies in the Black English Vernacular (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1972) p.xiii 
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have live here twelve years.’ And he continues to mix up past and present tense 
forms in his reading.”97 A reason that Labov gives for the student’s failure to adhere 
to the correct grammatical style is due to a teacher’s failure to recognise different 
structural rules that operate within Black English Vernacular: “… the child’s teacher 
has no systematic knowledge of the nonstandard forms which oppose and contradict 
standard English … [due to this] they look upon every deviation from schoolroom 
English as inherently evil, and they attribute these mistakes to laziness, sloppiness 
or the child’s natural disposition to be wrong.”98 In this view, the imposition of English 
grammar structure is to provide a structure to language that did not exist in the 
student’s language: “From this point of view, teaching English is a question of 
imposing rules upon chaotic and shapeless speech, filling a vacuum by supplying 
rules where no rules existed before.”99 However, not all teachers adopt this view and 
are interest the student’s language but fail to properly understand its structure: 
“Other teachers are sincerely interested in understanding the language of the 
children, but their knowledge is fragmentary and ineffective. They feel that the great 
difficulties in teaching black and Puerto Rican children are due in part to the 
systematic contradictions used by the child and the rules used by the teacher.”100  
 
Following this, Labov seeks to understand why Black English Vernacular is 
not recognised as its own form of the English language. A reason for this is identified 
from the analysis of the African-American children by educational psychologists: “… 
a great deal of federally sponsored research has been devoted to the educational 
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problems of children in ghetto schools. In order to account for the poor performance 
of children in these schools, educational psychologists have attempted to discover 
what kind of disadvantage or defect they are suffering from.”101 Educational 
psychologists identified this disadvantage as the student’s impoverished 
background: “the viewpoint that has been widely accepted … is that children show a 
cultural deficit as a result of an impoverished environment in their early years.”102 
This serves as a foundation for explaining black children’s incorrect use of grammar: 
“Considerable attention has been given to language. In this area the deficit theory 
appears as the concept of verbal deprivation. Black children from the ghetto area are 
said to receive little verbal stimulation, to hear very little well-formed language, and 
as a result are impoverished in their means of verbal expression ...”103 This can be 
seen in the view of Martin Deutsch in The Disadvantaged Child (1967) and Social 
Class, Race and Psychological Development (1968) as Labov notes: “… the notion 
of cultural deprivation put forward by Martin Deutsch and others … Black children 
are said to lack the favorable factors in their home environment which enable middle-
class children to do well in school.”104 Some of these factors are “… the development 
of various cognitive skills through verbal interaction with adults, including the ability 
to reason abstractly, speak fluently, and focus upon long-range goals.”105  
 
An extreme case of this deprivation is to adopt the view that African American 
English is not a language. This view is present in the technique of Carl Bereiter and 
Siegfried Engelmann in Teaching Disadvantaged Children in Preschool (1966) as 																																																								
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Labov states: “Bereiter’s program for an academically oriented preschool is based 
upon the premise that black children must have a language with which they can 
learn, and their empirical finding that these children come to school without such a 
language.”106 Instead of using a standard form of communication: “… Bereiter 
reports that their communication was by gestures, ‘single words,’ and ‘a series of 
badly connected words or phrases,’ such as They mine and Me got juice … Thus 
Bereiter concludes that the children’s speech forms are nothing more than a series 
of emotional cries, and decides to treat them [without any form of language at all].”107 
In order for children to learn a correct standard: “[Bereiter’s] basic program is … to 
teach [African American children] a new language devised by Engelmann, which 
consists of a limited series of questions and answers …”108 A problem with Bereiter’s 
approach is that the questions are framed in such a way that the answers given by a 
child is “… defensive, [and displays] monosyllabic behavior.”109 This leads to the 
creation of “[an] asymmetrical situation [for the child] where anything he says can 
literally be held against him. He has learned a number of devices to avoid saying 
anything in this situation, and he works very hard to achieve this end.”110  
 
Labov challenges this view of African American English as an inferior 
language due to cultural deprivation: “The concept of verbal deprivation has no basis 
in social reality. In fact, black children in the urban ghettos receive a great deal of 
verbal stimulation, hear more well-formed sentences than middle-class children, and 
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participate fully in a highly verbal culture.”111 From an analysis of African American 
English in a social environment demonstrates that an impoverished background 
does not lead to the incorrect use of English grammar. This is because the ghettos 
provide a stimulating environment for language development: “the view of the black 
speech community which we obtain from our work in the ghetto areas is precisely the 
opposite from that reported by Deutsch, Bereiter and Engelmann. We see a child 
bathed in verbal stimulation from morning to night ... We see the younger child trying 
to acquire these skills [of gaining social status through their use of language] from 
older children.”112 This stimulating environment is transposed to their schools where 
a contrast is identified with middle-class children with an affluent background who 
receive less stimulation: “… in many ways working-class speakers are more effective 
narrators, reasoners and debaters than many middle-class speakers [in high school 
and college] temporize, qualify, and lose their argument in a mass of irrelevant 
detail.”113  
 
As there remains no proof for cultural deprivation for a basing a claim for the 
inferiority of a language demonstrates that African American children: “… have the 
same basic vocabulary, possess the same capacity for conceptual learning, and use 
the same logic as anyone else who learns to speak and understand English.”114 This 
is because African American English has its own set of systematic rules that enable 
it to be defined as a language: “the deletion of the is or are in [African American 
English] is not the result of erratic or illogical behavior; it follows the same regular 
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rules as standard English contraction … the appropriate use of the deletion rule … 
requires a deep intimate knowledge of English grammar and phonology.”115 
Knowledge of the grammatical rules of deletion remain oblivious to the speakers of a 
language: “such knowledge is not available for conscious inspection by native 
speakers.”116 These grammatical rules are therefore formed at a subconscious level: 
“… the adult or child who uses these rules must have formed at some level of 
psychological organization, clear concepts of tense marker, verb phrase, rule 
ordering, sentence embedding, pronoun, and many other grammatical categories 
which are essential parts of any logical system.”117 
 
Labov therefore argues: “If we do not accept the fact that [African-American 
English] has distinct rules of its own, we find that the speech of black children is a 
mass of errors and this has indeed been the tradition of early education research in 
this area.”118 Black English Vernacular must be accepted as its own form of English 
language. If it is not accepted as its own unique form of the English language then it 
systematic qualities are negated through the imposition of a homogeneous system of 
language. Yet these systematic qualities are not errors, inherently evil, a natural 
disposition to be wrong or display a child’s laziness or natural disposition to be 
wrong. This is because Black English Vernacular has its own systematic qualities 
that enable it to function as a form of language and differentiate it from the standard 
form of English. It is the systematic differences, such as the lack of a past tense that 
must be affirmed. On the other hand, if African American English is not affirmed as a 
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unique language then it leads into a view that it is inferior and defective compared to 
standard English. Yet to privilege the status of one language above another is 
dangerous since it can lead to racism: “the myth of verbal deprivation is particularly 
dangerous because it diverts attention from real defects of our educational system to 
imaginary defects of the child … it leads its sponsors inevitably to hypothesis of the 
genetic inferiority of black children that it was originally designed to avoid.”119 The 
privileging of standard English is racist because African American English is treated 
as inferior and defective. This leads to the universal negation of all individuals who 
speak such language as inferior to those who use the standard form of English. 
 
In comparison with the previous analysis of Chomsky’s view, both Chomsky 
and Labov agree that African American English is not an inferior form of standard 
English. For Chomsky, one language cannot be inferior since all languages seek to 
express the same ideas. In this way, African American English is equal to standard 
English because both would express the same ideas regardless of their phonetic 
variances. However, Chomsky’s view of African American English is problematized 
in using Labov’s method. This is because, for Labov, a homogeneous system 
negates the singular variances and differences that occur between languages. This 
does not mean that due to their differences one language is superior to another. On 
the contrary, it is because of their variations that enables it to be affirmed as a 
language in itself.  If these variations are negated and a ‘standard’ grammatical form 
is used then it leads to a negative situation for a child. This is because any response 
that they give will be wrong if it is not based upon the prior determined structure.   
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However, the basis for using a universal form of grammar is flawed since an 
analysis of a social environment demonstrates the flourishing of a language. Labov’s 
form of flourishing is not based upon an analysis of the correct environmental 
situation where a child can achieve their best potential. Instead, a child’s capacity to 
flourish is not limited to any specific familial or class distinction. A language is not 
determined by generalisations but its variances are formed through worldly affects. 
In philosophical terms, Chomsky negates the immanent qualities of language that 
Labov seeks to affirm. In this negation of immanence, a pure rationalist philosophy of 
the mind is privileged. Whilst Labov, seeks to affirm language as being continually 
affected through worldly environment. It is therefore these immanent qualities that 
must be affirmed in order for a language to maintain its systematic differences.  
 
Conclusion 
For Deleuze and Guattari, Labov’s method problematizes the relationship between 
speech and language in linguistic analysis:  
 
William Labov has clearly shown the contradiction, or at least paradox, 
created by the distinction between language and speech: language is defined 
as the ‘social part’ of language, and speech is consigned to individual 
variations; but since the social part is self-enclosed, it necessarily follows that 
a single individual would be enough to illustrate the principles of language 
	
	
196	
without reference to any outside data, whereas speech could only be studied 
in a social context. The same paradox recurs from Saussure to Chomsky.120  
 
In its initial analysis, language is social because it takes place in part of a worldly 
environment. Speech is affected by these processes which enables linguistic 
variances for each individual. However, a worldly environment is defined according 
to specific instances. In other words, the immanent qualities of language are defined 
according to specific cases and classifications that occur. The role of language is 
then reversed from having taken place in a worldly environment to a specific context. 
This context enables general principles and formulas to be created. These 
mathematical formulas are abstracted from the immanent forces that were initially 
taken into account. A single individual would then serve as a general basis on which 
these formulas could be tested. Speech is also transformed from an analysis of 
singular linguistic variances to an analysis of how speech is affected in a social 
context. The singular variances are then also generalized through an analysis of how 
they differ between different classifications, such as sex, age, and regional variation. 
A general variance can then be analyzed in order to note the overall difference 
between classes. However, this also leads to a negation of the immanent variations 
within each individual expression that was initially analyzed.  
 
This problem can be seen in both methodologies of Chomsky and Labov. In 
Chomsky’s method immanent processes and variances are negated in preference to 
a homogeneous system for language. Whilst in Labov, these immanent processes 																																																								
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197	
are negated through their quantification. The process of quantification is necessary 
for Labov’s method as it enables generalities and classifications to be created in 
order to analyze the variations that occur. It is within this context that variations are 
defined within social context, of sex, age, regional variation and so forth. Deleuze 
and Guattari therefore seek to affirm these initial immanent processes and the 
singular linguistic variations before their quantitative transformation into general 
formulas and their universal contextualization: “How can we conceptualize this 
continuous variation at work within a language, even if it means overstepping the 
limits Labov sets for himself as well as the conditions of scientificity invoked by 
linguistics?”121 That is, Deleuze and Guattari seek to establish the concept of 
continuous variation as a continual becoming that always affects those generalities 
that are established through scientific method. 
 
In relation to the study of sense and of meaning in my thesis, Deleuze and 
Guattari here assert that sense is a process that continually effects the 
establishment of meaning. Worldly forces condition the establishment of meaning. 
Yet these conditions remain in a state of becoming. This is due to the continual 
change in worldly forces (working environments, social and cultural conditions and 
so forth). Any establishment of causal or general principles can only remain 
transitory. It is by affirming worldly conditions as becoming that Deleuze and Guattari 
seek to overcome the problems of a transcendental or causal foundation that is 
apparent in the approaches of Chomsky and Labov. The danger in the establishment 
of transcendent or general foundations for language is the negation of uniqueness 
and singularity. This can be seen in their analysis of African American English. For 																																																								
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Deleuze and Guattari, we arrive at forms of institutional racism by negating the 
unique expression of a certain language. From this we can conclude that each 
individual’s understanding is unique and affected by worldly forces. These forces 
remain in a continual state of becoming where any given generality is always 
conditioned by the analysis of a set of forces at a given time. We should then affirm 
the uniqueness of form and style of expression.  
 
In the next chapter I develop the concept of a Leibnizian apprenticeship. This 
takes place through an analysis of the three stages of signs that occurs in Proust 
and Signs. Put briefly, worldly signs are the social and cultural basis for our 
knowledge. They provide structure and enable us to gain a basic understanding of 
the world. Signs of love challenge this foundation by enabling us to think of other 
perspectives, or in Leibnizian terms, other possible worlds. We then arrive at the last 
stage, signs of art that demonstrate the pure singularity of the world and the 
uniqueness of our understanding. After this, I return to the problems of dualism in 
Leibniz’s philosophy and present an alternative approach based upon immanence, 
rather than, transcendence. The aim of the next chapter will then be to develop my 
initial analysis of Leibnizian philosophy that is based upon immanence, and its 
relation to epistemology and language.  
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4 
 
Immanence and a Leibnizian apprenticeship to signs 		
 
 
Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter, the concept of a Cartesian apprenticeship was defined. A 
rational apprenticeship was necessary for Descartes in order for individuals to use 
rational deduction to reflect upon a transcendent sign, the true form of an object. It 
was demonstrated that the construction of pure rational structures of the mind is 
dependent on worldly forces. This is because worldly forces implicitly influence our 
use of language. Examples of such worldly forces were the environmental and 
spatial effects on language shown in William Labov’s analysis of the variance of the 
constant (r) in New York Department stores. Our use of language is dependent on 
worldly forces and not on an abstract value. This emphasises further the importance 
of rhetoric that was developed in Chapter One. An analysis of Nietzsche’s early 
remarks on language identified that in the establishment of an origin for language, a 
specific transcendent value was privileged. This establishment of a transcendent 
value was necessary in order for the origin to be pure and truly original. A problem 
was then identified in cases of origins such that worldly forces were shown to 
influence the construction of a transcendent value. This collection of worldly forces 
gave an explanation for the difference between origins across cases, because the 
multiplicity of forces gave rise to different origins thereby denying their claims to be 
absolute foundations. This was also seen through in the various responses that were 
given to Labov, since each answer given was different due to the continual change 
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of tonal variance (r). This tonal variance was identified due to various factors at work 
such as an individual’s age, sex, race, job, and the environmental space. 
 
Building on this previous analysis, it can be said that from Deleuze’s 
Nietzschean perspective that sense is a singularity. This is because each individual’s 
understanding is always different. In order to define singularity we can adopt Max 
Stirner’s usage from Chapter Two’s discussion of The Ego and Its Own. For Stirner, 
everything is singular and unique. Nothing can then be truly compared to anything 
else (everything is a designer’s one-off piece). By negating any form of similarity or 
resemblance Stirner transforms the Hegelian form of negation. As we have 
previously discussed, the Hegelian form of negation in both the Phenomenology and 
Science of Logic is to move from sensory experience, which is merely sensory and 
nonsensical, towards knowledge of the Ideal. Stirner returns to these initial stages of 
immediacy of sensory experience that is negated in Hegelian philosophy. In doing 
so, Stirner affirms the ‘nothingness’ of immediacy, the lack of an absolute Idea or 
telos that must be achieved for Hegel’s logic. This demonstrates a reversal of a 
Hegelian conception of negation where the emergence of any form of association is 
negated in order to maintain singularity and uniqueness. Therefore, in Stirner’s view 
singularity must always be truly unique in preventing any form of generality from 
emerging. This is where negation does not lead to the same universal knowledge for 
all individuals but maintains the uniqueness of each individual’s understanding.  
 
A Hegelian counter argument based on the necessity of universality can be 
made. This view could argue that singularity in itself is meaningless. The immediacy 
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of sensory experience does not provide knowledge since objects are only known in 
terms of sensual properties. In order for knowledge to emerge, singularity must be 
negated. However, the negation of sensual properties does not mean that each 
object cannot be differentiated from others. This is because negation affirms the 
uniqueness of an object. The uniqueness of an object is always affirmed because its 
singular properties are always affirmed. For instance, white is not black and black is 
not white. Through their inherent differences black and white are able to maintain 
their unique colour properties. In contrast to Stirner, a universal Idea does not 
prevent singularity and difference in objects but affirms them. This enables every 
individual to reach the same knowledge of these differences. Therefore, the conflict 
between Stirner’s and Hegel’s use of negation can be summarised as follows: It is 
against Stirner’s use of negation that a criticism from Hegelian philosophy is made in 
preference of generality and as prevention of true uniqueness of singularity in order 
to affirm universal knowledge. In opposition to this view, Stirner affirms the 
singularity of individuals in order for their understanding to be truly unique. This is in 
order to affirm the uniqueness of each individual perspective that is generalised in 
being defined according to the same universal Idea. 
 
The previous chapter’s discussion of a Cartesian apprenticeship resolves the 
problems of Stirner’s singularity and Hegel’s universality. Comparable to Hegel, a 
rational apprenticeship argues for innateness of our ideas in order for an individual to 
achieve a correct understanding of the world. Without the process of rational 
reflection we would be unable to clearly distinguish experiential ideas from innate 
ideas. An example of this can be seen in Descartes’ discussion in the Meditations of 
understanding the correct size of the sun:  
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… I find within myself two ideas of the sun. One idea is drawn, as it were, 
from the senses … by means of this idea the sun appears to me to be quite 
small. But there is another idea, one derived from astronomical reasoning … 
through this idea the sun is shown to be several times larger than the earth. 
Both ideas surely cannot resemble the same sun existing outside me1  
 
The experiential idea of the sun is that it is smaller than the earth. In contrast, the 
rational idea of the sun is that it is several times larger than the earth. In order to 
correctly understand the size of the sun or distance of the earth to the sun it must be 
based on a mathematical calculation. This mathematical calculation is not based on 
purely abstract reasoning but is subject to scientific experimentation. An experiment 
enables a methodology to be established in which others can affirm or deny the 
results.  
 
It is because of the continual confusion of experiential and rational ideas that 
individuals require a Cartesian apprenticeship. This is because Cartesian 
apprenticeship enables an individual to remove this confusion and reflect upon the 
rational truth. In order to gain a correct understanding individuals must clear their 
mind of all false qualities of an object to reflect upon its eternal and unchanging 
properties. In other words, forming a correct idea is a process of reflection upon the 
transcendent sign. This is to remove all empirical qualities from an object in order for 
the true rational idea to be revealed. For Descartes, we can only trust what we can 
																																																								
1 Rene Descartes, Meditations, Objections and Replies ed. and trans. by Roger Ariew and Donald Cress 
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 2006) p.22 
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rationally deduce for ourselves. Another individual’s knowledge cannot be trusted 
because their ideas are a conflation of experienced and rational ideas. It is only 
through completely singular apprenticeship without any external teaching or 
methodology that a true idea can emerge. However, in contrast to Stirner’s 
conception of singularity, in a Cartesian apprenticeship, each individual will reflect 
upon the same universal idea. The same idea is reflected upon by different 
individuals because all differential qualities have been removed in the process of 
rational apprenticeship. The idea that is reflected upon then is pure and enables a 
universal methodology to be created where all individuals can arrive at the same 
understanding of the world.  
 
It is at this point that a difference between Descartes’ and Hegel’s processes 
of rational reflection must be noted. This occurs due to their different understanding 
of the limits of the intellect. As Michael Inwood remarks “for Descartes the intellect is 
‘limited’ or finite, because it cannot perceive anything and everything without end or 
limit. For Hegel it is infinite because it circles back on itself, especially in ‘conceptual 
cognition, where it entirely permeates its objects, whether these be its own thoughts 
or external objects.”2 A Cartesian understanding of the intellect is limited due to the 
empirical act of association. In this way, we can only imagine or understand objects 
that can be associated to our own experience. We cannot then imagine objects 
outwith our experience such as a chiliagon, a 1000-sided polygon. In contrast, a 
Hegelian intellect is not limited by our experience. This is because we overcome the 
experiential limitation by reflection upon its absent qualities. In reflection upon absent 
qualities we can understand the general properties of objects which allow us to 																																																								
2 Michael J. Inwood, A Commentary on Hegel’s Philosophy of Mind (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2010) p.465 
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distinguish one object from another. A Cartesian approach therefore attempts to 
understand the rational structures underlying our experience. A Hegelian approach 
seeks to ground our understanding on the pure mind. This allows us to overcome 
any limitation and move towards a purely rational and free basis for our 
understanding. This can be identified in Hegel’s critical remarks on Descartes’ 
innatism: “To Descartes, inborn ideas are not universal … but that which has 
evidence … found in thought itself … resembling what Cicero calls natural feelings 
implanted in the heart. We would rather say that such is implied in the nature and 
essence of our mind and spirit. Mind is active and … has no other ground than its 
freedom.”3 
 
A problem can be identified in all three approaches, the transcendent 
signifiers of the subject/Ego, Reason and pure Ideas are the foundation upon which 
singularity is determined. This was also the basis upon which Locke made his 
determination of sense as we have seen in the introduction to this thesis. The act of 
foundation is either through understanding how the world is a reflection of an innate 
idea of the mind (Descartes), how the mind captures the absolute Idea (Hegelian), or 
the uniqueness of their mind (Stirner). These transcendent signifiers deny that the 
worldly or immanent forces have any effect upon a pure metaphysical foundation for 
knowledge. Empirical qualities are either denied in preference to the sign 
(Descartes); or are completely nonsensical and therefore unable to give any 
knowledge or understanding without negation (Hegel); or are completely stopped 
from emerging by an Ego (Stirner).  
																																																								
3 Georg W. F. Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Medieval and Modern Philosophy, trans. by E.S 
Haldane and Frances H. Simson (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1995) pp.242-3 
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It is therefore the aim of this chapter to build upon the previous chapter’s analysis of 
immanence in order to affirm the singularity of our understanding, arrive at meaning 
and be able to make sense to others. This is in order to challenge the role of a 
transcendent or absolute foundation for meaning. In contrast to this, I have argued 
that the attainment of meaning is always novel. This allows for immanent forces to 
continually affect our thought. At the same time, I will demonstrate that our unique 
understanding can be maintained, paradoxically, through the adoption of a general 
methodology. This will be made through an analysis of Deleuze’s concept of 
immanent apprenticeship in Proust and Signs. For the moment a simple definition of 
this paradox can be given: upon making sense of the world we arrive at a temporary 
understanding, which can always be changed later as we return to an area of 
knowledge. In this way, the process of making sense is in a state of becoming, our 
understanding remaining in a fragmentary state where our knowledge is continually 
formed and reformed. As we make sense of things differently each time, our 
understanding is singular. Singularity in this sense, differs from Descartes’ and 
Stirner’s usages. For Descartes and for Stirner, singularity remains in a transcendent 
and abstracted state due to their vicious negation of any worldly forces. There, 
meaning takes precedence over sense. For Deleuze, we must take into account of 
the process of making sense before the attainment of meaning. By taking sense into 
account we can therefore affirm novelty in the process of apprenticeship. A different 
understanding of singularity must then be developed.  
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This singularity of our sense and its interaction with structure is made through 
an analysis of three engagements with signs in Proust and Signs. The first, worldly 
signs enable us to attain general meanings based upon its social and cultural 
context. This general foundation then enables us to form an understanding based 
upon general truth-values that are correct at a given time period. The second and 
third stages, signs of love and signs of art challenge this general foundation. In signs 
of love, we become an apprentice to another. This is because we must learn their 
different use of the same gestures and signs. Through this process of interpretation 
we are shown other possible ways and different perspectives that challenge our 
predisposed and presupposed views. My analysis of signs of art continues the 
critical analysis of the general interpretation of signs by illustrating the problem of 
resemblance. The act of resemblance creates generality through which all different 
variances share a comparable quality. Yet by comparing, we deny the unique and 
singular perspective of the artist’s work and their understanding. With this emphasis 
upon uniqueness, Deleuze’s brief remarks on Leibniz in Proust will be used in 
conjunction with my analysis of signs of art and of love. This is in order to 
demonstrate that it is the task of a Deleuzian apprenticeship to affirm this 
paradoxical relation between our understanding, structure and communication in 
order to allow for us to make continual sense of the world and thereby allow us to 
continually transform the way we think. Deleuze’s apprenticeship is then for us to 
use this general structure as a foundation in order for us to attain our own 
understanding of its values. 
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Deleuze’s Proust: worldly signs and generality 	
Deleuze’s brief remark in the preface to the first edition of Proust and Signs defines 
its aim as: “the first part of this book concerns the emission and the interpretation of 
signs as presented in In Search of Lost Time. Extra material was added to the 1972 
edition deals which deals with a different problem: “the production and multiplication 
of signs themselves, from the point of view of the composition of the search.”4 These 
additional chapters analyse the role of madness in Proust’s works. This is not to say 
that Proust himself was mad, but to analyse the proliferation of signs that contests 
the role of a dominant signifier (X is good but A, B, C are also good options). The 
role of madness and Deleuze’s critical approach to psychoanalysis’ interpretation of 
signifiers can be seen in his later work of Logic of Sense (1969) in the twenty-sixth 
series on language. This later addition also draws on Deleuze’s later work with Felix 
Guattari and their novel approach to psychoanalysis, schizoanalysis, in their work 
Anti-Oedipus (1972). Due to their contrasting analysis, only the material in the first 
edition will be analysed.  
 
For Deleuze, Proust’s series of novels, In Search of Lost Time, are a detailed 
study of a variety of signs. This is to analyse the way in which individual’s 
understand and convey signs to others and why specific signs are attributed to 
specific signifiers: “Proust’s work is based on … the apprenticeship to signs … The 
Search is presented as the exploration of different worlds of signs … for the signs 
are specific and constitute the substance of one world or another.”5 The first sign that 
an individual engages with is its general signification. This general meaning that has 																																																								
4 Gilles Deleuze, Proust and Signs trans. Richard Howard (London: Continuum, 2008) p.vii 
5 Ibid, p.4 
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been associated to a specific object. This general signification is defined by Deleuze 
as the worldly sign: “the worldly sign appears as the replacement of an action or a 
thought. It stands for action and for thought. It is therefore a sign that does not refer 
to something else, a transcendent signification or to an ideal content, but has 
usurped the supposed value of its meaning.”6 For Deleuze, a worldly sign replaces 
meaning as its valuation is replaced by a generality. In other words, a worldly sign is 
blank since there is a no learning process that takes place. This is because an 
individual repeats the same determined actions and gestures, which in turn, expects 
the same response to the gesture.  
 
For instance, this can be seen in pretending to laugh at an unfunny joke: 
“nothing funny is said at the Verdurins’, and Mme Verdurin does not laugh; but 
Cottard makes a sign that he is saying something funny, Mme Verdurin makes a sign 
that she is laughing, and her sign is so perfectly emitted that M. Verdurin, not to be 
outdone, seeks in his turn for an appropriate mimicry.”7 There is no meaning 
attached to the performance as the gesture is done out of habit and conforms to the 
expected response. It is by habitually performing an action that a criterion is created 
of gestures. When these gestures are performed an individual will be able to 
habitually perform tasks, expect certain responses without care or consideration for 
the initial struggles or responses that they had received. Mme. Verdurin represents 
for Deleuze the performance of everyday tasks and responses through signs: “this is 
																																																								
6 Ibid, p.5 
7 Ibid 
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why worldliness, judged from the viewpoint of actions appears to be disappointing 
and cruel, and from the viewpoint of thought, it appears stupid.”8 
 
In relation to thought, a worldly sign appears to be cruel and stupid as it 
prevents the emergence of a different view. In this way, a repetition of the same 
gesture, denies the possibility of it having a different value. This demonstrates its 
cruel aspect when an individual fails to recognise another valuation and only seeks 
to repeat what is expected of them. An individual thus remains trapped according to 
custom determined solely by the widely accepted way of behaving. It must be noted 
that a repetition of the same gesture is not a revaluation as it remains determined by 
habit and so never seeks to attain a higher valuation. It is through this blind 
obedience to a gesture that its absurdity is revealed. This can be identified in 
comedies which reveal the absurdity of always performing a gesture in the same 
way. For instance, one of Peter Seller’s characters, Dr Strangelove, in Stanley 
Kubrick’s film of the same title (1964), is an ex-Nazi scientist who cannot control the 
right side of his body. Due to this it can perform gestures abruptly such as 
infrequently performing the Nazi salute. This demonstrates the absurdity of 
performing the same action as Dr Strangelove’s body remains completely 
determined by habit and so always performs the action at an inappropriate time 
since the film takes place during the Cold War.   
 
A problem with a performance of a gesture being solely determined by the 
same criterion is its adherence to stereotypes. In each performance an individual 																																																								
8 Ibid 
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would signify another object or individual through their general qualities and not their 
own unique singular points. Through this adherence to stereotypes each 
performance then leads itself to racism, sexism, and bigoted views. Whilst a comedic 
performance of a sign reveals the absurdity of a general sign, this is would be, in 
contrast, to reinforce a negative image attached to a specific individual or object. For 
instance, this can be seen in Roland Barthes’ analysis of a young black African 
giving a salute on the cover of a popular French newspaper Paris Match:  
 
I am at the barber’s, and copy of Paris-Match is offered to me. On the cover, a 
young Negro in a French uniform is saluting, with his eyes uplifted, probably 
fixed on a fold of the tricolour. All this is the meaning of the picture. But 
whether naively or not, I see very well what it signifies to me: that France is a 
great Empire, that all her sons, without any colour discrimination, faithfully 
serve under the flag …9  
 
The initial and naive signification of the image is one of patriotism. The signifier of a 
young black soldier giving a salute is for a shared collective feeling of patriotism to 
be felt by the viewer. This signification that is created has a transcendent foundation 
as it attempts to overcome all social and cultural differences in order for the same 
universal feeling of nationalism to be affirmed. However, by seeking to affirm 
nationalism on a transcendent grounding negates the very differences that divide the 
nationality of those of France and its colonies. As Barthes continues “[the image’s 
true signification is] that there is no better answer to the detractors of an alleged 																																																								
9 Roland Barthes, Mythologies, trans. Anne Lavers (New York: Noonday Press, 1991) p.115 
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colonialism than the zeal shown by this Negro in serving his so-called oppressors 
...”10 Upon further analysis signification of patriotism is transformed to oppression. 
This is because far from affirming his own culture or nationality the African soldier 
only affirms France. 
  
A comparable example to Barthes’ soldier is the use of Nazi propaganda. This 
can be seen in the prior discussion of the Nazi’s in the chapter on Nietzsche, this 
was to be affirmative of an extreme patriotism and the ideal of an Aryan Race. This 
ideal meant that the Nazi’s patriotism had an extremely negative attitude to society, 
namely, to eradicate all impure German qualities from society. This transcendent 
ideal lead ultimately to a genocidal attitude towards the Jewish populous, as Jeffery 
Herf states: 
 
[Hitler] and his propagandists insisted that the extermination of the Jews was 
a justified response to a war launched against Germany … [Nazi propaganda] 
repeatedly asserted that an actual political subject, an actor called Jewry or 
international Jewry, was ‘guilty’ of starting and prolonging the war and that a 
Jewish international conspiracy was intent on exterminating Germany and the 
Germans.11  
 
																																																								
10 Ibid 
11 Jeffery Herf,  The Jewish Enemy: Nazi Ideology and Propaganda During World War II and the Holocaust 
(Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2006) pp.1-2 
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In both cases, the initial signification affirms an image of thought where its meaning 
suppresses sense. This is because a multiplicity of different understandings is 
negated in preference to the same universal signification of patriotism. This 
patriotism in the Paris Match example is an oppression of all cultural and social 
differences by maintaining the ideal of the French empire. Whilst the ideal of 
patriotism in Nazi propaganda also is idealistic as it led to the adoption of a 
genocidal attitude by seeking to eradicate ‘non-German’ qualities by maintaining the 
ideal of a supreme race. In contrast to this suppression of sense by an ideal, in 
Barthes’ analysis, the sign is revealed to be affirmative of sense and multiplicity. In 
other words, Barthes’ analysis of the sign penetrates the general image of thought 
and reveals the underlying process of thought itself. This is Barthes’ task in 
Mythologies (1957) in which the essay appears, a demystification of the sign. 
Jonathan Culler elaborates on this project “In many cases … [Barthes] reveals the 
ideological implications of what seems natural, ‘myth’ means a delusion to be 
exposed.”12  
 
For Deleuze, comparable to Barthes’ process of demystification of signs, the 
process of entering into an apprenticeship to worldly signs is not to accept bigoted or 
extremely right wing political views, rather, it is to demonstrate the fragility of such 
views through an apprenticeship. An apprentice is to enter into a dynamic 
relationship with a sign in order to revaluate knowledge: “Learning is essentially 
concerned with signs. Signs are the object of a temporal apprenticeship, not of an 
abstract knowledge. To learn is first of all to consider a substance, an object, a being 
																																																								
12 Jonathan Culler, Barthes: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) p.23 
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as if it emitted signs to be deciphered, interpreted.”13 In order for us to learn signs 
are necessary. This is because they give us an initial basis in which we can form an 
understanding of the world. We have a temporary apprenticeship with a sign in order 
to decipher its signification (sign X signifier Y signification Z). For instance, on 
perceiving a rose, there is a sign of the particular flower, signifier of a rose, and 
signification of love. It is through an apprenticeship and learning that we are able to 
overcome this initial relationship with signs in order to decipher its meaning. That is, 
to transvalue its general signification through gaining a personal understanding of it.  
 
It is through this encounter, in the discovery of meaning within a sign, that an 
individual becomes an ‘Egyptologist’: “There is no apprentice who is not ‘the 
Egyptologist’ of something … everything that teaches us emits signs; every act of 
learning is an interpretation of signs or hieroglyphics.”14 Deleuze’s use of 
hieroglyphics is not to privilege languages which are based on ideographs, a symbol 
which represents language than written word, rather, written language is itself like 
hieroglyphics as both attempt to represent a given idea within a conceptualisation 
either in word or symbol. In this way, an individual becomes like an Egyptologist by 
discovering meaning through a symbol. Just as in relation to love, a sign remains 
empty without an experience to give it meaning (she threw the flowers to the ground, 
shattering all my expectations).  
 
Following this, Deleuze gives two examples of apprenticeship: “one becomes 
a carpenter only by becoming sensitive to the signs of wood, a physician by 
																																																								
13 Deleuze, Proust and Signs, p.4 
14 Ibid 
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becoming sensitive to the signs of disease.”15 In the carpenter’s case, the wood itself 
without any process of learning about its qualities is empty. That is an individual 
does not immediately know what wood would be able to be crafted and not. It is only 
once an individual has undergone an apprenticeship, the carpenter would be able to 
differentiate between different types of wood and to observe signs of decay to 
determine how freshly cut was a piece of wood16. In the physician’s case, a sign of a 
disease without any prior knowledge is empty. An individual cannot identify which 
specific disease it is or the possible medical treatments available. In becoming an 
apprentice physician, an individual would be able to make sense of the different 
signs of a disease and be able to identify at what stage of development it was at. 
Depending on the sign of what stage of development was the disease this would 
lead to a diagnosis and to different treatments that were available. From this it is 
evident that in both apprenticeships an initial process of making sense of a sign is 
crucial in order for an individual to form an understanding of the world. This is 
because the worldly sign provides a structure from which learning can emerge. In 
other words, without affirming the general representation of an object, an 
apprenticeship cannot take place. Deleuze’s apprenticeship to signs is therefore 
empirical since an individual must engage with the experiential world in order to learn 
from it.  
 
 
																																																								
15 Ibid, p.4 
16 Gasper J. Lewis and Floyd Vogt argue that it is necessary to understand different types of wood in order to 
apply this knowledge practically in carpentry “the carpenter works with wood more than any other material and 
must understand its characteristics in order to use it intelligently ... there are many kinds of wood ... it is 
important to keep these qualities in mind when selecting wood.” Gasper J. Lewis and Floyd Vogt, Carpentry, 3rd 
Edition (New York: Delmar, 2001) p.12   
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Signs of love and a multiplicity of possible interpretations   	
The general methodology that allows us to correctly interpret worldly signs is then 
put into practical use. Through this practical implementation our own style and 
singular perspective develops. This is to arrive at a completely unique understanding 
of the world. Or to put it another way, we develop one possible way to view the 
world. Deleuze’s emphasis upon singularity and possible worlds allows us to these 
points to his view of Leibniz in Proust and Signs. This engagement with Leibniz in 
Proust is restricted to a few brief remarks.17 The first engagement is implicitly made 
through a discussion of Leibniz’s concept of possible worlds in the first chapter on 
‘Types of Signs’. This is referred to by Deleuze as plurality of signs in his initial 
discussion of interpreting signs of love. The plurality of signs is reflected as a 
possible world in the signs of the beloved in the signs of love: “The beloved appears 
as a sign, a ‘soul’; the beloved expresses a possible world unknown to us, implying, 
enveloping, imprisoning a world that must be deciphered, that is, interpreted.”18  
 
Individuals appear to us as signs where an apprenticeship must be 
undertaken in order to correctly understand them. However, an interpretation of a 
sign of a beloved is different from a worldly sign since that they cannot be 
determined by any given meaning (She meant X to be nothing but X). In order to 
correctly understand others we must enter a relationship that challenges our 
preconceptions. It is through this challenge to our preconceptions that a sign reflects 																																																								
17 Deleuze’s encounters with Leibniz are varied. After Proust and Signs, we find a discussion of the difference 
between Leibniz and Spinoza’s concepts of expressionism in the conclusion of Expressionism in Philosophy: 
Spinoza (1968). In Difference and Repetition (1968), there is a discussion of Leibniz’s differential calculus in 
the chapter four ‘Ideas and the Synthesis of Difference’ and his concept of difference and its relation to identity, 
with a contrasting analysis with Hegel’s view, made in the first chapter, ‘Difference in Itself’. Deleuze also gave 
a two series of lectures on Leibniz at Paris 8 University in Vincennes. The first course took place in 1980 and 
second in 1987. Transcriptions of these are available at webdeleuze.com thanks to the efforts of Richard Pinhas. 
After these lectures Deleuze released his main work on Leibniz, The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque (1988). 
18 Deleuze, Proust and Signs, p.6 
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a possible world, one particular aspect of how we can understand a sign. As Vincent 
Descombes states “It has been common practice since Leibniz to attribute to each 
mind its own unique vision of the world. This is just what Proust does throughout his 
novel. He does his best to reduce intellectual errors to optical errors that can be 
explained by the way things appears from such and such a perspective.”19 An 
example of possible worlds in Proust can be seen in Marcel’s detailed explanation of 
kissing Albertine in The Guermantes Way: “At first, as my mouth began to gradually 
approach the cheeks which my eyes had recommended it to kiss, my eyes, in 
changing position saw a different pair of cheeks; the neck, observed at closer range 
and as through a magnifying glass, showed in its coarser grain a robustness which 
modified the character of the face.”20   
 
Marcel’s initial gaze is drawn towards Albertine’s cheeks, however, as his 
glance moves towards her neck he reflects upon qualities that had previously gone 
unnoticed. In this brief reflection an entire transformation of Albertine’s face occurs. 
Marcel reflects on this transformation: “… just as Albertine had often appeared 
different to me, so now – as if, prodigiously accelerating the speed of changes of 
perspective and changes of colouring which a person presents to us in the course of 
our various encounters, I had sought to contain them all in the space of a few 
seconds …”21 It is not just one image of Albertine, nor two, but a multiplicity that have 
been build up over time that Marcel wants to kiss. It through Marcel’s various 
encounters that his image of her is continually transformed. This is represented 
																																																								
19 Vincent Descombes, Proust: Philosophy of the Novel, trans. Catherine Chance Macksey (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1992) P.40 
20 Marcel Proust, In Search of Lost Time: The Guermantes Way trans. by C. K. Scott Moncrieff and Terence 
Kilmartin (London: Vintage, 2000) p.420 
21 Ibid, p.421 
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when Marcel leans in for the kiss: “… so now, during this brief journey of my lips 
towards her cheek, it was ten Albertines that I saw; this one girl being like a many-
headed goddess …”22 However, this moment is short lived as the actual kiss 
destroys the multiple images that have been created of Albertine: “But alas – for in 
this matter of kissing our nostrils and eyes are as ill-placed as our lips are ill-made- 
suddenly my eyes ceased to see, then my nose crushed by the collision, no longer 
perceived any odour [from her perfume] … from these obnoxious signs, that at last I 
was in the act of kissing Albertine.”23. Marcel’s various images that are reflected 
upon are negated by closing his eyes and by pressing his nose into her flesh. That 
is, Marcel comes to an acceptance that there was no way in which he could kiss 
every image of Albertine, only one. Following Marcel’s discussion of these images 
we can see that they are continually transformed in each attempt he seeks to make 
sense of the signs of Albertine. Thus Marcel always remains in a continual 
apprentice to the signs of love.  
 
We can see from this example that each singular image represents a possible 
world. An image of Albertine defined by her cheeks, another image is created when 
reflecting upon her neck, and this is in turned redefined when considering her as a 
multiple headed goddess. These are possible worlds as they do not actually reflect 
Albertine but the many different senses that Marcel has of her. Each of these senses 
is singular and monadic. That is, truly and completely unique that cannot be 
compared to another. This describes Leibniz’s view in Discourse on Metaphysics 
(1686) where: “each substance is like a whole world, and like a mirror of God, or 
																																																								
22 Ibid 
23 Ibid 
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indeed of the whole universe, which each represents in its own fashion …”24 For 
Leibniz, just as Marcel’s many different senses of Albertine, every individual creates 
a multiplicity of images in the process of making sense of the world. As multiple 
images are created, each thing in the world has an innumerable different ways in 
which it could be understood.  
 
An individual discovers new and different ways in which the world can be 
viewed by entering into an apprenticeship. By entering an apprenticeship, an 
individual must learn how to understand the world to view the world through a set of 
concepts. A set of concepts enables an individual to decipher the world in a 
particular way. In this way, as there are a variety of different disciplines and fields of 
study, each area of study is a world in itself. That is to say, there is not an absolute 
field of knowledge that would determine for all other fields a universal view of the 
world. This is because each subject’s different set of concepts enables a multiplicity 
of ways in which the world can be viewed. Therefore there is no absolute way to 
view the world but a variety of possible representations of the world. For instance, 
this is reflective of philosophy where each philosopher has their own view of the 
world. Their view of the world is revealed through the set of philosophical concepts 
that are created (Descartes’ cogito, Hegel’s negation). In order to understand how a 
philosopher views the world an individual must enter into an apprenticeship in order 
to decipher their concepts. In this way, there is cannot be an absolute method that 
would allow an individual to understand the world. All what remains are singular 
views of a world that is created through each individual’s perspective. In other words, 
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for Leibniz, every individual’s perspective is completely different from another’s. No 
two perspectives of the world are alike.  
 
This is representative of Deleuze and Guattari’s discussion of philosophical 
concepts as conceptual personae in What is Philosophy? (1991): “… conceptual 
personae carry out the movements that describe the author’s plane of immanence, 
and they play a part in the very creation of the author’s concepts.”25 Deleuze and 
Guattari challenge the attribution of a causal basis for concepts based upon an 
author. In order to understand their concepts we do not traditionally analyse each 
concept and its history but its author. By analysing its author a general framework is 
created in order to allow us to understand their concepts. However, for Deleuze and 
Guattari, a philosopher’s concepts are not solely a creation of an author as they are 
reaction to contemporary problems. A philosophers concepts then are not created 
from nothing but influenced by worldly forces. In relation to Descartes, we saw how 
historical forces of the Scientific Revolution influenced the concept of the cogito. In 
order to understand a philosophical concept we should not attempt to understand a 
general framework since this negates a variety of different worldly influences in 
which each concept is created. This also negates the different periods in which a 
philosopher can return to their concept and change their ideas about it. Deleuze and 
Guattari therefore reverse the role from a traditional approach from analysing its 
author to a focus on analysis of various forces at work in the creation of concepts 
and the different periods: “… conceptual personae is not the philosopher’s 
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representative, but, rather, the reverse: the philosopher is only the envelope of his 
principal conceptual persona …”26  
 
However, this is not to solely determine the role of conceptual analysis to 
various cultural, social or historical forces. This is because Deleuze and Guattari 
take into account the way in which a concept influences other individuals and 
transforms different preconceptions. In being able to influence others a philosophical 
concept remains in a state of becoming that is transformed through each interaction: 
“… the destiny of the philosopher is to become his conceptual persona or personae, 
at the same time that these personae themselves becoming something other than 
what they are historically, mythologically, or commonly … The conceptual personae 
is the becoming or the subject of a philosophy, on par with the philosopher …”27 This 
means there is no absolute or causal basis in which an analysis can be made. With 
each analysis a different understanding of worldly forces can be made. In other 
words, each analysis remains singular and represents a possible way in which a 
concept can be understood.  
 
Singularity and its relation to a unique understanding is developed through 
Leibniz’s critical discussion of the construction of generalities and causal 
foundations. Leibniz’s problem with these is illustrated through an analysis of his 
Principles of Indiscernibles. This is to affirm a radical nature of singularity and affirm 
the continual variable nature of the world. Leibniz’s radical view of singularity is then 
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related to his later discussion of monads in the Monadology. This is in used in order 
to further highlight problems in scientific use of causality through problematizing 
atomic theory. I then challenge a traditional reading of Leibniz’s philosophy as based 
upon a transcendent foundation where I argue for an immanent foundation.  
 
Challenging resemblance and generality in Leibniz 	
Returning to Leibniz, we can gain further understanding the singularity of each 
individual’s perspective through Leibniz’s example of viewing a town: “the same town 
is differently represented according to the different situations of the person who looks 
at it.”28 A perspective is dependent upon each different situation. However, the 
situation is not determined solely upon their background. This would allow for a 
collection of individuals to share a comparable view (Individuals A, B, C all were 
brought up in X environment). Each different situation is also not based upon a 
subjective difference. This would also allow for two individuals to share a similarity 
within their views (X and Y both subjectively think Y is good). In both cases there is 
an attempt to negate the difference of each perspective into a shared general view. 
This is either in the attempt to find a causal basis or in using the subject as basis in 
which knowledge is constructed. By situation, Leibniz is referring to the immanent 
qualities of an object. The immanent qualities of an object are always in 
transformation such as its reflection of light. Due to this continual change in its 
qualities a perception is always different. Following this, when viewing a particular 
building in a town or city it is never the same.  
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As our immediate sense perception is incorrect Leibniz calls into question a 
purely empirical basis where our knowledge is completely derived from our senses. 
This is to challenge the way in which our immediate perception generalises our 
experience: “Although the senses are necessary for all our actual knowledge, they 
are not sufficient to provide it all, since they never give us anything but instances, 
that are particular or singular truths. But however many instances confirm a general 
truth, they do not suffice to establish its universal necessity; for it does not follow that 
what has happened will always happen in the same way.”29 Based upon our 
associations we can sometimes assume a particular event will always happen the 
same way. Due to this, we assume that a particular instance holds as universally 
true for all other instances. For instance, from our experience we associate that 
daytime has sunlight and night time has an absence of light. From this expectation a 
universal law is constructed that day will always turn into night and night into day. 
Yet this is not universally true, only generally as not all places in the world 
experience the same passage of time. Leibniz uses the example of the island of 
Novaya Zemlya, a Russian Arctic Island, to illustrate this: “For instance, the Greeks 
and Romans and all the other nations on earth always found that within the passage 
of twenty-four hours day turns into night and night into day. But they would have 
been mistaken if they had believed that the same rule holds everywhere, since the 
contrary was observed during a stay in Novaya Zemlya.”30 The length of day and 
night varies due to the change in the rotation of the Earth during different seasons as 
Jaya Balagopal explains:  
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Varying lengths of day and night is experienced with the march of the 
seasons. During summer in the Northern Hemisphere, days and nights are 
equal on the Equator. Towards the poles, the duration of daylight increases. 
At the Arctic Circle there will be 24 hours of daylight … Near the poles 
duration of daylight will be there for 6 months … In the Southern Hemisphere 
winter will be experienced. The Antarctic Circle will experience 24 hours of 
darkness and at the South Pole there will be 6 months of darkness.31  
 
Based upon empiricism, a determinate basis is attempted to be formed by general 
(in various instances it can be verified that X is sometimes present but not always) or 
universal truths (X is always true in every instance) attempt to establish certain truths 
However, as shown through Leibniz’s example of variance of daylight and darkness, 
a problem with empirical perception is that there is a negation of singularities by a 
generality. In this case, we cannot always assume that our view of the world is 
universally true. This is because our understanding remains only a possible truth 
since the way in which we understand can be proven to be incorrect. From this we 
can see that truth for Leibniz is not based upon universal or general truths but is 
dependent upon singularities. Each individual’s perspective is only possibly true.  
Leibniz describes an alternative view of petites perceptions or minute perception that 
takes into account these singular differences without generalising them: “We are 
never without perceptions, but necessarily we are often without awareness, namely 
when none of perceptions stand out.”32 Through an empirical understanding of 
qualities we generalise singularities or petites perceptions. For instance, in 
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perceiving a variety of the colour red, crimson, maroon, and blood red we may say 
that different colour shares the same general property of redness. However, to 
generalise a colour is to negate each singular variation of it. What forms our 
experience then is not the immediate general properties but its singular quality.  
 
Leibniz’s view of taking into account minute qualitative differences is 
described as the Principle of Indiscernibility of Identicals and has been described by 
modern scholars as the theory of indiscernibles or Leibniz’s Law. Leibniz describes 
his theory of indiscernibles in his fourth paper to British philosopher and clergyman 
Samuel Clarke in June 1716. He writes: “there is no such thing as two individuals 
indiscernible from each other … To suppose two things indiscernible, is to suppose 
the same thing under two names.”33 That is, every individual has their own unique 
attributes such as their shade of eyes, hair colour, skin colour and so forth. These 
unique properties about individual make us able to be different from each other. Due 
to these singular qualities it is impossible for two individuals to be exactly the same. 
His theory that no two things are alike did not apply just to individuals but also the 
world. In discussion in the garden with a gentleman and Princess Sophie, the Elector 
of Hanover and future mother of George I of England in the gardens of her residence 
of Herrenhausen, the gentleman seeks to challenges Leibniz’s theory by finding two 
leaves that are exactly the same, as Leibniz remarks: “An ingenious gentleman of 
my acquaintance, discoursing with me, in the presence of … the Princess Sophia, in 
the garden of Herrenhausen; thought he could find two leaves perfectly alike.”34 
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Princess Sophia asks the gentleman, Carl August von Alvensleben who was an 
official at the Hanoverian Court, to prove his argument but ultimately: “… he ran all 
over the garden a long time to look for some; but it was to no purpose.”35  
 
In contrast to Leibniz, it could be argued that identical twins are replications of 
the same individual and so share the same qualities. Each twin sharing the same 
shade of eye colour, hair, and skin colour. Yet, this would be to generalise the 
qualities of each twin and negate their unique differences between twins. As identical 
twin (and writing teacher at Stanford University) Marjorie Ford explains in the 
foreword to her twin and psychologist Barbara Klein’s Not All Twins Are Alike (2003): 
“… people tend to be so taken by the similarities in twins’ appearances they may 
forget to think more deeply and to try and understand what it might really feel like to 
have a double in the world.”36 Due to this comparison that is made: “… each partner 
in the twinship begins to find a way to feel and to be an intensely unique individual.”37 
An example of how they emphasised their differences was in tricking their teachers 
at school to have a case of mistaken identity: “We loved to trade our clothes in 
between classes so that our teachers, who could tell us apart only by memorizing 
our outfits, would inevitably call us the wrong name.”38 Another example was in using 
their own strengths to benefit a weakness of the other twin, in their different 
pronunciations of French and Hebrew: “Sometimes we took tests for each other … 
My French pronunciation was not impressive, so Barbara would sit in my seat and 
pass the test for me. Barbara, on the other hand, had difficulty with her Hebrew 																																																								
35 Ibid 
36 Barbara Schave Klein, Not All Twins are Alike: Psychological Profiles of Twinship (Connecticut: Praeger 
Publishers, 2003) p.ix 
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pronunciation and would argue with our uncle, who was the rabbi of our temple, that 
she was pronouncing all the words correctly … [but] I knew that she was wrong.”39  
 
Another argument against Leibniz is through the modern development of 
cloning with the famous example of the clone of a sheep named Dolly in 1997. From 
this advent of cloning it could be argued that a clone is an exact replica or carbon 
copy of the original. If this is the case then it would prove that there could be two 
things exactly the same in nature. However, as with identical twins, no two clones 
are completely alike. As Kerry Lynn Macintosh explains: 
… although animals born through cloning share nuclear DNA with their 
donors, they are not carbon copies. Genetic factors, epigenetic factors, and 
environmental influences give each animal its own physical, psychological, 
and behavioural traits. Many don’t look like their donor or siblings cloned from 
the same DNA … animals born through cloning are unique individuals.40  
 
Singularity as monadic 	
Based upon an empirical understanding, we were led into error due to resemblance. 
When using an empirical understanding we accept general qualities (of leaves, 
twins, or sheep) as a true representation. However, these general qualities do not 
represent a true identity. A true identity is the singular qualities that enable an 
individual to be unique and differentiated from others. A problem then emerges for 
Leibniz: how are singularities able to be named independently of general terms and 																																																								
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qualities? In other words, how can each singular quality be affirmed in itself without 
being denied through a generalization? Leibniz’s answer to this problem in the New 
Essays implicitly refers to his theory of pure singularity, monads:  
 
… paradoxical as it may seem, it is impossible for us to know individuals or to 
find any way of precisely determining the individuality of anything except by 
keeping hold of the thing itself. For any set of circumstances could recur, with 
tiny differences which we would not take in; and place and time, far from 
being determinants by themselves, must themselves be determined by the 
things they contain. The most important point in this is that individuality 
involves infinity, and only someone who is capable of grasping the infinite 
could know the principle of individuation of a given thing. This arises from the 
influence properly understood – that all the things in the universe have on one 
another.41  
 
In order for the singularity of a substance to be truly unique it must be completely 
unaffected. In being affected a substance’s qualities continually transform. We are 
then left with a problem of being unable to correctly state what a given thing is. For 
instance, if looking at a painted wall, the initial colour upon decorating is vibrant but 
changes over time as it is affected by various forces such as wind and steam (the 
colour on the tin clearly stated crimson red but its slowly changed to burgundy.) In 
being affected then a substance has lost its unique qualities that defined it. Leibniz 
not only considers this level of transformation of an object based on our immediate 
perception but also on a molecular level. At a molecular level we can perceive how 																																																								
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an object is always affected and is never the same over time. In this way, there is a 
continual transformation of an object over a period of time (the slow decay of a 
wooden chair). In order to be completely unaffected a singularity must be 
metaphysical. This is to establish an untimely basis in which an object remains in a 
pure state (X is X not Y). An untimely foundation therefore secures the basis in which 
its singular qualities are always unaffected. Yet this metaphysical singularity is not 
completely separated from the material world. It is in his later work in the 
Monadology (1714) that Leibniz fully explains how a monad, or metaphysical 
singularity is paradoxically connected to the world.   
 
The Monadology begins with the argument that there are simple substances. 
Monads exist because they form more complex substances: “the monad … is 
nothing but simple substance … meaning without parts … there must be simple 
substances, because there are composites … [and a] composite is nothing but a 
collection … of simples.”42 Leibniz here draws on Locke’s idea of complex ideas in 
The Essay: “Combining several simple Ideas into one compound one, and thus all 
Complex Ideas are made.”43 For instance, a jigsaw is a complex picture that is 
formed by combining all of its parts. As we form our ideas based upon simplicity then 
we can associate a form of pure simplicity to an object. Leibniz thus argues that the 
simplest part of which forms all substances are monads.  
 
By making this claim Leibniz is in opposition to the scientific argument for the 
existence of atoms as the fundamental basis of all substances. This was to react 																																																								
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against the revival of atomism that had recently occurred, as Daniel Garber explains 
“the revival of interest in ancient atomism in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth 
centuries. While there are a number of important figures connected with the revival 
of atomism, Pierre Gassendi is the most prominent. An editor, translator into Latin, 
and commentator on the Epicurean tracts preserved by Diogenes Laertius.”44 An 
argument for the existence atoms was that: “… the world was made up of a void 
filled with atoms, small parts of matter that are perfectly hard, unsplittable, 
indestructible, at least by natural means”.45 A reason Leibniz challenged an atomist 
view is based on a denial of singularity. That is, by stating that there is the same 
general atomic basis for substances then there would be no way in they could truly 
be singular. As Leibniz states in a note from March 1690: “A body is not a substance, 
but an aggregate of substances. For it consists of many things that are really 
distinct.”46 That is to say, a body is not a single substance. This is because a 
collection of singular parts (organs, different limbs, bones and fluids) form the body. 
It is an error of atomists and materialist philosophers to assume that unity can be 
found empirically: “The error of materialist philosophers lies in this, that when they 
acknowledged the necessity of unity they sought substance in matter, as if any body 
could exist that would in fact be one substance.”47 This is because all empirical 
bodies are a: “mass or aggregate of many bodies”48 In other words, an individual 
would never be able to find a true singular substance but always a collection of 
qualities and substances.   
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A few months later in a marginal note from 23rd October 1690 Leibniz 
discusses the problem of the generalisation in an atomist’s view: “if there be atoms, 
then bodies similar and equal but different from each other could exist, so that there 
could be two equal spheres.”49 If all objects have the same atomic basis, there is a 
complete negation of the singular qualities that enable them to be different such as 
their size, shape, and colour. Using Leibniz’s example, qualitative differences in size 
or colour in two spheres are negated as they are both related to the same general 
atomic properties. Leibniz then uses a geometric example to highlight problems in an 
atomist’s generalisation of singularity.   
 
Leibniz’s geometric example uses a cube and two triangular prisms: “Let us 
assume … three atoms A, B and C, of which A is cubical but B and C are triangular 
prisms which compose cube D, which is similar and equal to the aforementioned 
A.”50 When the two triangular prisms of B and C are placed together they form the 
cube of D and resemble the cube of A. From this we can clearly understand that both 
cubes are different. One is solid whilst the other is composed from two triangular 
prisms. Based upon the atomist view, despite these clear perceptual differences, 
both cubes have the same general basis. Yet in order to account for this atomic 
foundation we have to conclude, as Garber notes:  “either A is made up of smaller 
parts, and is thus not an atom, or D is an atom, and is not made up of smaller parts, 
as hypothesized.”51 The solid cube of A must be made of smaller parts in order to 
account for the difference in D. Yet if this is the case then cube A cannot be an atom 
since it cannot be split. If we then accept cube D as an atom it is not made of smaller 
parts but composed of parts that were already evident. From this we can see the 																																																								
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geometric example confirms Leibniz’s earlier note in March 1690 that it would be 
impossible for an atomist to find a true unity empirically since a substance is a 
collection of parts.   
 
For Leibniz, the true unity of substances are monads, as he states in the 
Monadology: “… monads are the true atoms of nature …”52 A monad is an indivisible 
substance that is not immediately apparent to our perception but exists upon 
reflection. It is through the use of rational deduction that an individual is able to 
reflect upon the monadic structure itself. This is because monads provide the basis 
for the parts various material substances in the world. If monads did not exist then 
there would be no structure to unify all the various material substances. Leibniz 
provides the reader with a mathematics example to demonstrate how rational ideas 
give structure to our physical world: “Substances do not exist when a substance 
does not exist, and numbers do not exist unless there are unities, and so it is 
necessary that besides bodies there exist certain substances truly one, or indivisible, 
by whose aggregations bodies are formed.”53 In relation to mathematics, by adding 
or removing objects various equations can be performed such as addition, 
subtraction, multiplication and so forth. Yet the objects by themselves do not provide 
any structure. This is because it is the mathematical structure that supplies a 
framework in which we can understand the various arrangements of objects. A 
mathematical structure provides such a framework that we do not require any 
material objects in order for equations to be true.  
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In contrast to a material substance that is perishable over time and which also 
loses its singularity through transformation, a monad is metaphysical. By having a 
metaphysical basis every substance is able to maintain its singularity (Each leaf is 
unique). An individual cannot create a monad as this would require the destruction 
and loss of these unique properties. For instance, a painting of a leaf cannot capture 
the exact same use of colours. To replicate it would then mean an imperfect copy of 
the original. From this, Leibniz is able to maintain that even when we create 
substances in the world, its singular qualities can never be truly eradicated. An 
untimely foundation also means that a substance cannot be transformed into another 
over time. This explains why, like Descartes’ cogito, a monad subsists throughout 
time despite a continual flux in experiential properties: “A substance, however, is 
something truly one, indivisible, and thus ingenerable and incorruptible … which 
subsists even though my body undergoes changes through its parts, as my body is 
certainly in a perpetual flux, while ‘I’ survive. No part of my body can be identified 
which is necessary for my subsistence, yet I am never without some united part of 
matter.”54  
 
By having a metaphysical basis, it can be assumed that there is a loss of a 
material objects qualities. This is the case in Descartes’ metaphysics where upon 
reflection on the cogito there is the loss of all material qualities of the body. Yet for 
Leibniz, despite their metaphysical basis, monads are able to maintain their 
uniqueness: “… monads must have some qualities otherwise they would not even be 
beings. Moreover, if simple substances did not differ in their qualities, there would be 
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no way of detecting any change in things.”55 Monads are able to be distinguished 
because they are not completely detached from the world but are part of it. We can 
identify that monads are part of the world because, as attained through the law of 
Indiscernibles, everything is singular. Without the existence of monads, everything 
would be exactly the same. There would be a complete loss of all unique properties 
and so nothing would be able to distinguish from one another. This enables a further 
explanation of Leibniz’s theory of Indiscernibles for why each thing in the world is 
truly different: “… every monad must be different from every other. Because in 
nature there are never two being that are perfectly alike …”56  
 
 Based upon this immanent view of Leibniz’s philosophy, Deleuze’s discussion 
of signs of art in Proust demonstrates a way in which singularity can be actualized. In 
other words, our unique understanding is always actualized through the general 
methods that is used (This conforms to the earlier discussion in the introduction of 
how our unique sense is maintained through the use of general names.) This is 
illustrated through a discussion of Cezanne. This view is then problematized through 
a reading of Proust where Vinteuil longs for a musical phrase to return. In this way, 
Proust illustrates a Platonic problem with the use of ideal or category challenges the 
actual novel differences. This enables the Platonic problem to be further developed 
in the next chapter on Plato’s Cratylus. 
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Signs of Art: signs as reflective of monadic singularity   	
Deleuze’s relates Leibniz’s concept of monads to aesthetic signs. This occurs in the 
fourth chapter of Proust and Signs, ‘Essences and the Signs of Art’: 
What is an essence as revealed in the work of art? It is a difference, the 
absolute and ultimate difference …what is an absolute, ultimate difference? 
Not an empirical difference between two objects, always extrinsic … In this 
regard Proust is Leibnizian: the essences [of things] are veritable monads, 
each defined by the viewpoint to which it expresses the world, each viewpoint 
itself referring to an ultimate quality at the heart of the monad.”57  
 
Aesthetics signs are monadic because they enable us to reflect on singularity within 
the world. In contrast, material objects without artistic expression is based on 
resemblance. This negates each singularity quality of an object into sharing the 
same general properties. Artistic expression of objects enables an individual to 
reflect upon singularity of material objects. For instance, in Paul Cézanne’s Still Life 
with Apples and Oranges (c.1895-1902) there is a challenge to our idea of apples 
and oranges, as Carol Armstrong explains:  
 
… apple is all but indistinguishable from orange, though it is safe to say, 
because of coloration, that the oranges sit in the compotier and apples in the 
plate, and a mix of the two is found loose around them and the pitcher … [this 
enables us to question] the ability to attach the names of objects to their 
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painted representations – how can we be sure they are apples? – and the 
capacity to identify and distinguish the aspects of simple things with 
continuous spherical surfaces – what is the difference between the front and 
back of an apple … and where does one draw the dividing line between 
them?58 
 
Cézanne’s use of coloration enables us to call into question our knowledge of 
objects based on resemblance. From our resemblance, we associate the various 
colours of green, red and yellow into a generality of our idea of an apple. However, 
these colours are not solely unique to apples, yellow is also apparent in the oranges 
in the compotier. Ruby oranges, once sliced open, have red innards and oranges 
grown in a tropical climate are green. Following this, the same colours of red, yellow, 
and green can be also applied to oranges. Based on our general understanding 
leads us incapable of clearly distinguishing between objects. What enables us to 
distinguish between objects is their singular qualities. These singular qualities are 
expressed through Cézanne’s precise use of coloration. Each apple has a singular 
way in which the colours of green, red and yellow are expressed. This can be seen 
in the different levels of intensity that is expressed in each use of colour. A hint of 
yellow is expressed at the top of one apple whilst another has a more prominent use 
of yellow at its top. In the oranges, there is a different use of colouration based upon 
the intensity of orange that is used. Whilst others which express yellow hint upon its 
variation with orange, blending the two together but maintaining their separation.  
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Art enables us to reflect upon an immaterial sign within a material object that 
reveals an idea: “…art gives us the true unity: unity of the immaterial sign and of an 
entirely spiritual meaning. The essence is precisely this unity of sign and meaning as 
it is revealed in the work of art.”59 Deleuze illustrate this by using music: “Essences 
or Ideas, that is what each sign of the little phrase reveals. This is what gives the 
phrase its real existence independent of the instruments or incarnate it more than 
they compose it.”60 It is the purpose of playing a sequence of notes by a musician 
that a composer wants to inspire a certain idea within individuals. Here Deleuze 
remarks on the way in which Marcel reflects upon Vinteuil’s phrase that is played 
simultaneously by piano and violin: “Vinteuil’s little phrase is uttered by the piano and 
the violin. Of course, it can be decomposed materially, five notes very close together 
two of which recur. But in their case, as in Plato 3 + 2 explains nothing … the notes 
merely the ‘sonorous appearance of an entirely spiritual entity.”61   
 
This spiritual image that is revealed to Marcel by the piano is that of the sea: 
“… he had suddenly become aware of the mass of the piano-part beginning to 
emerge in a sort of liquid rippling of sound, multiform but indivisible, smooth yet 
restless, like the deep blue tumult of the sea, silvered and charmed into a minor key 
by the moonlight.”62 When the music had finished playing, Marcel gains a heightened 
sense of the world: “… suddenly enraptured, he had tried to grasp the phrase or 
harmony … that had just been played and that had opened and expanded his soul, 
as the fragrance of certain roses, wafted upon the moist air of evening, has the 																																																								
59 Deleuze, Proust and Signs, p.27 
60 Ibid 
61 Ibid, p.26 
62 Marcel Proust, In Search of Lost Time: Swann’s Way trans. by C. K. Scott Moncrieff, trans. revision by. D. J. 
Enright (London, Vintage, 2005) p.250 
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power of dilating one’s nostril’s.”63 This moment of heightened sensation, like his 
encounter with multiple Albertines, is short lived: “With a slow and rhythmical 
movement it led him first this way, then that, towards a state of happiness that was 
noble, unintelligible, and yet precise. And then … having reached a certain point … it 
changed direction and in a fresh movement, more rapid, fragile, melancholy, 
incessant, sweet, it bore him off with it towards new vistas. Then it vanished.”64 After 
the second time hearing the phrase: “He hoped, with a passionate longing, that he 
might find it again, a third time. And reappear it did though without speaking to him 
more clearly, bringing him, indeed, a pleasure less profound.”65  
 
From this, Marcel’s experience can be defined according to a lack. This lack is 
due to being unable to recapture the same heightened experience through the 
repetition of the musical phrase. As Miguel de Beistegui explains “… Proust’s point is 
to show that the dissatisfaction - whether in the form of suffering or in the form of 
boredom – that defines our relation to the world actually stems from an even deeper 
lack, one inscribed at the heart of reality itself.”66 The lack is not resolved through the 
process of repetition itself where “[it] could be remedied by a strategy of 
compensation, by recapturing or reproducing the ‘thing’ that’s lacking.”67 This is 
because it is part of the very structure of our experience: “It’s precisely by lacking 
that what’s lacking ‘functions’ and ‘structures’. And it’s precisely this lack or this 
deficiency that we experience … I’d go so far as to say that it actually defines the 
																																																								
63 Ibid 
64 Ibid, p.251 
65 Ibid, p.251-2 
66 Miguel de Beistegui, Proust as Philosopher: The Art of Metaphor (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013) p.2 
67 Ibid 
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very meaning of experience, that is, the meaning of the sensible.”68 Marcel’s lack 
therefore is based upon an expectation of a return of same phrase. In anticipating 
the same phrase to return, there is a determination of his experience by an ideality. 
Each subsequent repetition of the phrase then leads to a lack where each phrase 
does not meet his previous experience. 
 
This lack can also be applied to the structures of our experience as they 
cannot adequately express the embodiment of the world itself. Deleuze relates this 
creation of a lack by ideality in Proust to Plato: “… Proust treats essences as 
Platonic Ideas and confers upon them an independent reality. Even Vinteuil has 
‘revealed’ the phrase more than he has created it.”69 Based upon a Platonic view, an 
artist bases his expression upon a differential measurement. This is to measure the 
various differences qualities of things in the material world: “… the art of 
measurement is universal, and has to do with all things.”70 A bad artist distorts our 
idea so we are unable to clearly distinguish between objects: “… because they are 
not accustomed to distinguish classes according to real forms, jumble together two 
widely different things … and to a standard under the idea that they are the same 
…”71 For instance, Plato would have a negative view of Cézanne’s Still Life with 
Apples and Oranges because it does not conform to our resemblance of apples and 
oranges. We are unable to clearly distinguish or identify the fruits and so Cézanne’s 
painting jumbles together two very different things. In order for us to understand the 
																																																								
68 Ibid 
69 Deleuze, Proust and Signs, p.28 
70 Plato, The Statesman 285b in Albert Hofstadter and Richard Kuhns (eds.) Philosophies of Art and Beauty: 
Selected Reading in Aesthetics from Plato to Heidegger (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1964) p.7 
71	Ibid 
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ideas that are expressed, an artist must express the general quality that is reflected 
in the variety of different qualities72. As Plato states:  
… the right way is, if a man has first seen the unity of things, to go on with the 
enquiry and not desist until he has found all the differences contained in it 
which form distinct classes; nor again should he be able to rest contented with 
the manifold diversities … until he has comprehended all of them that have 
any affinity within the bounds of one similarity and embraced them within the 
reality of a single kind.73  	
Conclusion 	
An apprenticeship is based upon the performance of signs. Each performance is 
based upon a gesture that is associated with a sign. (Mme. Verdurin’s performance 
of laughing at an unfunny joke) The performance of gestures implies a correct and 
incorrect action based upon social convention. It is from this initial basis that worldly 
signs are positive since they allow us to understand the structure of our society and 
culture. It also enables us to learn from methodologies. This leads to an educational 
system to be created where we must repeat the method’s correct answer in order to 
have a sound judgment. However, if we are solely reliant upon the performance of 
signs, there is also a denial of the process of learning. This is because education is 
always predetermined according to the same set of criteria. The process of learning 
implies that these general social conventions must be challenged. They must be 
challenged in order for an individual to know, but to know what? Precisely, it is not 																																																								
72 Plato’s theory of art is also related to his theory of ethics, as Tom Rockmore explains “Plato’s widely known 
rejection of imitative art is motivated and justified by his commitment to a political approach to art in the city-
state. This is the art of constructing a just or good state, based on the intuitive grasp of reality beyond mere 
appearance. The true artist is not just anyone … [but] someone qualified to do just this [reflect upon the Ideas], 
hence to direct the city.” Tom Rockmore, Art and Truth after Plato (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
2013) p.3  
73 Plato, The Statesman 285b in Albert Hofstadter and Richard Kuhns (eds.) p.7 
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methodology or society that solely determines knowledge but also how an individual 
makes sense. It is through this process of making sense of the world that an 
individual must enter into an apprenticeship to signs. This is no longer to simply 
perform and repeat the same signs but to rediscover signs. In other words, an 
individual no longer performs what is expected but begins to make individual sense 
of the processes around why it is performed in a certain way.  
 
This is why Deleuze relates an apprenticeship to signs of love and signs of 
art. With signs of love there is a rediscovery of our love. To rediscover love is to 
affirm the multiplicity of things we love about a specific thing (Marcel’s multiple 
images of Albertine). This transforms our image of things from being based upon 
ideality (an image of thought) to a number of different possible reasons for why we 
love them. Through opening up a number of possible reasons our image of thought 
is challenged. In this way, thought is not determined by transcendent signifiers (the 
Ego, Reason) but rather, is continual affected through immanent processes. This 
multiplicity of forces is displayed through signs of art. It is signs of art that 
demonstrate the singularity of our thought (the singularity of Cezanne’s apples and 
oranges). Our thought is monadic as it is truly unique and cannot be compared to 
another’s. A monadic foundation for thought challenges the rationalist apprenticeship 
since there can never be a point of a shared view between individuals. As can be 
seen in artistic representation, every image will be different since it reflects not only 
the unique perspective of the artist but also the temporal capture of an image of the 
world that is continually in flux. Each image is a still frame in time that represents a 
particular way in which we viewed the world. Yet this still frame can always be 
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returned to, transforming how we initially thought of it (the heavily criticised film that 
turns into a cult classic).  
 
From my analysis of the Platonic influence in Proust, a problem arises for 
Deleuze’s theory of monadic singularity. This problem is that singularity and ideality 
are opposed. Or to put it another way, the process of making sense and attaining 
meaning are opposed. This problem is reflected in the two ways in which art is 
expressed for Deleuze. On the one hand, art expresses an idea (Marcel’s reflection 
on Vinteuil’s phrase as an image of the sea). The created ideality negates all other 
forms (each subsequent repetition of the phrase is negated). On the other hand, 
Deleuze also remarks that essence also expresses immanence: “each subject 
expresses the world from a certain viewpoint. But the viewpoint is the difference 
itself, the absolute internal difference. Each subject therefore expresses an 
absolutely different world.”74 In this way, there is no clear way for singularity to be 
immanent. It is metaphysical and detached from the world and so must be based 
upon a transcendent metaphysics. Deleuze raises this problem of singularity in 
Leibniz through the inability of monads to communicate: “Philosophically, Leibniz 
was the first to raise the problem of a communication resulting from sealed parts or 
from what does not communicate. How are we to conceive the communication of 
‘monads’ that have neither door nor window?”75  
 
An epistemic problem of monadic communication is that individuals have a 
singular understanding, whilst at the same time, they must communicate through the 
use of a general language that has been established by society. How then is an 																																																								
74 Deleuze, Proust and Signs, p.28 
75 Ibid, p.105 
	
	
242	
individual able to maintain unique understanding through a general language? If we 
attempt to resolve this problem by justifying the use of proper names (a private use 
of language) in order to maintain our unique perspective, this does not allow for any 
other individual to understand us. The problem of monadic communication can be 
related to an empirical problem with the inherence of monads that is raised by 
Johnathan Bennett: “… how can extended things ‘result’ from monads? Not, one 
would think, in the ordinary causal way in which a forest-fire results from lightning.”76 
This calls into question how monads, as metaphysical substances, can inhere in a 
physical substance. This follows from Leibniz’s insistence that monads must remain 
completely unaffected in order to retain their singularity. In being completely 
unaffected, a monad has no extension, this is, a way in which it can affect a physical 
substance. However, to say that something remains unaffected seems bizarre. This 
is because from an empirical perspective, we can perceive how material substances 
can have effects on one another. This is because we can perceive how change 
occurs. For instance, we can perceive that there is a flash of lightning and then a 
forest fire resulting from it. Following this empirical view, we cannot perceive or 
detect by any empirical means a monad. We only can detect singularities in physical 
objects that are derived from its monadic structure. From this Bennett argues “… 
extended things cannot contain monads as parts, properly so-called.”77 Parts are 
things which are evident to our senses. Without being evident we can never be truly 
certain of a metaphysical basis for a substance. This dualism is reflected in 
communication between our monadic understanding and general language. An 
																																																								
76 Johnathan Bennett, Kant’s Dialectics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974) p.45 
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opposition is therefore created between the metaphysical (based upon pure 
singularity) and physical world78 (based upon generality).  
 
A Leibnizian reply to this empirical criticism of monadic dualism is based upon 
the concept of a pre-established harmony, as Deleuze states: “Leibniz’s [solution is] 
… that the closed ‘monads’ all possess the same stock, enveloping and expressing 
the same world in the infinite series of their predicates, each content to have a region 
of expression distinct from that of the others, all thus being different viewpoints 
toward the same world that God causes them to develop.”79 All monads are able to 
communicate their own singular perspective of the world because, for Leibniz, God is 
both the creator of the world and monads: “… God is the source not only of 
existences, but also of essences, in so far as they are real; he is the source of what 
reality there is among possibilities. This is because God’s understanding is the realm 
of eternal truths … and without God … not only would nothing exist, but nothing 
would be possible.”80 In being creator of both, God establishes a harmony between 
each metaphysical singularity and material world81. 
 
																																																								
78 Bertrand Russell in the History of Western Philosophy also alludes to the problem of monadic dualism: 
“Leibniz held that extension cannot be an attribute of a substance. His reason was that extension involves 
plurality, and can therefore only belong to an aggregate of substances; each single substance must be 
unextended. He believed, consequently, in an infinite number of substances, which he called ‘monads’.” 
Bertrand Russell, History of Western Philosophy (London: Routledge, 2004) p.533 
79 Deleuze, Proust and Signs, p.105  
80 Leibniz, Philosophical Texts, p.273 
81 God as a foundation for the relation between monads and the world is also the reason why this world is the 
best possible world that could have been created, as Donald Rutherford explains “Accepting that no possible 
world contains more monads, or at least more monads with as rich variety of distinct perceptions, we may 
conclude that in creating the greatest collection of monads, God thereby realizes the greatest possible harmony 
among their perceptions. Yet Leibniz sees God as going beyond this. The more levels at which there can be 
conceived an order or agreement among a variety of things, the more harmony God produces. Consequently, 
Leibniz envisions God as embedding harmonies within harmonies, so as to realize a world as harmonious as any 
world could be.” Donald Rutherford, Leibniz and the Rational Order of Nature (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995) p.227 
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It is through his reading of Proust that Deleuze criticises the transcendent 
nature of monads: “This can no longer be the case for Proust, for whom so many 
various worlds correspond to viewpoints toward the world … and not constitute a 
preestablished stock.”82 In opposition to Leibniz, in Proust, there is no pre-
established harmony because each monad is part of an immanent relation to the 
world. This is because singularity and difference always underlies the construction of 
Marcel’s ideality. This can be identified in Vinteuil’s repeated phrase, as Deleuze 
states: “… Vinteuil’s phrase, is itself valid as a part alongside others, adjacent to 
others: unity ‘appears (but relating now to the whole) like any one fragment 
composed separately,’ like a last localized brushstroke, not like a general 
varnishing.”83 That is, by idealising his experience of a specific repetition Vinteuil’s 
phrase, Marcel fails to appreciate the uniqueness of each phrase. If Marcel was 
open to the novelty and differences in each repeated phrase then we would have 
enjoyed his experience, rather than failing to capture his initial experience.  
 
Deleuze’s later work on Leibniz in The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque (1988) 
attempts to rethink this criticism of the transcendent nature of monads to focus on an 
immanent monadic structure84. An aspect of this can be seen by Deleuze’s 
																																																								
82 Deleuze, Proust and Signs, p.106 
83 Ibid 
84 Deleuze’s process of rethinking of Leibniz’s philosophy from transcendent to immanent foundation can be 
related to a difference between Descartes and Leibniz in their use of rational deduction. In Descartes’ second 
meditation we are able to use rational deduction in order to reflect upon the wax. In doing so, we move away 
from an empirical understanding where its qualities are constantly in flux to a rational understanding of its 
universal unchanging properties. However, Descartes used rational deduction as proof of the sign of innate ideas 
of the mind. The mind providing an absolute structure to the world. In contrast, Leibniz used reasoned deduction 
to prove a structure exists within material substances. That is, Leibniz does not seek to establish an abstract 
metaphysical basis that structures knowledge of the world itself. This is because metaphysical basis is apparent 
from within the material object itself. In philosophical terms, as monads exist within objects, his philosophical 
foundation is immanent. Descartes’ foundation is transcendent since it is a metaphysics that is based upon truths 
that are abstract from the world. Therefore Leibniz has reversed the role of metaphysics that is transcendent and 
based upon sameness [the purity of the cogito] to one that is based upon immanence and difference. This 
monadic metaphysics is based upon understanding of singularity in the world. Without this immanent basis to 
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association of the emergence of Leibniz’s concept of monads as a response to the 
Baroque period. Monads, in this sense, are no longer purely metaphysical but are a 
response to a contemporary need to define modernity, as an expression of various 
aspects of history where each part is maintained in a fold: “the Baroque refers not to 
an essence but rather to an operative function, to a trait. It endlessly produces folds. 
It does not invent things: there are all sorts of folds coming from the East, Greek, 
Roman … Yet the Baroque trait twists and turns its folds … fold over fold, one upon 
the other.”85 This leads Deleuze to establish a different monadic harmony in the final 
chapter of The Fold where the paradox of singularity is maintained and not resolved 
through a pre-established harmony.  
 
The next chapter continues the discussion of the paradox of an immanent position 
through a discussion of Plato’s Cratylus. This paradox that is evident in the conflict 
between the two opposing views of Hermogenes and Cratylus. Put simply, 
Hermogenes affirms an empirical plurality of multiple senses. In contrast, Cratylus 
argues for the use of etymology in order to establish an absolute meaning. The aim 
of the next chapter will then be to develop Plato’s solution to the empirical and 
rationalist tension. This is to create a metaphysical foundation for meaning by 
demonstrating how the many and the one function together. In philosophical terms, 
each particular empirical object is a reflection of the same Idea.  
																																																																																																																																																																												
uphold singularity itself in each object everything is left to an understanding based upon a transcendent 
metaphysics.    
 
85 Gilles Deleuze, The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque, trans. Tom Conley (London: Continuum, 2006) p.3 
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 5 	
Logic of Sense and Plato:  
Towards a pure metaphysical foundation for meaning 		
 
Introduction 	
I have so far identified that Deleuze challenges the traditional epistemological model, 
or image of thought. His concern with this philosophical model is how it has an 
implicit effect upon our judgment: “By [image of thought] I mean not only that we 
think according to a given method, but also that there is a more or less implicit, tacit 
or presupposed image of thought which determines our goals when we try to think.”1 
We must then always repeat the same techniques involving rational deduction in 
order to be correct and attain clarity of our thoughts. For instance, this can be 
identified in the Cartesian apprenticeship where an individual uses rational deduction 
to remove any doubt by reflecting upon the transcendent sign (such as the cogito). 
Or in Hegelian apprenticeship, an individual must use rational deduction to reflect 
upon the ideal properties of an object. When an individual then attempts to think 
differently from these models they are portrayed as incorrect and idiotic. This is 
because we differentiate ourselves from the norm and what is socially accepted as 
an answer: “we suppose that thought possesses a good nature, and the thinker a 
good will, we take as a model the process of recognition – in other words, a common 
sense … on a supposed same object: we designate error, nothing but error, as the 
																																																								
1 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton (London: Continuum, 2004) p.xv 
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enemy to be fought; and we suppose that the true concerns solutions – in other 
words, propositions capable of serving as answers.”2 
 
As we have seen it is this engagement with the image of thought that defines 
Deleuze’s early philosophy. Deleuze’s alternative model, to affirm the act of thinking 
differently defines his move from the early work to Difference and Repetition (1968): 
“A new image of thought – or rather, a liberation of thought from those images which 
imprison it: this is what I had already sought to discover in Proust … however, in 
Difference and Repetition this search is autonomous and it becomes the condition 
for the discovery of these two concepts.”3 In the previous chapter, this alternative 
and new image of thought in Proust and Signs was defined according to a Leibnizian 
apprenticeship. This process of apprenticeship involved three stages: worldly signs, 
signs of love and signs of art. Worldly signs define our initial experiential 
engagement where a social and cultural background provides a basis for our 
interpretation. Although criticising the traditional epistemic model in philosophy this 
demonstrates its importance for Deleuze since it provides a foundation for thought. 
Deleuze then does not seek to destroy all prior epistemic models in order for his own 
model to be accepted as the best. Or to allow for a foundation where a brand new 
model must be continually created.  
 
Signs of love enable us to discover other possible perspectives or ways of 
thinking. This is identified in Proust where Marcel has a preconceived idea of 
Albertine. This idea is challenged when reflecting upon other images of her. When 
leaning in for the kiss he must then decide to choose one specific idea of her. In 																																																								
2 Ibid 
3 Ibid 
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philosophical terms, this is related to Leibniz’s concept of possible worlds. This is 
because each individual has a different perspective in which we view the world. 
Different perspectives then challenge a general or absolute view by affirming the 
multiplicity of variations of styles and techniques within a method. For instance, in 
playing guitar, there is a multiplicity of different artists that transform how we think of 
it (did you hear X? I didn’t even realise that was possible within Y). As Thomas 
Harrison notes we identify this in Eddie Van Halen’s finger tapping technique: “Van 
Halen’s success started with an eponymous album in 1978, featuring … a guitar solo 
that featured Eddie Van Halen, ‘Eruption’. The inclusion of the solo helped Van 
Halen become the leader of the 1980s guitar style ... largely because the solo 
included new guitar techniques not seen in the commercial realm, especially two-
handed slurs (also known as tapping).”4  
 
The Leibnizian apprenticeship is developed in the last stage, signs of art. This 
is because for Deleuze each individual’s perspective is completely unique. In 
philosophical terms, our understanding is a monadic singularity. We are then faced 
with the problem of dualism, a separation of subject and world. This is comparable to 
Stirner’s unique ego defined in chapter 2. Deleuze identified that in Stirner we arrive 
at a metaphysics of pure difference with no way for us to actualise our 
understanding. Any attempt to do so would negate our uniqueness. Deleuze 
resolves the problem of dualism through the relation of immanence to monadic 
singularity. With this relation to immanence, any concept or philosophical idea is 
constructed and influenced by worldly forces.  
 
																																																								
4 Thomas Harrison, American History through Music: Music of the 1980s (California: Abc-Clio, 2011) p.37 
	
	
249	
Deleuze’s Alphabet interview with Claire Parnet, highlights this relation of 
immanence to the creation of Plato’s concept of the Idea. A traditional understanding 
of Plato’s concept of the Idea is that it is transcendent, abstract and metaphysical. As 
Stephen Mumford explains "Plato thought that the perfect [understanding of things] 
existed in a heavenly, transcendent world: above and beyond the physical world of 
everyday objects that we inhabit. This heavenly realm would contain all the true 
versions of all the properties and relations too."5 Plato's Idea is not based on our 
experience of the world, as this is merely an imperfect copy. The Idea then becomes 
Plato’s metaphysical foundation for knowledge as it allows for truth and certainty in 
shared universal understanding between individuals: “[Plato] found himself in a given 
situation: that whatever happens … or whatever might be a given therein, there are 
rivals. That is, there are people who say: for this thing, I’m the best example of it … 
the problem for Plato … [is] how to select [between] the claimants, how to discover 
among them which one is the valid one … It’s the Idea, that is, the thing in a pure 
state, that will permit this selection.”6 
 
In contrast to this, Deleuze argues Plato’s Idea only appears to be abstract 
since we have not considered the problem that Plato was responding to, namely, 
those of a democratic Athenian society: “[The problem of selection between 
claimants] begins with the Greeks because it’s a typically Greek problem of the 
democratic, Greek city … The Athenian city is this rivalry of claimants …it’s a 
civilisation in which confrontation with rivals constantly appears: that’s why they 
invented gymnastics, they invent [the] Olympic games … they invent legal 																																																								
5 Stephen Mumford, Metaphysics: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) p.17 
6 Deleuze, ‘H as in the History of Philosophy’, From A to Z, trans. by Charles J. Stivale, dir. by Pierre-Andre 
Boutang (London: Semiotext(e), 2011) 
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procedures …”7  Plato's understanding of imperfect copies reflect the many different 
ways in which rivalry is responded to in Ancient Greek society such as in the 
Olympic games and legal proceedings. This removes the abstract understanding of 
the concept to reveal the social and cultural influences which form a worldly 
foundation to Plato’s concept of the Idea. In other words, with a consideration of the 
problems in which the concept of the Idea emerged, no longer makes it a 
metaphysical concept but becomes concrete: “If you haven’t found the problem to 
which a concept corresponds, everything stays abstract. If you’ve found the problem, 
everything becomes concrete.”8  
 
From this it can be said, if everything becomes concrete through the 
consideration of a problem, for Deleuze, then why is the problem not always 
apparent? His answer is that a philosopher wants to give meaning to these social 
and cultural problems: “one might wonder why the problem isn’t clearly stated by a 
philosopher since it certainly exists in [their] work ... the philosopher’s task is already 
that of exposing the concepts that he/she is in the process of creating, so he/she 
can’t expose the problems on top of that or at least one can discover these problems 
only through the concepts being created.”9 For Deleuze, meaning is so vigorously 
sought by a philosopher that the preceding social and cultural processes that are 
being reacted to form part of their understanding. Their answer to these problems is 
through a concept. In other words, in seeking to understand the world a philosopher 
is formed by but oblivious to the process of sense that underlies it. It is then the task 
of a reader and not a philosopher to engage with their work in order to correctly 																																																								
7 Ibid 
8 Ibid 
9 Ibid 
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situate their concepts according to the social and cultural influences which shape 
their understanding of the world. This allows a reader to reconstruct the various 
social and cultural influences that affected a philosopher’s thought that they had 
otherwise had been oblivious to. 
 
This chapter firstly analyses Deleuze’s remarks on Plato’s Cratylus in Logic of 
Sense. This is because these remarks further develop Deleuze’s Leibnizian 
apprenticeship and emphasis upon perspective and singularity. This is identified 
through the two contrasting characters of Hermogenes and Cratylus. Hermogenes’ 
view affirms singularity and a private use of language. In contrast, Cratylus argues 
for a rationalist view by where the etymological origin is the meaning of a word. An 
analysis of Hermogenes’ and Cratylus’ views then allows me to demonstrate how the 
Platonic foundation for language overcomes this tension. This is where Plato 
overcomes the empirical (pure becoming) and rational tension (causal origin) 
towards a pure metaphysics of the Idea that resolves problems in both positions. My 
view of Plato presented is contrary to a traditional view of his philosophy of 
language. The traditional view is where words are negated altogether in preference 
to the Idea. I argue that language and Ideas form a paradoxical relationship. Words 
remain an expression of the Idea, although imperfect, still retaining an essence of 
perfection.  The next chapter returns to this tension in my reading of Deleuze’s Logic 
of Sense where it is argued that this paradox is affirmed, rather than, overcome. 
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Sense as a process and knowledge as becoming 	
In Logic of Sense Deleuze identifies a tension in the concept of sense: “good sense 
affirms that in all things there is a determinable sense or direction: but paradox is the 
affirmation of both senses or directions at the same time.”10 This tension is between 
good sense and sense as a process of understanding. A methodology enables us to 
have good sense by following its guidelines. This allows us to have a specific 
understanding of what something means. In this way, our understanding is 
predetermined to repeat the same meaning or action (C does not follow Y try again! 
Correct, C follows B). What Deleuze makes us aware of is that sense is a process. 
That is, when understanding we learn about other possible perspectives or 
techniques. It is due to this that sense itself cannot be truly determined by a given 
methodology. This is because each time we attempt to learn our sense is continually 
transformed. For instance, when we are attempting to understand something and 
state ‘this does not make sense’. This struggle forces us to challenge our 
presuppositions. When suddenly what seemed to make perfect sense no longer 
holds as true (I thought I knew X but Y has made me rethink X altogether). The 
revelation presented to our thought is that our understanding is not predetermined by 
repetition of the same meaning or in adherence to a universal foundation. This is 
because through the process of understanding we repeat differently. In philosophical 
terms, our understanding and knowledge is in a continual state of becoming. 
 
Deleuze’s account of difference as becoming is developed in his prior work 
Difference and Repetition. It is there that Deleuze challenges our traditional 
understanding of repetition based upon habit. Due to this, we assume repetition is to 																																																								
10 Gilles Deleuze, Logic of Sense, ed. by Constantin V. Boundas, trans. by Mark Lester and Charles Stivale 
(London: Continuum, 2004) p.1 
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repeat the same action or process (His daily habit involved buying a set of 
sandwiches, a packet of crisps and a sweetie for lunch). However, Deleuze 
challenges this understanding: “Repetition is not a generality.”11 Henry Somers-Hall 
develops this in relation Deleuze’s discussion of law in the natural sciences: “We 
normally see laws as applying to all particular entities that resemble one another in a 
pertinent way, that is, all particulars that fall under a generality.”12 For instance, a 
general property of apples is that their colours are green, red or yellow. In relation to 
experimentation a causal principle determines and governs all particulars instances: 
“the laws of gravitation apply to particular bodies in so far as they have mass.”13 
Deleuze’s claim is that: “… we do not really encounter repetition.”14 That is, we do 
not encounter the continually changing qualities and variations that occur in each 
experiment. In this way, we do not take into account the novel differences that occur. 
As Somers-Hall notes this can be seen through generalisation of experiential data by 
its quantification: “These [experiential] factors …are understood in terms that are 
essentially quantitative … in order to conduct an experiment, we presuppose that the 
pertinent features of a system can be understood in numerical terms.”15  
 
Deleuze’s concept of difference is then Leibnizian. Everything in the world is a 
completely singular and unique. It is due to this that Deleuze reverses the Platonic 
model that moves from particular to general, as Daniel W. Smith remarks “Plato 
defines [difference] in purely negative terms; it is the copy of a copy, an endlessly 
degraded copy, an infinitely slackened icon.”16 For Plato, the Idea takes precedence 
																																																								
11 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p.1 
12 Henry Somers-Hall, Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013) p.7 
13 Ibid 
14 Ibid 
15 Ibid, p.8 
16 Daniel W. Smith, Essays on Deleuze (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012) p.12 
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over any particulars. In this way, every object that we experience is a ‘degraded 
copy’ of a metaphysical ideal. To reverse this model “… means that the difference 
between copy and simulacrum must be seen, not merely as a difference of degree 
but as a difference in nature … The simulacrum must then be given its own concept 
and be defined in affirmative terms.”17 Like Stirner’s extreme egoism, we must not 
attempt to compare or contrast uniqueness. In order for uniqueness to be affirmed 
we must allow for a revaluation of an idea. In doing so, an idea becomes dynamic 
and allows for other perspectives, rather than, privileging the view of one over many.  
 
Underlying this metaphysics is Deleuze’s epistemic concern, namely, that we 
must negate the multiplicity of senses in order to arrive at meaning. In other words, 
this is in order to move from the process of learning to the attainment of 
understanding. Deleuze identifies a relation to Plato where we seek to both clearly 
define an idea and attain meaning for ourselves:  
 
Plato ... distinguishes between two dimensions (1) that of limited and 
measured things, of fixed qualities, permanent or temporary which always 
presuppose pauses and rests, the fixing of presets, and the assignation of 
subjects ... and (2) a pure becoming without measure, a veritable becoming-
mad, which never rests. It moves in both directions at once. It always eludes 
the present, causing future and past, more or less, too much and not enough 
to coincide in the simultaneity of a rebellious matter.18  
 
																																																								
17 Ibid 
18Deleuze, Logic of Sense, pp.1-2 
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The two dimensions represent the rationalist and empirical divide. The rationalist 
position seeks fixity where transcendent concepts are created in order for knowledge 
to always remain the same. This is to allow for every individual, regardless of his or 
her social or cultural backgrounds or time period to arrive at the same correct 
understanding. On the other hand, the empirical position affirms the transitory nature 
of knowledge. This is where knowledge remains a state of continual change. An 
empirical view then allows for other perspectives to challenge and overturn dominant 
views and thereby change how we think of the world.   
 
This divide also represents the influence of the pre-Socratics Parmenides and 
Heraclitus on Plato. Parmenides takes a ‘rationalist’ and monist position and 
identifies problems with an empirical view of becoming: “… how could what becomes 
have being … seeing that, if it came to be, it is not, nor is it, if at some time it is going 
to be. Thus becoming has been extinguished and perishing is unheard of.”19 That is, 
if a thing continually changes we cannot be certain that it exists. This is because at 
the moment it exists, it is not the same object [X is now Y].  We cannot perceive it or 
learn about its states of transformation. For Parmenides, in order to gain knowledge 
and clarity, we must reflect on the same qualities that unites each object: “[A thing is] 
changeless in the coils of huge bonds, without beginning or cessation … remaining 
the same and in the same state, it lies by itself and remains thus where it is 
perpetually, for strong necessity holds it in the bondage of a limit, which keeps it 
apart … it is not lawful that Being should be incomplete for it is not defective, 
whereas Not-being would lack everything”20 For Parmenides, becoming remains in 
bondage since it cannot be actualised. By reflecting upon what remains the same we 																																																								
19 Parmenides, Section 66 in The Fragments of Parmenides, revised edition, original trans. by A. H Coxon, ed. 
and new trans. by Richard McKirahan (Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing, 2009) p.70  
20 Ibid, Section 68-70, pp.72-4 
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overcome this problem. This is to reflect on the timeless quality of an object (what 
remains the same about X over time?) These timeless qualities then enable us to 
gain a complete idea of things in the world. For instance, the life cycle of a bee 
enables us to understand the production of honey and its function in a hive.  
 
In contrast, Heraclitus takes an ‘empirical’ and pluralist position that affirms 
becoming. This is because for Heraclitus fire is used as a metaphor for explaining 
how the world is in flux. “All things are exchanged for fire and fire for all things, just 
as wares for gold and gold for wares.”21 For Heraclitus, everything in the world is 
perishable since everything can be destroyed with fire. Or to put it another way, 
nothing in the world is everlasting but only lasts a brief period of time. As James 
Hillman remarks: “[Heraclitus’] name for this changing flux, or process, in today’s 
terms, is ‘fire,’ a metaphor for the shifting meanings of all truth. Therefore, the verbal 
account, or logos, of the world is also fire. Truth, wisdom, knowledge, reality-none 
can stand apart from this fire that allows no objective fixity.”22 However, fire should 
not only a destructive force but also a creative one. By erasing prior structures of 
knowledge we can build arrive at new understandings of the world. This is a 
continual cyclical process of needing to continually eradicate prior structures of 
knowledge in order to always arrive at different perspectives. In this way, everything 
remains transitory with nothing remaining everlasting expect the process of 
transformation itself. Deleuze’s relates these two opposing positions to the 
discussion of language in Plato’s Cratylus: 																																																								
21 Heraclitus, The Fragments of the Work of Heraclitus of Ephesus on Nature, trans. by G.T.W. Patrick 
(Baltimore: N. Murray, 1889) Available at http://www.classicpersuasion.org/pw/heraclitus/herpate.htm 
[accessed 18th April 2015] 
22 James Hillman, ‘Foreword’ in Heraclitus, Fragments, trans. by Brooks Haxton (London: Viking, 2001) 
Available at 
https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=bVxk39znNwIC&pg=PT96&dq=heraclitus+fragments&hl=en&sa=X&ei=
KD0yVeiOOZbfau3ogFg&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q&f=false [accessed 18th April 2015]  
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Sometimes Plato wonders whether this pure becoming might not have a 
peculiar relation to language. This seems to be one of the principal meanings 
of the Cratylus ... could this relation, perhaps, be essential to language ... 
might there not be two sorts of languages ... or further still, is it not possible 
that there are two distinct dimensions to language in general?23  
 
Although not explicit referenced by Deleuze, these two contrasting positions in the 
Cratylus are represented in the views of Hermogenes and Cratylus. It is then through 
Plato’s resolution of these positions that he must take into consideration the role and 
function of pure becoming and the attainment of meaning. By taking this into 
consideration we either arrive two separate forms of language, private and general 
use of names. Or, that becoming and structure paradoxically function within 
language itself. Following this, we cannot take Deleuze’s position as anti-Platonic. I 
then disagree with Miguel de Beistegui’s view where Plato’s philosophy is to be 
overcome. This is because a method of judgment introduced negates multiplicity in 
preference to the One: “Deleuze will not cease to attack [Platonism] and try [to] 
overturn [it] by revealing … [its desire] to introduce judgment in philosophy (in the 
plane of immanence), and give it a (preferably bad) conscience.”24 In contrast to this, 
I agree with Daniel W. Smith’s view where we must then revaluate the role of 
simulacra and its relation to structure, rather than, completely dismiss it altogether: 
“Deleuze’s [philosophy] … must not be taken as a rejection of Platonism … 
Deleuze’s inverted Platonism retrieves almost every aspect of the Platonic project, 
but now reconceived from the viewpoint of the simulacrum itself.”25 By taking 																																																								
23 Deleuze, Logic of Sense, p. 2 
24 Miguel de Beistegui, ‘The Deleuzian reversal of Platonism’ in The Cambridge Companion to Deleuze ed. by 
Henry Somers-Hall and Daniel W. Smith (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) p.57 
25 Daniel W. Smith, Essays on Deleuze, p.16 
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simulacra into account: “it shows how Plato failed in his attempt to ‘make the 
difference,’ but at the same time it opens up a path towards a retrieval of the Platonic 
project on a new basis. In this sense, Deleuze’s inverted Platonism can at the same 
time be seen as a rejuvenated Platonism and even a completed Platonism.”26 We 
will now consider the role and function of pure becoming in Plato’s Cratylus. The 
next chapter will continue this discussion analysing their role in Deleuze’s in Logic of 
Sense through Alice’s apprenticeship in Lewis Carroll’s Alice in Wonderland and 
Through the Looking Glass.  
 
Plato’s Cratylus: the problem of naming and maintaining 
uniqueness 	
The Cratylus aims to discover the universal and causal basis that explains the 
reason for the diversity of names and meanings. This discovery occurs through 
Hermogenes, a follower of Socrates, who seeks Socrates’ assistance in clarifying 
Cratylus’ view. As Hermogenes states at the beginning of dialogue: “Cratylus says, 
Socrates, that there is a correctness of name for each thing, one that belongs to it by 
nature. A thing’s name isn’t whatever people agree to call it—some bit of their native 
language that applies to it—but there is a natural correctness of names, which is the 
same for everyone, Greek or foreigner.”27 I have so far illustrated the problem of 
naming through the negation of singularity. This is because each time we attribute a 
name to a particular object, we refer to its general qualities. This view was related to 
Leibniz’s philosophy of language where naming presents a lack since we are 
incapable to express uniqueness.  
																																																								
26 Ibid 
27 Cratylus 383b in Plato, Plato Complete Works, ed. by John M. Cooper and D.S. Hutchinson, trans. by G.D.C. 
Reeve (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997) 
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This inability to adequately express singularity can also be identified in 
Hermogenes’ frustrated response in asking Cratylus his name: “... I ask [Cratylus] 
whether his own name is truly 'Cratylus'. He agrees that it is ... ’Does this also hold 
for everyone else? Is the name we call him his name?’ ‘It certainly doesn't hold of 
you.’”28 For Cratylus, a name does not truly express who we are since we must 
connect a given name to a thing, as Timothy M. S. Baxter explains: “It matters not 
that people who know Hermogenes know him as Hermogenes. Some kind of ‘glue’ 
must link name and thing. And this turns out to be the describing of his nature. Since 
nothing of the semantic analysis of Hermogenes seems to fit the man conventionally 
so named, the name, when applied to that particular man, is just a piece of speech, 
mere hot air.”29 We can understand Hermogenes’ confusion at this since it is through 
our use of names that we have a sense of personal identity. For instance, when a 
friend, family member or loved one calls us by our name we recognise that it is us 
that they are addressing. Yet, even though each of us is given a name, it is not truly 
unique. This shock to our sense of personal identity is apparent when searching for 
our name on a social media website such as Facebook or twitter. In searching, we 
are presented with sometimes a few or even a seemingly innumerable amount of 
other individuals with the same name. It is then through a seemingly innocent task 
that we penetrate the deeper philosophical nature of questioning our own personal 
identity. Who am I if X amount of people share the same name? What makes me 
unique? 
 
Before a discussion of Cratylus’ view is made, Hermogenes gives his own 																																																								
28 Ibid 
29 Timothy M.S. Baxter, The Cratylus: Plato’s Critique of Naming (Leiden, E.J. Brill, 1992) p.10 
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opinion on names: “no one is able to persuade me  that the correctness of names is 
determined by anything besides convention  and agreement. I believe that any name 
you give a thing is its correct name.”30 Hermogenes’ solution in order to maintain 
uniqueness is through the use of proper names (a private use of language). As he 
remarks “I call a thing by the name I gave it; you call it by the different name you 
gave it.”31 Following Hermogenes’ view, a singular language should be created in 
order to maintain each individual’s own understanding. Each individual would then 
have his or her own different use of language with their own set of vocabulary and 
meanings. Hermogenes’ foundation for correctness is then based upon an 
individual’s ability to create their own rules and usage of language: “No name 
belongs to a particular thing by nature, but only because of the rules and usage of 
those who establish the usage and call it by that name.”32 It is then not an external 
foundation that individuals need to reflect upon in order for them to arrive at a correct 
understanding of the world. This is because, for Hermogenes, individuals are free to 
create whatever use of language they see fit.  
 
However, from this basis of pure creativity, we are not lead into a metaphysics 
of pure difference. This is because, comparable to Locke, we will adopt novel uses of 
language. For Hermogenes, this process explains the reason for the diversity of 
languages: “In the same … [practice of attributing names] I see that different 
communities have different names for the same things—Greeks differing from other 
Greeks, and Greeks from foreigners.”33 In this way, individuals will gradually adopt 
																																																								
30 Cratylus, 384d 
31 Cratylus, 385d 
32 Ibid, 384d 
33 Ibid, 385e 
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more uses of a private language in order for it to differ locally within a country. For 
instance, there is regional variation of the Scottish language, as Fiona Douglas 
remarks “the term Scots … is generally held to include localised Scottish vernaculars 
known variously as broad Scots or dialect Scots, for example, rural or more 
traditional varieties such as the Ayrshire dialectic or the Doric of northeastern 
Scotland.”34 This local adoption will then gradually increase to a regional level. This 
is evident by the different variations of English language within Britain in Scotland, 
England, Ireland and Wales. Once there has been an overall adoption of a dominant 
vernacular use of language this will enable us to understand the different emergence 
of languages in other countries such as French, German, Spanish and so forth.     
 
Therefore, in Hermogenes’ view (as Leibniz would also later remark) our 
dominant use of language came into being through the popularisation of a private 
use of language. This process is then dynamic and allows for the novel use of 
language to then eventually transform the entire foundation and structure of the 
mother tongue. For instance, this process explains the emergence of Modern 
English in the 17th and 18th as Ute Dons explains “The main reason for the beginning 
of an English grammar tradition in the sixteenth century was the change in the 
cultural climate due to the movements of Renaissance, Reformation, and Humanism 
… [these] raised the desire among the English people to similarly refine and enlarge 
the means of expression of their own language.”35 This was no easy task since: “… 
at the time, English possessed neither a standardized grammar nor a binding 
spelling system. Pronunciation varied considerably in the sixteenth century, while the 																																																								
34 Fiona Douglas, Scottish Newspapers, Language and Identity (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009) 
p.33 
35 Ute Dons, Descriptive Adequacy of Early Modern English Grammars, (Berlin: Mouton de Gruyer, 2004) p.4 
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lexicon was relatively limited as Latin, the language of the scholars and the sciences 
was traditionally preferred for complex subject matters.”36 Despite this dominance of 
Latin: “… most scholars were aware of the potential of the English language and 
tried to increase the acceptance of their mother tongue. Their efforts to lay down 
rules for the English language … resulted in the publication of numerous grammars, 
dictionaries, and essays about orthography and spelling.”37  
 
Plato illustrates a problem of nonsense in Hermogenes’ view: “Suppose I call 
one of the things that are— for instance, the one we now call 'man'—suppose I give 
that the name 'horse' and give the one we now call 'horse' the name 'man'.”38 If we 
attempted to give a different name than what was socially acceptable then we 
appear to be idiotic. It is then not based upon our own choice to give names to 
things. This is because names are determined by their social and cultural usage. If 
every individual used a different name we would also be unable to clearly 
understand the idea that was attempting to be communicated. For instance, if I 
stated ‘I loved that blurp, did you love it too?’ The other individual is initially clueless 
about what blurp meant but then corrects them according to what they know from 
their experience, ‘By blurp don’t you mean the film?’ In the most extreme instances, 
nothing would be understood by anyone at all ‘znip znack znool?’ In this case, we 
have nothing from our experience to associate each particular word. This is further 
problematized when the other individual replies back in another set of nonsensical 
words, ‘Zi! Snaj jurip nip bip.’ Therefore we must adhere to the social and cultural 
accepted meaning of name at a given time. This allows for us to communicate and 																																																								
36 Ibid, pp.4-5 
37 Ibid, p.5 
38 Cratylus, 385e 
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reflect upon the same ideas thereby avoid problems of nonsense since we can 
associate ideas to particular things from our experience.   
   
Plato’s criticism connects Hermogenes’ view with the pre-Socratic philosopher 
Protagoras. Plato quotes Protagoras’ famous relativist statement:  “… man is the 
measure of all things’ and that things are to me as they appear to me, and are to you 
as they appear to you.”39 For Protagoras, we arrive at a subjective foundation where 
our knowledge and judgment is based upon our own relative taste (I like X and I 
don’t like Y, she does not like X but does like Y).  Or we might read the term man in 
the case for humanity and not a male, as Catherine Osborne remarks “we might read 
‘man’ in ‘man is the measure as a reference to human society as a whole. If so, 
Protagoras meant that the conventions of your society determine for you what does 
and what doesn’t count as a matter of importance.”40 Despite this slight difference in 
interpretation Protagoras argues that truth is a human creation: “… Protagoras 
appears to say that there is no independent truth about what things exist, or what 
they like, apart from the way human beings construct them for themselves.”41 His 
relativist view also applies to morality where: “… societies form their own codes of 
moral conduct and legal systems, and that what was right for one society need not 
be right for another.”42 
 
																																																								
39 Ibid, 386a 
40 Catherine Osborne, Presocratic Philosophy: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2004) Available at 
https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=4QO_2YHyv4cC&printsec=frontcover&dq=very+short+introduction+pres
ocratics&hl=en&sa=X&ei=dekjVZO_NtCxae-MgNgF&ved=0CCEQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q&f=false [date 
accessed 7th April 2015] 
41 Ibid 
42 Ibid 
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For Plato, Protagoras’ relativism proves to be problematical when applied to 
learning: “if what each person believes to be true is true for him, no one can truly be 
wiser than anyone else.”43 Comparable to Stirner’s egoism, every individual’s 
judgment is correct since they must arrive at knowledge for themselves. However, 
Plato’s critical remark highlights a problem of apprenticeship and education. This is 
because without a given method in order to instruct us we have no need for a 
process of learning. Without any method we cannot know whether our opinion is 
correct or incorrect. This leads to a chaotic situation where any given opinion, 
technique or style would be deemed as correct (It doesn’t matter how I hold the 
hammer, whatever works for me). Heda Segvic remarks that this problem reoccurs in 
the dialogue on Protagoras: “[Socrates’] dissatisfaction with Protagoras’ position is 
likely to turn upon Protagoras’ uncritical attitude toward ‘appearances’, and 
especially upon the received or socially accepted standards of goodness.”44 From 
this, we can see that a universal standard must be created. This universal standard 
allows for an educational system where individuals can be taught what is correct and 
incorrect. We thereby avoid harm towards others or ourselves (if I hold the hammer 
in the correct way I won’t hurt myself or potentially others.)  
 
Plato’s third criticism of Hermogenes is in relation to Euthydemus’ view that: 
“… everything always has every attribute simultaneously.”45 For Euthydemus, an 
infinite set of possibilities is contained within any finite thing. This view seems initially 
strange since we can immediately reply that any given object is finite and limited to a 
given set of properties (X has properties A, B, C). However, these properties are not 																																																								
43 Ibid, 386d 
44 Heda Segvic, From Protagoras to Aristotle: Essays in Ancient Moral Philosophy, ed. by Myles Burnyeat 
(New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2009) p.26 
45 Cratylus, 386d 
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eternal since they can change over time (X now has properties A, B, and D). Due to 
this any possible combination of qualities can be applied to it (The redesign of Y has 
transformed Z completely). This allows us to change overcome initial view of its 
limitation to being open to an infinite possible combination of qualities that a given 
object can contain. In philosophical terms, difference is inherent to a given object. It 
is through the act of actualising these changes that reflect its inherent differences 
(the redesign of Y was thought of as improving the qualities of A, B, C).  
 
For instance, we can relate Protagoras’ view to the development of modern 
technology. The infinite possibility of how an object can function can be seen in the 
evolution of Nintendo’s hand held consoles. For the Nintendo DS, there are specific 
qualities that can be identified: two separate LCD screens, the lower screen being 
touch screen, a stylus in order to enable the user to effectively use the touch screen 
and two separate controls, one to control movement and the other for actions. Each 
Nintendo model has this basic design yet each has a different set of unique 
properties such as the Nintendo DS XL (2009) has larger screens that its 
predecessors and the Nintendo 3DS (2011) is the only model capable of playing 
games in a 3D format.   
 
For Plato, Euthydemus’ view is problematical since we would unable to reach 
a clear definition of each object. Or to put it another way, we are no longer able to 
clearly define what makes each thing unique. (If X and Y both have property Z what 
makes them distinct?) We then return to an educational system where our 
knowledge is timely and limited to a given period. In order to maintain a correct view 
we must continually alter our methodologies and prior forms of knowledge. This 
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leads to a problem for an educational system since our knowledge is flawed and 
continually corrected. In this way, we continually fix prior incorrect forms of 
knowledge by updating them. For Plato, an educational system should be based 
upon one set of definition that always remains correct: 
 
… if neither [Euthydemus or Protagoras] is right, if it isn't the case that 
everything always has every attribute simultaneously [Euthydemus’ view] or 
that each thing has a being or essence privately for each person [Protagoras’ 
view], then it is clear that things have some fixed being or essence of their 
own. They are not in relation to us and are not made to fluctuate by how they 
appear to us. They are by themselves, in relation to their own being or 
essence, which is theirs by nature.46  
 
In contrast to Hermogenes, Protagoras or Euthydemus, a basis for knowledge is not 
upon our own relative choice but rather a natural foundation. This natural foundation, 
for Plato, is based upon using a tool in the adherence to the structure that it was 
designed for: “an action’s performance accords with the action’s own nature, and not 
with what we believe. Suppose, for example, that we undertake to cut something. If 
we make the cut in whatever way we choose and with whatever tool we choose, we 
will not succeed in cutting.”47 In order to correctly cut something it: “… if in each case 
we choose to cut in accord with the nature of cutting and being cut and the natural 
tool for cutting, we’ll succeed and cut correctly.”48 In order to be correct then it must 
adhere to a methodology that teaches us how to correctly and incorrectly to use it. 
Following this methodology we are then able to make a rational choice that is good 																																																								
46 Ibid, 386e                                                          
47 Cratylus, 387a 
48 Ibid 
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for us since it enables us to correctly apply our knowledge.  
 
Plato on Cratylus’ view: etymology and problems with a causal 
foundation for meaning 
  
We have so far identified that a foundation for language must be universal. By 
affirming variances we arrive at multiple foundations based upon each individual’s 
relative view. Plato’s problem with Hermogenes’, Protagoras and Euthydemus is that 
they do not explain similarities or points of comparison. We should then seek to 
discover a foundation to explain how variances occur. This process of identification 
of a universal foundation is achieved through rational deduction. This is because it is 
through the process of rational deduction that we move from the Many to the One. 
Or to put it another way, from a multiplicity of perspectives to one clear view. 
Cratylus’ view is then analysed since he advocates the use of both techniques. As 
we have seen for Cratylus that our current means of expression lacks the ability to 
adequately connect name and thing. This is because of the amount of competing 
claims for the same name.  
 
As Plato states “… Our fine modern language has obliterated the true meaning of 
these names by so twisting them around that they now mean the opposite of what 
they used to, whereas the ancient language expresses clearly what they mean.”49 
The continual transformation of word of over time then negates its original meaning. 
This is because a word will constantly take on new meaning, significations, and 
pronunciations. Time and timeliness then has a destructive effect on its original 																																																								
49 Cratylus, 418b 
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constitution (X used to mean Y but now means Z). Therefore, for Cratylus, we must 
affirm an etymological approach. By using this approach we can reverse the 
destructive effect of time and by return to a word’s original meaning.  
 
By reversing the effects of the transformation of a word, we return to 
understand the how a word is formed and in the context of the time in which it is 
used. This can be seen in Anatoly Liberman’s etymology of the word daisy: “The 
word daisy first surfaced in a manuscript going back to the year 1000 [AD], that is, to 
the time about two centuries after the emergence of the earliest texts in the English 
language … [the term was coined] probably after 450, the date given for the invasion 
of Britain by Germanic tribes, since no word like daisy has been recorded on the 
continent. ”50 During this period when individuals spoke Old English: “… the daisy 
[was called] dœges eage (pronounced approximately as ‘day-z éay-e’, with ea as in 
the French name Réamur.)”51 The phrase: “… meant ‘day’s eye,’ either because the 
daisy resembles the sun … or because it covers the yellow disk in the evening and 
opens it in the morning.”52 By performing this etymology of the English for daisy we 
then return to an age where: “… things revealed their nature in words, and words 
captured the most salient features of things. Happy cave dwellers exchanged 
nosegays of day’s eyes, and no one needed lessons in etymology.”53  
 
In order to test whether etymological is indeed the best foundation for 																																																								
50 Anatoly Liberman, Word Origins and How We Know Them: Etymology for Everyone (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005) p.7 
51 Ibid 
52 Ibid 
53 Ibid, p.8 
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meaning, Plato uses an etymological technique in order to analyze various words. 
His adoption of this technique follows a traditional one at the time, as Francesco 
Ademollo remarks “At a first stage Socrates’ analyses follow the … standard one in 
Greek etymology before and after Plato – names are more or less disguised 
descriptions of their referents, deriving either from one single word or from more 
words conflated together …”54 The etymological section of the Cratylus is quite 
detailed, as Michael W. Riley explains “Socrates goes on a lengthy tangent that 
finally takes over and takes up most of the dialogues.”55 The level of etymological 
analysis given by Plato is, of course, not comparable to modern standards of 
research: “The set of some 140 etymologies for 108 names that Socrates provides in 
this tangent consists of derivations almost entirely specious by modern standards. 
[By comparison to modern standards] Louis Meridier [in the preface to the French 
1950 edition of the Cratylus] lists only twenty successful or partially successful 
etymologies, about a seventh of the total.”56 Despite these problems, Liberman notes 
the value in Plato’s etymology: “Let us admire Socrates who was fluent only in Greek 
but understood so much about language and repeat the watchword of etymological 
research: original ‘names’ were conventional (for other sounds could have expressed 
the same meaning) but not arbitrary (the speakers who chose those sounds had a 
reason to do so. The entire science of etymology is centered on finding that 
reason.”57 
 
																																																								
54 Francesco Ademollo, The Cratylus of Plato: A Commentary (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011) 
p.181 
55 Michael W. Riley, Plato’s Cratylus: Argument, Form and Structure (Amsterdam: Rodopi B.V., 2005) p.1 
56 Ibid 
57 Liberman, Words Origins and How We Know Them, p.15 
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Plato’s interest with etymology is to identify problems in the investigator’s 
process of selection. This is where specific instances are privileged as the true 
origins for a word. In order to illustrate this point, Plato discusses an example taken 
from Hesiod’s Theogony that has continued into modern day, that is, by incorrectly 
using the word Sphinx instead of ‘Phix’. As Stanley Lombardo remarks in the notes 
to the Theogony: “Chimaira is probably the mother of the Sphinx (or rather the 
‘Phiks’ – this local variant of ‘Sphinx’ is the single example of Boeotian dialect in the 
Hesiodic corpus) ...”58 For Plato, although the single example of Boeotian dialectic, 
this remains important since it challenges the popular etymology which “… 
inappropriately connects 'Sphinx' with a verb meaning 'to torture'. 'Phix', the Boeotian 
form of the word, connects it more appropriately with Mount Phikion in Boeotia, 
because of the special association of the Sphinx with Thebes.”59 We should then 
relate the correct our use of the word Sphinx to ‘Phix’ in order to relate it to the Greek 
myth. This is where a Sphinx guarded the gates to the entrance of the city of Thebes 
(which in the Boeotian region of Greece) and asked a riddle in order travellers to 
safe passage. If answered incorrectly she devoured them. Oedipus famously solves 
this riddle in Sophocles’ play Oedipus the King (c.429 BC).  
 
It is therefore through the process of selection that is problematical since a 
rational judgment can only be made through the evidence provided. In terms of 
scientific analysis for etymology is problematical since it attempts to trace an origin 
from fragments of data. The problem then is there is always a possibility of finding 
new evidence that can contradict or challenge a previous hypothesis. This can be 
seen in Liberman’s analysis of trying to find an origin for the Old Scandanavian name 																																																								
58 Hesiod, Work and Days and Theogony trans. by Stanley Lombardo (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1993) p.95 
59 Hesiod, Theogony 326.  
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Heiðrún but keeps on finding different explanations. Icelandic myth states that 
“Heiðrún is a goat from whose udder a never-ceasing stream of mead flows.”60 A 
breakdown of the name reveals each separate meaning: “Heið[brightness of the sky] 
or [heath], or [honor] and rún [rune], but the whole makes little sense when applied to 
a goat.”61 Nevertheless: “… a heavenly goat is a character in many myths … so that 
Heiðrún’s name could not be bestowed upon it by chance or by mistake.”62 Liberman 
then remembers of the: “the English noun heifer … [and looked up its definition] in 
Skeat, the Oxford English Dictionary, and a few other easily available books. They 
offered conflicting solutions and gave no references to their competitors or 
predecessors. Some cited the Old English form heahfore and stopped there …”63 
Still determined to find the origin Liberman consulted: “the eleventh edition of the 
Encyclopedia Britannica[‘s entry] all of which is devoted to the etymology of the word 
[Heifer]. Surprisingly, the Britannica etymology is different from every other one I 
have seen.”64 Finally dejected after a period of: “… half a year to collect an 
insufficient bibliography of heifer, and I shuddered at the thought that the next project 
would be even more time consuming.”65  
 
For Plato, an etymological analysis cannot return to the original meaning due 
to the multiplicity of opinions that claim to be its correct interpretation. Due to this, an 
ancient names are equally as distorted as modern ones: “Names have been twisted 
in so many ways, indeed, that it wouldn't be surprising if the ancient Greek word was 
																																																								
60 Liberman, Words Origins and How We Know Them, pp.1-2 
61 Ibid, p.2 
62 Ibid 
63 Ibid, p.2 
64 Ibid, pp.2-3 
65 Ibid, p.3 
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the same as the modern foreign one …”66 Regardless then of its time period, an 
empirical analysis of meaning still remains timely. What is then analysed is not the 
meaning itself but rather its transformation over time. Plato’s etymological analysis 
then illustrates a problem of underdetermination that is still relevant to modern 
philosophy of science, as Andrew Gregory notes: “In modern philosophy of science 
there is a problem known as underdetermination. In short, in order to determine 
which theory to adopt the data (however good) are insufficient and non-empirical 
criteria must be employed.”67 As shown in the problems of etymology: “Plato 
recognised some of the difficulties here, albeit in a rather more general form … Plato 
then develops a solution involving teleology.”68 This can be identified in the second 
process stage of Plato’s etymological analysis where a different approach must be 
used, as Adernollo states “Socrates will face the problem of accounting for those 
names that cannot be analysed further into more elementary names. This will call for 
a different kind of etymologies, based rather on the mimetic power of the 
letters/sounds that constitute a name.”69 This mimetic power of letters and sounds is 
their ability to reflect the same Idea.  
 
Plato’s view: towards a metaphysics of language 	
For Plato, due to the problems of timeliness, we must then reach a timeless or 
untimely foundation:  “… if we ever get hold of a name that isn't composed out of 
other names, we'll be right to say that at last we've reached an element, which 
cannot any longer be carried back to other names.”70 The remainder of the Cratylus 
																																																								
66 Plato, Cratylus, 421d 
67 Andrew Gregory, Plato’s Philosophy of Science (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2015) p.6 
68 Ibid 
69 Francesco Ademollo, The Cratylus of Plato: A Commentary, p.181 
70 Plato, Cratylus, 422b 
	
	
273	
demonstrates how we can arrive at a metaphysical foundation for language based 
upon mimesis/copying of the Idea. Plato notes how in relation to speech we must 
imitate an Idea in order to be understood: “It seems to follow that a name is a vocal 
imitation of what it imitates, and that someone who imitates something with his voice 
names what he imitates.”71 In relation to speech, we must imitate the correct tonal 
utterances of names in order to be understood (X muttered, Y asked them to state 
what they said again clearly.) In philosophical terms, each imitation of a word is a 
simulacrum, an imperfect copy of the original. We then imperfectly imitate the 
original idea through speech. For instance, in order to imitate an animal we must 
copy its sounds and actions (X said meow, what an uninspiring impression of a cat.) 
 
For Plato, it is from this basis of mimicking an Idea that we can understand 
how words are formed: “… it isn't every man who can give names, Hermogenes, but 
only a namemaker, and he, it seems, is a rule-setter—the kind of craftsman most 
rarely found among human beings.”72 The namemaker or craftsman has undertaken 
an apprenticeship to be trained to correctly form words. The correct formation of 
words is based upon the natural combination of sounds: “… Cratylus is right in 
saying that things have natural names, and that not everyone is a craftsman of 
names, but only someone who looks to the natural name of each thing and is able to 
put its form into letters and syllables.”73 It is then only an individual who is able to 
rationally reflect upon the structure itself that can select the best combination of 
tones to form a word. For Plato the craftsman of words or wordsmith is comparable 
to any craftsman such as a carpenter. This is because a carpenter also looks to a 																																																								
71 Ibid, 423b 
72 Ibid, 388b 
73 Ibid, 390 
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structure or blueprint in order to create their work. By adhering to this structure it 
enables a carpenter to correctly build their work and also teach others. In the same 
way, a wordsmith then uses a natural combination of words that adhere to the same 
pre-given form or structure. Therefore, despite any difference in language (X for Y or 
Z for Y) the same structure will have been adhered to.  
 
This structure will be taken into account into the very construction of the name 
itself where: “the rule-setter apparently used the other letters or elements as 
likenesses in order to make a sign or name for each of the things that are, and then 
compounded all the remaining names out of these, imitating the things they name.”74 
Every different component of a name, its syllables and even rhythm express an Idea. 
This creates an effectual relationship between its expression and its signification (the 
bodily expression X corresponds to signification Y). In order to illustrate this point, 
Plato uses the example of the Greek word for round ‘gongulon’ that is created with 
lots of ‘o’s’: “[the rule setter] wanted 'o' to signify roundness, so he mixed lots of it 
into the name 'gongulon' ('round').”75 When the word gongulon is spoken our mouth 
goes into an ‘o’ shape which then copies the Idea of roundness.   
 
Plato’s model for the wordsmith enables an educational system to be created. 
This is because any new language that is correct must always adhere to the same 
Ideas. A model of judgment of language then is to be adhered to in order to prevent 
a complete deviation from the Idea or structure altogether: “the best possible way to 
speak consists in using names all (or most) of which are like the things they name 
(that is, are appropriate to them), while the worst is to use the opposite kind of 																																																								
74 Ibid, 427d 
75 Ibid 
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names.”76 Plato does allow for the namemaker or craftsman to make mistakes: “even 
if a name doesn't include all the appropriate letters, it will still describe the thing if it 
includes its pattern—though it will describe the thing well, if it includes all the 
appropriate letters, and badly, if it includes few of them.”77 A word may not be a 
perfect copy of the model but still conveys the essence of the Idea or structure (X 
may not be perfect representation of Y but still represents the idea of Z). This 
variance of the namemakers style in creating a word explains how foreign languages 
emerged. This is because, for Plato, namemakers will have deviated in their use of 
language in order to express the same Idea. However, a completely nonsensical or 
absurd word cannot be counted as a name since it lacks any relation to the original 
Idea: “if you deny it, you cannot agree that a name is correct if it expresses things by 
means of letters and syllables and you'll have to search for some other account of 
the correctness of names.”78  In this way, a dialectical relation between a new word 
and an existing signification must be upheld as dissimilarity between a word and sign 
negates the use of language altogether by means of absurdity.   
 
In order to make sure the namemaker adheres to the correct formation a 
dialectician, an individual skilled in the art of philosophical debate, must supervise 
them: “it’s the work of a rule-setter, it seems, to make a name. And if names are to 
be given well, a dialectician must supervise him.”79 This is because the philosopher 
will enable the wordsmith to rationally reflect upon the form or ideal structure, rather 
than, base their understanding upon opinion. Plato is then making explicit reference 
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to the elenchus or Socratic method. This is to move from a multiplicity of opinions 
based upon our initial experiential idea of the world, to a generalization of these 
qualities and finally arriving at the Idea, the point of convergence and synthesis of 
these various points. For instance, we can identify the Socratic method in the 
dialogue structure of the Meno. It begins with a discussion of various virtues: “… a 
man’s virtue consists of being able to manage public affairs and in doing so to 
benefit his friends and harm his enemies and to be careful that no harm comes to 
himself  … And there are very many other virtues, so that one is not at a loss to say 
what virtue is.”80 After Socrates dissatisfaction with this answer Meno gives a general 
definition that applies to everyone: “… virtue is to desire beautiful things and have 
the power to acquire them.”81 Even after this general answer Socrates’ still remains 
dissatisfied and Meno frustrated by this point responds with the famous paradox: 
“How will you look for it, Socrates, when you do not know at all what it is? How will 
you aim to search for something you do not know at all? If you should meet with it, 
how will you know that this is the thing that you did not know?”82  
 
From this we can see that Meno affirms an empirical view and challenges 
Socrates’ rationalism. This is because for Meno we learn from our immediate 
experience of objects and also use this as a basis to discover new things in the world 
(as a combination of prior associations). If knowledge is metaphysical, our idea is 
blank and so we would neither know what it looks like nor be able to discover it in the 
world. Socrates then gives the response of how knowledge is attained through 
																																																								
80 Meno, 71e-72a in Plato, Five Dialogues: Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Meno, Phaedo, 2nd edition, trans. by 
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recollection, which is illustrated by Meno’s slave arriving at a correct understanding 
of geometry despite having no prior experiential knowledge of it. In philosophical 
terms, this means that rational reflection upon a structure, comparable to 
mathematics enables us to arrive at the timeless definitions. As Julia Annas remarks 
“Socrates has taught the boy in the sense of presenting the proof to him in such a 
way that the boy can come to have knowledge of it for himself. The boy will not 
actually have knowledge until he has done something for himself – making the effort 
to understand the proof.”83 Socrates’ teaching method then enables individuals’ to 
think for themselves: “[Socrates] can convey the proof to the boy in a way that will 
enable the boy to make the effort for himself. Hence we can see how knowledge can 
be teachable while it is still true that knowledge is something each person can 
achieve only for himself.”84 Therefore much like Meno’s slave we are not presented 
with a precise definition of virtue, but rather, we should arrive at it for ourselves by 
following this method of rational deduction.  
 
Conclusion 	
Plato therefore resolves the problems of pure difference and pure meaning in 
Hermogenes’ and Cratylus’ views. In Hermogenes’ view, our sense must always 
take precedence over meaning. Each individual’s unique understanding then can 
only be maintained through the use of proper names and adopt a private use of 
language. Due to Hermogenes’ radical affirmation of uniqueness there is a complete 
denial of shared meaning and understandings. Plato illustrates that without any 
shared understanding an idea cannot be clearly understood. In order to be 
understood by others our sense must still have a relation to social and culturally 																																																								
83 Julia Annas, Plato: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) p.9 
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defined terms. In philosophical terms, we cannot solely affirm pure difference or 
becoming. This is because there is no structure but a process. Or to put it another 
way, we arrive at various examples but no precise definition. Knowledge then must 
be defined according to a structure that allows others to be educated and to develop 
their own technique. The development of one’s own technique is then not to affirm 
the relativism of Hermogenes, Protagoras or Euthydemus. For Plato, an individual’s 
own technique can emerge through the use of the general methodology, rather than 
having to have radically different approaches for everyone.  
 
In Cratylus’ view meaning must always take precedence over sense. This is 
why the etymological takes precedence in the dialogue since it allows for an 
individual to trace the history of a word to its original meaning. The problem 
highlighted by Plato is then the act of tracing itself. We can be lead into error by 
tracing an incorrect origin. This is not a problem of reason but the evidence that is 
presented at a given time. In this way, through the use of etymology we arrive at 
meaning and structure but its foundation does not remain stable. This is because 
there are other possible claims for the correct origin. In order to arrive at a stable 
foundation all various competing claims must be overcome in preference to the One, 
a metaphysical and timeless foundation for meaning.  
 
Plato’s resolution of Hermogenes’ and Cratylus’ views is where both meaning 
and sense are affirmed. This is achieved through the use of a general methodology 
and pure meaning. A general methodology allows for all individuals to be taught the 
same methods. For Plato, regardless that the methodology itself may vary or differ 
over time the same Idea will be able to be reflected upon. This can be seen through 
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the various incarnations of a name over time that are still able to reflect the same 
Idea. It is through the education of these Ideas or pure meanings that we can attain a 
correct understanding. This is because we are able to move from uncertainty to 
clarity, or from a multiplicity of possible senses to a clear and certain definition. 
Plato’s model for language therefore emerges between chaos and universal order 
neither destroyed nor completely regulated, a perfect imperfection. The next chapter 
will return to this dynamic between sense and meaning in relation to Deleuze’s 
reading of Lewis Carroll in Logic of Sense. In contrast to Plato, it will be argued that 
Deleuze does not seek to construct a transcendent structure for meaning. Deleuze 
seeks an immanent model that affirms the continual change of sense over time. In 
this way, we do not always fall into error but allow for our own understanding to 
change and a multiplicity of perspectives to have a positive influence on our 
knowledge.  
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6 	
Logic of Sense and Lewis Carroll:  
Challenging the pure foundation of meaning by 
rediscovering sense 
 
 
Introduction 	
In my thesis I have identified that in both rationalist and empiricist approaches 
meaning must be based upon a metaphysical foundation. Yet we never attain full 
meaning for them. This is because things lack names and only retain purely sensual 
information. In order to move from understanding to knowledge, sense to meaning, 
we must impose general names. In the rationalist model, experiential definitions 
always remain incorrect. This is because everything worldly is in a continual state of 
flux. A definition would never be able to accurately represent the present state of 
change. Likewise, in relation to the empiricist model, without the process of 
association that generalises of our experiential knowledge we remain without secure 
ideas. In both models then a process of generalisation is necessary in order to attain 
knowledge. In the introduction, I demonstrated the problems of nonsense in a private 
use of language in Locke. This problem is also apparent in Descartes’ method of 
doubt where our experiential knowledge is nonsensical, since we cannot arrive at a 
clear and distinct understanding of the world from experience. Therefore general 
names and the use of rational deduction enable the act of communication to take 
place and to confirm that another individual understands us. This is because 
language signifies a given worldly object and expressing our thoughts. When a word 
is uttered we are able to identify which specific object or thing that is being referred 
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to. At the same time, there is a psychological aspect revealed in the rhetorical nature 
of the communication itself that expresses our feelings towards it.   
 
How then does language that begins with an expression of worldly objects 
become metaphysical? The answer is through the establishment of meaning. In 
other words, the problem is to establish a certain and permanent foundation for 
knowledge. In the empirical model this is to establish a causal principle. The causal 
principle then acts as the basis for all subsequent changes that occur. In the 
rationalist model, a transcendent signifier is established through the process of 
rational deduction. In both models then the aim is to create a metaphysical 
foundation in order for our understanding to always attain a correct understanding 
and knowledge of the world. Without this metaphysical structure, based upon causal 
principles and transcendent signifiers, we are left in a purely child-like state, in a 
world of blank words and nonsense. From this the rationalist and empirical models 
then create an image of thought in order for an apprenticeship to take place. This is 
to be guided by principles that can be practically applied and used by all individuals. 
A benefit then is that it does not lead to harm of others or ourselves through a 
misuse of knowledge.  
 
Deleuze challenges this traditional model consistently through his reading of 
Proust and in Difference and Repetition. He seeks to arrive at a different image of 
thought that emphasises sense and the importance of immanence. In this way, 
thought is not to be considered as solely based upon an eternal structure but rather 
as a process where the structure itself is affected and transformed by our own 
practical application and by immanent forces. Deleuze’s definition of thought as a 
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process can be connected to Merleau-Ponty’s view which states “language is neither 
thing nor mind, but it is immanent and transcendent at the same time”1 Language 
then no longer expresses an actual object or our thought but the metaphysical 
structure and the immanent forces that affect that structure. In Logic of Sense, 
Deleuze remarks “It is language which fixes the limits ... but it is language as well 
which transcends the limits and restores them to the infinite equivalence of an 
unlimited becoming.”2 Language then enables us to have structure through 
predefined meanings. Yet as we have seen through Deleuze’s reading of Proust in 
chapter 4, the aim of an apprenticeship is to become an Egyptologist. The 
decipherer of signs makes sense of them but not by repeating and reiterating the 
same meaning (Describe what a tree looks like? Which one of these is not a 
spoon?).  
 
Deleuze’s apprenticeship then contrasts with the traditional rationalist and 
empirical models. This is because his apprenticeship does not begin with the 
process of making sense. Instead it begins with a proliferation of meaning. In this 
way, there is nothing to initially make sense of since everything has been predefined 
by our social and cultural backgrounds. What we learn is corrected according to 
accepted truths at a given time. For Deleuze, at this point there is nothing to truly 
think about, and our thoughts must conform or be corrected. As we have seen in the 
previous chapter, what defines the new image of thought is that we must think 
differently. In Proust and Signs, a Leibnizian apprenticeship is to affirm the monadic 
singularity of understanding and different viewpoints from our own. Deleuze’s 																																																								
1 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language trans. Hugh J. Silverman by (Illinois: 
Northwestern University Press, 1979) p.6 
2 Gilles Deleuze, Logic of Sense, ed. by Constantin V. Boundas, trans. by Mark Lester and Charles Stivale 
(London: Continuum, 2004) p.4 
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Difference and Repetition further develops this metaphysics based upon pure 
difference. Yet what must be emphasised is the immanent relation to the world (the 
singularity of leaves, of our appearance). This overcomes the problem of dualism as 
expressed by Peter Hallward in the introduction to the thesis. Deleuze does not seek 
to affirm an either/or position, either an empirical or a rationalist position, since he 
demonstrates the relationship between experience and the rational structures that 
govern it. In philosophical terms, becoming and actuality are not two opposing 
philosophical models (Heraclitus contra Paramenides). Our understanding requires 
structure and models in order to learn and, at the same time, transformation of these 
models occurs through their practical application. This is because a model is 
transformed by reacting to the worldly forces at a given time (How does Plato help to 
enable us to understand African American discrimination?) 
 
Plato’s criticisms in the previous chapter on the Cratylus revealed problems in 
empirical and rational approaches. Hermogenes’ empirical view that affirmed a 
private use of language was flawed through the need to use general terms in order 
for our ideas to be understood. Cratylus’ rational view privileged the etymological 
origin as the basis for meaning. This was shown to be based on unsound reasoning 
since we can only make the best informed judgment on the basis of the evidence 
given. In this way, there could be evidence that can appear in the future that would 
demonstrate that our judgment was incorrect. After discussing these problems Plato 
offers his solution through the theory of Ideas. He uses the example of the craftsman 
in order to explain that when words are created they reflect the same Ideas. A 
variance can occur when words do not adhere to the Idea and, if this happens, then 
a philosopher can assist in correct use of rational deduction. Plato then resolves the 
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difference between Hermogenes’ and Cratylus’ views by combining the elements of 
uniqueness and the need for an original structure for meaning. Variance and unique 
qualities are maintained since all languages reflect the same origin. This origin for 
meaning is not flawed since it is metaphysical, providing an absolute and pure basis.  
 
In this chapter I will discuss Deleuze’s reversal of Plato’s philosophy of 
language in his reading of Lewis Carroll’s Alice in Wonderland and Through the 
Looking Glass. Comparable to Plato, Deleuze seeks to combine empiricist and 
rationalist positions. In philosophical terms, this is to unite pure difference with 
structure. However, in contrast to Plato, Deleuze does not seek to create a 
transcendent foundation for meaning. Instead Deleuze seeks to affirm the immanent 
process and forces that affects language. He therefore aims then to reverse the 
traditional model by demonstrating how immanent forces always affect a 
transcendent foundation. I firstly analyse the paradoxes of indefinite proliferation, dry 
reiteration and neutrality in the series on sense in the Logic of Sense. These 
paradoxes enable a connection to be made to Hermogenes’ and Cratylus’ views and 
also Plato’s solution.  
 
After this, I develop Alice’s apprenticeship through Deleuze’s reading of Lewis 
Carroll. This demonstrates the evolution of concept of apprenticeship from Proust 
and Signs. In this way, the concept of apprenticeship remains relevant to Deleuze’s 
philosophy even though the term itself appears to disappear after Proust. Alice’s 
apprenticeship takes place through three stages, the identification of blank words, 
challenging predispositions through other possible meaning and the rediscovery of 
meaning through an ideal game. From this we can see that the Logic of Sense 
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combines the use of Locke and Leibnizian apprenticeship. Yet what separates 
Alice’s apprenticeship from the Leibnizian apprenticeship is the rediscovery of 
meaning. In other words, it is not simply the purpose to discover other possible 
perspectives but to arrive at our own understanding. The chapter concludes by 
returning to Deleuze’s relation to Plato. I argue that Deleuze paradoxically affirms 
both Hermogenes’ and Cratylus’ positions, without attempting to resolve them. By 
not seeking to resolve the paradox allows for an apprenticeship to not be always 
determined by an absolute structure that would guide their understanding. Crucially, 
in contrast to a Platonic position, structure, values and meaning are not destroyed 
altogether but retained. Paradox is a positive process for our understanding. This is 
because structure guides our understanding but at the same time it is transformed 
through the process of making sense.  
 
Deleuze meets Hermogenes and Cratylus: the paradoxes of 
indefinite proliferation and dry reiteration  	
Despite discussing the Cratylus, Deleuze does not explicitly discuss Hermogenes’ 
and Cratylus’ views. However, we can relate Deleuze’s discussion of the paradox of 
indefinite proliferation and dry reiteration in the fifth series on Sense in the Logic of 
Sense to illustrate the deeper problems within Hermogenes’ and Cratylus’ positions. 
The paradox of neutrality also illuminates problems within Plato’s solution. The 
paradox of indefinite proliferation is to the need to continually define the meaning of 
one word with the name of another [n1, n2, n3 …] For instance, if I asked what is a 
dog? We do not arrive at a precise definition of a dog, but rather, a collection of 
names (four legged, hairy, mammal) that also need to be defined (what is four-
leggedness? Hairiness? Mammals?). In attempting to arrive at a clear and certain 
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definition then we arrive at a multiplicity of possible definitions: “… I can always take 
the sense of what I say as the object of another proposition whose sense, in turn, I 
cannot state. I thus enter into the infinite regress of that which is presupposed.”3 The 
same problem can be applied to Hermogenes’ view. This is because in order to 
explain a private use of language we would have to explain what the specific word 
meant. Even if we used a succession of nonsensical terms it would lead into infinity.  
 
  This paradox can also related to the Meno where Socrates attempts to arrive 
a definition of virtue. Meno initially gives a definition of the virtues between men and 
women: “… a man’s virtue consists of being able to manage public affairs and in so 
doing to benefit his friends and harm his enemies and to be careful that no harm 
comes to himself … [a woman’s virtue is that] she must manage the home well, 
preserve its possessions, and be submissive to her husband.”4 However the list 
provides to be endless since there is a multiplicity of virtues: “… there are very many 
other virtues, so that one is not at a loss to say what virtue is. There is virtue for 
every action and every age, for every task of ours and every one of us—and, 
Socrates, the same is true for wickedness.”5 Socrates’ reply then attempts to make 
Meno identify general qualities that each of these virtues have in common through 
the example of bees: “If I were asking you what is the nature of bees, and you said 
that they are many and of all kinds … what is this very thing, Meno in which they are 
all the same and do not differ from one another.”6 We can then apply this technique 
of identifying the general qualities from bees to virtue itself: “The same is true in the 
																																																								
3 Deleuze, Logic of Sense, p.35 
4 Meno 72a in Plato, Plato Complete Works, ed. by John M. Cooper and D.S. Hutchinson, trans. by G.D.C. 
Reeve (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997)  
5 Ibid 
6 Ibid, 72b-c 
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case of virtues. Even if they are many and various, all of them have one and the 
same form which makes them virtues, and it is right to look to this when one is asked 
to make clear what virtue is.”7  
 
  The paradox of indefinite proliferation is apparent within my definition of sense 
as a process of understanding. This is because it appears that we never get to what 
we truly mean. Or to put it another way, we always remain stuck within a process of 
learning without knowledge. In philosophical terms, our understanding remains in a 
continual state of becoming that viciously negates the emergence of any structure or 
meaning whatsoever. However, this would be to assume that we initially have an 
invalid or incorrect understanding of the world that can only be resolved through the 
establishment of a metaphysical foundation for meaning. In this way, our empirical 
understanding then would be intrinsically flawed that can only be resolved through a 
rationalist approach and reflection upon a transcendent signifier. Yet we must not 
view the generation of a multiplicity of senses as negative or intrinsically flawed, as 
James Williams argues “this generation of new senses should not be seen as 
intrinsically negative, since the values come from the generated sense and are both 
negative and positive.”8  To have a multiplicity of understanding is then not 
meaningless or a distortion of knowledge but a production of senses. This is where 
in generating a new sense there is a revaluation of a prior value: “the infinite chains 
are not series of qualified and qualifier propositions, but rather, for the later 
propositions to refer to the sense of earlier ones, they have to take names from them 
																																																								
7 Ibid, 72c 
8 James Williams, Gilles Deleuze’s Logic of Sense: A Critical Introduction and Guide (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2008) p.54 
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and give different ones for their sense. You said ‘bed’, but you meant ‘red’.”9 What 
appears then to be a negative paradox where we cannot arrive at a clear definition or 
pure meaning is a positive since it emphasizes the revaluation of knowledge: “What 
can seem like a negative paradox ... [is] also a productive one because sense 
proliferates indefinitely ‘We have more sense than we think.’”10 The proliferation of 
sense then is a productive force that continually resists any final word upon a matter. 
To do so would deny the process of education itself where we would forever learn 
the same ways to understand the world. This would then deny any new 
developments in knowledge or to transform prior structures in order to make them 
respond to contemporary problems (Keynesian economics is the only way).  
 
The answer to the paradox of indefinite proliferation is then to completely 
determine sense: “there is indeed a way of avoiding this infinite regress. It is to fix 
the proposition, to immobilize it, just long enough to extract from it its sense.”11 This 
is so that there is never production of a multiplicity of senses, but rather, the 
preference of one specific view over many. We then arrive at another paradox, of dry 
reiteration. This is because we continually deny any new understanding by always 
returning to the same original foundation. The paradox of dry reiteration can be 
applied to Cratylus’ view. In Cratylus’ view meaning is determined by its etymological 
origin. In this way, there can never be any new or different senses since the original 
meaning that was traced through historical analysed would always be privileged.  
 
  We can also relate the paradox of dry reiteration to the Meno. In remaining 																																																								
9 Ibid 
10 Ibid 
11 Deleuze, Logic of Sense, p.38 
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unsatisfied with the Meno’s definition of virtue, Socrates asks him to define it again: 
“Come now, you too try to fulfill your promise to me and tell me the nature of virtue 
as a whole and stop making many out of one, as jokers say whenever someone 
breaks something; but allow virtue to remain whole and sound, and tell me what it 
is.”12 Meno replies with a more refined definition: “… virtue is, as the poet says, ‘to 
find joy in beautiful things and have power.’ So I say that virtue is to desire beautiful 
things and have the power to acquire them.”13 Meno’s more refined definition then is 
‘dry’ since it has removed a multiplicity of virtues to be based solely upon the poetic 
ideal. Socrates then illuminates a moral problem with this poetic definition of virtue: 
“… virtue according to your argument, the power of securing good things … And by 
good things you mean, for example, health and wealth? Yes [Meno replies], and also 
to acquire gold and silver, also honors and offices in the city. “14  
 
  This is because the individuals in the state who have the power to acquire 
beautiful things are the aristocracy. Meno has then given a more refined definition of 
virtue based upon his own aristocratic background. However, for Socrates and Plato, 
we must move away from our own selfish desire of what we find beautiful and 
pleasurable towards a universal idea of goodness that is attainable by everyone 
through rational deduction. Therefore, as we have seen, the foundation for meaning 
that is claimed by etymology then is not truly original. For Plato, the true foundation 
for meaning, as with the foundation for moral judgment, must be metaphysical: 
“when I begged you to tell me about virtue as a whole, you are far from telling me 
what it is. Rather, you say that every action is virtue if it is performed with a  part of 																																																								
12 Meno, 77b 
13 Ibid 
14 Ibid, 78c 
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virtue, as if you had said what virtue is as a whole, so I would already know that, 
even if you fragment it into parts.“15  
 
This paradox was also apparent in Chapter 3’s discussion of linguistics of 
Descartes and Chomsky. This is because of the privileging grammatical structure 
over phonetics. In doing so, there is complete denial of novel forms of language. As 
illustrated by Deleuze and Guattari, the danger with this view is that we arrive at 
institutional racism. This can be seen in Tarni Prasad’s denial of the use of slang: “ 
slang is language of highly colloquial type used by the people who are not educated 
and who do not belong to the cultural society.”16 This then to deny the youth or 
children use of language in order to continually correct with the use of correct 
grammar, as Mary Bucholtz remarks “In most linguistic scholarship, slang is defined 
as a rapidly changing lexicon associated with casual social contexts and used 
primarily by youth ...”17  
 
The rationalist approach that attempts to define the causal principle or origin 
with its identification leading to the paradox of dry iteration then appears to be the 
most negative paradox. There is an absolute denial of newness, emergence of 
novelty, and knowledge becomes a process of reiteration of the same ideal. 
However, as with the paradox of indefinite proliferation, it enables an engagement 
and challenge to the validity of its claim for an absolute truth. As Williams remarks “It 
can seem that this paradox is the most ‘negative’ one that Deleuze presents, but 
																																																								
15 Ibid, 79c 
16 Tarni Prasad, A Course in Linguistics (New Delhi: Prentice-Hall of India, 2008) p.164 
17 Mary Bucholtz, White Kids: Language, Race and Styles of Youth Identity (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2011) p.68 
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that’s not the case since … [it] allows[s] for the power of the ‘infinite’ paradoxes to be 
re-launched.”18 By challenging the validity of its claim for absolute truth then 
reinvigorates the debate where other possible perspectives and sense are taken into 
account (Godfather isn’t the best, what about Goodfellas or Brian De Palma’s 
Scarface?). What initially appears to be impenetrable is then penetrated through the 
process of making sense and discovering other possible perspectives: “… we re-
energise movement or ‘impenetrability’ in exactly the kind of way interminable 
scholastic debates can be helped by the impenetrability of an esoteric term or the 
way a detached esotericism can be released through its insertion in chains of 
clarifying commentary.”19 
 
The solution to the rationalist problem of a causal origin then is to discover a 
pure metaphysics. In other words, understanding must become completely neutral 
and unaffected by worldly forces or have the potential to make an error in our use of 
rational deduction: “if sense as the double of the proposition is indifferent to 
affirmation and negation, if it is no more passive than active, then no mode of the 
proposition is able to affect it.”20 We then arrive at the paradox of neutrality where a 
multiplicity of senses is determined by meaning (A, B, C all reflect X). This is to arrive 
at a tautological foundation for knowledge where regardless of the many different 
perspectives still reflect the same meaning. This paradox can be compared to Plato’s 
position in both the Cratylus (various languages still use the same meaning) and the 
Meno (all examples of virtue reflect the Idea of virtue) where language and meaning 
must become metaphysical. By reflecting upon the Idea our sense and 
understanding then is determined. In philosophical terms, reflection upon the 																																																								
18 James Williams, Gilles Deleuze’s Logic of Sense, p.55 
19 Ibid, pp.55-6 
20 Deleuze, Logic of Sense, p.39 
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transcendent signifier determines the same basis for all individuals regardless of 
their social or cultural backgrounds or their time period. This then enables us to 
overcome errors made in our rational deduction or moral problems by reflecting upon 
the same universal principles.  
 
Deleuze illuminates this point through the paradox of Nicolas d’Autrecourt: 
“Let us take first quality, affirmation and negation: ‘God is’ and ‘God is not’ must have 
the same sense, by virtue of the autonomy of sense in relation to the existence of the 
denotatum. This was, in fact, in the fourteenth century, the fantastic paradox of 
Nicolas d’Autrecourt.”21 That is to say, the proof for the existence or non-existence of 
God still maintains the fact that God itself is an entity. As Chistophe Grellard remarks 
“… Nicholas, analysing the conditions of possibility of the knowledge and acutely 
aware of the limits of knowledge, is led to defend a form of fallibilist foundationalism 
based on a theory of probable knowledge. Such a conception of knowledge 
emphasized degrees of epistemic justification and rejects the traditional picture of 
knowledge as based upon evidentness and truth.”22  
 
With the paradox of neutrality Deleuze is makes us aware of the importance 
of the rhetorical and emotional relation to language, rather than, a complete focus 
upon meaning. As Williams remarks “[Deleuze] is allowing that the relations of 
intensity between different senses associated with propositions can change; that is; 
their significance.”23  By taking into account the rhetorical differences we can then 
make sense of the various different intensities that occur within speech (I don’t just 																																																								
21 Ibid 
22 Christophe Grellard ‘Nicholas of Autrecourt’s Skepticism: The Ambivalence of Medieval Epistemology’ in 
Rethinking the History of Skepticism: The Missing Medieval Background, ed. by Henrick Lagerlund (Leiden, 
Holland: Koninklijke Brill NV, 2010) pp.119-20 
23 James Williams, Gilles Deleuze’s Logic of Sense, p.56 
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really love cats, I really love cats). The importance of this is that it demonstrates our 
own personal sense, rather than, a neutral one that can be applied to everyone: 
“[Deleuze] is also stating that this significance and its changes are not secondary to 
and do not supervene on any of the other moments or modalities of the 
proposition.”24 Comparable to Nietzsche, what initially appears to be neutral or purely 
metaphysical is not independent or neutral but related the process of making sense. 
Paul Livingston remarks upon these deeper immanent relations: “Within the structure 
that is defined simply by its differential relations, the singularities (or sense-events) 
are those points that correspond to what seem to be solid elements.”25 The 
metaphysical structure then becomes actualised through worldly processes: “these 
events, or singularities, are thus ideal in that they correspond to the structure of 
language as a whole and define its action, but at the same time real in that they 
account for the actual processes of change and becoming that occur within the 
course of this action.”26  
 
The final paradox of the absurd will be discussed later in context to the 
problem of nonsense in Alice’s apprenticeship. Put simply for the moment, nonsense 
or the lack of sense is challenged by Deleuze. This is because, as we have seen, 
sense is a productive process of our understanding. In this way, when faced with 
portmanteau words we attempt to make sense of them (does the combination snake 
and shark mean snark?) From this nonsense must be defined not a lack of meaning 
but as an attempt to reach understanding. This is what defines Lewis Carroll’s 
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25 Paul M. Livingston, The Politics of Logic: Badiou, Wittgenstein and the Consequences of Formalism 
(London: Routledge, 2012) p.101 
26 Ibid 
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procedure, making the process of sense evident and preventing its confusion with 
meaning. 
 
Alice’s apprenticeship: a return to making sense of the world 	
Alice’s initial understanding of the world does not begin through the process of 
making sense. This is because her understanding has been predetermined by social 
and cultural norms. In this way, there is nothing to be made sense of since her 
understanding of the world conforms that what is expected. It is through her journey 
in wonderland that we must return to the initial process of making sense. As Deleuze 
states: “it is not … a question of the adventures of Alice, but of Alice’s adventure: her 
climb to the surface, her disavowal of a false depth and her discovery that everything 
happens at the border.”27 Her journey in wonderland then should not be dismissed 
as a mere nonsense or absurdity that is overcome when she returns to the surface. 
The importance is the journey itself since where Alice has to challenge her 
predetermined meaning and arrive at an understanding for herself.  
 
Lewis Carroll’s use of esoteric words forces us to think about the relationship 
between words and their relationship to worldly objects. As Deleuze states:  
 
Carroll asks: how can names have a ‘respondent’? What does it mean for 
something to respond to its name? And if things do not respond to their name, 
what is it that prevents them from losing it? What is it then that would remain, 
save arbitrariness of denotations to which nothing responds, and emptiness of 
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indexicals or formal designators of ‘that’ type – both being stripped of 
sense?28   
 
What Carroll’s use of language makes us reflect upon is the blank word. It must be 
noted that that a blank word has meaning, defined according to a society and 
culture. Yet it lacks sense, the process of attaining an understanding for ourselves. 
Comparable to Locke, Carroll’s use of language challenges a pure rationalist view of 
language. This also enables a Deleuzian criticism of Plato to be made. This is 
because the making sense is an empirical process. We must be able to associate 
experiential qualities to our ideas, without which, they remain blank.  
 
What then the signified or socially and culturally predefined meaning lacks is 
the excess of different senses and a displacement from its normative background. 
As Deleuze states “what is lacking in the signified series is a supernumerary and 
non-situated given – an unknown, an occupant without a place, or something always 
displaced.”29 These are complementary functions that challenge our social and 
cultural predispositions by displacing them. This displacement is then to return to the 
initial process of making sense where it has yet to be defined. In this way, it occupies 
a pure space devoid of any worldliness. Deleuze illuminates this point through the 
example of Alice’s adventure in the Sheep’s shop: “It is the adventure in the Sheep’s 
shop or the story that the esoteric word narrates.”30  
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In looking around the Sheep’s shop Alice attempts to find an object that she 
would like to buy. Yet the problem is that each time she attempts to look at an object 
it suddenly disappears: “The shop seemed to be full of all manner of curious things 
— but the oddest part of it all was that, whenever she looked hard at any shelf, to 
make out exactly what it had on it, that particular shelf was always quite, empty, 
though the others round it were crowded as full as they could hold …”31 A thought 
then suddenly strikes her to attempt to prevent this from happening by following an 
object: 'And this one is the most provoking of all — but I'll tell you what —' she 
added, as a sudden thought struck her. 'I'll follow it up to the very top shelf of all. It'll 
puzzle it to go through the ceiling, I expect!' But even this plan failed: the 'thing' went 
through the ceiling as quietly as possible, as if it were quite used to it.”32 What is 
crucial here is that she expects how things should occur and a common 
reoccurrence in wonderland these expectations are shattered. As Laurence 
Talairach-Vielmas states “As Alice’s sense of the real – and therefore of her own 
reality – is increasingly constructed in semiotic terms … Objects become clichés, 
visual signs which keep displacing meaning elsewhere, as when Alice … tries to stop 
commodities from shifting from one shelf to the next and changing shape in the 
Sheep’s shop.”33 On a deeper philosophical level, Carroll demonstrates that worldly 
signs are blank if we take them at face value. There is no worldly structure to them, 
only an ideal one that drifts away. In this displacement of meaning there is a 
discovery of pure sense, as Deleuze remarks, “Alice discovers the complementarity 
of ‘the empty shelf’ and of the ‘bright thing always in the next shelf above,’ that is, of 
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the place without an occupant and of the occupant without a place.”34 Alice discovers 
the relationship between a word without language (blank word) and that there is no 
relation of language to determinate the object.   
 
The contesting of the meaning of general names can be seen through the 
continual loss of a proper name, as Deleuze states: “…the contesting of Alice’s 
personal identity and the loss of her proper name. The loss of the proper name is the 
adventure repeated throughout all Alice’s adventures.”35 We no longer are comforted 
by a worldly sign but brought into dissatisfaction. This is to call into question our 
sense of personal identity, as Talairach-Vielmas notes: “By dint of displacing objects 
into images, Alice eventually displaces her own self, becomes literally alienated …”36  
In philosophical terms, our dissatisfaction makes a sign blank that which was 
previously gave us meaning is no longer the case. This can be seen in Alice’s 
dissatisfaction with the empty jar of orange marmalade: “she took down a jar from 
one of the shelves as she passed: it was labelled ‘ORANGE MARMALADE’ but to 
her great disappointment it was empty.”37 It is through the loss of meaning that we 
may attempt to return to good sense, a determine meaning or structure that provides 
a determinate meaning. Alice’s return to good sense is when she forgets the name 
for antipodes, that are “regions on the opposite side of the globe”38, by calling it 
‘antipathies’: “’I wonder if I shall fall right through the earth! How funny it’ll seem to 
come out among the people that walk with their heads downwards! The antipathies, I 
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36 Laurence Talairach-Vielmas, Moulding the Female Body in Victorian Fairy Tales and Sensation Novels, p.64 
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think-‘ (she was rather glad there was no one listening, this time, as it didn’t sound at 
all the right word).”39  
 
She then seeks to know the correct answer: “-I shall have to ask them what 
the name of the country is, you know. Please, Ma’am is this New Zealand or 
Australia?”40 Yet far from arriving at a certain answer Carroll is challenging the 
Platonic notion that a name can only have only one correct meaning. This is because 
meaning is dependent upon our perspective. From a European perspective 
antipodes includes New Zealand and Australia and not either New Zealand or 
Australia. Yet it is also true, depending on our location that Zealand is opposite to 
Australia or Australia is opposed to New Zealand. Or to use another example, if we 
asked the question ‘what is red?’ The answer is not absolute but dependent upon a 
multiplicity of different senses (X is a different shade of ruby from Y). Carroll’s 
affirmation of sense as having an effect on meaning can then be related to 
Hermogenes’ view in the previous chapter.  
 
In Hermogenes’ view we must use a private use of language in order to affirm 
each individual’s unique understanding. As Ugo Zilioli comments Hermogenes’ 
position is related to the character of Humpty Dumpty in Through the Looking Glass: 
“we can label [Hermogenes] position the ‘Humpty Dumpty’ thesis, as it is normally 
called in contemporary debates of philosophy of language.”41 In the famous passage 
Humpty Dumpty states that he solely determines the meaning of each word: “When I 
use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said in a rather scornful tone, “it means just what I 																																																								
39 Lewis Carroll, The Complete Works of Lewis Carroll, p.17 
40 Ibid 
41 Ugo Zilioli, Protagoras and the challenge of relativism: Plato's subtlest enemy (Aldershot: Ashgate 
Publishing Ltd., 2007) p.55 
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choose it to mean — neither more nor less.”42 Alice questions this to state that it is 
better to demonstrate the multiplicity of senses that a word can take but Humpty 
Dumpty replies that meaning must take precedence: “The question is,” said Alice, 
“whether you can make the words mean so many different things.” “The question is,” 
said Humpty Dumpty, “which is to be master — that’s all.”43 
 
Nonsense and its relation to sense 
The problem is that Hermogenes’ and Humpty Dumpty’s position is difficult to defend 
since it does not take into account the everyday use of language, as Zilioli remarks: 
 
… the Humpty Dumpty position is not very easy to defend, since very few 
arguments could be advanced for holding that the individual somehow 
privately decides the meaning of a word … [this is because if] a community 
that decides to name things according to the semantic ‘rules and usage’ that 
such a community has established, we cannot help but think of Wittgenstein’s 
idea that the meaning of a word is its use in the (public) language.44   
 
An individual cannot determine the meaning of a word since language must always 
be used in a public space, a social and cultural context. In this way, language is part 
of our everyday life and emerges from our everyday activities, David Blair further 
elaborates on Wittgenstein’s view: “[For Wittgenstein] language is not so much a 
collection of ‘meanings’ but something that can be used to do things – it is an 
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essential part of our everyday activities and practices.”45 Meaning then is not a 
subjective action but a collective one: “this makes meaning a largely collective 
notion: meaning emerges from the use of language in the conduct of day-to-day 
activities and practices.”46 The Wittgensteinian counterargument to Hermogenes’ 
and Humpty Dumpty’s views is therefore comparable to Plato’s criticism. A private 
use of language makes it impossible for us to understand the idea that is being 
communicated. We must then adhere to the general names in order so that all ideas 
communicated can be understood.  
 
However, if we include the process of sense then Hermogenes’ and Humpty 
Dumpty’s view is transformed. This is because it is not solely a matter of preference 
of private names or general names but rather the expression that affects our 
understanding of an idea. As Todd May states “… language and the world offer 
certain ways of being ‘proposed.’ A ‘proposition,’ which is what has a sense, is a way 
of their being proposed. It is both an effect of that circulation [between nonsense and 
the different languages of the world] and a proposal within language for the world.”47 
For instance, when learning a foreign language we are presented with a nonsensical 
word that does not make sense to us. Depending upon how a word is proposed to us 
then effects how we understand it.  
 
In this way, our ability to understand does not have any preference since it is 
a process. As Deleuze states “[Sense] is indifferent to all opposites. This is because 
all of these opposites are but modes of the proposition considered in its relations of 																																																								
45 David Blair, Wittgenstein, Language and Information: ‘Back to the Rough Ground!’ (Dordrecht: Springer, 
2006) p.8 
46 Ibid 
47 Todd May, Gilles Deleuze: An Introduction (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005) p.109 
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denotation and signification, and not the traits of the sense which it expresses.”48 If 
we attempted to define sense according to only operating according to either private 
terms or general names then it would not focus upon the expression itself. In 
philosophical terms, Deleuze enables us to understand how pure difference 
(singularity of our understanding) is not completely separated from structure or 
actuality. This is because in seeking to understand the world we must make sense of 
it and relate it to our immediate experiential understanding of the world. As May 
remarks “Sense is produced by nonsense … it is because there is nonsense, 
because something can bring together the series that is being (or the world) and the 
series that is language and circulate between and among them, that there can be 
sense.”49 Yet we must not confuse this relation by materialism or a causal 
explanation. This is because: “Sense is incorporeal; it is not inserted into the causal 
order of material things.”50 We cannot then force or determine a causal occurrence of 
sense like when: “the sound that is produced when a bat hits a ball”51 In contrast to 
this, it is a process that works through the structure itself. This can be seen through 
the example of an optical illusion. In order to understanding the illusion our eyes 
must make sense of more than what is drawn or merely perceive: “Draw a certain 
pattern on paper and the eyes see something more than what is drawn. This doesn’t 
just have to do with the lines on the paper, nor with the eyes, but with what happens 
between them, with what Deleuze might call a certain nonsense that circulates in 
their interaction.”52  
 
																																																								
48 Deleuze, Logic of Sense, p.41 
49 Todd May, Gilles Deleuze: An Introduction, p.108 
50 Ibid 
51 Ibid 
52 Ibid, pp.108-9 
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May’s use of an optical illusion builds upon a remark that Deleuze makes with 
regards to the relationship between sense and meaning in Alice’s adventures: “the 
reversals that constitute Alice’s adventures … sensing … is always in both directions 
at the same time, so that for once she stays the same, through an optical illusion.”53 
It is then illusory that our use of language always the same. This is because our 
understanding is in a state of continually making sense. Carroll challenges the 
empirical act of association to always assume a connection between a word and its 
meaning. We cannot always assume the same sense applies to other individuals. 
However, a different sense or understanding of the same words must be used when 
in engaging in conversation with others (I said X casually, they look at me as if I just 
gave them a cold cup of tea.) Following this, we can then relate further develop 
Carroll’s position to the Leibniz concept of possible worlds in Chapter 4. This is 
because our use of language represents our understanding of the world. However, 
this remains only one possible way in which to view the world. This should not 
determine other perspectives, other possible ways to views the world. In order to 
begin to understand another individual we must become an apprentice to them, a 
discoverer of an unknown world. Through a process of learning the unknown world 
becomes discoverable over time allowing us to view a different landscape from our 
own.  
 
We then arrive at a minor use of language, which works within a major 
language. Deleuze outlines this through a discussion of the roles of Czech, German 
and Yiddish in Kafka’s style with Guattari in Kafka: Towards A Minor Literature 
(1975). As they state “The vernacular language for … Jews who have come from a 
																																																								
53 Deleuze, Logic of Sense, p.4 
	
	
303	
rural milieu is Czech, but the Czech language tends to be forgotten and repressed; 
as for Yiddish, it is often disdained or viewed with suspicion – it frightens, as Kafka 
tells us.”54 The Czech Jewish population then used German as a vehicular language: 
“German is the vehicular language of the towns, a bureaucratic language of the 
state, a commercial language of exchange.”55 What is problematical is that a direct 
translation of Yiddish into German without destroying its original sense: “[Yiddish] is 
a language that is grafted onto Middle High German and that so reworks the German 
language from within that one cannot translate it into German without destroying it.”56 
We are left to only understand Yiddish through an emotion connection that is made 
through the expression: “one can understand Yiddish only be ‘feeling it’ in the heart. 
In short, it is a language where minor utilizations will carry you away.”57 What makes 
Kafka unique is that he is one of the few Jewish writers to still speak Czech: “Kafka’s 
own situation: he is one of the few Jewish writers in Prague to understand and speak 
Czech.”58  
 
The greatness of Kafka’s style then is not to opt for a preference of Czech, 
German, or Hebrew but a combination of all these factors: “Kafka does not opt for a 
reterritorialization [of Hebrew and German] through the Czech language. Nor toward 
a hypercultural usage of German … nor toward an oral, popular Yiddish. Instead, 
using the path that Yiddish opens up to him, he takes it in such a way as to convert it 
into a unique and solitary form of writing.”59 It is through this combination of elements 
that Kafka’s style is a minor use of language that transforms the possibilities of what 																																																								
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is possible within a major language: “What interests him … is the possibility of 
making of his own language – assuming that it is unique, that it is a major language 
or has been – a minor utilization.  To be a sort of stranger within his own language 
…”60 
 
Therefore for Deleuze sense is then neither a private use of language or a 
lack of understanding. It is a process that works with an engagement of worldly signs 
in order to understand them. In doing so, we arrive at our understanding of them. 
This is then to arrive at a minor use of language that works through the use of major 
language. Comparable to African American English that works through American 
English in Chapter 3 or Kafka’s use of Czech that combines German and Hebrew. 
Deleuze is then making aware us of that each individual develops a minor use of 
language through the process of making sense.  
 
Is a blueprint for meaning required? The ideal game and 
rediscovering meaning  	
A critical question can be asked of Deleuze’s epistemology and philosophy of 
language so far, what is it to discover meaning? Or to put it another way, how does 
Alice rediscover her proper name that enables her to successfully return to the 
surface with an identity? (“‘Who am I, then? Tell me that first, and then, if I like being 
that person, I’ll come up: if not I’ll stay down here till I’m somebody else’ …”61) In 
comparison to Plato, a structure, model or ‘blueprint’ is required for us to gain 
knowledge. This is because they provide a guide for our understanding to ensure we 
arrive at a correct understanding of the world and avoid making errors. We are then 																																																								
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able to use this guide in order to teach, educate others and make sure they avoid 
any unnecessary harm unto themselves or others. However, in contrast to Plato, 
there is no absolute model or structure to take place above all overs.  This is 
because there is a multiplicity of different techniques and styles within disciplines. 
For Deleuze, we should be affirmative of these different approaches. In this way, the 
variance of different approaches is not destructive of knowledge itself where we 
cannot arrive at clarity or meaning. Instead they provide alternative perspectives in 
which we can understand and analyse the world.  
 
An apprenticeship or a process of learning should not be determined by any 
specific disciplinary approach since we can go down any avenue and discover a 
correct way to analyse the world. In Carroll this is illuminated through Alice’s 
discussion with the Cheshire Cat. Alice seeks his advice in which is the best 
direction she should take. Alice then represents the journey of apprenticeship where 
she is unsure which path in life she should take. The Cheshire Cat answers with it 
does not matter which direct she takes as any place will reach somewhere: “Would 
you tell me, please, which way I ought to go from here?” “That depends a good deal 
on where you want to get to,” said the Cat. “I don’t much care where—,” said Alice. 
“Then it doesn’t matter which way you go,” said the Cat. “—so long as I get 
somewhere,” Alice added as an explanation. “Oh, you’re sure to do that,” said the 
Cat, “if you only walk long enough.”62  
 
What is crucial then is that although we have a structure or model to guide us, 
it is left up to us to enact it and make sense of it. The structure by itself cannot 
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enable us to attain knowledge. For instance, we must not only learn driving theory 
but we must also practically apply this knowledge in actually driving a car.  This 
practical application of a structure is called by Deleuze an ideal game: “… [Carroll’s 
rules] seem to have no precise rules, and they permit neither winner nor loser. We 
are not acquainted with such games which seem to contradict themselves.”63 In a 
traditional setting, rules provide a guideline in how to play a game, with an element 
of luck and chance in order to attain the goal of winning it and are usually played 
against other players or against an A.I. As Matthew Fuller and Olga Goriunova state: 
“A classical understanding of games, running through from Huizinga to contemporary 
studies of computer games entails that one enters the game willingly and the game 
comprises ‘the magic circle’”64. The ‘magic circle’ is “a zone in which the norms of the 
outer world are suspended, in order to follow through the iterations of logic, skill and 
luck inherent to the game. Each game has its own economy of chance and an end 
point of triumph or loss and refers simply to the constrained range of activity within 
the circle, the iterations of cards, pieces or gameplay.”65  
 
Carroll’s ideal games in Wonderland run counter to this, there is no definitive 
guideline with the rule set constantly changing, nor is it competitive but usually in 
cooperation with others (everyone moving places at the tea party or getting dry at the 
caucus race). What we are left with is making sense of how to play the game and the 
chance that our understanding that we arrive at is correct. Carroll then forces us to 
return back to the initial process of learning to understand the world, our stumbles, 
fumbles and stuttering. Those initial attempts where we tried to do something 																																																								
63 Deleuze, Logic of Sense, p.71 
64 Matthew Fuller and Olga Goriunova, ‘Worse Luck’ in Revisiting Normativity with Deleuze, ed. by Rosi 
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differently before being corrected. As Aden Evens, Mani Haghighi, Stacey Johnson, 
Karen Ocaña, and Gordon Thompson state “Thought [for Deleuze] is never a merely 
virtual [metaphysical] potency detached from its actualisation; rather, it is always an 
actualization of a virtuality; it is at once transcendent and immanent.”66 These ideal, 
metaphysical or virtual moments take place within the actual games. It must be 
noted that it does not have to be an abstract or nonsensical game that has to be 
played but rather a traditional one. As can be seen in Fuller and Goriunova’s 
comments: “what is so fascinating in many games is the staging of their magic circle 
into an all-consuming mayhem of other forms of energy, such as the deep 
implication of violence within football, and in a game as serene and mad as chess, 
the multiple filiations of the cold war with world chess championships.”67  
 
On a deeper philosophical level, Deleuze is demonstrating the fragility of 
attained meaning. With the continual flux of the world each association that we make 
is by chance. Just as each time we play a game it is different, each time we arrive at 
meaning, it is novel. Deleuze illustrates this in the thirteenth series in Logic of Sense 
entitled ‘the Schizophrenic and the Little Girl.’ In this series, he analyses Antonin 
Artaud’s translation of ‘Jabberwocky’. Upon first appearance, Artaud’s translation 
resembles nothing like Carroll’s poem. The initial stanza reads “ratara ratara ratara 
atara tara rana”68 In this way, Carroll’s use of nonsense maintains its relation to 
understanding where we are able to make sense of the portmanteau words. 
However, for Artaud we must destroy this relation to sense in order to challenge the 
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aristocratic nature of Carroll’s use of language, as Deleuze states “To Artaud, 
Carroll’s games seem puerile, his food too worldly, and even his fecality [his 
emphasis upon eating] hypocritical and too well-bred.”69  The nonsense of Carroll 
then is a fanciful game that does not really force us to think too hard about the many 
different combinations of words. What we are left with in Artaud’s nonsense is a 
creative way in which a variety of tonal combinations can be used70, rather than, in 
Carroll’s case where the selection is limited. As Artaud remarks: “[the lines] can only 
be read rhythmically, in a tempo which the reader himself must find in order to 
understand and to think.”71  
 
Even when a portmanteau word appears it is not confined to a set of function 
of rules but is one of a selection of possible meanings. As Deleuze states: “As soon 
as the word appears … as a portmanteau word, its structure and the commentary 
attached to it persuade of us of the presence of something very different. Artaud’s 
‘Ghore Uk’hatis’ are not equivalent to the lost pigs, to Carroll’s ‘mome raths,’ …”72 
This is because of the many different ways in which the word could be understood: 
“[Artaud’s portmanteau] enact a chain of associations between tonic and 
consonantal elements … according to a fluid and burning principle which aborbs and 
rebsorbs effectively the sense as soon as it is produced: Uk’hatis (or the lost pigs of 
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the moon) is K’H (cahot = jolt), ‘KT (nocturnal), and H’KT (Hecate).”73 Therefore what 
remains important about Deleuze’s analysis of Artaud’s language is that it is not 
dismissed outright, the language of the schizophrenic is not to be overcome by 
general terms, but rather, it demonstrates how language functions within the process 
of making sense. As Edward Scheer states “Deleuze tries to explain how the mad 
text functions and attempts to reveal the inner logic of Artaud’s madness in an 
engagement with rather than a rejection of, this kind of ‘outsider’ textuality”74 
 
The ideal games then affirms a dynamic set of rules where each individual’s 
use of language has to be analysed separately. This singular analysis of each 
individual’s language can be compared to Wittgenstein’s language games. 
Comparable to Carroll, we must not restrict language to a unitary set of rules or 
functions, as Wittgenstein explains “it is as if someone were to say, ‘playing a game 
consists in moving objects about on a surface according to certain rules …’ – and we 
replied: You seem to be thinking of board-games, but they are not all the games 
there are. You can rectify your explanation by expressly restricting it to those 
games.”75  This move away from an absolute basis of meaning towards the multiple 
functions of language demonstrates the transition from the Tractatus to the 
Investigations, as A. C. Grayling remarks “in the Tractatus: there the claim was that 
the meaning of a word is the object it denotes; here, in the Investigations, it is that 
the meaning of an expression is the use to which it can be put in one or another of 
the many and various language games constituting language.”76 A word’s meaning is 
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not solely based upon its denotation due to the different expressions that can be 
used. Depending upon how a word is used then defines various multiple functions. 
 
We must then analyse language according to the various games through the 
intention of the speaker, as Alain de Botton notes: “If a parent says to a frightened 
child, don’t worry everything is going to be fine. They can’t know that it really will be 
fine. [A parent isn’t] playing the ‘rational prediction from available facts’ game. They 
are playing another game, the ‘words as an instrument of comfort and security’ 
game.”77 For Wittgenstein problems then arise through communication since we do 
not understand the games that the other individual is playing. This is because our 
understanding and rules for language differs from another. For instance, in terms of 
relationships and a partner is angry with us and states “you never help me, you are 
so unreliable” we can interpret this as a stating the facts game, as Botton remarks 
“… one might respond by sighting facts about how actually you got the car insurance 
yesterday and you bought some vegetables at lunchtime too.”78 The problem is that 
our partner is playing a different language game based upon help and reassurance: 
“in the language game [our partner is involved in] you never help means I want you 
to be nurturing.”79 
 
Surprisingly, after calling Wittgenstein an assassination of philosophy in the 
Alphabet interview with Claire Parnet that I discussed in the introduction, Deleuze 
agrees with Wittgenstein’s use of language games: “Wittgenstein and his disciples 																																																								
77 Alain de Botton, Philosophy: Ludwig Wittgenstein, The School of Life, 
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are right to define meaning by its use”80 From this it is evident that Deleuze in the 
Alphabet interview critical of the Tractatus whilst he praises the move towards the 
multiple functions and uses of languages that occurs in the Investigations. This is the 
use of a language becomes more than representation of images (It was a sunny day 
whilst sitting on a park bench) towards the focus on the intention of the expression 
itself: “… [the] use [of language] is in the relation between representation and 
something extra-representative, a nonrepresented and merely expressed entity.”81 
Representation then provides us with the body and outline of an image but it is the 
expression itself that brings it to life. Without the expression itself we are left with 
abstract and blank (or dead) images: “Representation envelops the event in another 
nature, it envelops it at its borders, it stretches until this point, and it brings about this 
lining or hem. This is the operation which defines living usage, to the extent that … 
when it does not reach this point, remains only a dead letter confronting what it 
represents, and stupid in its representativeness.”82  
 
Anti-Oedipus, schizoanalysis and the affirmation of language 
games 	
Deleuze’s later work with Guattari in Anti-Oedipus draws upon the influence of ideal 
games and dynamic rules for language in their novel approach to psychoanalysis, 
which they call schizoanalysis. This is to develop a novel form of therapy that 
challenges the Freudian role of the unconscious. For Freud, the unconscious is the 
repression of the memory of a traumatic event that has occurred in our life. This 
leads to a negative manifestation through our conscious actions. It is because the 
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event was so traumatic that we forget it and forget the reasons why it happened to 
us: “When we try to do it in ourselves, we become aware of a distinct feeling of 
repulsion which must be overcome, and when we produce it in a patient we get the 
most unquestionable signs of what we call his resistance to it.”83  The aim of therapy 
is to provide awareness to the patient of these reasons in order to be cured of the 
effects of trauma: “How are we to arrive at knowledge of the unconscious? It is of 
course only as something conscious that we know it, after it has undergone 
transformation or translation into something conscious. Psychoanalytic work shows 
us every day that translation of this kind is possible.”84 In psychoanalytic terms, the 
therapist then makes the patient aware through forcing the memory from the 
unconscious, to the preconscious, to consciousness. Or in other words, the patient 
begins with a complete unawareness, then gradually becomes aware, and then 
finally arrives at complete awareness of the reasons for their behavior.  
 
Deleuze and Guattari’s schizoanalysis does not seek to completely overturn Freud. 
On the contrary, they maintain Freud’s model of the unconscious but seek to 
revaluate its function and role, as Ian Buchanan notes “Deleuze and Guattari’s 
schizoanalytic revolution hinges on their renovation of the psychoanalytic concept of 
the unconscious … [they] preserve this basic model of the unconscious; they even 
keep to Freud’s tripartite way of thinking about it; but they change its internal 
dynamics.”85 The best way of understanding their revaluation of the unconscious is 
through the contrasting approaches by Freud and Deleuze and Guattari in their 
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analysis of Memoirs of My Nervous Illness (1884-5) by Daniel Paul Schreber. In his 
memoirs Schreber notes the sudden desire to experience sexual intercourse as a 
woman: “I had a feeling which, thinking about it later when fully awake, struck me as 
highly peculiar. It was the idea that it really must be rather pleasant to be a woman 
succumbing to intercourse.”86 Schreber is then convinced throughout the remainder 
of his memoir that he is becoming a woman that is willed by God.   
 
Freud interprets’ Scheber’s desire to become a woman as an expression of 
homosexual desire for his doctor, Flechsig:  
Schreber's mode of expression to enable us to divine the fact that the patient 
was in fear of sexual abuse at the hands of his doctor himself. The exciting 
cause of his illness, then, was an outburst of homosexual libido; the object of 
this libido was probably from the very first his doctor, Flechsig; and his 
struggles against the libidinal impulse produced the conflict which gave rise to 
the symptoms.87  
 
He then traces the reasons for becoming woman to the original person(s) who are 
replaced figures of Flechsig and God: “If the persecutor Flechsig was originally a 
person whom Schreber loved, then God must also simply be the reappearance of 
some one else whom he loved, and probably some one of greater importance.”88 
These original figures then “If we pursue this train of thought … we shall be driven to 																																																								
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88 Ibid, p.50 
	
	
314	
the conclusion that this other person must have been his father; this makes it all the 
clearer that Flechsig must have stood for his brother…”89 The cause for Scheber’s 
becoming woman then is based upon a love for his brother and father with signs of 
initial sexual conflict with his brother/Flechsig that is resolved through its 
transference onto his father/God. As Freud states “The feminine phantasy, … thus 
had its root in a longing, intensified to an erotic pitch, for his father and brother. This 
feeling, so far as it referred to his brother, passed, by a process of transference, on 
to his doctor, Flechsig; and when it was carried back on to his father a settlement of 
the conflict was reached.”90 From this we arrive at the settlement of sexual conflict by 
resolution of the Oedipal complex, as Colin MacCabe states “The real moment of the 
Oedipus arrives, and with that visceral hatred of the father which psychoanalysis 
finds so fundamental, at the moment the child realizes that the father is himself 
subject to the law.”91  
 
Deleuze and Guattari note the problem of reducing the rich language and 
context in Schreber to the Oedipal themes: “Freud[‘s analysis] encounters the most 
formidable of questions: how does one dare reduce to the paternal theme a delirium 
so rich, so differentiated, so ‘divine’ as the Judge’s – since the Judge in his memoirs 
makes only very brief references to his father.”92 In order to arrive at this as a causal 
reason for Schreber’s illness Freud then disregards the various forces at work in 
Schreber’s text: “… the enormous political, social, and historical content of 
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Schreber’s delirium, not one word is retained, as though the libido did not bother 
itself with such things.”93 McCabe also notes that Freud’s Oedipal resolution is 
problematical since it does not actually take place. This is because the father is 
transformed into an omnipotent image which affirms his transformation: “… 
paradoxically, one could say that Schreber never achieved that hatred of his father, 
for his father offered an image of omnipotence which allowed the child to imagine 
that he could avoid castration, that he could speak a language entirely under his 
control.”94   
 
For Deleuze and Guattari, an analysis of the political, social and historical 
forces allows us to understand why the delirium developed. In this way, through an 
analysis of the language games of Schreber we move away from Freud’s 
metapsychological cause to an organic explanation that affirms the text itself and the 
worldly processes that contribute to it, as Buchanan notes “Freud maintains that 
there is a metapsychological cause to Schreber’s illness (namely his homosexual 
feelings towards Dr. Flechsig) whereas Deleuze and Guattari insist that its cause is 
organic.”95 The patient then does not have an option to move from irrational to 
rational reflect, but rather, is developed as a response to the overproduction of 
certain intensities and images in their experiences: “Deleuze and Guattari very 
clearly take the view that the schizophrenic does not decide to see the world that 
way, nor can they decide not to see the world that way.”96 Comparable to Freud, 
Deleuze and Guattari take into consideration the role of Schreber’s father but focus 
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on the use of his machines that were used to correct children’s behavior: “Schreber’s 
father invented and fabricated astonishing little machines, sadistico-paranoiac 
machines – for example head straps with a metallic shank and leather bands, for 
restrictive use on children, for making them straighten up and behave.”97 These 
sadistic machines surprisingly: “play[ed] no role whatever in the Freudian analysis.”98 
 
Another part that played no role in Freud’s analysis was Schreber’s 
description of himself in the middle of historical conflicts: “In his intense 
metamorphoses and passages, Schreber becomes a pupil of the Jesuits, the 
burgomaster [mayor] of a city where the Germans are fighting against the Slavs, and 
a girl defending Alsace against the French. At last he crosses the Aryan gradient or 
threshold to become a Mongol prince.”99 These represent Schreber’s conflict with his 
identity in order to revolutionize himself, or to become a Mongol prince: “Delirium has 
something like two poles, racist and racial, paranoiac-segregative and 
schizonomadic. And between the two, ever so many, uncertain shiftings where the  
unconscious itself oscillates between its reactionary charge and its revolutionary 
potential.”100  
 
Deleuze and Guattari argue that mimicking his father’s machines, the need for 
Schreber to revolutionize or transform his self into becoming a woman is the need for 
him to produce. This is illustrated this through a point in Freud’s own analysis: “Freud 
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… stresses the crucial turning point that occurs in Schreber’s illness when Schreber 
becomes reconciled to becoming-woman and embarks upon a process of self-cure 
that brings him back to the equation Nature = Production (the production of a new 
humanity).”101 This allows us to make sense of the bizarre statements that he has a 
sunbeam in his ass. Our ass produces, just like the sun produces warmth: “Judge 
Schreber has sunbeams in his ass. A solar anus. And rest assured that it works: 
Judge Schreber feels something, produces something, and is capable of explaining 
the process theoretically. Something is produced: the effects of a machine, not mere 
metaphors”102. Therefore in Deleuze and Guattari’s analysis we still maintain the 
importance of Schreber’s father but by taking into account his background it is then 
evident that Schreber seeks to produce something that has value and worth. This is 
equated with the transformation of becoming a woman in order to produce things in 
order to have worth and value in society. Therefore, the role of the unconscious is 
not causal for Deleuze and Guattari but takes its place in a richer analysis of multiple 
senses, including the patient’s many self-justifications. 
 
Conclusion 	
Hermogenes’ defence of an affirmation of a unique understanding for each individual 
can be identified in Alice’s apprenticeship in Logic of Sense. This is because Alice is 
forced to confront and challenge preconditioned knowledge as gained from her 
social and cultural background. Through this confrontation these social and cultural 
meanings are shown to be blank. That is, the words lack any relation to Alice’s 
experience or to her understanding of what is happening to her, so she must 																																																								
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discover a new and unique meaning. This process of discovering meaning is not to 
completely disregard all prior structures of knowledge. Nor is this process to invent a 
totally new and novel form of communication. The process of discovery happens 
through being educated in accordance with structures of knowledge and general 
terms. We then arrive at Cratylus’ view where the structure provides a basis for our 
understanding. What Deleuze makes us aware of is the importance of our practical 
application of this structure. It is through practical application that we arrive at greater 
understanding of structures for ourselves. Yet we also affirm the individual process 
of learning itself, based upon stumbling, making errors and overcoming problems.  
  
In contrast to Plato, Deleuze does not attempt to resolve Hermogenes’ and 
Cratylus’ views since he demonstrates how both function together in a disjunctive 
synthesis. By combining their positions and still affirming their differences we can 
see the deeper philosophical implications of the empiricist and rationalist positions. 
For Deleuze, they work together paradoxically. On the one hand, there is the 
importance of our experience, and social and cultural background in forming an idea. 
On the other hand, we retain the importance of structures that enables us to teach 
and educate others. Comparable to Plato, a blueprint is therefore required for our 
understanding in order to gain knowledge of its structure. Yet it is through the 
process of learning and our practical application that a structure becomes dynamic 
and able to respond to contemporary problems.  
 
This can be seen in Deleuze and Guattari’s analysis of Schreber’s illness. 
Although Freud’s interpretation of the illness is problematized, it still retains value. 
They illustrate elements of Freud’s interpretation focusing upon the social, historical 
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and cultural problems that contributed to the illness. In philosophical terms, by taking 
these immanent forces shown to be influential in the construction of Freud’s 
transcendent signifier. In this way, our analysis must affirm novelty in order to 
account for the each individual’s language games. This would take into consideration 
each individual’s unique understanding and use of language. Or in other words, we 
take into consideration a possible world, a different way of viewing the world that 
must be explored and discovered than denied altogether.
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Conclusion 
 
 
What is it to know?  	
Traditionally philosophy has provided the answer to the profound question ‘What is it 
to know?’ by defining and communicating knowledge as meaning. Meaning is the 
end result of the attempt to communicate what we know. We are able to 
communicate our knowledge once we have attained an understanding of a meaning. 
In this thesis, the claim is that understanding is gained through a childlike interaction: 
the process of making sense of the world. This initial process of making sense of the 
world, as Hegel described it in the Phenomenology of Spirit, is based on an affectual 
relationship with the world (the brightness of the sun, the roundness of a ball). The 
world in this state is a process of pure sense making. With no given structure, 
individuals are left to create their own structures and understanding based on how 
an object affects them. 
 
It has been claimed here that at this point, of pure creativity and interaction, 
tension is created between sense and meaning. An individual’s sense is at odds with 
general and factual understanding. In philosophical terms, this tension has been 
defined here as holding between singularity and generality. The tension is identified 
in language use through the correction of an improper use of a name. The private 
and singular use of language is negated or corrected by preference for a generally 
used term (that is not a nonsensical word jurblatt, it is a chair). A particular private 
use of language is novel but it is not knowledge. The private use of language is 
nonsensical as it lacks meaning and therefore in order for it to stand as knowledge 
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there must be conformity to generality. In order for meaning to be knowledge it must 
be communicated in a language that is understandable. This allows others to 
associate the same qualities and ideas to the same concepts. The process of 
attaining meaning can therefore be described as: making sense of signs (gaining an 
understanding), the attainment of understanding, formulation of meaning and the 
communication of meaning. A process of apprenticeship allows for an individual to 
gain correct understanding and to be able to clearly communicate knowledge. 
However, it has been shown here that philosophers disagree deeply on the nature of 
the process of apprenticeship. This thesis identifies two competing models of 
apprenticeship: rationalist and empiricist.  
 
What is a rationalist apprenticeship?  	
The rationalist apprenticeship emerges by problematising our experiential 
knowledge. Our experiential knowledge is based upon opinion. It is from our singular 
opinions that we form a temporary understanding of the world. This is because our 
experiential world is in a state of continual transformation. For instance, each time 
we watch the same film or television program it is different due to varying 
circumstances that arise in each viewing. We can enjoy a particular viewing of a film 
but upon watching it at another time, there can be annoyances, such as an 
interruption by someone knocking at the door, the phone ringing, the neighbours’ 
noise preventing us from concentrating, which make the experience unpleasant. In 
this way, opinion is temporary and affected by a set of circumstances outwith our 
immediate control. Due to this, perspectives can be transformed by different sets of 
circumstances such as viewing the film with or without constant interruptions. 
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Therefore, for rationalist philosophers, we cannot gain correct knowledge of the 
world based solely upon any opinions. In attempting to know a given thing we are 
always presented with a multiplicity of different opinions and perspectives. 			
For rationalist philosophers, the use of our reason allows us to arrive at clarity. This 
is because we are able to remove doubt about a multiplicity of possible meanings (X 
is A, B, C) and settle on one absolute definition (X is always A). This discovery of 
absolute definition follows from reflection on the inherent structure of given things. In 
philosophical terms, rational deduction allows an individual to move from an 
indeterminate foundation based upon subjective opinion to a determinate foundation 
based upon the structure of the object itself. For instance, in Descartes’ 2nd 
Meditation the self is not defined according to body. Our bodies are based upon 
multiple meanings associated with organs, blood, flesh, and varying experiences 
over time. Through the use of rational deduction we are able to reflect upon the 
cogito, the pure and true idea of the self since it is not affected by anything sensually 
experienced. In not being able to be affected by external forces, rationalist concepts 
are transcendent and have a metaphysical foundation. A metaphysical foundation is 
necessary in order for meaning to always remain the same over time and be 
universally reflected upon by all. Through this reflection, regardless of social or 
cultural differences or time period, the same correct knowledge is always available to 
all. Therefore, in order to know, we move away from our worldly knowledge based a 
multiplicity of opinions to a metaphysical foundation that is universal and based upon 
a transcendent signifier.  
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An apprentice must therefore reflect upon a transcendent signifier in order to 
gain correct understanding. Using this methodology in an educational system, 
teachers would continually repeat the same values and methodologies. These 
methods would then be repeated by students in order for their knowledge to be 
correct. From this, we can see that communication plays a specific role, as a teacher 
always desires a particular answer associated to a particular question. When giving 
a different answer the student can then be corrected, allowing for an individual to 
reach general clarity. The aim of knowledge is not based upon the view of any one 
individual but is to arrive at the same idea apparent to everyone. This removes the 
potential for students to be manipulated into believing in false answers. It also 
removes the potential for an individual to be manipulated by another’s opinion. This 
is because correct knowledge and true understanding is free from any prejudice or 
bias. In being free from prejudice an individual can move from having an incorrect 
understanding of the world, limited to their own culture, body and society, to one that 
is unbiased and universally true. 
 
What is an empirical apprenticeship? 	
 For empirical philosophers our knowledge is gained solely from experience. In his 
Essay Concerning Human Understanding Locke’s concept of sense presents a 
challenge to the role of transcendent signifiers within philosophy. This is because he 
claims that in the pure use of rational deduction we only reflect upon a blank sign. 
The transcendent sign is blank since it is devoid of all of experiential qualities that we 
can associate with it and thereby differentiate it from other things in the world. For 
instance, the transcendent sign of red is ‘redness’ but when this is devoid of all 
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experiential qualities of red we cannot differentiate its various shades such as 
maroon, ruby, crimson and so forth. For Locke, in order to gain an understanding we 
must make sense of a sign. Making sense of a sign is to affirm the relation of our 
sensual experience to our ideas. Our ideas are a collection of simple experiential 
qualities that are collected together to form a complex idea. An example to illustrate 
this is the idea of our bodies. A series of simple ideas, blood, bones, organs, flesh 
form our complex idea of a body. This associates a series of different experiential 
qualities to our idea of a body, whereas a rationalist negates the body itself in 
preference to its transcendent sign such as the universally accessible idea of the 
cogito that we can correctly communicate.  
 
Our empirical ideas are based on inductive reasoning where we must base 
knowledge on most probable induction from varied impressions. For instance, in 
scientific experimentation, a collection of data is accumulated. In each instance, the 
set of data that is collected is different in each collection. From these sets of variable 
numbers an average or median number is generated. Yet this median number or 
average is a probabilistic reduction of the differences in the data. If the experiments 
continued, the median number could be altered and change the overall conclusion. 
This can be seen in the collection of data for calculating the average height of 
individuals, as Peter Feinsinger explains “If my question is simply ‘What’s the 
average height of people?’ all I can do is estimate that average height, basing my 
estimate on a much, much smaller random sample of people … the larger my 
sample, the better my estimate, although by chance that might not hold in every 
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case.”1 Increasing the number of people measured can collect a better sample; it is 
impossible to measure every individual. Due to this impossibility: “… no matter how 
large your sample, it’s still just a sample from a much larger universe of possibilities. 
If you place absolute faith in the accuracy of your estimate, you always run the risk of 
being wrong.”2  
 
In relation to education, a multiplicity of perspectives is beneficial because it 
allows for different educational opportunities and also allows for the enrichment of 
knowledge. This is because an individual is not restricted to one specific discipline or 
methodology but has a choice of many different disciplines and methods. All 
methods, whether philosophical, artistic or scientific, and their attainment of truth is 
correct as they enable a different perspective of a truth. This transforms the 
rationalist understanding of a sign from being transcendent, pure and eternal to a 
sign that is immanent, fragmented, and timely. A sign is immanent as it is 
constructed from our experience. In this way, no sign can be devoid of any 
experiential qualities. Its fragmented nature should be comparable to an 
archaeological find. Each crack and piece representing a unique perspective once 
formed together, representing a multiplicity of perspectives. Therefore it is not the 
purpose of students to reflect upon the same inherent structure but to discover for 
themselves the way in which it could be different. In other words, this is to challenge 
the given structure of knowledge in order for an apprentice to reshape it. The 
process of reshaping a given structure is for individuals to attain their own 
understanding. However, this is not to destroy a value or method completely with the 
replacement of another. This is also not, in a Cartesian manner, to completely 																																																								
1 Peter Feinsinger, Designing Field Studies for Biodiversity Conservation (Washington DC: Island Press, 2001) 
p.177 
2 Ibid, p.178   
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destroy all values and methods altogether. In an empirical apprenticeship, to 
reshape a structure is to retain a given value or methodology.  
 
Deleuze and the tree model for knowledge 	
The rationalist and empirical models for apprenticeship can be related to Deleuze’s 
later description of a tree model for philosophy in A Thousand Plateaus with Felix 
Guattari. As Cliff Stagoll states “Deleuze’s model of the tree-like structure appears to 
be quite simple. Typically, at its top, is some immutable concept given prominence 
either by transcendental theorising works on epistemology and ontology, he 
identifies Plato’s Forms, the model … of the subject espoused by Rene Descartes … 
as well as the ‘Absolute Spirit’ of … Hegel.”3 With the establishment of the core 
concepts of a philosophical system: “all other concepts or particulars are organised 
vertically under this concept in a tree/trunk/root arrangement. The ordering is strictly 
hierarchical, from superior to subordinate, or transcendent to particular, such that the 
individual or particular element is conceived as less important, powerful, productive 
creative or interesting than the transcendent.”4 From this it is evident the aim of the 
tree model is to form the foundation (or ‘roots’) of philosophy. A foundation is 
necessary to establish a basis for our knowledge. This basis is therefore founded 
upon the creation of stability for our understanding. Stability for knowledge and 
understanding is achieved through the discovery of absolute truths or transcendent 
concepts. Transcendent concepts are absolute and pure as they are devoid of any 
experiential influence. Due to this, the validity of a transcendent concept cannot be 
called into question through either subjective bias or through social or cultural 																																																								
3 Cliff Stagoll, ‘Arborescent Schema’ in The Deleuze Dictionary Revised Edition, ed. Adrian Parr (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2010) p.14 
4 Ibid 
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differences. This is because all individuals regardless of their bias or their 
environmental background can universally reflect upon the same transcendent 
concepts.  
 
The search for the discovery of transcendent concepts is evident in both 
rationalist and empirical apprenticeships. In the rationalist model, the discovery of 
transcendent concepts is seen to be necessary due to the unreliability of an 
empirical understanding of the world. A reason for this unreliability is because of the 
continual change of the world. This continual change then would mean that an 
individual has to always adapt their methodologies in order to understand the world. 
For instance, in discovering a new species of animal, there would have to be a 
complete revaluation of the species as a whole. As Richard A. Richards explains the 
problems of the classification of a new species “we can … identify what makes a 
new specimen a genuine instance of a new species, whether through genetic 
analysis, observation of interbreeding or some other criterion ... but if the differences 
in grouping are due to the use of conflicting species concepts, then it is hard to see 
how we can come to agree on species groupings …”5 This inadequacy in defining 
species concepts can be demonstrated in: “… the biological species concept [that 
was explained] in our introductory biology classes, that species are groups of 
interbreeding or potentially interbreeding organisms. It takes only a moment to 
realize, however, that this concept applies only to sexually reproducing organisms 
and we would need at least one other species concept for the many asexual 
organisms.”6 This represents the greater problem in scientific analysis for Richards 
which is defined as: “… the species problem: there are multiple, conflicting species 																																																								
5 Richard A. Richards, The Species Problem: A Philosophical Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2010) p.4 
6 Ibid 
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concepts, without any obvious way of resolving the conflict. No single species 
concept seems adequate.”7  
 
In the empirical model, transcendent concepts are necessary in order for to 
make sense of the world. It is necessary to establish concepts that ground our 
understanding in order for us to reach comprehension of the world. This allows us to 
give order and structure to our sensory impressions. For instance, Locke’s concepts 
of complex ideas or Hume’s concept of association provides conceptual foundation 
for our understanding of the world. In Locke’s use of complex ideas we are able to 
provide a framework for understanding a collection of simple qualities. Through 
Hume’s concept of association we can understand how our social and cultural 
background enables us to have different ideas from other individuals with varied 
cultural and regional backgrounds. This allows a close connection to the rationalist 
model to be made because the characteristics of the mind that are discovered by 
empiricist philosophers apply universally. That is to say, even though empirical 
philosophers allow for our ideas to differ based upon our impressions and 
experience, our conceptual framework for understanding the world is the same. It is 
due to this universal conceptual framework that empirical concepts are transcendent 
and provide the roots or foundation for our knowledge.  
 
A counter to this view of empiricism as establishing transcendent concepts 
could be that Hume’s philosophy explicitly criticises any transcendent or causal 
origin. An individual need only look to Hume’s infamous statement on burning 
metaphysical books: “If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity or school of 
																																																								
7 Ibid, p.5 
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metaphysics … let us ask Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity 
or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matters of 
fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames: for it contains nothing but 
sophistry and illusion.”8 This is true but Hume’s criticisms form part of a paradoxical 
problem in his philosophy. The paradox being, how does an individual establish a 
value that allows for a process of transvaluation and thereby deny a transcendent 
foundation or origin for our thought? Or to put it another way, how can a value be 
established in such a way that it always remains challenged? By always being open 
to criticism it would then mean that the value remains in a state of immanence by 
always being affected by worldly forces. For instance, this problem was illustrated in 
the thesis’ discussion of Kant’s transcendental categories. Kant’s categories 
attempted to completely resolve the problems that he illustrated between empiricist 
and rationalist position. In this way, knowledge, values, and concepts take upon a 
dogmatic approach by no longer being open to other opinions (of alternative 
categories or a different view of how it functions.) 
 
Hume’s paradox is evident in his short essay The Immortality of the Soul. In 
the final paragraph there is a comparable empiricist criticism against any form of 
metaphysics: “… If the question [of the soul’s immortality] be out of the common 
experienced course of nature, this circumstance is almost if not altogether decisive. 
By what arguments or analogies can we prove any state of existence, which no one 
ever saw, and which no wise resembles any that ever was seen?”9 However, despite 
Hume’s humorous remark at an individual’s inability to produce physical evidence for 																																																								
8 David Hume, Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding And Concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. by 
L. A. Shelby-Biggie and revised by P.H. Nidditch, 3rd edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975) p.165 
9 David Hume, Of the Immortality of the soul’, in An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding: And Other 
Writings, ed. Stephen Buckle (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007) p.196 
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an immaterial object, there is a paradox in his call for: “Some new species of logic is 
requisite for that purpose; and some new faculties of the mind, which may enable us 
to comprehend that logic.”10 Hume is here challenging the philosophies of logic and 
the mind, which are traditionally based on abstract truths such as mathematical 
proofs or the innate concepts of the mind. For instance, this can be identified in the 
Cartesian cogito’s separation from the body or the mathematical proof’s detachment 
from everyday objects. However, Hume’s statement also challenges the 
establishment of meaning in empiricism. This is because in identifying empirical 
characteristics of the mind, complex ideas or association, there is a detachment from 
what we can experience to a concept of the mind. The empirical characteristics of 
the mind remains detached from the world as it gives structure and a framework to 
understand our experience. A paradox is then evident; our experiential world is in 
continual change and yet each time that structure is given that enables us to 
understand it, we remain detached from our experience, our bodies and the world.  
 
A connection to this paradox is made in my thesis through Deleuze’s 
reflection on his education in the history of philosophy. In being educated in the 
history of philosophy a student learns a philosopher’s concepts. This enables a 
student to be able to communicate a given idea associated to a concept. For 
instance, the Cartesian cogito is a thinking thing. A student is then corrected in their 
idea if it does not adhere to expectation. From this we can identify both rationalist 
and empirical apprenticeships. A rationalist apprenticeship is evident, as a student 
must reflect upon the general signified in order for the concept to have meaning. An 
empirical apprenticeship is also evident as the communicated meaning adheres to 
																																																								
10 Ibid, pp.196-7 
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the generally accepted view at a given time of a philosopher. Yet at the same time, 
the meaning that is reflected upon and communicated is blank. In other words, the 
sign and its attributed meaning does not truly make sense to the student. This is 
because they have not undertaken an apprenticeship in order for them to make 
sense of the sign.  
 
This allows a connection of the empirical philosophy of Locke to be made to 
Deleuze. A connection can be made here as both affirm the necessity of the process 
of making sense before an object can be attributed with understanding and attain 
meaning11. The process of making sense then is an empirical act. This is because in 
making sense of a sign, an individual has to engage with a material object. Or 
associate particular experiential qualities together to make sense of immaterial 
objects (An agreed point in rationalist and empirical philosophy, as can be seen in 
Descartes’ discussion of satyrs, the association of a goat’s qualities with human 
ones, in the Meditations. Also in Hume’s discussion of golden mountains, the 
combination of gold and mountain, in the Enquiry Concerning Human 
Understanding.) In doing so, a sign is no longer blank but has worldly qualities that 
can be attributed to things from our experience. This allows us to understand why 
Deleuze argues in Logic of Sense that there cannot be nonsense or a complete lack 
of meaning as all things in the world are made sense of and seek to be understood 
through an affectual engagement with phenomena. For instance, in Hegelian 
philosophy, in the Phenomenology, we can see the process of making sense of the 
																																																								
11 The necessity of making sense of a sign in order for it to have meaning is not solely a creation of Locke’s but 
can traced to Socrates. This is because of Socrates’ concern for other individual’s education. This concern came 
from the problem of having a multiplicity of lecturers or rhetoricians who charged individuals money to listen to 
their talks on various subjects. In order to make sure individuals were spending their money wisely he asked 
what they had learnt at the lecture. In doing so, Socrates asks the individual or individuals in the dialogue to 
make sense of the lecture and arrive at a clear understanding for their self.  
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shapes, colours, and other qualities of material objects. They lack names and 
therefore meaning or knowledge, however, there is not a complete absence of 
understanding. This is because the particular object has qualities that can be 
associated to it such as its colour and shape.  
 
The process of exposing transcendent signs, abstract ideas, as composed 
from worldly forces connects Deleuze to Nietzsche. Nietzsche’s early essay On the 
Origin of Language (1869-70) analyses various philosophical claims for an original 
foundation for language by Rousseau, de Brosses, Lord Monboddo and Herder. In 
each case, the identification of the origin of language enables us to understand why 
we are able to communicate. However, on a deeper philosophical level, it 
establishes a foundation for meaning. This is because an origin establishes a causal 
foundation for meaning that explains how all languages can communicate the same 
Ideas. A project to establish an original foundation is therefore rational since it seeks 
to establish a transcendent sign that provides a structure and foundation for the 
formation of all languages. All individuals can then rationally reflect upon the same 
causal origin. However, the establishment of a causal origin for language leads to a 
problem that Nietzsche constructs throughout the brief essay, namely, the desire to 
attain meaning and its discovery lead to a detachment from our actual use of 
language. The idea of a foundation and origin leads to a negation of the tonal 
differences in expression.  
 
For Nietzsche, rhetoric denies an origin to language, since what is 
communicated is not the truth but only a copy of it. This is because each individual 
has a unique sense of the truth. Our unique understanding is demonstrated through 
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the way in which we use specific tones and place tonal emphasis on certain words or 
phrases. An individual can then be influenced to make decisions based upon the 
association of the tonal emphasis. However, we continually revaluate our knowledge. 
We question its validity, diversify it through other perspectives, connection it to other 
fields, or discover new aspects to it. For instance, a sports fan and their knowledge 
of a particular team is dynamic. They continually revaluate particular team members 
and the overall performance of a team in each game played. Due to the process of 
continually revaluating our knowledge, individuals remain in a continual 
apprenticeship.  
 
From tree models towards a rhizomic apprenticeship 	
In contrast to the tree model that attempts to discover and define the origins, causes 
or ‘roots’ of knowledge, Deleuze and Guattari offer an alternative model, the 
rhizome. They borrow the use of term from biology, as Felicity J. Colman states “… 
the biological term ‘rhizome’ describes a form of plant that can extend itself through 
its underground horizontal tuber-like root system and develop new plants.”12 For 
instance, potatoes form from rhizomes and not roots. As Hielke De Jong, Joseph B. 
Sieczka, Walter De Jong remark: “A potato plant consists of one or more stems that 
have grown from a seed tuber or seed piece. Tubers themselves are underground 
stems and are formed on stolons (rhizomes), not roots.”13 In Deleuze and Guattari’s 
usage of the term, knowledge is a rhizome. In other words, knowledge is 
interconnected to the extent that it cannot be defined according to a hierarchical 
model: “unlike trees or their roots, the rhizome connects any point to any other point, 																																																								
12 Felicity J. Colman, ‘Rhizome’ in The Deleuze Dictionary, ed. by Adrian Parr (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2005) p.231 
13 Hielke De Jong, Joseph B. Sieczka, Walter De Jong, The Complete Book of Potatoes: What Every Grower 
and Gardener Needs to Know (Oregon: Timber Press, 2011) p.15 
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and its traits are not necessarily linked to traits of the same nature.”14 In a tree 
model, methods are related to their specific discipline.  
 
For Deleuze and Guattari: “The rhizome is reducible neither to the One nor the 
multiple. It is not the One that becomes Two or even directly, three, four, five, etc. It 
is not a multiple derived from the One, or to which One is added (n+1).”15 A rhizome 
is not to be reducible to an empirical model of general phases. It also should not be 
considered to be a rationalist model of an origin to which subsequent variations can 
be traced back. For instance, we should not consider the rhizome as reducible to 
general phases of technological change. Moving from the 8-bit Nintendo 
Entertainment System (1983), to 16-bit Super Nintendo Entertainment System 
(1990) and 3d graphics with the Nintendo 64 (1996). We should also not view each 
variation of the Mario Bros. games such as Super Mario Bros. (1985), Super Mario 
Land (1989) Super Mario 64 (1996) as a variation on the same mechanics and 
gameplay in Donkey Kong (1981). From this, we can see how Deleuze and 
Guattari’s rhizome with their difficult and abstract explanation can simplified and 
relatable to everyday life. In doing so, this enables us to clearly understand its 
innovativeness. 
  
For Deleuze and Guattari, an origin denies the unique and novel differences 
that are apparent in each variation in order to uphold the absolute structure. In 
relation to the Mario Bros. series, this would be to deny the various innovations in 
each game upon the basic platform principles of jumping in order to avoid dangers 
and reach the end goal. In Donkey Kong, the player has ladders and a hammer to 																																																								
14 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, trans. by Brian Massumi (London: Continuum, 
2004) p.23 
15 Ibid 
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assist them in reaching the goal. Super Mario Bros. lacks these aids; the player’s 
goal no longer becomes a process of climbing and proceeding upwards but 
continuing forwards until it is reached. It also includes various different enemies that 
have a unique ability that the player must learn in order to know when best to move. 
This can be seen in the enemy known as the hammer bros who throw a series of 
hammers towards the player. Super Mario Bros. also includes power ups where 
Mario is given a unique ability that is signified through the change in his normal 
appearance. These include a mushroom that makes Mario slightly bigger, a flower 
that allows a fireball to be thrown or a star that turns him temporarily invincible.  
 
In contrast to origins, a generalisation would allow for various differences in 
each game to be taken into account. However, this does not take into account the 
process of learning the new mechanics in each game. In making sense of how to 
correctly use a new mechanic there is a novel transformation of the overall structure 
of how to correctly play the game. For instance, New Super Mario Bros. U (2012) 
introduced the acorn power up that allows Mario to temporarily glide. A player has to 
learn how to correctly glide in order to avoid accidently hitting enemies and use it to 
reach otherwise unattainable items or levels. From this, we can see that a 
generalisation does not take into account the novel process of making sense. This is 
where a level is repeated and played differently according to how we were able to 
use the ability. This process of making sense does not mean that we should only 
privilege our successful use of the ability or completion of a level, rather, it allows us 
to identify that each play through is novel and different.  
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The tree model reduction of knowledge to origins and causes does not take 
into account the way in which our understanding bifurcates in several directions, 
crossing boundaries, disciplines, and perspectives. For instance, if we ask the simple 
question what is a fox? We are presented with a rhizome. Or in other words, what 
appeared to be an easy question with a straightforward answer becomes 
problematical because of the multiplicity of answers that can be given. This is 
because depending upon which discipline is chosen a different answer will be given. 
A scientific answer would provide us with the information that they are mammals, 
belonging to the biological genera the Canidae, the recognisable red fox belonging to 
its subgroup of Vulpes. An answer from literature is the tale of Fantastic Mr Fox 
(1970) by Roald Dahl who must steal chickens and outwits the farmers in order to 
feed his family. Or from art, there is Franz Marc’s The Fox (1913) and, in music, Jimi 
Hendrix’s Foxy Lady (1967) and Ylvis’ The Fox (What Does The Fox Say) (2013).  
 
The same problem of multiplicity is also evident if we try to find a particular 
answer within a discipline. In terms of biography, if we asked a question of who is 
John Lennon? We are faced with various historical accounts of his life. Philip 
Norman’s John Lennon: The Life (2009), his first wife Cynthia Lennon’s John (2006), 
Robert Rosen’s Nowhere Man: The Final Days of John Lennon (2000), his sister 
Julia Baird’s Imagine This (2007) or various celebrity accounts from Dennis Hopper 
and Mick Jagger to Yoko Ono’s own account in her edited, Memories of John 
Lennon (2005). Or in terms of philosophical concepts, if we asked what is 
Nietzsche’s concept of the eternal return? There is a multiplicity of answers and 
perspectives such as Deleuze’s eternal return of difference in Nietzsche and 
Philosophy (1962), Heidegger’s eternal return of the same in Nietzsche: Volume IV, 
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Nihilism (1961), or Karl Löwith’s Nietzsche’s Philosophy of the Eternal Recurrence of 
the Same (1978) who identifies the eternal return as the unifying principle for 
Nietzsche’s philosophy.  
 
As we have seen, a rationalist answer to the problem of multiplicity is to arrive 
at the transcendent signifier through rational deduction. However, an empirical reply 
is to note the importance of our experience, and social and cultural background in 
formation of an idea. Without our experience and background the idea remains 
blank. The empirical answer to the problem of multiplicity is through generalisation. 
For instance, we must use median number in order to calculate the frequency of an 
occurrence in an experiment. Without the use of a median we cannot arrive at an 
adequate conclusion since there would be a series of continual variables. The 
rationalist criticism is that the scientific data can always be called into question or 
doubted. In order to have a correct understanding of the world we must arrive at 
indubitable foundation. From this, we therefore arrive at choice of either a rationalist 
system that affirms an indubitable foundation/or an empirical system that allows a 
hypothesis to be continually called into question.  
 
My thesis’ reading of Plato’s Cratylus problematizes the rationalist and 
empirical positions and their distinction. These positions can be identified through the 
conflict in the dialogue between the positions of Hermogenes and Cratylus. An 
empirical position is held by Hermogenes who argues that the emergence of foreign 
or minor languages can be explained through the use of proper names. This is 
because the use of proper names involves the communication of the specific 
understanding of an idea rather than a general one. Comparable to Locke’s view in 
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the Essay, the adoption and popularisation of this usage then leads it to become a 
standard empirical use of language. Following this, we can see that eventually minor 
and foreign languages will emerge from the popularisation of using different terms to 
express an idea. In contrast, a rationalist position is held by Cratylus who argues for 
an etymological origin for language. From his perspective, there is a multiplicity of 
various meanings of words. In order to achieve a clear and certain understanding we 
must trace its origin. Comparable to Descartes’ view in the Discourse and 
Meditations, it is through reflection upon this origin that we are able to attain clarity 
and able to achieve a correct understanding. 
 
Plato problematizes Hermogenes’ view through nonsense. That is, an 
individual’s experience and the social and cultural background structures their use of 
language. If we attempted to use a different name for an object it would be in conflict 
with its general usage in society. In this way, the different use of language appears 
nonsensical since it is difficult for us to understand what idea is being communicated 
(what is a nagzat?) It also makes an individual appear to be idiotic as they attribute 
another name to an object that has already been predefined (a nagzat is actually a 
cat). 
 
Plato problematizes Cratylus’ view through the possibility of tracing to an 
incorrect origin. The act of tracing an origin is dependent upon the correct use of 
rational deduction. This is not to call into question the capabilities of an individual’s 
use of reason, but rather, to demonstrate that our capacity to make a correct 
decision is limited to the information that is given. If a piece of information is 
forgotten or missing this could call into question the validity of the original judgment. 
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In order to explain this point Plato discusses the etymology of Sphinx. The tracing of 
the origin of the Sphinx relates it to the incorrect meaning of torture. The correct 
origin is the forgotten Boeotian form, ‘Phix’, which relates it to the mountain of 
Phikion in Boeotia. A modern example to illustrate Plato’s example is an individual 
having been unjustly convicted. A wrong conviction is possible because new 
information and evidence may appear which calls into question the original verdict.  
 
Alan Marzilli illuminates this point through questioning the validity of DNA 
evidence in the case of Josiah Sutton: “… Sutton and a friend were arrested after a 
women pointed them out to police as the two men who had raped her several days 
earlier. Sutton and his friend were shocked, and they proclaimed their innocence … 
Sutton’s friend was released after a DNA test failed to match him to the crime 
scene.”16 However, Sutton’s DNA test was reported by “… the Houston Police crime 
lab … that Sutton’s DNA was consistent with the crime scene evidence, and that 
only one in 694,000 people had the matching characteristics. With those types of 
odds, a jury convicted Sutton and sentenced him to twenty-five years in prison.”17 It 
was later found out by “a pair of reporters, acting on tips from defense lawyers, had 
launched an investigation into the crime lab and had sent some of the lab’s reports to 
independent experts. Those experts found serious flaws in the lab’s work.” Sutton’s 
mother saw this story on the news and contacted the reporter’s about her son’s 
case. The case file was sent to William Thompson a prominent DNA expert who “… 
discovered that the crime lab had misinterpreted the results of the DNA tests, and 
that, in fact, Sutton’s DNA was inconsistent with the DNA of either of the two rapists. 
																																																								
16 Alan Marzilli, DNA Evidence (New York: Infobase Publishing, 2005) p.18 
17 Ibid 
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After a new DNA test of crime scene evidence confirmed Thompson’s conclusions, 
Sutton was finally freed from prison …”18  
 
If we follow Hermogenes’ and Cratylus’ views we are faced with a problem of 
multiplicity. This is because of the multiplicity of meanings and possible origins for 
the same word. In order to arrive at multiplicity allied to certainty, Plato unifies the 
empiricist and rationalist positions. For Plato, all meanings regardless of whether 
they are proper names or general terms express the same Idea. In this way, the 
same Idea can be found and is communicated in foreign languages, our mother 
tongues, or minor languages. For instance, we are able to learn a foreign language 
because we can associate the same Idea in our native language to another 
language. This enables us to make sense to others when using a different language 
since they are able to recognise the same Idea.  
 
The Idea therefore unifies all etymological origins and causes by providing a 
metaphysical structure for meaning. This is because same Idea can be reflected 
upon regardless of our social or cultural background or time period. In order to 
illustrate this point and contest the idea of different meanings, Plato uses an example 
of a craftsman. A craftsman uses the Idea as the structure or ‘blueprint’ to create 
things in the world. A good item that is produced will closely resemble the Idea such 
as a good car will closely resemble the same structure for all other cars. In this way, 
a good word will closely resemble the same meaning, which provides a structure for 
all variations of language.  
 
																																																								
18 Ibid, p.19 
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 Deleuze also problematizes the empirical and rationalist positions and their 
distinction. This is made in his engagement with Plato’s Cratylus through a reading 
of Lewis Carroll’s Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland and Through the Looking Glass. 
The various characters of Wonderland represent the empirical position of 
Hermogenes. Each character has a unique understanding of the world. Their unique 
perspective is represented by their minor use of language, either through the use of 
proper names or by having a different sense of a word. Due to this, Alice’s ability to 
make sense and arrive at a determinate meaning is continually challenged. It is 
through Alice’s attempt to understand Wonderland that the position of Cratylus can 
be identified. Comparable to Cratylus, Alice seeks to affirm a set of predefined set of 
worldly meanings as the foundation for meaning. These predefinitions allow for her 
to create a tension between the characters of Wonderland by confronting their 
unique perspectives and use of language.  
 
 In this way, Alice is not an apprentice but a master. She does not seek to 
understand but reaffirms a particular meaning. Yet each time she attempts to 
understand she is presented with a blank word. Or to put it another way, they do not 
make sense. This is not to say, there is no meaning whatsoever, but rather, meaning 
has to be discovered. The discovery of meaning is precisely when Alice is forced to 
confront her adoption of general terms in order for her to make sense of them. It is 
through this confrontation that Alice must learn to become an apprentice in order to 
form an understanding for herself. For instance, when she asks Humpty Dumpty the 
meaning of the Jabberwocky poem, he responds by giving her the meaning of the 
first few words. Brillig is four o’ clock in the afternoon, the perfect time for broiling 
things for dinner. Humpty’s answer enables us to begin to make sense of brillig. Yet 
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it remains only one possible meaning, could it not also be a portmanteau 
combination of the words amazing and brilliant? Alice then does not receive an 
answer that would always determine her understanding but rather leaves it open to 
different possible meanings.  
 
It is through the process of making sense, engaging with a multiplicity of 
competing meanings and origins that we arrive at understanding. This is not to be 
understood in a Platonic sense: to demonstrate how all meanings and causes reflect 
the same structure. Deleuze reverses the Platonic model by affirming multiplicity. 
This is because all meanings are reflective of a process of apprenticeship. In other 
words, a multiplicity of meanings is reflected in each individual’s understanding. In 
contrast to Plato, we are not led into a chaotic model where no meaning can be 
arrived at whatsoever, but rather, various uses of a given methodology. The 
attainment of understanding is for an individual to make sense of a structure through 
its practical application. It is through the practical application of a structure that we 
engage various problems. The resolution of these problems allows for the creation of 
a unique and singular perspective. In other words, the creation of an individual’s own 
style. For instance, a film student will learn the general methodology of filmmaking. 
Yet in the practical application of the method they will face various challenges. It is 
through their novel resolution of these problems that enable their own style to 
emerge by their modification of the existing structure. Therefore after an 
understanding of a methodology has been attained we become ‘structural 
engineers’. This is the process of transforming the structure in order for it to function 
in relation to a problem. 
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Deleuze and Guattari relate this process of the apprentice’s transformation of 
structure to the modification of a map: “the rhizome pertains to a map that must be 
produced, constructed, a map that is always detachable, connectable, reversible, 
modifiable, and has multiple entry ways and exists and its own lines of flight.”19 Here 
they relate the structure of knowledge to cartography. This is because a given map 
may be drawn at a period in time but it will have to be changed over time. A modern 
example is the dissolution of Czechoslovakia in 1992, as William Mahoney remarks 
“After the June elections, Václav Klaus and Vladimír Mečiar are chosen as prime 
ministers of the Czech and Slovak republics, respectively. The negotiated ‘Velvet 
Divorce’ leads to the dissolution of Czechoslovakia and the creation of two 
independent republics, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, at the end of the year.”20  
 
For Deleuze and Guattari, a structure or map must be modified in order for it 
to have practical use. However, this does not mean that they completely disregard all 
ancient or non-modern structures. A structure of knowledge is not limited by its 
specific time period since we can still apply them to contemporary problems. 
Deleuze then does not seek a radical Cartesian approach, to continually destroy all 
forms of prior knowledge by continual reinvention of completely new methods; rather, 
he demonstrates how problems will enable an established method to be 
reinvigorated. We can therefore change our perspective on previous models and 
affirm those that may have been disregarded or forgotten. For instance, Deleuze’s 
reading of the history of philosophy is reflective of this process. His reading of 
Leibniz and Spinoza challenges the traditionally held view of their philosophies as 
solely rationalist by revealing their dependence upon empirical elements. This can 																																																								
19 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p.23 
20 William Mahoney, The History of the Czech Republic and Slovakia (California: Greenwood Publishing, 2011) 
p.xix 
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also be applied to his reading of Nietzsche and Hume where the empiricist elements 
are challenged through the discovery of a rationalist conceptual foundation. From 
this we do not have to accept an either/or choice of either rationalism or empiricism. 
There is another way which seeks out the paradoxical affirmation of both positions. 
By affirming both we maintain a rationalist foundation or methodology with an 
empirical system that calls this foundation continually into question. The process of 
criticising this foundation is not to devalue or destroy all methodologies or values but 
to revaluate them. Through revaluating a given value as methodology we affirm 
different possible views and different potential senses. At the same time, there is the 
continual use of a practical methodology and its values are also upheld.  
  
A Rhizomic apprenticeship is therefore to discover new possibilities thanks to 
the empirical use of a structure. At the same time, general methodology and rational 
aspects of structure are upheld because they serve as conditions for this empirical 
use. Newness is not to be considered in its Hegelian sense as a synthesis. This is 
because there novelty and difference are negated in a generality. Newness is to be 
considered as a radical Leibnizian singularity. Deleuze affirms the radical singularity 
of each individual’s understanding where no one shares the same sense. This also 
affirms the process of a continual apprenticeship, with a perspective in state of 
continual flux and transformation of prior understanding. The transforming of our 
understanding does not eradicate a value or prior methodology altogether. A 
rhizomic apprenticeship paradoxically maintains our unique perspective through the 
use of general names. For instance, our understanding of our pets such as cats and 
dogs are known by their appearance. This is maintained at the same time as we use 
the general terms of dog, cat and their names. In philosophical terms, our sense and 
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unique perspective is communicated precisely through the use of general names, in 
doing so, we retain the use of the name itself. From this we can see how Deleuze 
overcomes a Leibnizian problem for language. The inability to adequately describe 
singularity is solved through the affirmation of rhetorical differences that are present 
when individuals discuss the same values (It was clear from her volume and tone 
that she loved cats more than I did.)   
 
Before I make my final summary of the points that have been made I will 
address a final criticism. A criticism can be made from a Deleuzian view that my 
description of a rhizomic apprenticeship appears to deny the creation of new 
concepts. This is because I have affirmed both the use of a methodology and its 
revaluation but not the creation of a completely new concept. In other words, it 
appears that a rhizomic apprenticeship is precisely against Deleuze’s claim that the 
aim of philosophy is to create new concepts by affirming the same concepts in new 
ways. A problem with this criticism is that it does not take into account that the 
process of revaluation also allows for the creation of newness. This can be identified 
in the rhizomic apprenticeship when a student begins to develop his or her own style 
that differs from the standard method. It is also worth noting here that, for Deleuze, 
the creation of style is a novel accident that we are not immediately aware of. In this 
way, in the creation of concepts, a philosopher cannot be aware of all the 
contemporary problems that affect and are affected by their new concept. 
Nonetheless, their concept provides an answer to a particular contemporary 
problem. The creation of a concept is then a revaluation of given problems in the 
history of philosophy. This allows for the creation of new contemporary concepts that 
respond to the same problems. Therefore we can arrive at deeper philosophical 
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understanding between problems and the creation of concepts. Problems remain in 
a state of becoming throughout history. It is by engaging with them that we actualise 
them through a new concept. This enables connection to a conceptual history but, 
more importantly, the modernisation of that history. A rhizomic apprenticeship then 
allows for the creation of new concepts through a revaluation of a given problem.  
 	
To sum up, the thesis has demonstrated the following:  
 
  
• Sense and meaning remain in a dialectical relationship 
• In order to understand, we must make sense. 
• The process of making sense is to associate various qualities from our 
experience, social and cultural background to ideas 
• Meaning is attained once we are able to associate qualities together 
• Philosophy traditionally places the role of meaning over sense in order to 
establish an absolute foundation for our knowledge. 
• Education is based upon rediscovering the same truths. 
• Language is based upon the communication of these truths. If differing from 
social acceptance then it is incorrect or if adhering to it, an understanding is 
correct. 
 
• For Deleuze, sense takes precedence over meaning  
• Sense is a continual process of understanding and revaluating meaning  
• The attainment of meaning is novel and in a state of becoming    
• Learning is achieved through the process of apprenticeship 
• To be an apprentice is to learn how to decipher worldly signs  
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• Each attainment of understanding is always singular and unique 
• Worldly forces affect understanding and language 
• Language is based upon the paradox of expressing singular understanding 
through general terms. 
• Singular understanding is maintained through the use of general terms 
through tonal expressions.  
 
 As for future research directions, the concept of sense and its relation to 
apprenticeship can be further developed with regards to Deleuze and Guattari’s work 
on psychoanalysis in Anti-Oedipus. This is because the role of the signifier and its 
communication takes precedence in psychoanalysis. The analyst is able to diagnose 
a patient based upon their behavior and use of words. As with Michel Foucault’s the 
History of Madness they are concerned with the harsh and tortuous punishments of 
a patient’s non-adherence to the norm. In contrast to this, Deleuze and Guattari 
create the concept of schizoanalysis in order to challenge the role of the signifier and 
norm within psychoanalysis. Their alternative method is based upon a method that 
allows for a multiplicity of senses of a sign. The psychoanalyst must then transform 
his or her approach from identifying and seeking the communication of a signifier to 
allowing for a singular approach to be taken for each patient. This allows for a variety 
of causes and problems to be a potential reason for their behavior or illness rather 
than the same ones.  
 
Given the diversity of Deleuze’s work, other future research directions can seek to 
develop the relation of sense and apprenticeship in aesthetics and politics. In relation 
to aesthetics, the role of the film student and the film making process could be 
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developed using both Cinema 1: The Movement-Image (1986) and Cinema 2: The 
Time-Image (1989). Another aesthetic project can analyse the role of the artist within 
Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation (1981). This develops the Lockean theme in 
of the artist making sense of the blank canvas. With the canvas representing various 
process and forces that affect their thought and also the creative task of challenging 
an image of thought. In relation to politics, Deleuze’s work on Nietzsche and later 
work with Guattari in A Thousand Plateaus (1987) add to the development of an 
immanent politics. This is to develop the role of the disjunctive synthesis within the 
thesis’ chapters on Hegel and apply it to a political context. The idea behind this is 
two-fold: to address the problems of a dialectical and Hegelian-Marxist approach and 
to address the problems in the contemporary left. My future project then seeks to 
create an alternative process philosophy reading of Marx. I seek to offer a risk-based 
answer to the problem of the left that is influenced by Nietzsche, Deleuze and 
Guattari and David Harvey’s reading of Marx. 
 
 I will end in the spirit of Roger Hargreaves, the next time someone says to 
you, do you understand? You will know what to respond, of course, I’ve made sense 
of it.  
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